Attorney for Appellant
Bryan Lee Ciyou
Indianapolis, IN
Attorney for Appellee
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
TROY D. COHOON,
Appellant (Respondent below),
v.
DAPHNE D. COHOON,
Appellee (Petitioner below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 49S04-0303-CV-101
)
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robyn Moberly, Judge
Cause No. 49D12-9901-DR-10
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
March 7, 2003
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Both the trial court and Court of Appeals majority found a binding
arbitration provision incorporated into the Cohoons’ divorce decree void as
against public policy. Cohoon v. Cohoon, No. 49D12-9901-DR-010 (Marion
Super. Ct. July 20, 2001), aff’d, 770 N.E.2d 885, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
The dispositive issue in this case is whether Mr. Cohoon was in contempt
for failure to pay child support, not whether the binding arbitration
provision was void as against public policy. We affirm the courts below on
the dispositive issue in this case, that Mr. Cohoon was in contempt for
failure to pay child support.
Background
This case involves a dispute between divorced parents arising from
the following facts. In approving the parents’ divorce, the trial court
approved and incorporated into the divorce decree a settlement agreement in
which the parents agreed to submit to and resolve by binding arbitration
"[a]ny dispute between the parties as to child support, custody, or
visitation." (Appellant’s App. at 7, ¶ 7.) Approximately one year later,
on July 23, 2000, the mother filed a petition for modification of the
settlement agreement and a petition to hold the father in contempt for an
alleged nonpayment of child support. The father argued that the petitions
were not properly before the trial court because the parties had agreed to
resolve all child support disputes through binding arbitration. The mother
subsequently withdrew her petition for modification and the trial court
then held a hearing on the contempt petition on March 7, 2001.
The trial court reached three conclusions of relevance to us here.
First, it found that "whether a party is in contempt of the [divorce
decree] is not encompassed within the binding arbitration provision of the
[settlement agreement]" and that it had jurisdiction over enforcement of
the divorce decree. (Appellant’s App. at 7, ¶ 8.) Second, it found the
father to be in contempt. Third, it held that "the provision in the
parties' Agreement which states that child support, custody, or visitation
issues shall be resolved by ‘binding arbitration’ is void as against public
policy in that the agreement attempts to usurp the continuing jurisdiction
of the Court over the issues concerning child support modifications,
contempt actions, custody, and visitation." (Appellant’s App. at 11, ¶
13.)
The father appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court
with a lengthy discussion of its own as to why the binding arbitration
provision of the settlement agreement was void as against public policy as
well as a shorter discussion affirming the contempt citation. Cohoon v.
Cohoon, 770 N.E.2d 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The father now seeks
transfer.
Discussion
We find it unnecessary in this case to make a definitive judgment on
the validity of binding arbitration provisions in domestic relations
matters. Once the mother withdrew her petition for modification, the only
issue before the trial court was the question of contempt. We agree with
the trial court that whether a party was in contempt of the divorce decree
was not encompassed within the binding arbitration provision of the
settlement agreement. See Pettit v. Pettit, 626 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind.
1993) (holding that “contempt is always available [to courts] to assist in
the enforcement of child support”). Upon making that determination, the
court was then free to rule upon the contempt petition without further
reference to the binding arbitration provision. We likewise agree with its
ruling on the merits of the contempt petition.
Conclusion
We grant transfer pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A), thereby
vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals except for Issue II. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court as to contempt (including its
findings on the presumption of fees and authority to compensate an
aggrieved party for losses and damages) but vacate its judgment that the
binding arbitration provisions of the parties' settlement agreement is void
as against public policy.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.