12-2726-cv
Connolly v. Calvanese
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 25th day of March, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 CHESTER J. STRAUB,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 RICHARD J. CONNOLLY,
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 -v.- 12-2726-cv
17
18 JOSEPH F. CALVANESE AND ROBERT
19 COLEMAN,
20 Defendants-Appellees.
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22
23 FOR APPELLANT: Russell A. Schindler, Kingston,
24 New York.
25
26 FOR APPELLEES: Denise A. Hartman and Frank
27 Brady, Assistant Solicitors
28 General, Barbara D. Underwood,
1
1 Solicitor General, for Eric T.
2 Schneiderman, Attorney General
3 of the State of New York,
4 Albany, New York.
5
6 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
7 Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.).
8
9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
10 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
11 AFFIRMED.
12
13 Richard J. Connolly appeals from the judgment of the
14 United States District Court for the Northern District of
15 New York (McAvoy, J.), granting summary judgment to Troopers
16 Joseph F. Calvanese and Robert Coleman, and thereby
17 dismissing Connolly’s claims of false arrest, malicious
18 prosecution, and use of excessive force. We assume the
19 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
20 procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
21
22 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
23 the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving
24 party and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in that
25 party’s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. School Dist.,
26 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is
27 appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
28 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
29 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Where the record
30 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
31 find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for
32 trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
33 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34 “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of
35 which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
36 reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt
37 that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion
38 for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
39 (2007).
40
41 Connolly argues that there are genuine issues of
42 material fact with regard to his false arrest, malicious
43 prosecution, and excessive force claims. False arrest and
44 malicious prosecution claims are barred if the officer had
45 probable cause to make the arrest. Singer v. Fulton Cnty.
46 Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
47 Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007);
2
1 Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003).
2 The undisputed facts--including the toll collector’s radio
3 dispatch reporting Connolly as a suspected impaired driver,
4 Connolly’s illegal U-turn, and his illegal parking--support
5 the district court’s determination that Calvanese had
6 probable cause to arrest Connolly for suspected DWI and
7 initiate proceedings against him.
8
9 As to Connolly’s claim that Coleman used excessive
10 force in fingerprinting him, Connolly’s version of events is
11 blatantly contradicted by the record evidence, such that no
12 reasonable jury could believe it. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380;
13 see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553-55
14 (2d Cir. 2005). Most significantly, his story that Coleman
15 dislocated his left arm while pulling on it in order to make
16 a single impression of all of his fingers is belied by the
17 fingerprint card, which shows that Connolly’s left digits
18 were printed one at a time.
19
20 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
21 Connolly’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of
22 the district court.
23
24 FOR THE COURT:
25 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
26
3