FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 21, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
BYRON KYLE GAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 12-1324
(D.C. No. 1:11-CV-03128-WJH-MEH)
DANNY ROJAS; KRIS KRONCKE; (D. Colo.)
JOHN DOES 1-5,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before O’BRIEN, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Byron Kyle Gay, proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint seeking relief for alleged violations of his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. He also seeks leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Gay’s complaint is based upon a November 28,
2008, incident, but he did not file the underlying complaint until December 1, 2011.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
The magistrate judge recommended Gay’s complaint be dismissed because it
was filed outside of the two-year statute of limitations for civil rights claims. Gay
did not file objections to the recommended dismissal, and the district court adopted
the recommendation and dismissed the complaint. Gay then filed a motion for relief
under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending the prison
mailroom improperly marked the mail containing the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation (R&R) as “refused” and returned it to the court. Since he had no
knowledge of the refusal and return, he claims to have been prevented, through no
fault of his own, from filing timely objections to the R&R. The district court denied
the Rule 60(b) motion. Gay appeals from the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion and the
dismissal of his complaint. We affirm.
In his Rule 60(b) motion and on appeal, Gay contends the district court
inappropriately denied his request to file belated objections to the R&R. He presents
an arguable case, but we need not decide the issue because the district court did not
base its denial solely on a waiver rationale, explaining:
More importantly, . . . Plaintiff has had an opportunity to put forth his
position on the limitations issue. Plaintiff filed an opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in which he set forth his argument as to
why his claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff also
submitted evidence in support of his argument. Before adopting
Magistrate Judge Hegarty’s Recommendation, the Court considered
both Plaintiff’s arguments and evidence but did not find either
persuasive.
R. at 119 (record citations omitted). In essence the district court looked past the
technical problems to the merits (including the statute-of-limitations issue). It
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considered Gay’s evidence and arguments (which were already before the court) with
respect to those issues. Since Gay has fully aired his arguments in the district court
and again on appeal, we will take the most expedient path to a resolution of this
matter by conducting a de novo review.1
Gay complains about the dismissal of his complaint on statute-of-limitations
grounds and the denial of his request to amend his complaint to add the City of
Denver as a defendant. He also argues the merits of his underlying complaint,
asserting his constitutional rights were violated. With regard to these arguments, we
affirm for substantially the same reasons stated in the “Recommendation of United
States Magistrate Judge” filed June 12, 2012, and the district court’s order adopting
the recommendation filed July 9, 2012.
We grant Gay’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal, but doing so only relieves
him of prepayment, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), it does not excuse him from paying the
filing and docketing fees in full. He is obligated to continue making partial payments
until all fees are paid.
1
“[W]e have adopted a firm waiver rule when a party fails to object to the
findings and recommendations of the magistrate.” Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d
656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our firm waiver rule, “failure to make timely
objection to the magistrate’s findings or recommendations waives appellate review of
both factual and legal questions.” Id. The firm waiver rule, however, does not apply
(1) when a pro se litigant was not notified of the time period for filing an objection
and the consequences for failing to do so, (2) when the interests of justice warrant, or
(3) when the party that failed to object makes a showing of plain error. See Wardell
v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 958 (10th Cir. 2006). The exceptional facts of this case
warrant departure from normal practice.
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AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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