Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc.

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

ELEANORA FERNANDEZ, individually ) Arizona Supreme Court
and on behalf of all similarly ) No. CV-04-0277-PR
situated persons, )
) Court of Appeals
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Division One
) No. 1 CA-CV 03-0473
v. )
) Maricopa County
TAKATA SEAT BELTS, INC., NISSAN ) Superior Court
NORTH AMERICA, INC.; GENERAL ) No. CV 2002-022227
MOTORS CORPORATION; FORD MOTOR )
COMPANY; DAIMLERCHRYSLER )
CORPORATION; SGS U.S. TESTING ) O P I N I O N
COMPANY, INC., )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
The Honorable Mark R. Santana

AFFIRMED

Court of Appeals, Division One
Memorandum Decision (filed June 10, 2004)

VACATED IN PART
________________________________________________________________

Rake & Catanese, PC Phoenix
By: David J. Catanese
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

Bowman & Brooke, LLP Phoenix
By: Paul G. Cereghini
Jill S. Goldsmith
James C. Goodwin
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
Takata Seat Belts, Inc., General Motors
Corporation, and Nissan North America, Inc.
Carpenter & Lipps LLP Columbus, Ohio
By: Michael H. Carpenter
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
Takata Seat Belts, Inc.

Snell & Wilmer LLP Phoenix
By: Martha E. Gibbs
Gregory J. Marshall

And:

O’Melveny & Myers LLP Washington, D.C.
By: Brian C. Anderson
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
Ford Motor Company

Snell & Wilmer LLP Phoenix
By: Patrick X. Fowler

And:

Hogan & Hartson, LLP New York, New York
By: Lewis H. Goldfarb
Christopher B. Wren
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
DaimlerChrysler Corporation

Keller Rohrback, PLC Phoenix
By: Leon B. Silver
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
SGS U.S. Testing Company, Inc.

Pacific Legal Foundation Sacramento, California
By: Deborah J. La Fetra
Gregory T. Broderick
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Pacific Legal Foundation
________________________________________________________________

R Y A N, Justice

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¶1 In this case, we must decide whether a plaintiff who

has no individual claim against a defendant may allege class

action claims against that defendant and require the defendant

to remain as a party to the lawsuit because she seeks to

represent a class of other purported plaintiffs, some of whom

may have claims against the defendant.

I
1
¶2 Eleanora Fernandez brought a class action lawsuit

against, among others, Takata Seat Belts, SGS U.S. Testing

Company, Inc., Nissan North America, General Motors Corporation,

Ford Motor Company, and DaimlerChrysler Corporation. She

alleged fraudulent concealment, violation of the Arizona

Consumer Fraud Act, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust.

Fernandez claimed that between 1986 and 1999, several automobile

manufacturers installed in their vehicles TK-52 seatbelt buckles

manufactured by Takata and tested by SGS U.S. Testing. She

alleged that the TK-52 buckles were defective because they could

disengage in accidents. She also contended that all of the

defendants knew about this supposed defect and that they

concealed this risk from consumers.

¶3 The complaint did not specify the make or model of the

automobile Fernandez owned. But she later conceded that she did

not own a Nissan, General Motors, Ford, or DaimlerChrysler

1
See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 23.

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vehicle. These four automobile manufacturers filed a motion to

dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The superior court

dismissed all of Fernandez’s claims, concluding that she had

failed to allege essential elements of each of her four claims.

¶4 Fernandez appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the

trial court’s dismissal of her individual claims against the

four automobile manufacturers. Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts,

et al., 1-CA-CV 03-0473, ¶¶ 11-12 (Ariz. App. June 10, 2004)

(mem. decision). Under the standard of review for a motion to

dismiss, however, the court stated that “until such time as the

trial court issues an order determining whether a class action

can be maintained in this case,” it would “decline to review the

viability of Plaintiff’s class action claims against the

automobile manufacturers in her representative capacity.” Id.

at ¶ 13.
2
¶5 The automobile manufacturers petitioned for review,

contending that Fernandez’s “inability to assert individual

claims against the automobile manufacturers precludes her from

suing” them “on behalf of a proposed class.” We granted review

because this is a matter of first impression for this court. We

2
Although all defendants, including Takata and SGS U.S.
Testing, petitioned for review on a number of issues, we granted
review only on the automobile manufacturers’ argument that
Fernandez lacks standing to bring a class action against them.

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have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3), of the Arizona

Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-

120.24 (2003), and Rule 23 of the Arizona Rules of Civil

Appellate Procedure.

II

A

¶6 We have previously concluded that “the question of

standing in Arizona is not a constitutional mandate since we

have no counterpart to the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of

the federal constitution,” Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v.

Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Ariz., 148 Ariz. 1, 6, 712 P.2d 914,

919 (1985) (citing State v. B Bar Enters., 133 Ariz. 99, 649

P.2d 978 (1982)), and thus, when addressing questions of

standing “we are confronted only with questions of prudential or

judicial restraint.” Id. Nonetheless, we have established a

rigorous standing requirement. “To gain standing to bring an

action, a plaintiff must allege a distinct and palpable injury.”

Sears v. Hull, 192 Ariz. 65, 69, ¶ 16, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017

(1998) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). We

will consider the merits of a case without such an injury “only

in exceptional circumstances, generally in cases involving

issues of great public importance that are likely to recur. The

paucity of cases in which we have waived the standing

requirement demonstrates both our reluctance to do so and the

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narrowness of this exception.” Hull, 192 Ariz. at 71, ¶ 25, 961

P.2d at 1019.

¶7 Fernandez admits that she has never owned any vehicle

manufactured by defendants. Instead, she owns or owned an

automobile manufactured by Honda, which is not a party to the
3
lawsuit. Moreover, Fernandez has not alleged that she has

suffered any injury, either physical or economic, “fairly

traceable” to the conduct of the four defendant automobile

manufacturers. See Bennett v. Napolitano, 206 Ariz. 520, 525, ¶

18, 81 P.3d 311, 316 (2003) (“To establish federal standing, a

party invoking the court's jurisdiction ‘must allege personal

injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful

conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’”)

(citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)); see also

Easter v. American W. Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 961 (9th Cir. 2004)

(holding that “[t]o satisfy the traceability requirement, a

class action plaintiff must ‘allege a distinct and palpable

injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large

class of other possible litigants’”) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at

501)). Accordingly, because Fernandez cannot allege “a distinct

and palpable injury” resulting from any conduct of the four

automobile manufacturers, she has no standing to bring an

3
At oral argument, Fernandez’s counsel conceded that Honda
had never been served with the complaint.

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individual claim against them. Hull, 192 Ariz. at 69, ¶ 16, 961

P.2d at 1017.

¶8 The court of appeals therefore properly affirmed the

dismissal of her individual claims against the four automobile

manufacturers. Fernandez, 1-CA-CV 03-0473, mem. dec. at ¶ 12.

B

¶9 Fernandez nonetheless contends that because she owns

or did own a Honda, which allegedly has one of the defective TK-

52 series seatbelt buckles, she has standing to represent a

class of people who actually own automobiles manufactured by one

of the automobile manufacturer defendants in this case.

¶10 Because a plaintiff who cannot allege that a defendant

inflicted a distinct and palpable injury on her cannot sue that

defendant, Hull, 192 Ariz. at 69, ¶ 16, 961 P.2d at 1017, it

logically follows that the same plaintiff should not be able to

sue that defendant by bringing a class action purporting to

represent a class of people who actually were harmed by the

defendant. To permit a plaintiff to do that would severely

weaken, if not entirely eliminate, our standing requirement.

¶11 “Although we are not bound by federal jurisprudence on

the matter of standing, we have previously found federal case

law instructive.” Bennett, 206 Ariz. at 525, ¶ 22, 81 P.3d at

316 (citing Armory Park, 148 Ariz. at 6, 712 P.2d at 919). With

respect to the issue presented by this case, several United

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States Supreme Court decisions are instructive.

¶12 The Court has held that “if none of the named

plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the

requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may

seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the

class.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). In

addition, the Court has stressed that named plaintiffs in class

actions “must allege and show that they personally have been

injured, not that injury has been suffered by other,

unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which

they purport to represent.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 502; see also

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (standing requirements

are “no less true with respect to class actions than with

respect to other suits”); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights

Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“That a suit may be a class

action, however, adds nothing to the question of

standing . . . .”); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 828-29

(1974) (“[A] named plaintiff cannot acquire standing to sue by

bringing his action on behalf of others who suffered injury

which would have afforded them standing had they been named

plaintiffs; it bears repeating that a person cannot predicate

standing on injury which he does not share. Standing cannot be

acquired through the back door of a class action.”) (Burger,

C.J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part).

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Given that our class action rule mirrors the federal rule, 4 we

find these Supreme Court cases persuasive in deciding the issue

presented by this case.

¶13 We hold, therefore, that the proper inquiry in a class

action lawsuit must initially focus on whether the plaintiff has

an individual claim against the defendant. If she does not, she

cannot maintain a class action against that defendant. See

Easter, 381 F.3d at 962 (holding that District Court properly

addressed standing before addressing issue of class

certification). Because Fernandez has no individual claim

against the defendant automobile manufacturers, she does not

have standing to bring a class action against them.

III

¶14 Fernandez argues that under the “juridical link”

doctrine, she should be permitted to pursue her class action

against the automobile manufacturers.5 We disagree.

¶15 The juridical link doctrine was first articulated in

dicta in LaMar v. H&B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 470 (9th

Cir. 1973). Another court explained LaMar’s discussion of the

doctrine as follows:

4
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(d).
5
Although Fernandez made this argument in her appellate
briefs, the court of appeals did not address it.

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 LaMar held that a plaintiff without a cause of action
against a specific defendant cannot “‘fairly and
adequately’ protect the interests of those who do have
such causes of action,” for purposes of Rule 23(a).
Nevertheless . . . the court went on to hold that if
the plaintiffs as a group – named and unnamed – have
suffered an identical injury at the hands of several
parties related by way of a conspiracy or concerted
scheme, or otherwise “juridically related in a manner
that suggests a single resolution of the dispute would
be expeditious,” the claim could go forward.

Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted).

¶16 Federal case law after LaMar has largely limited the

application of the doctrine to circumstances in which “all the

defendants took part in a similar scheme that was sustained

either by a contract or conspiracy, or was mandated by a uniform

state rule,” such that it was “appropriate to join as defendants

even parties with whom the named class representative did not

have direct contact.” Id. at 679 (original emphasis); Moore v.

Comfed Sav. Bank, 908 F.2d 834, 838 (11th Cir. 1990) (commenting

that in most cases in which a juridical link was found, “there

was either a contractual obligation among all defendants or a

state or local statute requiring common action by the

defendants”); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 121 (N.D.

Cal. 1981) (juridical link “refers to some type of legal

relationship which relates all defendants in a way that would

make single resolution of a dispute preferable to a multiplicity

of similar actions”). For instance, some courts have found a

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juridical link when multiple government agencies or officers

apply a common rule that is the subject of legal challenge. See

Matte v. Sunshine Mobile Homes, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 805, 827

(W.D. La. 2003); see also Murer v. Montana State Comp. Mut. Ins.

Fund, 849 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Mont. 1993) (finding that a

“juridical link [exists] where the various defendants are

related instrumentalities of a single state, such as various law

enforcement agencies”).

¶17 Even if we were to adopt the juridical link doctrine,

we would conclude that the doctrine does not confer standing on

Fernandez under the circumstances of this case. Fernandez does

not allege a conspiracy or concerted action between the

automobile manufacturers, nor does she allege that they had some

legal relationship. See, e.g., Easter, 381 F.3d at 962 (finding

that juridical link doctrine did not apply because plaintiffs

“presented no evidence that their alleged injuries were the

result of a conspiracy or concerted scheme between the . . .

[defendants]”); Alexander v. PSB Lending Corp., 800 N.E.2d 984,

993 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that because plaintiffs did

not allege any “contractual relationship, concerted conduct, or

conspiracy” between defendants with whom named plaintiffs did

not have direct contact, application of the juridical link

doctrine was not warranted).

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 IV

¶18 Finally, “[a]lthough, as a matter of discretion, we

can waive the requirement of standing, we do so only in

exceptional circumstances, generally in cases involving issues

of great public importance that are likely to recur.” Hull, 192

Ariz. at 71, ¶ 25, 961 P.2d at 1019. Fernandez, however, has

presented no circumstance that persuades us to waive the

requirement of standing. She does not contend that her case

concerns a matter of statewide importance, involves

constitutional questions, or presents issues of such great

public importance that we should exercise our discretion and

waive standing for her class action claims. Id. at 71-72, ¶¶

25-29, 961 P.2d at 1019-20.

V

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate in part the

decision of the court of appeals and affirm the ruling of the

trial court dismissing the automobile manufacturers from the

lawsuit.

__________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

CONCURRING:

_________________________________________
Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice

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_________________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice

_________________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Justice

_________________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

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