Connolly v. Calvanese

12-2726-cv Connolly v. Calvanese UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 25th day of March, two thousand thirteen. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 Chief Judge, 8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 9 CHESTER J. STRAUB, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 13 RICHARD J. CONNOLLY, 14 Plaintiff-Appellant, 15 16 -v.- 12-2726-cv 17 18 JOSEPH F. CALVANESE AND ROBERT 19 COLEMAN, 20 Defendants-Appellees. 21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 22 23 FOR APPELLANT: Russell A. Schindler, Kingston, 24 New York. 25 26 FOR APPELLEES: Denise A. Hartman and Frank 27 Brady, Assistant Solicitors 28 General, Barbara D. Underwood, 1 1 Solicitor General, for Eric T. 2 Schneiderman, Attorney General 3 of the State of New York, 4 Albany, New York. 5 6 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 7 Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, J.). 8 9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 10 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be 11 AFFIRMED. 12 13 Richard J. Connolly appeals from the judgment of the 14 United States District Court for the Northern District of 15 New York (McAvoy, J.), granting summary judgment to Troopers 16 Joseph F. Calvanese and Robert Coleman, and thereby 17 dismissing Connolly’s claims of false arrest, malicious 18 prosecution, and use of excessive force. We assume the 19 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 20 procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 21 22 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing 23 the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving 24 party and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in that 25 party’s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. School Dist., 26 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is 27 appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any 28 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 29 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Where the record 30 taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to 31 find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for 32 trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 33 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). 34 “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of 35 which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no 36 reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt 37 that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion 38 for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 39 (2007). 40 41 Connolly argues that there are genuine issues of 42 material fact with regard to his false arrest, malicious 43 prosecution, and excessive force claims. False arrest and 44 malicious prosecution claims are barred if the officer had 45 probable cause to make the arrest. Singer v. Fulton Cnty. 46 Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1995); see also 47 Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007); 2 1 Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003). 2 The undisputed facts--including the toll collector’s radio 3 dispatch reporting Connolly as a suspected impaired driver, 4 Connolly’s illegal U-turn, and his illegal parking--support 5 the district court’s determination that Calvanese had 6 probable cause to arrest Connolly for suspected DWI and 7 initiate proceedings against him. 8 9 As to Connolly’s claim that Coleman used excessive 10 force in fingerprinting him, Connolly’s version of events is 11 blatantly contradicted by the record evidence, such that no 12 reasonable jury could believe it. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380; 13 see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553-55 14 (2d Cir. 2005). Most significantly, his story that Coleman 15 dislocated his left arm while pulling on it in order to make 16 a single impression of all of his fingers is belied by the 17 fingerprint card, which shows that Connolly’s left digits 18 were printed one at a time. 19 20 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in 21 Connolly’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of 22 the district court. 23 24 FOR THE COURT: 25 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 26 3