State Ex Rel. Department of Economic Security v. Hayden

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

In re the Matter of: ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-04-0303-PR
STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel., )
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY ) Court of Appeals
(Linda Dann), ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CV 03-0036
Petitioner-Appellee, )
) Maricopa County
v. ) Superior Court
) No. DR139604
JACK HAYDEN, )
) O P I N I O N
Respondent-Appellant. )
)
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Raymond P. Lee, Judge Pro Tempore

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
208 Ariz. 164, 91 P.3d 1007

VACATED

TERRY GODDARD, ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix
By Kathryn Harris Kupiszewski,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Arizona

LAW OFFICES OF JEFF C. JACKSON Phoenix
By Jeff C. Jackson

And

BURCH & CRACCHIOLO, P.A. Phoenix
By Daryl Manhart
Attorneys for Jack Hayden
LAW OFFICES OF PAUL G. ULRICH, P.C. Phoenix
By Paul G. Ulrich

And

LAW OFFICES OF MELINDA K. CEKANDER Flagstaff
By Melinda K. Cekander
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae James Michael Pacheco

LAW OFFICES OF BILL SPENCE, LTD. Chandler
By Brian K. Stanley
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Kevin Le Clair and Tony Russell
_______________________________________________________________

H U R W I T Z, Justice

¶1 Arizona law provides that each installment under a

child support order becomes “enforceable as a final judgment by

operation of law” when it comes due. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

(“A.R.S.”) § 25-503(H) (Supp. 2004). Either the party entitled

to receive the installment or the Arizona Department of Economic

Security (“ADES”) may file a request for a formal written

judgment for support arrearages no later than three years after

the emancipation of all of the children who were the subject of

a child support order. A.R.S. § 25-503(I). Once obtained, such

a written judgment is “exempt from renewal and . . . enforceable

until paid in full.” Id. If no written judgment for support

arrearages is timely requested, however, “an unpaid child

support judgment that became a judgment by operation of law

expires” at the end of that three-year period. A.R.S. § 25-

503(H).

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¶2 Arizona law also assigns to the State the right to the

support of a child and spouse who receive assistance under

certain federal welfare programs. A.R.S. § 46-407 (2005). The

legislature has provided ADES with a variety of administrative

remedies to collect child support arrearages. See, e.g., A.R.S.

§ 25-505.01(B) (Supp. 2004) (income withholding order); A.R.S. §

25-516 (2000) (lien on property of obligor); A.R.S. § 25-521

(2000) (levy on obligor’s rights to property).

¶3 The question in this case is whether ADES may pursue

administrative measures to collect unpaid child support despite

having failed timely to request a formal written judgment of

arrearages.

I.

¶4 In 1977, Linda Dann gave birth to a baby girl. In

1980, Dann filed a petition in superior court to establish

paternity and to require the child’s father, petitioner Jack

Hayden, to pay child support. Hayden admitted paternity and the

superior court ultimately ordered him to pay $150 per month in

child support. Hayden’s child support obligations were assigned

to the State after Dann and the child received Aid to Families

with Dependent Children, and ADES subsequently initiated

administrative measures to collect arrearages.

¶5 The child reached the age of majority in 1995.

Neither Dann nor ADES requested a formal written judgment for

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the outstanding support obligations within three years of the

child’s emancipation. In 2002, Hayden filed a petition seeking

to terminate ADES’s administrative collection efforts, alleging

that his obligation to pay child support had expired under

A.R.S. § 25-503(H).1

¶6 The superior court rejected Hayden’s claim and entered

judgment in favor of ADES. The court of appeals affirmed.

State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Hayden, 208 Ariz. 164, 168

¶ 17, 91 P.3d 1007, 1011 (App. 2004). We granted Hayden’s

petition for review because the issue is one of first impression

and statewide importance. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant

to A.R.S. § 12-120.24 (2003) and Article 6, Section 5(3) of the

Arizona Constitution.

II.

¶7 The issue in this case is one of statutory

construction: whether A.R.S. § 25-503(H) prohibits ADES from

collecting the child support arrearages through administrative

measures. We review questions of statutory interpretation de

novo. City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz.

544, 547 ¶ 8, 105 P.3d 1163, 1166 (2005). When interpreting a

statute, our aim is “to fulfill the intent of the legislature

1
The relevant provision at that time was A.R.S. § 25-503(I),
which has since been re-designated, without substantive change,
as § 25-503(H). Similarly, former § 25-503(J) has now been
renumbered as § 25-503(I). We refer to the current version of
the statute in this opinion.

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that wrote it.” Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464 ¶ 11, 80

P.3d 269, 271 (2003). To determine that intent, we look first

to the language of the statute. Id. We interpret statutory

language to give effect to each word of the statute, such that

“no clause, sentence or word is rendered superfluous, void,

contradictory or insignificant.” Id. Statutes that are in pari

materia – relating to the same matter – are construed together

as though they constituted one law. Pima County by City of

Tucson v. Maya Constr. Co., 158 Ariz. 151, 155, 761 P.2d 1055,

1059 (1988). In seeking to discern legislative intent, “we

construe the statute as a whole, and consider its context,

language, subject matter, historical background, effects and

consequences, and its spirit and purpose.” People’s Choice TV

Corp. v. City of Tucson, 202 Ariz. 401, 403 ¶ 7, 46 P.3d 412,

414 (2002).

A.

¶8 In relevant part, A.R.S. § 25-503(H) provides:

The right of a parent entitled to receive support or
the department to receive child support payments as
provided in the court order vests as each installment
falls due. Each vested child support installment is
enforceable as a final judgment by operation of law.
Unless it is reduced to a written money judgment, an
unpaid child support judgment that became a judgment
by operation of law expires three years after the
emancipation of the last remaining unemancipated child
who was included in the court order.

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¶9 The question is whether the expiration of judgments

under subsection (H) functions to cancel outstanding child

support arrearages. Hayden argues that because each child

support installment becomes a final judgment by operation of law

as it falls due, the expiration of the judgment therefore

eliminates the debt itself. The State counters that the vested

right to receive payment does not become a final judgment but

instead merely “is enforceable as a final judgment by operation

of law.” Therefore, the State contends, the expiration of a

judgment that arises by operation of law does not cause the

underlying debt to expire. Because the debt survives, the State

argues, it may be collected through statutory non-judicial

remedies even after the expiration of the judgment.

¶10 A commonsense reading of A.R.S. § 25-503(H) and

related statutory provisions supports Hayden’s interpretation.

The statutes provide a comprehensive scheme facilitating the

collection of child support installments over the life span of a

child support court order. By regulating the effect of the

support order, the statutes also necessarily regulate the

underlying obligation. See Lamb v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz.

400, 402, 621 P.2d 906, 908 (1980) (“Since the duty to pay

support does not exist unless a judgment, decree or order

creates it, it follows that no duty exists if a valid order

terminates the obligation.”). To be sure, § 25-503(H) does not

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state in so many words that child support installments “become”

judgments when they fall due. But the intent of the statute is

clear: each unpaid child support installment is enforceable as

if it were a final judgment and, unless timely reduced to a

written money judgment, this temporary “operation of law”

judgment “expires.” Because the child support obligation is

statutorily transformed into a temporary judgment, it logically

follows that when the judgment expires, so does the obligation.

And, once the obligation has expired, it necessarily follows

that administrative collection efforts by ADES, as assignee of

the obligee’s rights, must also be unavailing.2

B.

¶11 The argument that the legislature intended for ADES to

be cut off from both judicial and administrative remedies when

2
The State emphasizes that the statutes providing
administrative remedies to collect child support arrearages do
not expressly require the existence of a written money judgment.
See, e.g., A.R.S. § 25-505.01 (providing for income withholding
orders for child support arrearages that equal or exceed two
months’ worth of current support obligation); A.R.S. § 25-516
(providing that child support arrearages equal to at least two
months’ child support constitute a lien by operation of law on
all property of obligor); A.R.S. § 25-521 (providing that the
department may issue a levy on all non-exempt property of
obligor to collect child support arrearages equal to twelve
months’ support). Additionally, A.R.S. § 25-501(E) (Supp. 2004)
states that “[r]emedies provided by this chapter are cumulative
and do not affect the availability of remedies under other law.”
But the State cannot dispute that these administrative remedies
depend on the existence of a child support arrearage. If the
arrearage has expired by operation of law, then the
administrative remedies are simply inapplicable because there is
no outstanding debt upon which to collect.

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it fails timely to request a written judgment for child support

arrearages finds additional support in the broader statutory

scheme. Section 25-503(I) provides:

The department (ADES) or its agent or a party entitled
to receive support may file a request for judgment for
support arrearages not later than three years after
the emancipation of all of the children who were the
subject of the court order. . . . Notwithstanding
any other law, formal written judgments for support
and for associated costs and attorney fees are exempt
from renewal and are enforceable until paid in full.

The legislature thus provided that ADES would be bound by the

same time limits as a private party seeking a written money

judgment for child support arrearages. Once a written judgment

for arrearages is timely obtained, it remains effective “until

paid in full.” It would have been a largely meaningless gesture

for the legislature to enact this strict time limit on ADES’s

ability to obtain a written money judgment if lawmakers had

intended that the agency retain its administrative collection

remedies in perpetuity, with or without a written judgment.3

¶12 In addition, § 25-503(H) describes two narrow

exceptions to the requirement that a party or ADES must timely

3
The State argues that the expiration of the allotted time
to procure a written judgment is not meaningless because ADES
would be barred from two remedies that require a court order to
implement: contempt and license suspension. But there is no
evidence that the legislature intended to cut off ADES’s access
to only these two limited remedies for failing timely to request
a written judgment of arrearages.

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request a written judgment of arrearages to prevent support

judgments that arise by operation of law from expiring.

A request does not need to be filed within three years
if: (1) The court later determines that the actions
or conduct of an obligor impeded the establishment of
a written money judgment . . . [or] (2) The court
later finds that the obligor threatened, defrauded or
wrongfully coerced the obligee into not filing a
request to reduce any support arrearages to a written
money judgment.

A.R.S. § 25-503(H). Neither exception applies here. Yet, ADES,

in effect, argues for a third broad exception in all cases in

which it seeks to collect upon the arrearage by means of

administrative remedies. When the legislature has expressly

defined the narrow exceptions to the requirement to timely

request a written judgment for support arrearages, we cannot

read into the statute the kind of a broad – and unstated –

exception for which the State argues. See State v. Huskie, 202

Ariz. 283, 286 ¶ 10, 44 P.3d 161, 164 (App. 2002) (noting that

while “we must construe [child support] statutes liberally . . .

we are not permitted to re-write them”) (internal citations

omitted).

C.

¶13 The State also argues that A.R.S. § 25-503(H)

functions merely as a statute of limitations, placing a time

limit on the availability of judicial remedies to collect unpaid

child support. Under this view, the underlying debt remains and

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may be pursued through non-judicial means. But this argument is

undermined by the history of the statute. Before its amendment

in 1999, the subsection that is now § 25-503(H) read as follows:

The right of a parent, guardian or custodian or the
department to receive child support payments as
provided in the court order vests as each installment
falls due. This order is continuing from the date of
entry and is not barred from enforcement except as
provided in subsection J of this section. Each vested
child support installment is enforceable as a final
judgment by operation of law.

A.R.S. § 25-503(I) (Supp. 1998). Before 1999, § 25-503(J) (now

A.R.S. § 25-503(I)) provided in turn that a party or ADES “may

file an action within three years after the emancipation of the

youngest of all of the children who were the subject of the

court order.” Taken together, these previous provisions

supported the interpretation that ADES urges of the current

statutory scheme: the statute limited the time (within three

years of emancipation of the youngest child subject to the court

order) during which a party or ADES could “file an action” to

judicially collect on a child support arrearage, but stated that

the child support order was otherwise “not barred from

enforcement” and, therefore, could arguably be collected upon

through administrative remedies that did not require judicial

action. See A.R.S. § 1-215(1) (“‘Action’ includes any matter or

proceeding in a court, civil or criminal.”).

10
¶14 But while the State’s interpretation may be consistent

with the pre-1999 statutory language, it cannot be reconciled

with the statute’s amended language. The 1999 amendments

deleted the sentence that read: “This [child support] order is

continuing from the date of entry and is not barred from

enforcement except as provided in subsection J of this section,”

and substituted instead the current language providing that “an

unpaid child support judgment that became a judgment by

operation of law expires” if not timely reduced to a money

judgment. 1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 283, § 4. At the same

time, the legislature significantly amended A.R.S. § 25-503(I)

(then § 25-503(J)). That subsection had previously established

a three-year post-emancipation time limit to “file an action”;

as amended, it now provides the same time limit for making “a

request for judgment for support arrearages.” 1999 Ariz. Sess.

Laws, ch. 283, § 4. This was, of course, the same time limit

imposed for the expiration of judgments mandated by the amended

§ 25-503(H). These changes altered the statute from a

traditional statute of limitations to one providing for the

termination of child support obligations not timely reduced to a

written judgment.

D.

¶15 Other statutory history also supports the conclusion

that the legislature intended that the child support obligation

11
expire in the absence of a timely request for a written judgment

for arrearages. The fact sheet accompanying the bill that

enacted the 1999 amendments described as a purpose of the

amendments to “specif[y] that unpaid child support obligations

that by operation of law automatically become judgments will

expire within a specified period, unless a court-ordered

judgment is obtained.” Senate Fact Sheet for S.B. 1152, 44th

Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1999) (emphasis added). A description of

individual provisions of the bill similarly stated that the

amendment language “[s]pecifies that unpaid child support

obligations that automatically become judgments by operation of

law expire three years after emancipation of all the children

subject of the underlying support order, unless a court-ordered

judgment is obtained.” Id. (emphasis added). The fact sheet is

thus consistent with our reading of the statutory scheme:

expiration of the judgments that arise by operation of law

serves to terminate the underlying obligation to pay child

support arrearages that are not timely reduced to a written

judgment.

E.

¶16 The court of appeals suggested that an interpretation

of the statute that results in the cancellation of outstanding

child support arrearages would be inconsistent with the public

policy of this state. Hayden, 208 Ariz. at 167 ¶¶ 15-16, 91

12
P.3d at 1010 (“It is the public policy of this state that

parents shall be responsible for the support of their dependent

children in order to relieve or avoid the burden often borne by

the general citizenry through public assistance programs.”)

(quoting A.R.S. § 46-401). If Hayden has in fact failed to pay

child support, he has plainly failed to fulfill an important

responsibility to both his child and the State. But neither

Hayden’s culpability nor a public policy favoring the payment of

child support precludes the legislature from imposing time

limits on the life of the temporary judgments provided for by §

25-503(H). Nor can these considerations justify ignoring

specific statutory mandates enacted by the legislature.

¶17 The legislature is entitled to make the policy

determination that although written judgments of support

arrearages should remain enforceable until paid in full, child

support obligations upon which no request has been made for a

written judgment within three years of emancipation of all the

supported children should expire. This policy encourages a

reasonably prompt accounting of the support arrearage before

relevant evidence becomes hard to obtain or unavailable. It

also serves as notice to the obligor and creditors of the

obligor of the amount of the outstanding debt. Arguments as to

the wisdom of this policy are appropriately directed to the

legislature, not to the courts.

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 F.

¶18 The opinion below also cites case law from other

jurisdictions in support of its conclusion that the time limits

imposed by A.R.S. § 25-503 cut off only judicial – not

administrative – remedies to collect support arrearages. See,

e.g., Bednarek v. Bednarek, 430 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn. App. 1988)

(“We hold the ten-year statute of limitations barring court

actions on judgments does not apply to bar the administrative

remedy of intercepting an obligor’s tax refund to satisfy [child

support] arrearages previously validly established.”);

Guthmiller v. N.D. Dep’t of Human Servs., 421 N.W.2d 469, 471

(N.D. 1988) (“Attempted collection of child support arrearages

through the tax intercept procedures is not an ordinary

proceeding in a court of justice, but rather is in the form of

an administrative proceeding conducted before the agency.

Therefore, the statute of limitations . . . does not apply to

the tax intercept procedure.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). This case law is not persuasive, however, because it

merely interprets the effect of statutes of limitations on the

availability of non-judicial remedies. No case cited by the

court of appeals considers the effect of a provision such as

A.R.S. § 25-503(H), which does not merely limit the time for

bringing a court action to enforce a support arrearage, but

rather cancels the outstanding support obligation altogether.

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 III.

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the opinion of

the court of appeals and remand to the superior court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

CONCURRING:

_________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

____
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

____
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

____
Charles E. Jones, Justice (Retired)

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