FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 30, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RANDAL ANKENEY,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v. No. 12-1050
(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-02085-WJM-MJW)
ARISTEDES ZAVARAS, E.D. of (D. Colo.)
C.D.O.C.; STEVE HARTLEY, Warden
of Fremont; TIM CREANY, Freemont
Doctor; NURSE PRACTIONER
KLENKE, N.P.; NURSE PRACTIONER
HIBBS, N.P.; ANTHONY A.
DECESARO, Grievance Officer, JOHN
DOE, Grievance Officer,
Defendants–Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge, and
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Randal Ankeney, a Colorado prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
Ankeney was incarcerated from 2003 to 2004 at the Sterling Correctional
Facility. During this time, he had several medical examinations related to pain in his
left knee. On December 18, 2003, his knee was examined by Dr. Brooks, a Colorado
Department of Corrections (“CDOC”) general practitioner. Dr. Brooks diagnosed
Ankeney as suffering from a “likely medial meniscal tear” as well as the “possibility
of ACL tear,” and ordered an MRI. Ankeney was also examined by Dr. Pohlman, a
CDOC orthopedic surgeon, on May 18, 2004. Dr. Pohlman also diagnosed Ankeney
as suffering from a medial meniscus tear, and he ordered a surgical “scope and
meniscectomy ASAP.” However, because Ankeney was close to his release date
from the Sterling facility, the CDOC’s insurance provider denied the surgical
procedures requested by Dr. Pohlman. Ankeney did not pursue any treatment for his
knee between his release from Sterling and his subsequent re-incarceration on
different charges at Fremont Correctional Facility in February 2008.
In his intake screening in 2008, Ankeney pointed out his earlier meniscus tear
diagnosis and surgery recommendation. The intake evaluation noted no mobility
limitations. Shortly after re-incarceration, Ankeney reported slipping and
aggravating his knee. According to prison records, during the course of several
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subsequent appointments related to his knee, prison medical staff members
performed x-rays, diagnosed him with degenerative changes in his left knee, and
prescribed pain medication.
Ankeney disputes the results of these knee examinations. He claims that the
nurses at his prison served as “gate keepers” for specialized care and that the nurses’
treatment was inconsistent with the more serious findings of medical staff members
who treated him in 2003 and 2004. Ankeney alleges that the nurses’ examinations
were cursory and that non-emergency requests for care, such as his, were denied due
to budget policy.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Ankeney filed a § 1983 action in
federal district court. He claimed that defendants Zavaras, Hartley, DeCesaro, and
Doe were deliberately indifferent because they implemented and/or enforced a plan
to deny him medical care. He alleged that the three remaining defendants,
Dr. Creany, Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Klenke, and NP Hibbs, were deliberately
indifferent because they failed to order an MRI of his knee, failed to refer him to a
specialist, and eventually refused to even see or examine him.
The district court dismissed most of Ankeney’s charges for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court concluded that
Ankeney had failed to allege personal participation by defendants Zavaras, Hartley,
DeCesaro, and Doe. In addition, the court dismissed Ankeney’s claim that
Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs were deliberately indifferent to his knee injury
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because they failed to order an MRI or other diagnostic exam and did not refer him to
an orthopedic specialist. The court concluded that this claim amounted only to a
dispute over his diagnosis. However, the court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss
Ankeney’s claim that Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs “eventually refused to
even see or examine [him] despite his worsening condition.” Finally, in its dismissal
order, the district court denied Ankeney’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
The parties conducted discovery on the remaining claim that Dr. Creany,
NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs “refused to even see or examine” Ankeney. After the
close of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied
Ankeney’s motion, noting that the record demonstrated that Dr. Creany, NP Klenke,
and NP Hibbs had provided Ankeney with examinations, x-rays, and pain relief, and
that there was no evidence that they refused to see or treat him for his knee
complaint.
In the same order, the court also denied Ankeney’s motion to reinstate his
claim that Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs were deliberately indifferent to his
knee injury because they failed to order testing or refer him to a specialist. Ankeney
claimed that the Sterling medical records of Dr. Brooks and Dr. Pohlman, produced
during discovery, supported reinstatement of this claim. But the district court denied
his motion, concluding that Ankeney was already aware of the information contained
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in these medical records. In addition, the court denied Ankeney’s renewed motion
for injunctive relief.
II
A
Ankeney first challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim that
Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs were deliberately indifferent because they
failed to order an MRI or other diagnostic exam and did not refer him to an
orthopedic specialist. “This court reviews de novo the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) dismissal, accepting as true all of the well-pled factual allegations and
asking whether it is plausible that the plaintiff[] [is] entitled to relief.” Coll v. First
Am. Title Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 876, 886 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). Because
Ankeney proceeds pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Martinez v. Garden,
430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005). However, we may not “assume the role of
advocate” and make Ankeney’s arguments for him. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d
925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
A prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs
violates the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
A “deliberate indifference” claim involves both an objective and a subjective
component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective component
is established if the deprivation is “sufficiently serious.” Id. (quotation omitted).
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The subjective component is met if a prison official “knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.
Ankeney alleged in his amended complaint that Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and
NP Hibbs were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety because they
“improperly interfered with an examination and/or treatment ordered or
recommended by medical staff.” The district court found that these allegations were
insufficient to satisfy the subjective prong of a deliberate indifference claim because
they only stated Ankeney’s difference of opinion with the medical treatment that he
received at the Fremont facility. See Fitzgerald v. Corrections Corp. of Am.,
403 F.3d 1134, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that medical malpractice is not
actionable under the Eighth Amendment); Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corrections,
165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] prisoner who merely disagrees with a
diagnosis or a prescribed course of treatment does not state a constitutional
violation.”). We agree.
Ankeney did not allege that Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs were
deliberately indifferent to his knee injury because they failed to order the treatment
previously endorsed by Dr. Brooks and Dr. Pohlman. In fact, in his complaint
Ankeney did not allege any facts pertaining to the earlier MRI and surgery
recommendations of Dr. Brooks and Dr. Pohlman, stating instead that he was “denied
care for [his knee] injury [while incarcerated at Sterling] and was told that he did not
need surgery or other treatment.” Ankeney’s allegation that defendants “improperly
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interfered with an examination and/or treatment ordered or recommended by medical
staff” was thus wholly conclusory and not supported by any specific facts detailing
prior treatment or examinations. See Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188,
1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we will
disregard conclusory statements . . . .”).
We therefore agree with the district court that the allegations in Ankeney’s
amended complaint only stated a difference of opinion with the medical treatment
that was provided by Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs. As the court correctly
noted, such allegations do not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See
Fitzgerald, 403 F.3d at 1143; Perkins, 165 F.3d at 811. Because Ankeney failed to
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), the district court properly dismissed
his claim.
B
Ankeney also challenges the district court’s ruling denying his motion to
reinstate his claim that Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs were deliberately
indifferent for failing to order additional testing or refer him to a specialist.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that “any order or other
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . may be
revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims.” See
also Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005). For guidance, the
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court may look to the standard used to review a motion made pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Grounds for granting a motion to reconsider pursuant
to Rule 59(e) include: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new
evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012
(10th Cir. 2000). We review the reconsideration of an interim ruling for abuse of
discretion. See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011).
Ankeney claims that the district court should have reinstated his claim because
during discovery, his medical file revealed that Dr. Brooks and Dr. Pohlman “[b]oth
diagnosed him as having a meniscal tear and possible ACL tear” and ordered “[a]n
MRI and a surgical procedure.” The district court rejected Ankeney’s claim, finding
that Ankeney had known of Dr. Brooks and Dr. Pohlman’s diagnosis prior to his
2008 re-incarceration, and thus the opinions were not “new evidence” that could form
the basis for reinstatement of his claim. Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012.
We agree that Ankeney had independent knowledge of the recommendations
he received from Dr. Brooks and Dr. Pohlman when he filed his amended complaint.
Intake evaluations done when Ankeney was re-incarcerated in 2008 show that he
knew about Dr. Brooks and Dr. Pohlman’s opinions and called them to the attention
of the intake medical staff. Furthermore, Ankeney swore in the affidavit he
submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment that he “told both Hibbs
and Klenke that [he] had been previously diagnosed with a meniscus tear and
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possible ACL tear, and that an MRI and surgery were ordered by CDOC physicians.”
Ankeney made a similar claim in his response to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, asserting that he “informed Defendants of his medical history, including
the Sterling diagnosis by Dr. Brooks and Dr. Pohlman, and that his knee had not been
treated.” In addition, Ankeney has not challenged the magistrate judge’s finding that
the “intake evaluations done when plaintiff was reincarcerated [in 2008]” show that
“he knew about the prior [CDOC doctors’] opinions and recommendations.”
We are particularly concerned that Ankeney is trying to have it both ways on
the question of when Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs learned about the
diagnoses and recommendations of Dr. Brooks and Dr. Pohlman. Ankeney claimed
in his motion for summary judgment that “Defendants were so indifferent to
Ankeney’s injury that they were not even aware of the previous diagnosis until they
were questioned at their depositions,” and that “Defendants [admitted at their
depositions that they] were unaware of the examinations and diagnosis of
Drs. Brooks and Pohlman,” seeking to support his claim that Dr. Creany, NP Klenke,
and NP Hibbs were deliberately indifferent because they allegedly failed to see or
treat him. Yet he simultaneously claimed that they were deliberately indifferent
because they knew of the prior recommendations but nonetheless refused to
implement them.
Ankeney also argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining
that no manifest injustice justified his motion to reinstate. We sympathize with
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Ankeney’s situation, but his troubling pattern of pursuing contradictory allegations
counsels against disturbing our deference to the district court’s conclusion.
C
Ankeney next disputes the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
defendants on his claim that Dr. Creany, NP Klenke, and NP Hibbs were deliberately
indifferent because even as his condition continued, they refused to see or examine
him. An order granting a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Clark
v. Haas Group, Inc., 953 F.2d 1235, 1237 (10th Cir. 1992).
Ankeney’s prison medical records demonstrate that he was repeatedly seen and
treated for his knee concerns. Although he disagrees with the course of treatment,
such disagreement is a matter for a malpractice claim, not a constitutional violation.
We accordingly agree with the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
D
Ankeney also alleges that the district court erred in dismissing his claims
against defendants Zavaras, Hartley, DeCesaro, and Doe. We review the grant of a
motion to dismiss de novo. Coll, 642 F.3d at 886. Ankeney alleges that these
supervisors violated his Eighth Amendment rights because they “created and/or
participated in a plan or scheme to deny [his] constitutional rights in order to save
money.” He alleges that a CDOC medical officer admitted as much in her deposition
testimony, but has not provided the deposition transcript. Because Ankeney offers
only conclusory statements to substantiate his claim that senior prison officials
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personally participated in the deprivation of his rights, we determine that the district
court properly granted defendants’ motion to dismiss.
E
Finally, Ankeney claims that the district court erred in denying his motion for
injunctive relief. We review the denial of a motion for injunctive relief for abuse of
discretion. See Camfield v. City of Okla. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1234 (10th Cir.
2001). Because we agree with the district court that Ankeney’s claims are without
merit, we conclude that the court properly denied his motion for injunctive relief.
III
AFFIRMED. Ankeney’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of
costs or fees is GRANTED, but he is reminded to continue making monthly
payments until the filing fee is paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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