Attorney for Appellants
J.J. Paul, III
Indianapolis, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Steve Carter
Attorney General of Indiana
David L. Steiner
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
Scott A. Kreider
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
ROBERT L. GROCE and
SALVATORE DESANTIS,
Appellants (Petitioners below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, et al.,
Appellees (Respondents below).
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) Supreme Court No.
) 49S02-0203-CR-202
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APPEAL FROM THE MARION CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable William T. Lawrence, Judge
Cause Nos. 49C01-0006-MI-1312
49C01-0006-MI-1313
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
October 29, 2002
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Salvatore Desantis and Robert Groce both committed multiple driving
offenses and consequently received letters from the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles (“BMV”) identifying them individually as habitual traffic
violators (“HTV”). Contrary to their claims, we find that the BMV’s
failure to refer to judicial review opportunities in the initial HTV
suspension notice did not invalidate their suspensions. Rather, it was
sufficient that judicial review opportunities were outlined in a subsequent
letter.
Background
Salvatore Desantis was convicted of various traffic offenses and his
license was suspended on multiple occasions between July 13, 1988, and
September 2, 1994. On October 7, 1994, the BMV mailed Desantis an Habitual
Traffic Violator Notice of Suspension, informing him that his license would
be suspended for a ten-year period, beginning November 17, 1994. The
notice also provided the necessary form to request administrative review of
the suspension. In this initial notice, there was no reference to the
judicial review procedure.
Likewise, Robert Groce was convicted of various traffic offenses and
had his license suspended on multiple occasions between May 14, 1984, and
April 29, 1992. Consequently, on June 2, 1992, the BMV mailed Groce an
Habitual Traffic Violator Notice of Suspension, informing him that his
license would be suspended for a ten-year period, beginning July 13, 1992.
The notice also provided the necessary form for requesting administrative
review. In Groce’s initial notice, there was no reference to the judicial
review procedure.
On November 30, 1995, the BMV sent both Desantis and Groce follow-up
letters clarifying that they were entitled to seek judicial review of their
suspensions and directed them to the proper statutory section for guidance
regarding the judicial review procedure. The notices further stated that
their HTV suspensions remained “in effect without change.”
Both Desantis and Groce filed petitions for judicial review of their
license suspensions on June 28, 2000, alleging that the HTV notices they
received failed to comply with the due process requirements of Ind. Code §
9-30-10-5 by not informing them of their right to judicial review, and were
void ab initio. On July 24, 2000, the trial court denied their petitions
for judicial review. Desantis and Groce appealed to the Court of Appeals
and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of judicial
review, finding that a lack of advisement of judicial review opportunities
in the suspension notices invalidated ab initio an HTV determination.
Groce v. State ex rel. Newman, 757 N.E.2d 694, 697-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
We granted transfer, 774 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. 2002) (table), and now affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
Discussion
The State contends that the Court of Appeals erred by invalidating
the suspensions ab initio given this Court’s decision in Stewart v. State,
721 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. 1999). We agree that Stewart, and a subsequent case,
State v. Hammond, 761 N.E.2d 812 (Ind. 2002), control.
Stewart involved facts analogous to those presented here. In Stewart,
we held that a conviction for driving while suspended as an HTV was valid
even though the initial suspension notice did not refer to judicial review
opportunities. Rather, it was sufficient that a subsequent letter, nearly
identical to those received by Desantis and Groce, explained an HTV’s right
to seek judicial review. Stewart, 721 N.E.2d at 879-80. The state must
only show three things for an adjudication as an HTV: (1) the act of
driving; (2) a license suspension or an HTV adjudication; and (3) that the
defendant knew or should have known of the suspension or adjudication. Id.
at 879. As a result, since a notice of his HTV adjudication was sent to
the defendant, he had constructive knowledge that his license was
suspended. In spite of this knowledge, he continued to drive, thus
committing the offense of driving while suspended as an HTV, without regard
to the contents of the initial notice. Id. at 880.
In deciding this case, the Court of Appeals looked to the
Legislature’s amendment to Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 120-
2000, § 2, which inserted the word “validly” to modify “suspended,” and
concluded that the Legislature’s action was meant to overrule Stewart.
Subsequent to the Court of Appeals’ opinion in this case, we decided
State v. Hammond, 761 N.E.2d 812 (Ind. 2002). We determined in Hammond
that the Legislature’s addition of the word “validly” did not alter the
Stewart holding. Id. at 815. Rather, a suspension continues to be valid
until and unless it is successfully challenged on its merits. Id. (citing
Stewart, 721 N.E.2d at 879-80). Thus, an incomplete or untimely suspension
notice does not warrant automatic reversal of a suspension. Id. Rather,
the appropriate remedy continues to be a belated opportunity to challenge
the HTV suspension on the merits. Id. at 815-16 (emphasis added).
Stewart and Hammond control. The failure to outline the opportunity
for judicial review in the initial suspension notice does not void a
subsequent classification as a habitual traffic violator or any subsequent
convictions for driving while suspended as an HTV.
Conclusion
Having previously granted transfer pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule
58(A), thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, we now affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.