Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee
Steve Carter Frank J. Deveau
Attorney General of Indiana Geoffrey Slaughter
Michael D. Chambers
Frances Barrow Indianapolis, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
____________________________________________________________________________
__
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 37S00-0206-CV-330
Indiana Department of Natural
Resources and Larry D. Macklin, in
His Official Capacity as Director
of the Indiana Department of
Natural Resources,
Appellants (Defendants below),
v.
Newton County, Indiana,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
_________________________________
Appeal from the Jasper Superior Court, No. 37D01-0004-OV-33
The Honorable J. Phillip McGraw, Judge
_________________________________
On Direct Appeal
_________________________________
January 29, 2004
Boehm, Justice.
Newton County adopted two ordinances purporting to impose requirements
on purchases of land in the County by government agencies. The trial court
found that the acquisition of land by the Department of Natural Resources
violated the ordinances and set aside the transaction. The trial court
also held unconstitutional the Game Bird Habitat Act, which gave the agency
the authority to purchase the land. We hold that the ordinances are
invalid exercises of county authority and that the Game Bird Habitat Act is
constitutional.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1988 the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR), through its
division of Fish and Wildlife, leased approximately 122 acres of land in
Newton County from Steven Brandt. The property has been used as a Game
Bird habitat since that time. In March 1998, Brandt proposed selling the
property to DNR. After the purchase offer, but before the contract was
signed, the Newton County commissioners adopted two ordinances. The first,
the “Farm Preservation Ordinance” (FPO) purported to require any government
agency desiring to purchase more than twenty acres in Newton County to
complete the procedures specified in the ordinances before acquiring the
land. The ordinances required the agency to prepare a statement of intent
to purchase the land. The statement was to include a statement of the
effects the acquisition would have on Newton County’s economy, environment,
and tax base, a demonstration of the need for the property and some other
items. The statement was to be submitted to the Board of Commissioners of
Newton County who would then initiate a twelve-month process that included
public hearings on the proposed acquisition. The second ordinance, “Land
Acquisition Notice Act” (LANA) also applied to acquisitions by “government
agencies” and required thirty days notice of any proposed acquisition of
more than ten acres. Both FPO and LANA imposed a fine for violation.
After these ordinances became effective, DNR closed its purchase of
Brandt’s land. DNR did not give the required notice or file the required
statements. The County sued, contending the sale was void as in violation
of both ordinances. The trial court agreed that the sale violated the
ordinances and set aside the land sale. The trial court also ruled that
DNR had no authority to purchase Brandt’s land because the Game Bird
Habitat Act, Ind. Code § 14-22-8-7(c) (1998), is unconstitutional. That
statute authorizes the DNR to acquire land from “willing sellers” for “game
bird habitats.” The trial court found the statute unconstitutionally vague
and also a violation of separation of powers. Because the trial court held
a state statute unconstitutional, this appeal was taken directly to this
court pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(A)(1)(b).
I. Validity of the Ordinances
The State contends the ordinances are invalid exercises of county
authority and therefore provide no basis to invalidate DNR’s purchase of
Brandt’s land. Newton County responds that the Home Rule Act, Ind. Code §
36-1-3-1 (1998) et. seq., provides the authority to create and enforce the
two ordinances. The Home Rule Act “abrogated the traditional rule that
local governments possessed only those powers expressly authorized by
statute, because it expressly broadened a governmental unit’s authority to
include not only all powers granted it by statute,” but also “all other
powers necessary or desirable in the conduct of its affairs” even though
not expressly granted by the statute. I.C. § 36-1-3-4(b); City of Gary v.
Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind. 2000); City of Crown
Point v. Lake County, 510 N.E.2d 684, 685-86 (1987). Despite these
generous delegations of authority to “units” of local government, section
8(a)(3) of the Home Rule Act expressly prohibits a unit from imposing
duties on other “political subdivisions.” Nor may it impose duties on
activities regulated by a state agency. I.C. § 36-1-3-8(a)(7).
The ordinances by their terms apply to “government agencies” which
presumably include the United States and units of local government. The
Home Rule Act expressly prohibits the imposition of duties on other units
of local government, and the County concedes that the ordinances are
invalid as applied to federal agencies by reason of the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution of the United States. Despite the immunity enjoyed by
government agencies both below and above the State in the hierarchy of
governmental units, the County maintains that the ordinances may regulate
the state itself. The County correctly points out that neither DNR, an arm
of state government nor the State itself is a “subdivision.” It is also
true that nothing in the Home Rule Act in express terms prohibits a county
from regulating the State. But the short answer to these points is that a
county cannot prevent a state agency from carrying out statutorily
authorized actions.
The ordinances purport to allow a county ordinance to trump the
State’s statutory land acquisition authority. “An impermissible conflict
with state law will be found if the Ordinance seeks to prohibit that which
a statute expressly permits.” Hobble ex rel Hobble v. Basham, 575 N.E.2d
693, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Cf., Hopkins v. Tipton County Health Dep’t,
769 N.E.2d 604, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The Home Rule Act explicitly
denies this power to a county. Hobble noted that local governments may
“impose additional, reasonable regulations, and [to] supplement burdens
imposed by non-penal state law, provided the additional burdens are
logically consistent with the statutory purpose.” Hobble, 575 N.E.2d at
697. The County ordinances do not “supplement” any “burdens” imposed by
the state. Rather, the state law is frustrated by the county ordinance.
Moreover, the state law does not “impose burdens” on anyone. It simply
authorizes the DNR to act and does not require permission from local
authorities. In short, The Game Bird Habitat Act expressly grants DNR the
authority to acquire land to achieve its purposes, and the ordinances seek
to regulate the State in that activity. That is not within the County’s
power.
II. Constitutionality of the Game Bird Habitat Act
DNR’s authority to purchase Brandt’s property in Newton County is
derived from the Game Bird Habitat Act. The County contends that the Act
is unconstitutional, and therefore the purchase was unauthorized and void.
The trial court agreed and set aside the sale on that ground, independent
of its holding that the ordinances were valid. If the County’s sole
interest in the constitutionality of the Game Bird Habitat Act were its
claim that DNR is not authorized to acquire land, the County’s standing to
raise the issue would, as the State argues, be at best highly questionable.
But the County has a legitimate interest in upholding the challenged
validity of its ordinances just as it does in seeking interpretation of
statutes that affect its governance. Bd. of Comm’rs of the County of Howard
v. Kokomo City Plan Comm’n., 263 Ind. 282, 296, 330 N.E.2d 92, 101 (1975).
The most obvious flaw in the ordinances is their conflict with the Act. If
the Act is invalid that conflict evaporates. Accordingly, the
constitutionality of the Act is also relevant to the validity of the
ordinances. The County therefore properly raises the issue of the
constitutionality of the Game Bird Habitat Act.
In order to constitute a valid delegation of authority to a state
agency, legislation must provide sufficient standards to guide the agency
in its exercise of that authority. Barco Beverage Corp. v. Ind. Alcoholic
Beverage Comm’n, 595 N.E.2d 250, 253-54 (Ind. 1992) (“The only limitation
on the delegation of authority to administrative bodies is that reasonable
standards must be established to guide the administrative body. The
standards, however, only need to be [as] specific as the circumstances
permit, considering the purpose to be accomplished by the statute.”)
(citations omitted); cf., Ind. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt.,
Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 340 (Ind. 1994) (standards that guide an
administrative agency may be described in “very broad and general terms.”)
(citations omitted). Newton County argues that the Act fails this test.
First, the County contends the terms “willing seller” and “game bird
habitat” lack sufficient definition. Second, the County points out that
the terms have not been refined by any regulations. Third, the County
points out that the legislature failed to provide any specific procedures
for acquiring game bird habitats.
We do not agree that the legislature must supply more specific
definitions for the terms “willing seller” and “game bird habitat” to guide
the agency. To be sure, statutory terms must be understandable, but they
need not be rigorously precise. Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n. of
Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 245-46 (1915); Barco Beverage Corp., 595 N.E.2d at 254.
Newton County sets out a parade of horribles that it contends may
constitute examples of a “willing seller” under the statute. These for the
most part are examples of how the State might seek to employ tactics to
coerce an otherwise reluctant landowner to sell to the State. Newton
County points to no evidence whatsoever that DNR has wasted public funds,
purchased land for wrongful uses, or coerced residents into selling their
land. More importantly, there is no such evidence as to the Brandt sale.
To be sure, there may be litigable issues on the fringes of the term
“willing seller”, but there is no doubt that Brandt is one. He approached
DNR and proposed the sale.
The term “game bird” is defined by statute to mean pheasant, quail,
grouse, wild turkey, and Hungarian partridge. Ind. Code § 14-22-8-2
(1998). A particular bird is a “game bird” or it is not, and a “potential
habitat” is a place where a game bird can live. We see no need to define
the terms with any greater specificity. The birds are identified with
precision. “Habitat” as we take it, means these creatures may reasonably
be expected to occupy the site in the course of their natural activity.
“Game Bird Habitat” may present some issues if, as the County posits, DNR
attempts to use this statute to buy an asphalt parking lot. Courts can
deal with these if they occur. The terms are sufficiently specific to have
content. This regulatory framework may be less than wholly precise, but
perfection has never been required of administrative bodies. Chem. Waste
Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d at 340.
We also find unpersuasive Newton County’s argument that the terms
“willing seller” and “game bird habitat” need definition by DNR
regulations. Newton County cites the following passage in Indiana Dep’t of
Envtl. Mgmt.: “Such terms get precision from the knowledge and experience
of men whose duty it is to administer the Statutes, and then such Statutes
become reasonably certain guides in carrying out the will and intent of the
Legislature.” 643 N.E.2d at 340. We do not take this to require DNR to
promulgate rules or guidelines to interpret statutory terms. Rather it
merely acknowledges that regulations may fulfill that purpose. If no
ambiguity exists within the statute itself an agency may determine if
“facts or circumstances exist upon which the law makes or intends to make
its own action depend” so long as the agency does not make the law itself.
State ex rel. Standard Oil v. Review Bd. of Employment Sec. Div., 230 Ind.
1, 8, 101 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1951). In this case, the statute confers the
authority to determine whether or not a particular plot of land is a
suitable habitat for the named species. Finally, there is no evidence that
DNR interpreted these terms improperly with respect to the Brandt
acquisition. The statute is not so unclear as to be void on its face, and
there is no claim that its application here is outside the boundaries of
“game bird habitat” or “willing seller.”
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is reversed. This case is remanded
with instructions to dismiss the County’s complaint.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and RUCKER, JJ., concur.