ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARCE GONZALEZ, JR. JEFFREY A. MODISETT
Merrillville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JANET BROWN MALLETT
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
MARK E. HENRY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
) Supreme Court Cause Number
v. ) 45S00-9810-CR-558
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable James Clement, Judge
Cause No. 45G04-9704-CF-159
ON DIRECT APPEAL
November 16, 2000
RUCKER, Justice
A jury convicted Mark Henry of murder in the stabbing death of antique
storeowner Carol Nelson. The trial court sentenced him to sixty-five years
imprisonment. In this direct appeal, Henry raises one issue for our
review: did the trial court err by admitting Henry’s confession into
evidence? We find no error and therefore affirm.
Facts
The facts most favorable to the verdict show that on August 5, 1997,
Henry entered an antique store in Hobart, Indiana. An elderly couple,
Carol and William Nelson, owned the store. Alone at the time, Mrs. Nelson
became engaged in an argument with Henry. Wielding a carpenter’s knife,
Henry slit Mrs. Nelson’s throat, emptied the cash register, and left.
Afterwards Henry fled to Wisconsin driving a sports utility vehicle that
his girlfriend had reported stolen. Wisconsin authorities arrested Henry
for the stolen vehicle after he led them on a two-hour, high-speed chase.
Officers of the Hobart Police Department later went to Wisconsin and
questioned Henry about the antique store killing. After a short interview,
Henry confessed to the crime telling the officers that he had gone to the
store to sell an antique rocker and “he got into an argument with the gray
haired lady wearing glasses there. . . .[,] a scuffle ensued[,] and [] he
cut her.” R. at 437. Henry then “took money from the register and left.”
Id. Thereafter, Henry was arrested and charged with murder. Prior to
trial Henry filed a motion to suppress the statement, which the trial court
denied. At trial the statement was admitted into evidence over Henry’s
timely objection. The jury convicted Henry as charged, and the trial court
sentenced him to an enhanced term of sixty-five years. This direct appeal
followed. Additional facts are set forth below.
Discussion
Henry contends the interrogating officer obtained his confession
solely through deceit and thus the trial court erred by admitting it into
evidence. When a defendant challenges the admissibility of his confession,
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was
given voluntarily. Carter v. State, 730 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind. 2000);
Schmitt v. State, 730 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. 2000).[1] The voluntariness of
a confession is determined from the “totality of the circumstances.” Berry
v. State, 703 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ind. 1998). The “totality of the
circumstances” test focuses on the entire interrogation, not on any single
act by police or condition of the suspect. Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d
1073, 1079 (Ind. 1989). We review the record for evidence of inducement by
way of violence, threats, promises, or other improper influences. Berry,
703 N.E.2d at 157.
The record shows that during the police interrogation, officers
informed Henry that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime
and that someone present in the basement of the antique store identified
Henry as the person who killed Mrs. Nelson. R. at 459-60. Neither
statement was true. While not condoning such tactics, this Court has
upheld the trial court’s admission of a defendant’s statement into evidence
on facts more egregious than those presented here. See Light, 547 N.E.2d
at 1079 (holding that the trial court did not err by admitting defendant’s
statement despite evidence of a four-hour interrogation
punctuated by conduct of the interrogators involving cursing, lying, and
smacking the defendant on the arm). Henry acknowledges Light but urges us
to revisit that decision and “announce a bright line rule which would
render inadmissible[] a confession obtained solely by deceitful police
activity.” Brief of Appellant at 9.
We see no reason in this case to depart from the “totality of the
circumstances” test and thus decline Henry’s invitation. Although we
continue to disapprove of deceptive police interrogation tactics, such
conduct is not conclusive but rather weighs heavily against the
voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d
1075, 1080 (Ind. 1996). In the end, we must determine whether the police
conduct overbore Henry’s will, thus rendering his statement involuntary.
Lynch v. State, 632 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ind. 1994).
The record shows, and the trial court found, that Henry is a carpenter
by trade and of average intelligence; the interrogation was very brief
(lasting approximately one hour); Henry was Mirandized three times; after
being Mirandized on the third occasion, Henry indicated that he understood
his rights; the police made no threats or promises to Henry; Henry did not
ask for an attorney;[2] and he was not intoxicated or sleep-deprived. R.
at 256-59. Balanced against the officer’s obvious deception, these facts
tip the scales in favor of the conclusion that Henry’s statement was not
involuntary. We also observe that Henry actually gave two incriminating
statements: the first, unrecorded and accompanied by police deceit;
the second, audiotaped with no hint of police deception. It was the
second, audiotaped confession, that was admitted into evidence. R. at 439.
We have held “even if the earlier statements were the result of an
improper custodial interrogation, the results of this later station-house
interrogation, where [the defendant] had been properly apprised of his
rights, would remain admissible.” Deckard v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind.
1996). For this additional reason, the trial court did not err by
admitting Henry’s confession into evidence.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON and BOEHM, JJ., concur.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs in result without separate opinion.
-----------------------
[1] We note that the U.S. Constitution requires the State to prove
only by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s confession was
voluntarily given. Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238, 1246-47 n.11 (Ind.
1997) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1986); Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972)). However, in Indiana we require the
State to prove the voluntariness of a confession beyond a reasonable doubt,
and trial courts are bound to apply this standard when evaluating such
claims.
[2] Henry takes issue with the trial court’s findings that he did not
ask for an attorney. However, the record shows the following exchange
between the deputy prosecutor and the interrogating officer: “Q. Referring
to the statement that you took from Mark Henry on the 7th. At any time,
did Mark Henry ask you for an attorney? A. He did not. . . . Q. Did you
ever tell him that he doesn’t need an attorney? A. No.” R. at 239.
Although Henry disputes the officer’s claim, it is for the trial court and
not this Court to judge witness credibility.