SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
JUAN PICASO and MARIBEL PICASO, ) Arizona Supreme Court
husband and wife, individually ) No. CV-07-0154-PR
and as surviving parents of )
BENJAMIN PICASO, deceased, ) Court of Appeals
) Division Two
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ) No. 2 CA-CV 05-0174
)
v. ) Pima County
) Superior Court
TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, ) No. C20022430
)
Defendant/Appellee. ) O P I N I O N
)
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Richard S. Fields, Judge
AFFIRMED
________________________________________________________________
Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division Two
214 Ariz. 462, 154 P.3d 364 (App. 2007)
VACATED
________________________________________________________________
COPPLE, BOEHM & MURPHY, P.C. Phoenix
By Steven D. Copple
Scott E. Boehm
Attorneys for Juan Picaso and Maribel Picaso
MESCH, CLARK & ROTHSCHILD, P.C. Tucson
By Richard Davis
Gary J. Cohen
Attorneys for Tucson Unified School District
________________________________________________________________
H U R W I T Z, Justice
I.
¶1 On September 24, 2001, 14-month-old Benjamin Picaso
was struck and killed by a Tucson Unified School District
(“TUSD”) school bus. In 2003, Benjamin’s mother, Maribel
Picaso, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor child abuse. The plea
agreement stipulated that Maribel’s negligence had placed
Benjamin in the situation that led to his death.1
¶2 The case before us is a wrongful death action brought
by Maribel and her husband, Juan Picaso,2 against TUSD. The
1
The plea agreement provided:
AMENDED COUNT ONE: (CHILD ABUSE, NON-DEATH
or SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY, A CLASS ONE
MISDEMEANOR)
On or about the 24TH day of September, 2001,
MARIVEL [sic] PICASO-ATILANO, having care or
custody of BENJAMIN PICASO, committed child
abuse by criminally negligently causing or
permitting him, a child less than eighteen
years of age, to be placed in a situation
where he [sic] person or health was
endangered, to wit: resulting in the death
of the victim, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-
3623(B)(3), 13-603, 13-701, 13-702, 13-801,
13-804 and 13-811.
Maribel was originally charged with felony child abuse, but the
more serious charges were dropped as part of the plea agreement.
With the agreement of the state, the superior court imposed no
sentence other than the judgment of conviction in return for the
guilty plea.
2
Juan was also originally charged with felony child abuse,
but these charges were later dropped.
2
central issue below was the effect of Maribel’s plea on this
suit.
¶3 TUSD filed a motion in limine in the wrongful death
action seeking to “preclud[e] Maribel Picaso from denying the
essential allegation of her guilty plea.” The superior court
granted the motion, relying on Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) § 13-807 (2007). That statute provides that “[a]
defendant convicted in a criminal proceeding is precluded from
subsequently denying in any civil proceeding brought by the
victim or this state against the criminal defendant the
essential allegations of the criminal offense of which he was
adjudged guilty.”3 The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that this statute applies only when the convicted party
is a defendant, rather than a plaintiff, in a subsequent civil
suit.
¶4 After a defense verdict, the Picasos moved for a new
trial, again arguing that the superior court had improperly
relied on § 13-807 in granting the motion in limine. TUSD
argued in response that the doctrine of issue preclusion
(formerly referred to as “collateral estoppel”) also supported
the trial court’s ruling. The superior court denied the new
3
During the plea colloquy, Maribel claimed that she entered
the guilty plea “to help [her] children.” Her counsel argued
below that one of her other children had unlocked the front door
of her home and that she wanted to avoid a criminal trial in
which she might have to blame that child for Benjamin’s death.
3
trial motion, reasoning that “[w]hether the Court’s evidentiary
ruling was characterized as the application of A.R.S. § 13-807
or simply the application of [issue preclusion], the effect of
the ruling was to properly focus the jury’s attention upon the
relative actions of the parties and assess degrees of fault for
those actions.”
¶5 The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new
trial. Picaso v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 214 Ariz. 462, 154
P.3d 364 (App. 2007). The panel first held that § 13-807
“cannot possibly apply here” because “Maribel, the defendant in
the prior criminal proceeding, had no civil action brought
against her,” and “[t]he statute by its language applies only if
the criminal defendant is also later the civil defendant.” Id.
at 465 ¶ 9, 154 P.3d at 367. The court also rejected TUSD’s
argument that the guilty plea had issue preclusive effect.
Although noting that “[c]ourts in other jurisdictions are
divided on whether issue preclusion should prevent a party from
denying the essential elements of a guilty plea in a later civil
proceeding based on the same occurrence that led to the plea,”
id. at 467 ¶ 18, 154 P.3d at 369, the court of appeals adopted
the position of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments “that a
guilty plea in a criminal case should not have preclusive effect
in later civil litigation because no actual litigation occurs
when a criminal defendant pleads guilty,” id. at ¶ 20 (citing
4
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. e & § 85 cmt. b
(1980)).
¶6 We granted review because whether a guilty plea has
common law preclusive effect in a later civil proceeding is an
issue of first impression in this state.4 See ARCAP 23(c)(3).
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the
Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24. Application of
issue preclusion is an issue of law, which we review de novo.
Campbell v. SZL Props., Ltd., 204 Ariz. 221, 223 ¶ 8, 62 P.3d
966, 968 (App. 2003).
II.
¶7 The parties do not dispute that Maribel’s guilty plea
was properly admitted into evidence in the subsequent civil
suit. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (governing the statements of
parties); cf. Ariz. R. Evid. 803(22) (governing evidence of
conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment in excess of
one year). Rather, the question on which the Picasos and TUSD
divide is whether the guilty plea also has preclusive effect in
the wrongful death suit with respect to the issue of Maribel’s
negligence.
¶8 As the court of appeals noted, this issue has divided
commentators and the courts. A number of opinions and
authorities have adopted the position of the Restatement
4
TUSD has now abandoned any reliance on § 13-807.
5
(Second) of Judgments that guilty pleas have no issue preclusive
effect in later civil litigation because no issues have actually
been litigated. See, e.g., Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 699
N.W.2d 54, 63 ¶ 21 (Wis. 2005); Rawling v. City of New Haven,
537 A.2d 439, 445 (Conn. 1988); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 347 A.2d 842, 848 (Md. 1975); Glen Falls Group Ins. Corp.
v. Hoium, 200 N.W.2d 189, 192 (Minn. 1972); 18B Charles A.
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 4474.1 (2007); David L. Shapiro, Should a Guilty
Plea Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 27, 28 (1984).
Other courts and commentators, however, have rejected the
Restatement rule, generally taking the view that the safeguards
surrounding the entry of a guilty plea, which are designed to
make the conviction reliable enough to deprive a defendant of
his freedom, make the conviction preclusive as to the elements
of the offense in a civil context. See, e.g., Butler v. Mooers,
771 A.2d 1034, 1037 ¶ 8 (Me. 2001); Ray v. Stone, 952 S.W.2d
220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); State ex rel. Leach v. Schlaegel,
447 S.E.2d 1, 4 (W. Va. 1994); Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Winker,
319 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 1982); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion
and Related Problems, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 564, 578 (1981).
¶9 Although we granted review to address this interesting
issue, our review of the record reveals that this is not the
6
appropriate case in which to do so. An appellate court must
determine whether the judgment, not the reasoning, of the
superior court was correct. Gary Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Sun
Lodge, Inc., 133 Ariz. 240, 242, 650 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1982).
Even if we assume arguendo that Maribel’s guilty plea here had
no preclusive effect, the result at trial in this case would not
have changed.
¶10 The trial judge properly instructed the jury that the
threshold question was whether TUSD was at all at fault for
Benjamin’s death. If the jury did not so conclude, the judge
instructed, a defense verdict was required without more
deliberation:
Plaintiffs must prove, one: The defendant was at
fault; two: Plaintiffs were injured; and three:
Plaintiffs’ damages. . . . If you find the defendant
was not at fault, then your verdict must be for
defendant.
¶11 The jury was instructed that only if it found TUSD at
fault for Benjamin’s death should it “then consider the
defendant’s claim that plaintiff, Maribel Picaso,” was also at
fault. (Emphasis added.) The jury was given three forms of
verdict — a defense verdict, a plaintiffs’ verdict with no
comparative negligence on the part of Maribel, and a plaintiffs’
verdict with the damages reduced in accordance with Maribel’s
comparative negligence. The jury returned a unanimous defense
verdict.
7
¶12 The jury thus necessarily concluded that TUSD was
simply not at fault for Benjamin’s death. The trial court
rulings about which the Picasos complain on appeal all concern
the alleged comparative negligence of Maribel for that death.
Because the superior court instructed the jury that it was only
to consider Maribel’s comparative negligence in the event that
it also found TUSD at fault, any error below as to the
preclusive effect of the guilty plea could not have affected the
jury’s verdict.5 We therefore leave for another day the
preclusive effect of guilty pleas on subsequent civil
proceedings.
5
The superior court instructed the jury that “it is already
established in this case that Maribel Picaso negligently
permitted her son, Benjamin, to be placed in a situation where
his person or health was endangered, and that such negligence
was a cause of Benjamin’s death.” The jury was told, however,
that “[w]hether such admissions should be applied to find
Maribel Picaso at fault, and whether such fault should reduce
her full damages, is left in your discretion.” The instructions
thus did not give the guilty plea true preclusive effect, but
rather treated it simply as an evidentiary admission.
The Picasos complain that although the printed final jury
instructions describe Maribel’s negligence as “a” cause of
Benjamin’s death, the transcript of the proceedings quotes the
judge as saying it was “the” cause. TUSD claims that this is a
transcription error, and notes that preliminary jury
instructions referred to “a” cause. We need not resolve this
dispute. The Picasos did not object to the final jury
instructions on this point, and it is undisputed that the jury
was supplied with the printed instructions during its
deliberation. Moreover, the instruction at issue occurred after
the jury was told that it should consider Maribel’s negligence
only if it first found TUSD at fault.
8
III.
¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the opinion of
the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the superior
court.6
_______________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice
CONCURRING:
_______________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice
_______________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice
_______________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice
_______________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice
6
Because it reversed on other grounds, the court of appeals
did not consider the Picasos’ argument that the preliminary jury
instruction, which stated that Maribel’s negligence was “a
cause” of Benjamin’s death, violated Article 18, Section 5 of
the Arizona Constitution. Picaso, 214 Ariz. at 464 ¶ 1 n.1, 154
P.3d at 366 n.1. We need not remand on this point, however,
given the jury’s conclusion that TUSD had no fault in the death.
Whether Maribel was also at fault is a moot issue.
9