UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1734
ROGER BARBER; EDDIE SIMMONS, JR.,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
and
ERIC GODFREY; RYAN YOUNG, for themselves and on behalf of
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JTEKT AUTOMOTIVE VIRGINIA, INC.; JTEKT NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief
District Judge. (7:09-cv-00441-GEC)
Submitted: February 28, 2013 Decided: March 11, 2013
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Terry N. Grimes, TERRY N. GRIMES, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellants. Thomas M. Winn, III, Victor O. Cardwell, Frank K.
Friedman, Frank H. Hupfl, WOODS ROGERS PLC, Roanoke, Virginia,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
After a trial, a federal jury found for the Appellees
on the Appellants’ discrimination claims, and the district court
entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Appellants
argue on appeal that the district court erred in allowing the
Appellees to use one of their peremptory strikes to strike the
only African-American juror from the venire and in admitting
evidence containing hearsay at trial. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
The Appellants first challenge the district court’s
rejection of their challenge to the Appellees’ use of one of
their peremptory strikes to strike the only African-American
juror from the venire. Before the district court, the Appellees
stated that they had struck the juror because he was the only
member of the venire without an education above grade school and
the district court found this to be a legitimate, race-neutral
explanation for use of the strike.
The Equal Protection Clause prevents racial
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes at a civil
jury trial. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 618-28 (1991); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). When a party makes a Batson challenge, that party must
first establish a prima facie case that the strike was made on
the basis of race; the burden then shifts to the striking party
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to provide a non-discriminatory reason for the use of the
strike; the challenging party must then show that the proffered
reasons are pretextual and that the other party engaged in
intentional discrimination. United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d
358, 380 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted), petition for cert.
filed (U.S. Dec. 21, 2012) (No. 12-7923). Further,“[w]e accord
great deference to the district court’s finding as to whether a
peremptory challenge was exercised for a prohibited,
discriminatory reason; we review that finding for clear error.”
United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 377 (4th Cir. 2010). This
is so because the “outcome of a typical Batson challenge turns
largely on an evaluation of credibility and whether counsel’s
race-neutral explanation for a particular challenge is
believed,” a determination that the “district court is
especially well suited to make.” Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 379.
Applying these standards and having thoroughly reviewed the
record, we conclude that the district court did not commit clear
error in accepting the Appellees’ reason for striking the juror.
The Appellants next argue that the court erred in
admitting in evidence an email that contained hearsay statements
by a non-testifying witness. “We review a trial court’s rulings
on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, and we
will only overturn an evidentiary ruling that is arbitrary and
irrational.” United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153 (4th Cir.
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2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will not “set
aside or reverse a judgment on the grounds that evidence was
erroneously admitted unless justice so requires or a party’s
substantial rights are affected.” Creekmore v. Maryview Hosp.,
662 F.3d 686, 693 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 61).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the court did not
commit reversible error in admitting the evidence.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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