Lake County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals v. BP Amoco Corp.

Attorneys for Petitioners                          Attorneys for Respondent
Steve Carter                                       Jeffrey T. Bennett
Attorney General of Indiana                        Hamish S. Cohen
David L. Steiner                                   Steven G. Cracraft
Deputy Attorney General of Indiana                       Indianapolis,
Indiana
Nandita G. Shepherd
Department of Local Government Finance
Attorneys for North Township Assessor

Brian P. Popp
Merrillville, Indiana
Attorneys for the Lake County Property Tax Assessment
Board of Appeals and for the Lake County Assessor

John S. Dull
Crown Point, Indiana
Attorney for the Lake County Auditor and Treasurer
________________________________________________________________________

                                   In the
                            Indiana Supreme Court
                      _________________________________

                           No. 49S10-0309-TA-00400

Lake County Property Tax
Assessment Board of Appeals,
John Matanovich, in his official
capacity as North Township
Assessor, Peter Benjamin, in his
official capacity as Lake County
Auditor, Paul G. Karras, in his
official capacity as Lake County
Assessor, and Peggy Holinga
Katona, in her official capacity as
Lake County Treasurer,
                                             Petitioners (Respondents
                                             below),

                                     v.

BP Amoco Corporation n/k/a
BP Products North America, Inc.
                                             Respondent (Petitioner
                                             below).

                      ________________________________

         Appeal from the Indiana Tax Court, No. 49T10-0209-TA-00114
                    The Honorable Thomas G. Fisher, Judge
                      _________________________________

                           On Petition for Review
                      _________________________________

                              January 13, 2005

Sullivan, Justice.

      In May 1999, an industrial concern filed property tax appeals claiming
that the taxes on its Lake County personal property covering  the  five-year
period from 1995 through 1999 were  “illegal  as  a  matter  of  law.”   The
taxpayer’s  specific  claim  was  that  the   county   had   “systematically
underassessed property in Lake County to [its] detriment.”  Indiana  law  in
effect at the time permitted challenges to assessments  on  this  basis  but
required them to be made only to the current year’s  assessment,  not  prior
years’.  As such, the local and state  property  tax  authorities  correctly
dismissed the appeals covering 1995 through 1998.


                                 Background


      The taxpayer here, BP Amoco Corporation,  now  known  as  BP  Products
North America Inc., concluded that certain of its personal property in  Lake
County had been improperly assessed for property  tax  purposes  during  the
five years from January 1, 1995, through December  31,  1999.   On  May  10,
1999, BP filed papers challenging the assessments for  the  1995-1999  years
and seeking refunds of a portion of the property taxes it paid for the 1995-
1998 years.


      Indiana  property  tax  law  contains  appeal  provisions  that  allow
taxpayers  to  challenge  assessments,  provisions  that  provide  for  full
hearing and judicial determination at which a taxpayer  may  raise  any  and
all constitutional objections to the tax.  The procedures for doing  so  are
set forth in Indiana Code  Section  6-1.1-15-1  and  Indiana  Administrative
Code Title 50, Regulations 4.2-3-3 and 4.  On a form denominated “Form  130,
Petition to the  County  Board  of  Review  for  Review  of  Assessment,”  a
taxpayer  who  “disagree[s]  with  the  assessment  made  by  an   assessing
official” sets forth “[t]he reasons why the  petitioner  believes  that  the
assessment determination by  the  township  assessor  is  erroneous.”   Ind.
Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 4.2-3-3 (1996).  The petition is reviewed  by  local
and state property tax authorities[1]—in this case, the  Lake  County  Board
of Review and the State Board of  Tax  Commissioners[2]—and  is  subject  to
judicial review, as provided by applicable statutes and regulations.


      BP challenged the 1999 assessments by filing appeals on Form 130  with
the appropriate tax officials on May 10, 1999.[3]


      The procedures set  forth  in  Indiana  Code  Section  6-1.1-15-1  and
Indiana Administrative Code Title  50,  Regulation  4.2-3-3  and  Form  130,
however, are only available to challenge a current  year’s  assessment.   To
challenge its assessments for the 1995-1998 period,  therefore,  BP  used  a
different set of procedures and forms.


      Another statute and several regulations, Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-15-
12 and Indiana Administrative Code Title 50,  Regulations  4.2-3-4,  12  and
14, provide taxpayers with the opportunity to appeal assessments on  a  form
denominated “Form 133, Petition  for  Correction  of  Error,”  within  three
years from the date the taxes were first due.  BP challenged  the  1995-1998
assessments  by  filing  appeals  on  Form  133  with  the  appropriate  tax
officials on May 10, 1999.  It is these filings  that  are  the  subject  of
this case.


      The grounds on which challenges may be  made  on  Form  133  are  more
limited than challenges to current assessments on Form 130.  See  Ind.  Code
§ 6-1.1-15-12 (2004).  One ground on which a challenge may be made  on  Form
133 is where the taxpayer contends that “[t]he taxes, as a  matter  of  law,
were illegal.”  I.C. § 6-1.1-15-12(a)(6).  That is the ground upon which  BP
Amoco relies, i.e., it contends that  it  is  entitled  to  a  refund  of  a
portion of the taxes it paid on its personal property for  the  years  1995-
1998 because “the taxes, as a matter of law, were illegal.”


      BP’s challenges were denied by  both  local  and  state  property  tax
authorities, in each case without a hearing, on grounds that the  relief  BP
sought was not available under Indiana Code  Section  6-1.1-15-12  and  Form
133.  BP then sought judicial review in the  Indiana  Tax  Court.   The  Tax
Court concluded that while “[t]he claims raised in BP’s Forms 133  may  well
be inappropriate for a Form 133,” BP Amoco was entitled  to  a  hearing  “to
establish an  administrative  record  that  would  support  the  allegations
contained within its complaint.”[4]  BP Amoco Corp.  v.  Lake  Co.  Property
Tax Assessment Bd., 785 N.E.2d 1216, 1220, 1220 n.5 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003).


      The local and state property tax authorities sought, and  we  granted,
review of the Tax Court’s decision.  Lake Co. Prop. Tax  Assessment  Bd.  of
Appeals v. BP Amoco Corp., 804 N.E.2d 749 (Ind. 2003).


                                 Discussion


      BP’s argument is “its property assessments in the years  1995-98  were
not uniform and equal with other properties. . . . The Board dismissed  BP’s
claims without an evidentiary hearing, thereby  thwarting  BP’s  opportunity
to actually demonstrate that the evidence it was prepared to  introduce  was
appropriate for a Form 133 challenge.”  Br. of BP Amoco in Response  at  12.
More specifically, BP contends


            [T]he taxes it paid for assessment years 1995-1998 were “illegal
      as a matter of law.”  If BP had been afforded an  evidentiary  hearing
      before the Board, it would have presented objective evidence that Lake
      County has systematically underassessed property in Lake County to the
      detriment of BP and that BP  is  entitled  to  refunds  based  on  the
      illegal “systematic” underassessment.


Id. at 24-25 (citation and footnote omitted).


      The property tax authorities respond that BP was not entitled  to  the
hearing ordered by the Tax Court because  under  no  set  of  facts  was  it
entitled to the retrospective relief it sought.  As set  forth  above,  BP’s
claim to retrospective relief is predicated on  its  claim  that  its  taxes
were “illegal as a matter of law.”  But the taxing  authorities  argue  that
BP does not in fact contend that the taxes it challenges are  illegal  as  a
matter of law.


            Instead, without any precedent, BP seeks to expand  the  meaning
      of “illegal as a matter of law” beyond a determination of the legality
      of  the  tax  itself  to  a  determination  of  the  legality  of  the
      assessments on which the amount of its [personal property taxes  were]
      calculated.  The statutes, however, contain  no  language  that  would
      expand their application beyond the challenged tax to the  assessments
      used to calculate the amount of the tax.

Br. of Pet’r Lake Co. at 13.


      The tax authorities maintain that “BP Amoco does not  claim  that  any
particular  tax  law  is  illegal;  rather  it  asks  for  an   equalization
adjustment.”  And, they contend, neither  statutes  nor  judicial  precedent
“provide authority for  a  taxpayer  to  claim  an  individual  equalization
adjustment.”  Br. of Appellant North Township Assessor at 4-5.


      The taxing authorities seem to argue that appeals on  Form  133  using
the ground of “illegal as a matter of law” can only  be  used  to  challenge
the facial illegality of a tax itself.  For the reasons discussed below,  we
do not agree with that proposition.  The Board’s  regulation  in  effect  at
the time of the assessments in question here provides for the  use  of  Form
133  in  certain  circumstances  where  the  procedure  or  method  used  in
determining an assessment was erroneous.  See Ind. Admin. Code tit.  50,  r.
4.2-3-12 (1992 & 1996) (“Regulation 3-12”).  But we do agree that BP is  not
entitled to the relief  provided  by  Regulation  3-12  on  the  grounds  it
asserts here. [5]


      Our analysis turns a large degree on our interpretation of  Regulation
3-12.  It  is,  therefore,  important  to  note  that  this  regulation  was
repealed on April 1,  2000,  when  the  State  Board  of  Tax  Commissioners
promulgated a new regulation in response to this court’s decision  in  State
Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Town of St. John.[6]  See 23 Ind.  Reg.  1608  (2000).
While we express no opinion on the operation  of  appeals  of  property  tax
assessments made following  the  repeal,  we  do  not  discern  anything  in
current law that is inconsistent with Regulation 3-12 or the  interpretation
we give it today.


      The relevant provisions of  Regulation  3-12  (which  incorporate  the
relevant provisions of the statute) are as follows:

      Sec. 12.  (a) . . .  A  taxpayer  who  claims  that  an  error  in  an
      assessment entitles them to a refund must file both a Form No. 133 (50
      IAC 4.2-2-9), for correction of the assessment and a Form No. 17T  (50
      IAC 4.2-2-9), for a refund.  A fact to keep in mind when dealing  with
      these forms is  that  they  are  not  to  be  used  to  challenge  the
      methodology used  in  generating  an  assessment.   There  are  appeal
      provisions for that purpose.
      . . .
      (c) Form 133 required.  Form  No.  133  (Petition  for  Correction  of
      Error) (50 IAC 4.2-2-9), is to be filed in duplicate with the  auditor
      of the county where the assessment was made to correct one (1) of  the
      following errors in the tax duplicate:
        (1) The taxes, as a matter of law, were illegal.
        (2) There was a mathematical error in computing an assessment.
        (3) Through an error of omission by any state or county officer the
        taxpayer was  not  given  credit  for  an  exemption  or  deduction
        permitted by law.
      . . .
      (g) Grounds for filing Form No. 133.  The following  are  examples  of
      grounds for the filing of a petition for correction of error (Form No.
      133) (50 IAC 4.2-2-9) and a petition for refund of  taxes  (Form  17T)
      (50 IAC 4.2-2-9):
        (1) The taxes, as a matter of law, were illegal (subsection (c)).
              (A) Property that was entered on the  personal  property  tax
           return as taxable is not subject  to  property  taxes,  and  for
           which no application for exemption is required.
                                   example
           A vehicle subject to the motor vehicle excise tax  was  included
           on the personal property return as taxable.
              (B) Taxpayer “A” challenged  in  tax  court  a  procedure  or
           method used in determining their assessment for  year  “Y”,  and
           the court decided in favor of Taxpayer “A”.
              (C) Taxpayer “B” has a suit  pending  in  court  against  the
           state board with respect to year “Y” or any other  year  on  the
           same facts and challenging  the  same  procedure  or  method  as
           Taxpayer “A”.  The  board  will  order  the  correction  of  the
           assessment of Taxpayer “B” upon the filing of a Form No. 133 (50
           IAC 4.2-2-9), for the assessment year challenged  in  the  suit.
           After  the  assessment  has  been  corrected,  Taxpayer  “B”  is
           entitled to file a Form No. 17T (50 IAC 4.2-2-9), for  a  refund
           of taxes paid on that assessment.
              (D) Taxpayer “C” does not have a suit  pending  as  described
           above.  He is entitled to a correction of  assessments  made  on
           the same facts  and  using  the  same  procedure  or  method  as
           Taxpayer “A”.  By filing a Form No. 133 (50 IAC  4.2-2-9),  they
           may obtain a correction of their assessments  upon  which  taxes
           were due in the three (3) years preceding the  date  of  filing.
           However, they may not obtain an assessment correction for a year
           that precedes year  “Y”.   After  those  assessments  have  been
           corrected, Taxpayer “C” is entitled to file a Form No.  17T  (50
           IAC 4.2-2-9), for a refund of taxes paid on  those  assessments.
           Taxpayer “C” may also file a Form No. 133 (50 IAC 4.2-2-9),  for
           the correction of any assessment upon which taxes were  not  yet
           due at the time of filing.
      . . .

Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 4.2-3-12 (1992 & 1996) (emphasis added).

      We think it apparent from the language and structure of Regulation  3-
12 that appeals could not be made on Form 133 to challenge a  “procedure  or
method used in determining [an] assessment” on grounds that the  taxes  were
illegal as a matter of law.  Such challenges to  “the  methodology  used  in
generating an assessment” were required to utilize  the  “appeal  provisions
for that purpose” (i.e., Form 130).  Regulation 3-12(a).  Said  differently,
if the Tax Court had decided a challenge on Form  130  to  “a  procedure  or
method used in  determining  [an]  assessment  .  .  .  in  favor  of  [the]
taxpayer,” that would have constituted a declaration  that  the  taxes  were
illegal as a matter of law, and then the challenging taxpayer  (and  certain
other taxpayers) would have been entitled to use  Form  133  to  have  their
assessments corrected and Form 17T to obtain refunds.


      Subsections (a) and (g)(1)(B), (C), and (D) of Regulation  3-12,  when
read together, make clear  the  way  in  which  the  “correction  of  error”
mechanisms operated.  Subsection  (g)(1)(B)  of  Regulation  3-12  specified
that “Taxpayer A,” who had  used  the  “appeal  provisions,”  Regulation  3-
12(a), of Form 130 to challenge successfully in the Tax Court  “a  procedure
or method used in  determining  [its]  assessments[,]”  was  entitled  to  a
refund for a given year —because when (but only when) the  Tax  Court  ruled
in Taxpayer A’s favor, its assessments became illegal as a  matter  of  law.
Subsection (g)(1)(C) extended a right to a correction of  assessment  and  a
refund to other taxpayers who had suits pending in  the  Tax  Court  on  the
same facts and challenging the  same  procedure  or  method  as  a  taxpayer
successful under Subsection (g)(1)(B)—because when (but only when)  the  Tax
Court ruled in Taxpayer A’s favor, Taxpayer B’s assessments  became  illegal
as a matter of law.  And  Subsection  (g)(1)(D)  extended  a  correction  of
assessment and right to a refund to other taxpayers on the  same  facts  and
using  the  same  procedure  or  method  as  a  taxpayer  successful   under
Subsection (g)(1)(B)—because when (but only when) the  Tax  Court  ruled  in
Taxpayer A’s favor, Taxpayer C’s assessments became illegal as a  matter  of
law.


      The two cases cited by the Tax Court as examples  of  where  taxpayers
have been awarded relief who  have  been  able  to  “show[  ]  by  probative
evidence  that  their  property  is  assessed  and  taxed  differently  than
comparable properties” support this analysis.  See BP Amoco  Corp.  v.  Lake
County Prop. Tax Assessment Bd. of Appeals, 785 N.E.2d  1216,  1219  (2003).
In both Zakutansky v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 691 N.E.2d  1365  (Ind.  Tax
Ct. 1998), and Vonnegut v. State Board of Tax Comm’rs, 672 N.E.2d  87  (Ind.
Tax Ct. 1996), the taxpayers prosecuted their appeals using  Form  130,  not
Form 133.


      In  short,  appeals  challenging  the  legality  of  assessments  were
required to be made on Form  130.   Assessments  determined  to  be  illegal
could be corrected (and refunds obtained) using Form 133.  The names of  the
respective forms, set forth above, well  illustrate  the  distinction:  Form
130 is called a “Petition for Review of Assessment”; Form 133,  a  “Petition
for Correction of Error.”  Ind. Admin. Code tit.  50,  r.  4.2-2-9  (1992  &
1996).


      BP was not entitled to file appeals on Form 133 to challenge its 1995-
1998  assessments  on  grounds  that   “Lake   County   has   systematically
underassessed property in Lake County to the  detriment  of  BP  and  BP  is
entitled to refunds based on the illegal underassessment.”  Br. of BP  Amoco
in Response at 24-25.  BP is clearly challenging  the  methodology  used  in
generating the  assessment  of  its  property.   The  Regulation  explicitly
states that “these forms .  .  .  are  not  to  be  used  to  challenge  the
methodology used in generating an assessment.  There are  appeal  provisions
for that purpose.”  Regulation 3-12 § 12(a).  BP  failed  to  challenge  the
assessments in  1995-1998  within  time  periods  for  which  Form  130  was
available; it is foreclosed from using Form  133  for  these  purposes.   No
hearing was required to make this determination.


      BP was, of course, entitled to use the “appeal provisions” referred to
in Regulation 3-12 to challenge the “methodology  used  in  generating”  its
1999 assessment and did so  using  the  “appeal  provisions”  set  forth  in
Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-15-1 and Indiana Administrative  Code  Title  50,
Regulation 4.2-3-3 and Form 130.  Subsection (g)(1)(B)  of  Regulation  3-12
made clear that if that challenge is successful, it  would  be  entitled  to
correction and refund for that year.[7], [8]


                                 Conclusion

      The decision of the Indiana Tax Court in this case is  reversed.   The
decisions of the property tax authorities dismissing BP Amoco’s  appeals  on
Form 133 are affirmed.

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Boehm, J.J., concur.  Rucker, J., concurs  in
result.
-----------------------
[1] If an appeal  on  Form  130  is  rejected  by  the  local  property  tax
authority, an appeal to the state  authority  is  made  on  Form  131.   The
combined  procedure  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  “the  130/131  appeals
procedure.”  See  United  States  Steel  Corp.  v.  Lake  County  Prop.  Tax
Assessment Bd. of Appeals, 785 N.E.2d 1209, 1214 n.12 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2003).
[2] On January 1, 2002, the Legislature abolished the  State  Board  of  Tax
Commissioners and established an Indiana Board of Tax Review.  Ind. Code  §§
6-1.5-2-1; 6-1.5-4-1 (Supp. 2001); 2001 Ind. Acts 198 §  95.   For  purposes
of this case, the Indiana Board has the power and authority previously  held
by the State Board.  As a result, even  though  BP  appealed  to  the  State
Board of Tax Commissioners, the Indiana  Board  of  Tax  Review  issued  the
final determination in this case.
      The same  legislation  also  replaced  individual  county  “Boards  of
Review” with county “Property Tax Assessment Boards of  Appeals.”   In  this
case, therefore, the Lake County Board of Review  is  now  the  Lake  County
Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals.
[3] BP’s challenge to its 1999 assessment is not at issue in this appeal.
[4] The Tax Court attributes to the Respondents listed above  the  assertion
that “because BP used the wrong form, . . . its  attempt  to  obtain  review
and equalization counts for naught.”  BP Amoco Corp., 785  N.E.2d  at  1219.
The issue in this case is not whether BP mistakenly used the wrong form;  it
is whether Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-15-12 and Form 133  are  available  to
provide BP the retrospective relief it seeks on the grounds it asserts.
[5] In cases disputing the availability of Form 133  to  appeal  a  property
tax assessment, the cases frequently make a distinction between whether  the
appropriate tax officials are required to make an  objective  or  subjective
determination.  With only one exception, however, none of these cases  arise
under the “taxes, as a matter of law, illegal” provision.  That  case  (Rott
Dev. Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 647 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. Tax  Ct.  1995))
was resolved on other grounds and did  not  apply  the  objective/subjective
distinction.  We find the guidance in Regulation 3-12 sufficiently clear  so
as not to have to apply the objective/subjective distinction.
[6] 702 N.E.2d 1034 (1998).
[7] The property tax authorities’ arguments in their  briefs  in  this  case
relating to the availability  of  an  “individual  equalization  adjustment”
would appear to also relate to BP’s appeals on  Form  130.   This  issue  is
addressed in Dep’t of Local Gov’t Fin. v. Commonwealth Edison Co.  of  Ind.,
Inc., No. 49S10-0307-TA-293, __ N.E.2d __, slip op. at 4-7  (Ind.  Jan.  13,
2005).
[8] We also recognize that BP might conceivably be entitled to relief if  it
meets  the  requirements  of  the  hypothetical  Taxpayer  “C”  in   Indiana
Administrative Code Title 50,  Regulation  4.2-3-12(g)(1)(D).   However,  BP
advances no claim in that regard in this case.