________________________________________________________________________
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee
Patrick R. Ragains Karen M. Freeman-Wilson
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of
Indiana
Arthur Thaddeus Perry
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
________________________________________________________________________
IN THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT
CHRISTOPHER NICHOLSON, )
)
Appellant (Defendant below), ) Cause No.
v. ) 48S00-9907-CR-395
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee (Plaintiff below). )
________________________________________________________________________
APPEAL FROM MADISON SUPERIOR COURT 3
The Honorable Thomas Newman, Jr.
Cause No. 48D03-9710-CF-405
________________________________________________________________________
ON DIRECT APPEAL
________________________________________________________________________
September 13, 2000
Per Curiam
The appellant, Christopher Nicholson, appeals from his convictions
and sentences on eight counts, including Murder and Robbery. These
convictions and sentences were entered in connection with the stealing of a
car and credit card and the confinement and murder of a single victim.
The trial court imposed sentences for both Murder and Felony Murder.
As the State of Indiana, by its Attorney General, concedes, we have long
held that such a sentence is impermissible where there is only one victim.
The Felony Murder conviction should be vacated. Franks v. State, 262 Ind.
649, 656, 323 N.E.2d 221, 225 (1975); Garrett v. State, 714 N.E.2d 618,
621 (Ind. 1999); Appellee’s Br., p. 8.
Similarly, the State concedes the impropriety of the trial court
imposing two sentences of Life Without Parole where there is only one
victim. Appellee’s Br., p. 8.
Further, and again as the State points out, a court cannot sentence a
defendant to both a term of years and to Life Without Parole for the same
offense. Appellee’s Br., p. 9.
There are additional problems with the sentencing order. A sentence
of Life Without Parole is imposed under the same standards and is subject
to the same requirements as a capital sentence. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9;
Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 936 (Ind. 1998). In Harrison v. State, we
held that the sentencing order in a capital case requires greater
specificity than in other types of cases, and discussed those more
stringent standards. 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1262 (Ind. 1995). In Farber v.
State, we remanded for resentencing where the trial court failed to meet
the requirements of Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 in imposing a sentence of Life
Without Parole. 703 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1998). As the State of Indiana
additionally concedes, the sentencing order in this case does not comply
with Harrison. Appellee’s Br., p. 5.
The cause is remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing
and the entry of proper sentencing order, after which a new appeal may be
taken in accordance with the procedures set out in a separately issued
order.
All Justices concur.