SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
ELEANORA FERNANDEZ, individually ) Arizona Supreme Court
and on behalf of all similarly ) No. CV-04-0277-PR
situated persons, )
) Court of Appeals
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CV 03-0473
v. )
) Maricopa County
TAKATA SEAT BELTS, INC., NISSAN ) Superior Court
NORTH AMERICA, INC.; GENERAL ) No. CV 2002-022227
MOTORS CORPORATION; FORD MOTOR )
COMPANY; DAIMLERCHRYSLER )
CORPORATION; SGS U.S. TESTING ) O P I N I O N
COMPANY, INC., )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Mark R. Santana
AFFIRMED
Court of Appeals, Division One
Memorandum Decision (filed June 10, 2004)
VACATED IN PART
________________________________________________________________
Rake & Catanese, PC Phoenix
By: David J. Catanese
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Bowman & Brooke, LLP Phoenix
By: Paul G. Cereghini
Jill S. Goldsmith
James C. Goodwin
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
Takata Seat Belts, Inc., General Motors
Corporation, and Nissan North America, Inc.
Carpenter & Lipps LLP Columbus, Ohio
By: Michael H. Carpenter
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
Takata Seat Belts, Inc.
Snell & Wilmer LLP Phoenix
By: Martha E. Gibbs
Gregory J. Marshall
And:
O’Melveny & Myers LLP Washington, D.C.
By: Brian C. Anderson
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
Ford Motor Company
Snell & Wilmer LLP Phoenix
By: Patrick X. Fowler
And:
Hogan & Hartson, LLP New York, New York
By: Lewis H. Goldfarb
Christopher B. Wren
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
DaimlerChrysler Corporation
Keller Rohrback, PLC Phoenix
By: Leon B. Silver
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
SGS U.S. Testing Company, Inc.
Pacific Legal Foundation Sacramento, California
By: Deborah J. La Fetra
Gregory T. Broderick
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Pacific Legal Foundation
________________________________________________________________
R Y A N, Justice
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¶1 In this case, we must decide whether a plaintiff who
has no individual claim against a defendant may allege class
action claims against that defendant and require the defendant
to remain as a party to the lawsuit because she seeks to
represent a class of other purported plaintiffs, some of whom
may have claims against the defendant.
I
1
¶2 Eleanora Fernandez brought a class action lawsuit
against, among others, Takata Seat Belts, SGS U.S. Testing
Company, Inc., Nissan North America, General Motors Corporation,
Ford Motor Company, and DaimlerChrysler Corporation. She
alleged fraudulent concealment, violation of the Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust.
Fernandez claimed that between 1986 and 1999, several automobile
manufacturers installed in their vehicles TK-52 seatbelt buckles
manufactured by Takata and tested by SGS U.S. Testing. She
alleged that the TK-52 buckles were defective because they could
disengage in accidents. She also contended that all of the
defendants knew about this supposed defect and that they
concealed this risk from consumers.
¶3 The complaint did not specify the make or model of the
automobile Fernandez owned. But she later conceded that she did
not own a Nissan, General Motors, Ford, or DaimlerChrysler
1
See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 23.
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vehicle. These four automobile manufacturers filed a motion to
dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The superior court
dismissed all of Fernandez’s claims, concluding that she had
failed to allege essential elements of each of her four claims.
¶4 Fernandez appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court’s dismissal of her individual claims against the
four automobile manufacturers. Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts,
et al., 1-CA-CV 03-0473, ¶¶ 11-12 (Ariz. App. June 10, 2004)
(mem. decision). Under the standard of review for a motion to
dismiss, however, the court stated that “until such time as the
trial court issues an order determining whether a class action
can be maintained in this case,” it would “decline to review the
viability of Plaintiff’s class action claims against the
automobile manufacturers in her representative capacity.” Id.
at ¶ 13.
2
¶5 The automobile manufacturers petitioned for review,
contending that Fernandez’s “inability to assert individual
claims against the automobile manufacturers precludes her from
suing” them “on behalf of a proposed class.” We granted review
because this is a matter of first impression for this court. We
2
Although all defendants, including Takata and SGS U.S.
Testing, petitioned for review on a number of issues, we granted
review only on the automobile manufacturers’ argument that
Fernandez lacks standing to bring a class action against them.
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have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3), of the Arizona
Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-
120.24 (2003), and Rule 23 of the Arizona Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure.
II
A
¶6 We have previously concluded that “the question of
standing in Arizona is not a constitutional mandate since we
have no counterpart to the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of
the federal constitution,” Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v.
Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Ariz., 148 Ariz. 1, 6, 712 P.2d 914,
919 (1985) (citing State v. B Bar Enters., 133 Ariz. 99, 649
P.2d 978 (1982)), and thus, when addressing questions of
standing “we are confronted only with questions of prudential or
judicial restraint.” Id. Nonetheless, we have established a
rigorous standing requirement. “To gain standing to bring an
action, a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable injury.”
Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 69, ¶ 16, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017
(1998) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). We
will consider the merits of a case without such an injury “only
in exceptional circumstances, generally in cases involving
issues of great public importance that are likely to recur. The
paucity of cases in which we have waived the standing
requirement demonstrates both our reluctance to do so and the
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narrowness of this exception.” Hull, 192 Ariz. at 71, ¶ 25, 961
P.2d at 1019.
¶7 Fernandez admits that she has never owned any vehicle
manufactured by defendants. Instead, she owns or owned an
automobile manufactured by Honda, which is not a party to the
3
lawsuit. Moreover, Fernandez has not alleged that she has
suffered any injury, either physical or economic, “fairly
traceable” to the conduct of the four defendant automobile
manufacturers. See Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520, 525, ¶
18, 81 P.3d 311, 316 (2003) (“To establish federal standing, a
party invoking the court's jurisdiction ‘must allege personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’”)
(citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)); see also
Easter v. American W. Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 961 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that “[t]o satisfy the traceability requirement, a
class action plaintiff must ‘allege a distinct and palpable
injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large
class of other possible litigants’”) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at
501)). Accordingly, because Fernandez cannot allege “a distinct
and palpable injury” resulting from any conduct of the four
automobile manufacturers, she has no standing to bring an
3
At oral argument, Fernandez’s counsel conceded that Honda
had never been served with the complaint.
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individual claim against them. Hull, 192 Ariz. at 69, ¶ 16, 961
P.2d at 1017.
¶8 The court of appeals therefore properly affirmed the
dismissal of her individual claims against the four automobile
manufacturers. Fernandez, 1-CA-CV 03-0473, mem. dec. at ¶ 12.
B
¶9 Fernandez nonetheless contends that because she owns
or did own a Honda, which allegedly has one of the defective TK-
52 series seatbelt buckles, she has standing to represent a
class of people who actually own automobiles manufactured by one
of the automobile manufacturer defendants in this case.
¶10 Because a plaintiff who cannot allege that a defendant
inflicted a distinct and palpable injury on her cannot sue that
defendant, Hull, 192 Ariz. at 69, ¶ 16, 961 P.2d at 1017, it
logically follows that the same plaintiff should not be able to
sue that defendant by bringing a class action purporting to
represent a class of people who actually were harmed by the
defendant. To permit a plaintiff to do that would severely
weaken, if not entirely eliminate, our standing requirement.
¶11 “Although we are not bound by federal jurisprudence on
the matter of standing, we have previously found federal case
law instructive.” Bennett, 206 Ariz. at 525, ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at
316 (citing Armory Park, 148 Ariz. at 6, 712 P.2d at 919). With
respect to the issue presented by this case, several United
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States Supreme Court decisions are instructive.
¶12 The Court has held that “if none of the named
plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the
requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may
seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the
class.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). In
addition, the Court has stressed that named plaintiffs in class
actions “must allege and show that they personally have been
injured, not that injury has been suffered by other,
unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which
they purport to represent.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 502; see also
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (standing requirements
are “no less true with respect to class actions than with
respect to other suits”); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“That a suit may be a class
action, however, adds nothing to the question of
standing . . . .”); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 828-29
(1974) (“[A] named plaintiff cannot acquire standing to sue by
bringing his action on behalf of others who suffered injury
which would have afforded them standing had they been named
plaintiffs; it bears repeating that a person cannot predicate
standing on injury which he does not share. Standing cannot be
acquired through the back door of a class action.”) (Burger,
C.J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).
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Given that our class action rule mirrors the federal rule, 4 we
find these Supreme Court cases persuasive in deciding the issue
presented by this case.
¶13 We hold, therefore, that the proper inquiry in a class
action lawsuit must initially focus on whether the plaintiff has
an individual claim against the defendant. If she does not, she
cannot maintain a class action against that defendant. See
Easter, 381 F.3d at 962 (holding that District Court properly
addressed standing before addressing issue of class
certification). Because Fernandez has no individual claim
against the defendant automobile manufacturers, she does not
have standing to bring a class action against them.
III
¶14 Fernandez argues that under the “juridical link”
doctrine, she should be permitted to pursue her class action
against the automobile manufacturers.5 We disagree.
¶15 The juridical link doctrine was first articulated in
dicta in LaMar v. H&B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 470 (9th
Cir. 1973). Another court explained LaMar’s discussion of the
doctrine as follows:
4
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(d).
5
Although Fernandez made this argument in her appellate
briefs, the court of appeals did not address it.
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LaMar held that a plaintiff without a cause of action
against a specific defendant cannot “‘fairly and
adequately’ protect the interests of those who do have
such causes of action,” for purposes of Rule 23(a).
Nevertheless . . . the court went on to hold that if
the plaintiffs as a group – named and unnamed – have
suffered an identical injury at the hands of several
parties related by way of a conspiracy or concerted
scheme, or otherwise “juridically related in a manner
that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would
be expeditious,” the claim could go forward.
Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted).
¶16 Federal case law after LaMar has largely limited the
application of the doctrine to circumstances in which “all the
defendants took part in a similar scheme that was sustained
either by a contract or conspiracy, or was mandated by a uniform
state rule,” such that it was “appropriate to join as defendants
even parties with whom the named class representative did not
have direct contact.” Id. at 679 (original emphasis); Moore v.
Comfed Sav. Bank, 908 F.2d 834, 838 (11th Cir. 1990) (commenting
that in most cases in which a juridical link was found, “there
was either a contractual obligation among all defendants or a
state or local statute requiring common action by the
defendants”); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 121 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (juridical link “refers to some type of legal
relationship which relates all defendants in a way that would
make single resolution of a dispute preferable to a multiplicity
of similar actions”). For instance, some courts have found a
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juridical link when multiple government agencies or officers
apply a common rule that is the subject of legal challenge. See
Matte v. Sunshine Mobile Homes, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 805, 827
(W.D. La. 2003); see also Murer v. Montana State Comp. Mut. Ins.
Fund, 849 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Mont. 1993) (finding that a
“juridical link [exists] where the various defendants are
related instrumentalities of a single state, such as various law
enforcement agencies”).
¶17 Even if we were to adopt the juridical link doctrine,
we would conclude that the doctrine does not confer standing on
Fernandez under the circumstances of this case. Fernandez does
not allege a conspiracy or concerted action between the
automobile manufacturers, nor does she allege that they had some
legal relationship. See, e.g., Easter, 381 F.3d at 962 (finding
that juridical link doctrine did not apply because plaintiffs
“presented no evidence that their alleged injuries were the
result of a conspiracy or concerted scheme between the . . .
[defendants]”); Alexander v. PSB Lending Corp., 800 N.E.2d 984,
993 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that because plaintiffs did
not allege any “contractual relationship, concerted conduct, or
conspiracy” between defendants with whom named plaintiffs did
not have direct contact, application of the juridical link
doctrine was not warranted).
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IV
¶18 Finally, “[a]lthough, as a matter of discretion, we
can waive the requirement of standing, we do so only in
exceptional circumstances, generally in cases involving issues
of great public importance that are likely to recur.” Hull, 192
Ariz. at 71, ¶ 25, 961 P.2d at 1019. Fernandez, however, has
presented no circumstance that persuades us to waive the
requirement of standing. She does not contend that her case
concerns a matter of statewide importance, involves
constitutional questions, or presents issues of such great
public importance that we should exercise our discretion and
waive standing for her class action claims. Id. at 71-72, ¶¶
25-29, 961 P.2d at 1019-20.
V
¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate in part the
decision of the court of appeals and affirm the ruling of the
trial court dismissing the automobile manufacturers from the
lawsuit.
__________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice
CONCURRING:
_________________________________________
Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice
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_________________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice
_________________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Justice
_________________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice
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