ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE AMICUS CURIAE
Dan J. May Andrew J. Vandenbosch Howard County
Bar
Kokomo, Indiana Raquet & Vandenbosch Association
Kokomo, Indiana William C. Menges,
Jr.
Kokomo, Indiana
Donald E. C. Leicht
Kokomo, Indiana
In The
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
KIM BUCKALEW )
Respondent-Appellant, )
)
v. ) 34S05-0107-CV-332
)
TIM BUCKALEW )
Petioner-Appellee. )
________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Stephen M. Jessup, Special Judge
Cause No. 34C01-9811-DR-830
________________________________________________
On Petition to Transfer
September 7, 2001
DICKSON, Justice
Concluding that a local court rule requiring the filing of an income
and property disclosure form was jurisdictional, the Court of Appeals held
a dissolution decree was void due to the trial court's failure to follow
its own rule. Buckalew v. Buckalew, 744 N.E.2d 504 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Having previously granted transfer, we hold that the local rule was not
jurisdictional, and we reject the claim that noncompliance with the local
rule requires the dissolution decree to be vacated.
The parties do not dispute that at all times relevant to this case,
Howard County Local Civil Rule 16(B) required each party to a dissolution
action to file a specified financial disclosure form with the court.
Subsection (4) of the rule specified:
No final hearing may be scheduled and no decree of dissolution of
marriage or legal separation shall be entered unless and until the
prescribed disclosure form is filed with the Court, except in cases
where the parties are each represented by separate counsel and file
with the court a waiver of such requirement.
Br. of Appellant at 13. The proceedings that resulted in a dissolution of
the ten-year marriage of Tim and Kim Buckalew did not include the
disclosure form required by Rule 16(B), and neither Kim nor Tim were
represented by counsel of record in the dissolution. The issue of the
missing disclosure form was first raised seven months after the dissolution
when Kim sought relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)
alleging several grounds, one of which asserted that Tim "failed to file a
property disclosure as required by local rules." Record at 32. The trial
court denied Kim's T.R. 60(B) motion, finding that the parties "consented
to the waiver of the filing of a property disclosure statement." Record at
79. In her appeal from the denial of her motion, Kim argues that under the
express language of the rule, her waiver was invalid because she was not
represented by counsel. She also contends that, because the filing of the
disclosure form was mandatory and a prerequisite to the entry of a
dissolution decree under the local rule, the trial court lacked authority
to waive the filing of the disclosure form absent a valid waiver by the
parties.
She is correct that the local rule's specific authorization for
waiver of the disclosure form is expressly conditioned upon both parties
being represented by counsel, which condition was not met in this case.
Local court rules for the regulation of practice within a local court
are authorized by Indiana Trial Rule 81. In Meredith v. State, 679 N.E.2d
1309 (Ind. 1997), this Court permitted a trial court to waive compliance
with its own local court rule. We explained:
Before a court may set aside its own rule, and it should not be set
aside lightly, the court must assure itself that it is in the
interests of justice to do so, that the substantive rights of the
parties are not prejudiced, and that the rule is not a mandatory rule.
Id. at 1311. The inclusion of this "not a mandatory rule" qualification
was a reference to time limitations and other procedural prerequisites that
had generally been described as "jurisdictional," and from which courts may
not waive compliance. Id. at 1311 n.2. In the present case, Kim urges
that Howard County Local Civil Rule 16(B)(4) was such a jurisdictional or
mandatory rule.
We observe that the term "jurisdictional" is not helpful in resolving
the present issue. "To render a valid judgment, a court must possess two
forms of jurisdiction: jurisdiction over the subject matter and
jurisdiction over the parties." Mishler v. County of Elkhart, 544 N.E.2d
149, 151 (Ind. 1989). There is no claim that the trial court here lacked
either jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter jurisdiction, i.e.,
the general scope of authority to hear and determine dissolution cases.
See Pivarnik v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 636 N.E.2d 131, 137 (Ind. 1994).
Once a court has acquired subject matter and personal jurisdiction,
challenges to its subsequent rulings and judgment are questions incident to
the exercise of jurisdiction rather than to the existence of jurisdiction.
See Mishler, 544 N.E.2d at 152. We have noted that courts sometimes refer
to "jurisdiction over the particular case," but that "[i]mperfections of
this kind, however, merely make a judgment voidable through appeal," upon
specific and timely objections. Id.
Howard County Local Civil Rule 16(B)(4), as authorized by T.R. 81 to
regulate practice in the local court, is a rule to facilitate discovery and
to promote the disclosure of relevant information. It does not restrain
the court's subject matter jurisdiction, its jurisdiction over the parties,
or its jurisdiction over the particular case. To the extent that the local
rule appears to employ mandatory language, the local court must follow its
own rule. See Meredith, 679 N.E.2d at 1311. Upon a failure to do so,
however, the court's subsequent action is not void. Rather, as with other
trial errors, the error may be presented upon appeal if a specific and
timely objection was made.
In the present case, the dissolution trial court record included an
express written "Waiver of Domestic Relations Disclosure Form" signed by
each of the parties, and examined and approved by the trial judge. There
was no specific and timely objection to the court's entry of a dissolution
decree notwithstanding the absence of a disclosure form filed pursuant to
the local rule. Nor was there a timely objection to the court's acceptance
of the parties' written waiver contrary to the provision in the local rule
requiring that both parties be represented by counsel as a precondition to
waiver. We therefore reject the appellate claim that noncompliance with
Howard County Local Civil Rule 16(B)(4) requires the dissolution decree to
be vacated.
Because Kim's appeal from the denial of her T.R. 60 motion presented
several additional issues for consideration, we remand to the Court of
Appeals for further proceedings.
SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, BOEHM and RUCKER, JJ., concur.