ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Hilary Bowe Oakes Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
In The
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
KEITH SCRUGGS, )
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) 49S00-9908-CR-457
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
Plaintiff-Appellee. )
________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jane Magnus-Stinson
Cause No. 49G06-9806-CF-092690
________________________________________________
On Direct Appeal
October 31, 2000
DICKSON, Justice
The defendant, Keith Scruggs, was convicted of two counts of
murder[1] and one count of carrying a handgun without a license[2] for the
June 1, 1998, slaying of Cheron Lucas and Londa Oliver. He received a
total sentence of 120 years. Concluding that his convictions were based on
sufficient evidence and that his sentence was not manifestly unreasonable,
we affirm.
The defendant contends that there was not sufficient evidence of
probative value to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was the person
who shot Lucas and Oliver. He argues that the State's witnesses were not
sufficiently credible to support the convictions.
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we will affirm the
conviction unless, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences
favorable to the judgment, and neither reweighing the evidence nor judging
the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000); Webster v.
State, 699 N.E.2d 266, 268 (Ind. 1998); Hodge v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1246,
1247-48 (Ind. 1997).
The following facts are favorable to the judgment. The defendant
with his friend and girlfriend went to another friend’s house. The
defendant entered the residence which was occupied by several people. Upon
recognizing one of the occupants, Lucas, as a man who had robbed him five
or six months before, the defendant pulled out a revolver. One person
asked the defendant if "this was a joke," to which the defendant replied,
"this is no [expletive deleted] joke." Record at 225. Lucas ran into a
bedroom and shut the door. As the defendant tried to open the door, Lucas
tried to hold it closed. The defendant finally forced the door open and
shots were fired as he entered the bedroom. Lucas died from multiple
gunshot wounds. Oliver, another occupant of the room, was killed by a
single bullet wound to her head. No witnesses testified as to who fired
the shots, but there was no evidence that anyone else in the bedroom had a
gun other than the defendant.
The defendant argues that the inference that he was the shooter was
merely speculation and conjecture and that the State's witnesses were not
sufficiently credible to support the convictions. We disagree. From the
evidence and its reasonable inferences, a reasonable jury could find beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed
Lucas and Oliver.
The defendant also contends his sentences of sixty years for each
murder to run consecutively are manifestly unreasonable. Sentencing is
normally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Elmore v. State,
657 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 1995). Although this Court is empowered to
review and revise criminal sentences, we will not do so unless the sentence
is "'manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.'" Prowell v. State, 687 N.E.2d 563, 568 (Ind.
1997)(quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 17(B)), cert. denied 525 U.S. 841, 119
S.Ct. 104, 142 L.Ed.2d 83 (1998). We have emphasized that "'the issue is
not whether in our judgment the sentence is unreasonable, but whether it is
clearly, plainly, and obviously so.'" Thacker v. State, 709 N.E.2d 3, 10
(Ind. 1999)(quoting Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 779, 783-84 (Ind. 1998));
Prowell, 687 N.E.2d at 568.
Both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender
support the enhanced, consecutive sentences in this case. In cases
involving multiple killings, the imposition of consecutive sentences is
appropriate. Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ind. 2000). The
defendant without provocation shot two unarmed people, continuing in his
course of action even after repeated pleas from his friends to stop. Also,
the defendant has both a juvenile and an adult criminal record, and the
defendant was on probation at the time of the killings. His sentence of
120 years is not manifestly unreasonable.[3]
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and BOEHM and RUCKER, JJ., concur. SULLIVAN, J.,
concurs in result.
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[1] Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
[2] Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1.
[3] Included in the defendant's argument asserting manifest
unreasonableness are references to provisions of the Indiana Constitution
requiring penalties to be proportional to the nature of the offense and
requiring the penal code to be founded on principles of reformation and not
vindictive justice. Ind. Const. art. I, §§ 16, 18. Although the defendant
does not present these as independent appellate claims, we find that they
would be unavailing. A sentence may be found not proportional when a
criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of an
offense. Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind. 2000); Conner v.
State, 626 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. 1993); Hollars v. State, 259 Ind. 229,
236, 286 N.E.2d 166, 170 (Ind. 1972)). Given the circumstances presented
in this case, this sentence of 120 years imprisonment is not
disproportional to the nature of the offenses committed. With respect to
the need to seek reformation and avoid vindictive justice, we have
repeatedly stated that Section 18 applies only to the penal code as a whole
and not to individual sentences. Henson v. State, 707 N.E.2d 792, 796
(Ind. 1999).