Attorney for Appellant
John Pinnow
Greenwood, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Jeffrey A. Modisett
Attorney General of Indiana
Thomas D. Perkins
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
RONALD WILLIAMS,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 49S00-9903-CR-204
)
)
)
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE MARION COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Cale Bradford, Judge
Cause No. 49G03-9807-CF-123641
ON DIRECT APPEAL
June 28, 2001
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Ronald Williams was convicted of murder for cracking a
man’s skull with a metal pole. We find the force of the blow itself
provided sufficient evidence that the defendant knowingly killed the
victim. We also agree with the trial court that a witness’s prior drug use
and past work as a police informant were not relevant and that the
prosecutor’s failure to disclose certain police notes until trial did not
require reversal in these cicumstances.
Background
The facts most favorable to the verdict indicate that on May 29,
1998, Matthew McGarvey went with a friend to buy crack cocaine on the near
eastside of Indianapolis. McGarvey got out of the vehicle and approached a
crowd of people. At the same time, Adair Smith was on the same street
buying drugs. She saw McGarvey beaten by Defendant Ronald Williams and
several other men. She saw Defendant pick up a black metal pole and hit
McGarvey once in the head, knocking him to the ground. The impact was so
severe that Smith heard a cracking sound when he was hit. After McGarvey
was knocked to the ground, the group of men continued to beat and kick him.
McGarvey was hospitalized for eight days before he died. His skull was
fractured and he died as a result of the head injury.
Defendant was convicted of Murder.[1] Defendant also pled guilty to
being a habitual offender.[2]
Discussion
I
Defendant contends that the State’s evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for murder. See Appellant’s Br. at 10. He argues
that “[t]he State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams was
aware of a high probability that he would kill McGarvey by striking him one
time in the head with a metal pole.” Id. at 13.
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Court neither
reweighs the evidence nor assesses the credibility of the witnesses. See
Garland v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 (Ind. 1999). We look to the
evidence most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom. See Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999). We will
affirm the conviction if there is probative evidence from which a
reasonable jury could have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Brown v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1157, 1158 (Ind. 1999).
To convict a defendant of murder, the State must prove that the
defendant “knowingly or intentionally” killed the victim. Ind. Code § 35-
42-1-1. To “knowingly” kill requires, at a minimum, an awareness on the
part of the defendant of a high probability that death will result from his
actions. See Storey v. State, 552 N.E.2d 477, 483 (Ind. 1990). In
deciding whether a defendant was aware of the high probability that his
actions would result in the death of a victim, the jury may consider the
duration and brutality of a defendant’s actions, and the relative strengths
and sizes of a defendant and victim. See Childers v. State, 719 N.E.2d
1227, 1229 (Ind. 1999); Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334, 339 (Ind. 1992).
We find that the evidence was sufficient to find Defendant guilty of
murder. According to the evidence, Defendant struck McGarvey once with a
metal pole. The degree of force was equivalent to a fall from a height
greater than ten to twelve feet. The impact caused the victim’s brain to
swell and a portion of the brain shifted to the left side of the head.
In his defense, Defendant cites Nunn, where the Court held that there
was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for murder where the
defendant struck the victim once with his hands from behind and she died a
short time later. Id. at 338-39. Defendant claims that this case is
similar since the evidence here suggests that Defendant only struck the
victim once.
In Nunn, however, the Court also stated that “an intent to kill may be
inferred from a single blow.” Id. at 334. In Nunn we stated, “[the
defendant] struck [the victim] once with his hands, and ... the cause of
death, a severed vertebral artery, is an unusual injury.” Id. Here, in
contrast to Nunn, the State presented evidence of a vicious blow to the
head with a hard object. The injury was not uncommon for that kind of
impact. A jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that Defendant
knowingly killed the victim.
II
Defendant contends that “the court abused its discretion in excluding
evidence that [a witness] previously worked for the State as a confidential
informant while she was using drugs.” Appellant’s Br. at 15.
At trial, Adair Smith identified Defendant as one of McGarvey’s
attackers. She testified that she had gone to 21st and LaSalle Streets to
buy drugs on May 29, 1998, the night of the attack. There she saw the men
beating McGarvey and saw Defendant strike McGarvey with a metal pole,
causing McGarvey to fall to the ground. And she saw the other men kick and
punch McGarvey when he was down. Smith also testified at trial that she
smoked crack and marijuana on May 29 and throughout 1998.
Smith did not go to the police initially. Her boyfriend had agreed
to go to speak with the police about a different homicide and she
accompanied him. She testified that she was worried that her boyfriend was
in trouble. She told Detective Prater that she knew about a beating at
21st and LaSalle and she gave a statement and identified the attackers.
At a pretrial deposition, Smith testified that she had previously
worked as a confidential drug informant for the Lawrence Police in return
for not filing prostitution charges against her. She worked for them for
about two and a half years, starting in 1995. Smith testified that she
smoked crack while working as an informant and claimed that her police
supervisor knew she was using drugs. The trial court granted the State’s
motion in limine to exclude evidence of Smith’s prior drug use. The court,
however, allowed defense counsel to ask about her drug use at the time of
the crime.
Defendant argues that the court should have allowed evidence of
Smith’s past drug use and her work as an informant, claiming it “was
relevant to evaluating her credibility.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. Smith did
testify that she was afraid that her boyfriend was in trouble, and that she
had worked as an informant in the past in order to avoid prostitution
charges. Defendant maintains that this information suggests that Smith
“would do what was necessary to get the police to not [sic] pursue other
criminal charges.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. Defendant sought to argue that
Smith was a biased witness because she “did what she believed was necessary
to get [her boyfriend] off the hook by providing information about the
instant homicide.” Id.
“The trial court has wide latitude in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence and in determining its relevancy.” Kremer v. State, 514 N.E.2d
1068, 1073 (Ind. 1987). We review a trial court’s ruling as to relevance
for an abuse of discretion. See Anderson v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1101, 1103
(Ind. 1999); Willsey v. State, 698 N.E.2d 784, 793 (Ind. 1998). And even
if the trial court erroneously excludes admissible evidence, we will not
reverse a defendant’s conviction unless his substantial rights have been
affected. See Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ind. 1995);
Schwestak v. State, 674 N.E.2d 962, 965 (Ind. 1996).
The trial court stated that Smith’s prior drug use and work as an
informant was “not related to this case.” Evidence is not relevant unless
it has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. See Ind. Evidence Rule 401; Jackson v.
State, 712 N.E.2d 986, 988 (Ind. 1999).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
prohibiting testimony of Smith’s prior drug use. Defendant was allowed to,
and did, cross-examine Smith about her drug use on the day of the killing
and at the time of the trial. The trial court only prohibited Defendant
from asking Smith about her prior drug use. Defendant does not attempt to
argue that the prior drug use goes to Smith’s character but rather to her
credibility. He says that “[i]t is more likely that she lied to her case
officers about her continuing drug use.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. But
Defendant did not and does not present any evidence that she lied to her
case officers or anyone else about her past drug use. Even had there been
evidence that she had lied, it appears that such evidence would have been
inadmissible under Evid. R. 608(b) as constituting extrinsic acts used to
prove credibility.
We also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
prohibiting the testimony of Smith’s work as an informant in the past in
exchange for the police dropping charges. Defendant contends that her
testimony in this case was similarly motivated—that she testified to get
her boyfriend out of trouble. Id. at 19-20. Although Smith said in her
pretrial deposition that she thought her boyfriend was in trouble, she only
referred to the time that she gave her initial statement to the police.
Defendant did not and does not cite any evidence showing that Smith’s
boyfriend was in any danger of being prosecuted or that she remained in
fear of him being prosecuted. The trial court permitted Defendant to
question Smith about ulterior motives and bias in her testimony; Smith was
cross examined about her fear that her boyfriend was in trouble. The trial
court also allowed questions pertaining to any incentives she was receiving
for testifying. While there may be situations where prior service as a
police informant would be relevant to evaluating the credibility of a
witness, the connection here is simply too attenuated to find that the
trial court abused its discretion.
III
Defendant contends that “the court abused its discretion in denying
Williams’ motion to dismiss when the State had not timely complied with a
discovery order.” Appellant’s Br. at 20.
During the second day of trial, Defendant became aware of evidence
that the prosecutor had not disclosed. A State’s witness, Detective Mark
Prater, had 100 to 150 pages of handwritten notes of which Defendant was
not aware even though the prosecutor’s office had a copy of the notes.
Defendant had requested production of “all statements, notations,
memoranda or reports … prepared by any witnesses whom the State of Indiana
intends to call during the trial of this cause.” Under the Marion Superior
Court Division Rule 7(2), the State was required to disclose “[t]he names
and last known addresses of persons whom the State intends to call as
witnesses, with their relevant written or recorded statements,” and “any
material or information within its possession that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused.”
In the State’s notices of discovery compliance, the State listed
Prater on its witness list, but never disclosed the existence of the notes.
The notes revealed that the police department or victims assistance
provided money to Smith to stay at a motel one or two nights when her
electricity was shut off. Defendant moved for dismissal based on the new
information, arguing that evidence that Smith was receiving consideration
for her trial testimony was impeachment evidence relevant to the jury’s
assessment of her credibility. See Appellant’s Br. at 25. The trial court
denied Defendant’s motion, finding that Defendant suffered no prejudice.
The State’s failure to disclose the notes was a violation of the trial
court’s discovery order. See Goodner v. State, 714 N.E.2d 638, 642-3 (Ind.
1999); Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ind. 1999). But “trial
courts are given wide discretionary latitude in discovery matters and their
rulings will be given deference on appeal. Absent clear error and
resulting prejudice, the trial court’s determination of violations and
sanctions will be affirmed.”[3] Id. (citations omitted). There is no
indication that Defendant suffered prejudice by the State’s failure to
disclose Prater’s notes. The notes were produced and Prater was cross-
examined about them. Smith was also available to testify about the hotel
and any other benefits she received from the State. Under these
circumstances, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (1993).
[2] Id. § 35-50-2-8 (Supp. 1996).
[3] Although the trial court did not find any misconduct on the part
of any of the lawyers, we remain deeply concerned about discovery
violations by the State. Goodner, 714 N.E.2d at 642 (“We cannot continue to
tolerate late inning surprises later justified in the name of harmless
error. Continued abuses of this sort may require a prophylactic rule
requiring reversal.”). This case was tried prior to our decision in
Goodner.