FOR THE RESPONDENT FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
James Voyles Donald R. Lundberg, Executive
Secretary
One Virginia Ave. Seth T. Pruden, Staff Attorney
Indianapolis, IN 46204 115 East Washington St., Ste. 1060
Indianapolis, IN 46204
___________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF )
) Case No. 12S00-9810-DI-615
PAUL D. EDMISTON )
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
May 25, 2000
Per Curiam
The Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission charged the
respondent, Paul D. Edmiston, with violating the Rules of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys at Law for committing a criminal act, public
indecency, which reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. Our
jurisdiction in this case is derived from the respondent’s admission to the
bar of this state on October 10, 1973. The Disciplinary Commission and the
respondent have entered into a Statement of Circumstances and Conditional
Agreement for Discipline, which we accept. This opinion sets forth the
facts and circumstances of this case.
The respondent and the Commission agree that, during relevant times,
the respondent was serving as the chief deputy prosecutor for Clinton
County, Indiana. On June 23, 1998, the respondent was found guilty in the
Marion Superior Court of three counts of public indecency, each a class “A”
misdemeanor. These convictions stemmed from the respondent’s conduct on
three separate occasions in 1996, when witnesses observed the respondent
with his penis exposed, masturbating in an Indianapolis office building
while following female office workers. The respondent was sentenced to a
one year suspended sentence on each of the three counts and was placed on
probation for a period of two years.
The respondent was serving as the chief deputy prosecuting attorney of
Clinton County when he committed his criminal acts. Further, we cannot
overlook that the respondent was previously accused, arrested, and charged
with conduct nearly identical in nature to that which he was convicted in
this case. Although acquitted in the earlier case after a court trial, the
fact that he had been accused and charged of that conduct clearly had
little deterrent effect on the respondent when he engaged in the conduct
for which he was charged in 1998. We are also mindful of the serial nature
of the respondent’s criminal acts. For these reasons, we find that the
respondent’s commission of the crime of public indecency reflects adversely
on his trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer in violation of
Ind.Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b).
We now turn to assessment of the sanction to which the parties have
agreed, that being a suspension from the practice of law for two years.
That the respondent was serving as the chief deputy prosecuting attorney
aggravates his misconduct. We also note that the respondent’s criminal
actions cannot be attributed to ignorance of the law or an instantaneous
lapse of judgment. Instead, three times the respondent purposefully
engaged in criminal conduct for his own selfish gratification. We
therefore ascribe a high degree of culpability to his actions.
Similar acts by lawyers have resulted in harsh sanction. For example,
this Court suspended for one year a lawyer who masturbated in the presence
of female clients and his babysitter. Matter of Weir, 668 N.E. 2d 679
(Ind. 1996). A lawyer who engaged in non-consensual touching of young
males, including his clients, was suspended for not less than three years.
Matter of Wells, 572 N.E. 2d 1290 (Ind. 1991). We accept the present
conditional agreement’s provision calling for a two year suspension.
It is, therefore, ordered that the respondent be suspended for a
period of not fewer than two (2) years, beginning July 3, 2000. At such
time as the respondent completes this term of suspension, he may seek
reinstatement to the bar of this State, provided he satisfies the
requirements set forth in Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 23(4).
The clerk of this Court is directed to provide notice of this order in
accordance with Admis.Disc.R. 23(3)(d) and to provide the clerk of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the clerk of each
of the United States District Courts in this state, and the clerks of the
United States Bankruptcy Courts in this state with the last known address
of respondent as reflected in the records of the clerk.
Costs of this proceeding are assessed against the respondent.