ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN PINNOW STEVE CARTER
Special Assistant to the Attorney General of Indiana
Public Defender
Greenwood, Indiana NANDITA G. SHEPHERD
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
JAMI MARTIN, )
)
Appellant (Defendant), ) Supreme Court Cause Number
) 03S01-0108-PC-363
v. )
) Court of Appeals Cause Number
STATE OF INDIANA, ) 03A01-0012-PC-412
)
Appellee (Plaintiff). )
APPEAL FROM THE BARTHOLOMEW CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Stephen R. Heimann, Sr., Judge
Cause No. 03C01-8802-CF-175
CRIMINAL TRANSFER
August 28, 2002
RUCKER, Justice
We grant transfer and hold that the 2001 amendments to the Indiana
Code providing credit for time served on home detention as a condition of
probation should be applied retroactively to the defendant in this case.
Facts and Procedural History
After pleading guilty to two counts of dealing in cocaine, Jami
Martin was sentenced by the trial court to twenty years for each count, to
be served concurrently. The trial court later modified the sentence and
placed Martin on electronically monitored home detention as a condition of
probation. When Martin violated the conditions of his probation, the trial
court revoked it and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence.
Martin subsequently filed various motions with the trial court to receive
credit for the time he had served on home detention, all of which the trial
court denied. Martin then initiated an appeal.
On May 22, 2001, while Martin’s appeal was pending before the Court of
Appeals, the General Assembly amended Indiana Code sections 35-38-2-3 and
35-38-2.5-5. Pub.L. No. 166-2001, §§ 1, 2, 2001 Ind. Acts 1075-76, 1077.
Effective July 1, 2001, the amendments provide that a person earns credit
for time served on home detention as a condition of probation. Ind. Code
§§ 35-38-2-3(h)(2), (j)(2), -2.5-5(e). Previously, the statutes were
silent on this point. See I.C. §§ 35-38-2-3, -2.5-5 (1998). Noting in
passing that the amendments did not apply to Martin, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court. Martin v. State, 748 N.E.2d 428, 430 n.4 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001). Martin seeks transfer contending that the amendments
should be applied retroactively to him. We previously granted transfer and
now reverse the trial court.
Discussion
The general rule is that unless there are strong and compelling
reasons, statutes will normally be applied prospectively. Metro Holding
Co. v. Mitchell, 589 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ind. 1992). An exception to this
general rule exists for remedial statutes, which are statutes intended to
cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute. Bryarly v.
State, 232 Ind. 47, 111 N.E.2d 277, 278-79 (1953); Ind. Dep’t of State
Revenue v. Estate of Riggs, 735 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000). When
a remedial statute is involved, a court must construe it to “effect the
evident purpose for which it was enacted[.]” Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 14 N.E. 586, 589 (1887). Accordingly, remedial
statutes will be applied retroactively to carry out their legislative
purpose unless to do so violates a vested right or constitutional
guaranty.[1] Id.
Prior to the amendments at issue here, there was a conflict of
authority in the Court of Appeals regarding the availability of credit for
time served on home detention as a condition of probation. One line of
authority held that a person was entitled to such credit. See Dishroon v.
State, 722 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); cf. Purcell v. State, 721
N.E.2d 220, 222 n.4, 223 (Ind. 1999) (holding that a person is entitled to
credit for time served on home detention pursuant to a community
corrections program but expressing no opinion as to credit for time served
on home detention as a condition of probation). The other line of
authority held that a person was not entitled to such credit. See Palmer
v. State, 744 N.E.2d 525, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to follow
Dishroon).[2]
To highlight this conflict of authority, the Court of Appeals in
Palmer implored the General Assembly to address the issue of credit for
time served on home detention as a condition of probation because, as it
stood, it was a “patchwork quilt of contradiction and confusion.” Id.; see
also id. at 531 (requesting “the General Assembly to offer some much-needed
clarification, consistency, and guidance . . . .”) (Brook, J., concurring).
The General Assembly apparently responded by amending Indiana Code
sections 35-38-2-3 and 35-38-2.5-5 during the 2001 session to provide
credit for time served on home detention as a condition of probation. In
light of the General Assembly’s response, we conclude that the amendments
are remedial in nature as they were intended to cure a defect that existed
in prior statutes, namely: silence concerning whether a defendant was
entitled to credit for time served on home detention as a condition of
probation. Therefore, because the amendments do not violate a vested right
or constitutional guaranty, we apply them retroactively to Martin in order
to carry out their legislative purpose of providing credit for time served
on home detention as a condition of probation.[3]
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] We acknowledge that a number of decisions have stated that if a
remedial statute violates vested rights or creates new rights, then it
cannot be applied retroactively. See, e.g., Samm v. Great Dane Trailers,
715 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; Deasy-Leas v.
Leas, 693 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied; Estate of
Robinson v. C & I Leasing, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998),
trans. denied; R.L.G. v. T.L.E., 454 N.E.2d 1268, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983); McGill v. Muddy Fork of Silver Creek Watershed Conservancy Dist.,
175 Ind. App. 48, 370 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1977); Malone v. Conner, 135 Ind.
App. 167, 189 N.E.2d 590, 591 (1963), trans. denied. However, this
formulation is inconsistent with this Court’s precedent.
[2] We grant transfer today in Palmer and hold that the amendments at
issue here should also be applied retroactively to the defendant in that
case.
[3] We observe that since the amendments went into effect on July 1,
2001, the Court of Appeals has twice reached the same outcome as reached
here, albeit on different grounds. In Senn v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002), the defendant, who had been sentenced before the effective
date of the amendments, filed a motion in the trial court seeking credit
for time served on home detention as a condition of probation. The trial
court denied the motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the
General Assembly’s amendments to Indiana Code sections 35-38-2-3 and 35-38-
2.5-5 represented an “effort to clarify the law,” not to change it. Id. at
1199. As such, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Similarly,
in Stith v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), the Court of
Appeals held:
We believe the 2001 amendment to the statute reflects the
legislature’s clarification of its preexisting intent that
probationers on home detention be entitled to credit time. We
accordingly choose to follow Dishroon as more accurately reflecting
the legislative intent to be gleaned from the “patchwork quilt of
contradiction and confusion” that existed prior to the July 2001
amendment to the statute.
Stith was entitled to credit time for the period when he was on
home detention as a condition of probation, and we therefore reverse.
Id. at 1268 (citation and footnote omitted), trans. not sought.