UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7836
LADARIUS M. CAMERON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MR. BONNEY, Deputy,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (2:12-cv-00516-MSD-LRL)
Submitted: April 19, 2013 Decided: April 30, 2013
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Ladarius M. Cameron, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM
Ladarius Cameron, a Virginia state prisoner, appeals
the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006) complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2006). Cameron’s complaint detailed a
confrontation with prison officials but failed to articulate
specific constitutional violations. We affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand for further consideration.
We review de novo dismissals for failure to state a
claim under § 1915A(b)(1), “applying the same standards as those
for reviewing a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”
De’Lonta v. Angelone, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013). “The
purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of
a complaint; importantly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not
resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim,
or the applicability of defenses.” Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted). As a result, to survive such a
motion, a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and have
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “In assessing the complaint’s plausibility, we accept
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as true all the factual allegations contained therein.”
De’Lonta, 708 F.3d at 524.
To the extent that Cameron claimed constitutional
violations arising from being forced to talk to an unwanted
visitor, verbal abuse from prison officials, and the denial of
access to a grievance form, the district court properly denied
relief for failure to state a claim. See Siglar v. Hightower,
112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that mere “verbal
abuse by a prison guard does not give rise to a cause of action
under § 1983”), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy,
130 S. Ct. 1175 (2010); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.
1994) (“[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance
procedures or access to any such procedure.”). We affirm this
portion of the judgment.
On appeal, Cameron notes his complaint alleged, but
the district court failed to address, that in escorting Cameron
to his cell block, prison officials pushed him against a wall,
slammed his face to the floor, and used a knee to prevent him
from breathing. Moreover, Cameron seeks money damages to cover
his resulting medical bill. Affording Cameron’s contentions
liberal construction, see Gordon v. Leake, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151
(4th Cir. 1978), Cameron asserted a plausible claim of excessive
force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. See Williams
v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996) (detailing
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subjective and objective components to excessive force claims).
Because the district court’s opinion did not address this claim,
we conclude that dismissal of Cameron’s complaint under § 1915A
was premature and that Cameron should have been afforded an
opportunity to particularize his excessive force claim. Thus,
we vacate and remand for the district court to address this
issue. ∗
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment
in part, vacate the district court’s judgment with respect to
Cameron’s excessive force claim, and remand for further
proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART;
AND REMANDED
∗
By this disposition, we do not suggest that Cameron’s
claim is meritorious. Rather, on this record, we conclude only
that dismissal pursuant to § 1915A was inappropriate at this
stage of the proceedings.
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