UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4133
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SYLVESTER CUEVAS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Irene C. Berger,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00112-1)
Submitted: March 19, 2013 Decided: April 10, 2013
Before SHEDD and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Arenda Wright ALLEN,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David O. Schles, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID SCHLES, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin, United States
Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, John L. File, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sylvester Cuevas pled guilty to a two-count information
charging him with (1) committing an assault causing serious
bodily injury within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States and (2) assaulting a person
assisting the United States Marshal in the performance of the
Marshal’s official duties. Before sentencing, Cuevas moved to
exercise his right of self-representation. Following a hearing,
the district court denied the motion, finding that Cuevas’
request to waive his right to counsel was not knowing and
intelligent. Cuevas thereafter proceeded to sentencing
represented by court-appointed counsel. The court sentenced
Cuevas to a 96-month imprisonment term to run consecutively to
an undischarged term he was already serving.
Cuevas now appeals his sentence, primarily arguing that the
court erred in denying his self-representation motion. We review
this matter de novo, but in doing so, we review findings of
historical fact for clear error. United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d
263, 270 (4th Cir. 2005). In Bush, we explained:
We review the sufficiency of a waiver of the right to
counsel by evaluating the complete profile of the
defendant and the circumstances of his decision as
known to the trial court at the time, by examining the
record as a whole. In determining whether a defendant
properly has exercised his right to self-
representation and waived his right to counsel, we
ascertain whether the assertion of the right to self-
representation is (1) clear and unequivocal; (2)
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knowing, intelligent and voluntary; and (3) timely.
The requirement that the assertion be clear and
unequivocal is necessary to protect against an
inadvertent waiver of the right to counsel by a
defendant’s occasional musings, and it also prevents a
defendant from taking advantage of and manipulating
the mutual exclusivity of the rights to counsel and
self-representation. Additionally, in ambiguous
situations created by a defendant’s vacillation or
manipulation, we must ascribe a constitutional primacy
to the right to counsel. At bottom, the . . . right to
self-representation is not absolute, and the
government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and
efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the
defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.
404 F.3d at 270-71 (internal punctuation altered and citations
omitted).
In light of the foregoing standard, and based on our review
of the record and the parties’ arguments, we hold that the
district court did not err by denying Cuevas’ self-
representation motion. The court conducted a full hearing into
the matter, and we find no fault with its reasonable conclusion
– based on Cuevas’ own statements - that his waiver was not
knowingly and intelligently made. As the court explained, a
number of Cuevas’ statements were “inconsistent” and revealed “a
lack of appreciation” for what he was giving up by attempting to
proceed pro se. J.A. 104.
Accordingly, we affirm Cuevas’ sentence. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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