United States v. Spencer

12-1914-cr United States v. Spencer UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 26th day of March, two thousand thirteen. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 Chief Judge, 8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 9 CHESTER J. STRAUB, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 14 Plaintiff-Appellant, 15 16 -v.- 12-1914-cr 17 18 STACEY T. SPENCER, SR., 19 Defendant-Appellee. 20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 21 22 FOR APPELLANT: MONICA J. RICHARDS, Assistant 23 United States Attorney, for 24 William J. Hochul, Jr., United 25 States Attorney for the Western 26 District of New York, Buffalo, 27 New York. 28 1 1 FOR APPELLEE: EDWARD EARL KEY, Law Office of 2 Edward Early Key, Buffalo, New 3 York. 4 5 Appeal from an order of the United States District 6 Court for the Western District of New York (Skretny, C.J.). 7 8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 9 AND DECREED that the order of the district court be 10 AFFIRMED. 11 12 The United States of America appeals from the order of 13 the United States District Court for the Western District of 14 New York (Skretny, C.J.), adopting the report and 15 recommendation of the magistrate (Scott, M.J.), granting 16 Stacey T. Spencer, Sr.’s motion to suppress evidence 17 discovered pursuant to a search of his car. We assume the 18 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the 19 procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 20 21 In reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion to 22 suppress, we review the factual findings for clear error, 23 viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 24 prevailing party, and we review legal conclusions de novo. 25 United States v. Murphy, 703 F.3d 182, 188-89 (2d Cir. 26 2012). 27 28 When a search is conducted pursuant to a subject’s 29 purported consent, the government must “demonstrate that the 30 consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of 31 duress or coercion, express or implied.” Schneckloth v. 32 Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). “The standard for 33 measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth 34 Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness--what would 35 the typical reasonable person have understood by the 36 exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. 37 Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). Here, the magistrate 38 judge made a finding (which the district court adopted) that 39 Spencer “ambiguously consented to search a vehicle 40 he . . . did not possess, a truck,” or that Spencer “was 41 making a glib statement not intended to consent to 42 anything.” J.A. 188. Those findings are not clearly 43 erroneous. We therefore cannot hold that Spencer consented 44 to the search at issue, and the government has declined to 45 press on appeal any argument premised on abandonment. 46 2 1 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the 2 government’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the order of 3 the district court. 4 5 FOR THE COURT: 6 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 7 8 9 3