Aileen H Char Life Int v. Maricopa Co

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

AILEEN H. CHAR LIFE INTEREST, ) Arizona Supreme Court
629 INVESTMENTS, A HAWAII ) No. CV-03-0348-PR
PARTNERSHIP, REMAINDER INTEREST; )
AIMCO PROPERTIES LP; ) Court of Appeals
AIMCO/BLOSSOMTREE APTS LP; ) Division One
AL-SAID ANNA F T; ALTA PLACE ) Nos. 1 CA-TX 02-0003
PROPERTY INC.; ARCADIA VILLA ) 1 CA-TX 02-0013
APTS, LLC; ARIZONA GRANO-PALMS )
LTD; CAMINO APTS; CINNAMON ) Maricopa County Superior
PROPERTIES; CON AM REALTY ) Court
INVESTORS; COOK INLET REGION OF ) Nos. TX 98-00413
ARIZONA INC; DELCASTELLO IRENE ) TX 98-00419
TRUST; EQR VILLA MANANA VISTAS ) TX 98-00422
INC; EQR-WATSON GP; EQUITY )
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES; ERP )
OPERATING LP; EVANS WITHYCOMBE )
FINANCE PSHP SUITE A200; EVANS )
WITHYCOMBE FINANCE PARTNERSHIP )
LP; EVANS WITHYCOMBE )
RESIDENTIAL; EVANS WITHYCOMBE )
RESIDENTIAL LP; FOREST PARK LLC; )
G & E HOLDINGS INC; GREENWAY )
PHOENIX ASSOCIATION LTD )
PARTNERSHIP; HEATHERWOOD )
INVESTORS LTD PARTNERSHIP; )
LAURELS SADDLE CLUB LP; MAGELLAN )
NORTHWOOD INC; MARIPOSA JOINT ) O P I N I O N
VENTURE; MORARU, PETER & )
ELIZABETH; MOUNTAIN VIEW )
CASITAS LP; NHP SUMMER LP; )
ORCHARD MESA ASSOCIATES LTD )
PARTNERSHIP; OTC APARTMENTS LP; )
PARKSIDE; PARKSIDE PARTNERSHIP; )
PASO ROBLES LLC; PHOENIX )
COURTYARDS LTD PARTNERSHIP; PINE )
SPRINGS LLC; PROFESSIONAL )
PROPERTY INV LTD; SCOTTSDALE )
PALMS LTD PARTNERSHIP; SMITH )
MELVIN W JR & MARJORIE L TR; )
SUNSET SHADOWS INC; SUNSHINE )
LAND ASSOCIATES LP; THE PHOENIX )
APTS LLC; THE S DEVELOPMENT )
COMPANY; THOMSON THOMAS J; TPOC )
LTD LIABILITY CO; VERDE )
INVESTMENT INC; W. L. PROPERTIES )
LLC; WELLSFORD RESIDENTIAL )
TRUST; YF PARTNERS GREEN LP )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees, )
)
v. )
)
MARICOPA COUNTY, a political )
subdivision of the State of )
Arizona, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
__________________________________)
)
ANTHEM DUNLAP SQUARE, LLC, a )
limited liability company, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
MARICOPA COUNTY, a political )
subdivision of the State of )
Arizona, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
__________________________________)
)
CENTURY PROPERTIES FUND XIX; )
FARNAM COMPANIES INC; )
FEIGA/CIMMARON LP; PACIFIC )
CORINTHIAN LIFE INSURANCE; )
RONALD L. HERRICK TRUSTEE; SANO )
CORPORATION; WHITE, HOWELL AND )
HALL, LLC, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees, )
)
v. )
)
MARICOPA COUNTY, a political )

2
subdivision of the State of )
Arizona, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
__________________________________)
)
AILEEN H. CHAR LIFE INTEREST, )
629 INVESTMENTS, A HAWAII )
PARTNERSHIP, REMAINDER INTEREST; )
AIMCO PROPERTIES LP; )
AIMCO/BLOSSOMTREE APTS LP; )
ALSAID ANNA F T; ALTA PLACE )
PROPERTY INC; ARCADIA VILLA )
APTS. LLC; ARIZONA GRANO-PALMS )
LTD; CAMINO APTS; CINNAMON )
PROPERTIES; CON AM REALTY )
INVESTORS; COOK INLET REGION OF )
ARIZONA INC; DELCASTELLO IRENE )
TRUST; EQR-WATSON GP; EQUITY )
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES; ERP )
OPERATING LP; EVANS WITHYCOMBE )
FINANCE PSHP SUITE A200; EVANS )
WITHYCOMBE FINANCE PARTNERSHIP )
L.P.; EVANS WITHYCOMBE )
RESIDENTIAL; EVANS WITHYCOMBE )
RESIDENTIAL LP; FOREST PART LLC; )
G & E HOLDINGS INC; GLENWAY )
PHOENIX ASSOC LED PARTNERSHIP; )
LEATHERWOOD INVESTORS LED )
PARTNERSHIP; LAURELS SADDLE CLUB )
LP; MAGELLAN NORTHWOOD, INC; )
MARIPOSA JOINT VENTURE; MORARU, )
PETER & ELIZABETH; MOUNTAIN VIEW )
CASITAS LP; NHP SUMMER, L.P.; )
ORCHARD MESA ASSOCIATED LTD )
PARTNERSHIP; OTC APARTMENTS LP; )
PARKSIDE; PARKSIDE PARTNERSHIP; )
PASO ROBLES LLC; PHOENIX )
COURTYARDS LTD PARTNERSHIP; PINE )
SPRINGS, LLC; PROFESSIONAL )
PROPERTY INV LTD; SCOTTSDALE )
PALMS LTD PARTNERSHIP; SMITH )
MELVIN W JR & MARJORIE L TR; )
SUNSET SHADOWS, INC,; SUNSHINE )
LAND ASSOCIATES LP; THE PHOENIX )
ARTS LLC; THE S DEVELOPMENT )
COMPANY; THOMSON THOMAS J; TPOC )

3
LTD LIABILITY CO; VERDE )
INVESTMENTS, INC,; W. L. )
PROPERTIES, LLC; WELLSFORD )
RESIDENTIAL TRUST; YF PARTNERS )
GREEN LP, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
Cross-Appellees, )
)
v. )
)
MARICOPA COUNTY, a political )
subdivision of the State of )
Arizona; and the DEPARTMENT OF )
REVENUE OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, )
)
Defendants-Appellees, )
Cross-Appellants. )
)
__________________________________)

Appeal from the Arizona Tax Court
Nos. TX 98-00413, TX 98-00419, TX 98-00422
The Honorable Jeffrey S. Cates
Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; Remanded

Memorandum Decision of Court of Appeals, Division One
1 CA-TX 02-0003, 1 CA-TX 02-0013, Filed September 2, 2003
Vacated

Fennemore Craig, P.C. Phoenix
by Paul J. Mooney
Jim L. Wright
and Paul Moore
Attorneys for Aileen H. Char, et al.

Helm & Kyle, LTD Tempe
by Roberta S. Livesay
and Lisa J. Bowey
Special Counsel for Maricopa County

Terry Goddard, Attorney General Phoenix
by Frank Boucek, III, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Arizona Department of Revenue
_________________________________________________________________

4
M c G R E G O R, Vice Chief Justice

¶1 We granted review to clarify the elements a taxpayer

must prove to establish discriminatory property tax valuation in

violation of Arizona’s Uniformity Clause. Ariz. Const. art. IX,

§ 1. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article VI, Section

5.3 of the Arizona Constitution, Rule 23 of the Arizona Rules of

Civil Appellate Procedure, and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

§ 12-120.24 (2003).

I.

¶2 A group of property owners (the Taxpayers) brought

this action against Maricopa County and the Arizona Department

of Revenue (ADOR) to recover taxes allegedly collected

illegally. The Taxpayers contend that the Maricopa County

Assessor valued their apartment properties (Taxpayers’

properties) in a discriminatory manner and thus violated the

Uniformity Clause of the Arizona Constitution, Article IX,

Section 1, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States

Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1. The Taxpayers sought a

property tax refund under A.R.S. § 42-204.C (Supp. 1997),

repealed by 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 150, § 9 (repeal

effective 1999).1

1
At the time in question, A.R.S. § 42-204.C stated:

5
¶3 For tax years 1996 and 1997, as in previous years, the

Maricopa County Assessor implemented a computer program

(valuation program) to determine the values of commercial

properties, including multi-family residential properties,

located in Maricopa County.2 The valuation program calculated

each property’s value using a computerized cost model. The

county assessor, however, programmed the valuation program to

“roll over” or “freeze” the value of certain parcels. If a

multi-family residential property owner previously had appealed

the property’s valuation, the valuation program would roll over

that property’s valuation until one of several actions occurred.3

__________________
[W]ithin one year after payment of the first
installment of the tax, an action may be maintained to
recover any tax illegally collected, and if the tax due
is determined to be less than the amount paid, the
excess shall be refunded in the manner provided by this
title. Interest at the legal rate on the overpayment
shall be payable from the date of overpayment. For the
purpose of computing interest under any such judgment,
if the tax was paid in installments, a pro rata share
of the total overpayment shall be deemed attributable
to each installment.

A.R.S. § 42-204.C (Supp. 1997), repealed by 1997 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, Ch. 150, § 9 (repeal effective 1999).
2
We view the record in the light most favorable to upholding
the tax court’s judgment. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. City of
Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 53 ¶ 13, 961 P.2d 449, 451 (1998);
McFarlin v. Hall, 127 Ariz. 220, 224, 619 P.2d 729, 733 (1980).
3
For example, the assessor would revalue the property rather
than roll over its valuation if the assessor revalued the
property’s land, the property owner constructed new improvements

6
The valuation of these roll-over properties did not change from

1996 to 1997. If the valuation program did not roll over the

value of a multi-family residential parcel, or if the parcel’s

value was not manually entered into the County’s computer

system, the assessor retained the value assigned by the

valuation program.

¶4 The Taxpayers own sixty-two multi-family residential

parcels in Maricopa County, all among the group of properties

that the assessor valued by applying the cost model used as part

of the valuation program. The tax court, comparing the

valuations for 1996 and 1997, found that the Taxpayers’

properties’ valuations increased by an average of 37.6 percent,

while the roll-over properties’ valuations remained unchanged.

The tax court then entered judgment in favor of the Taxpayers

and ordered the County to refund to the Taxpayers “the

difference between the 1996 property valuations and the 1997

increased property valuations of their properties.” The County

appealed the tax court’s decision.

¶5 The court of appeals reversed. In its memorandum

decision, the court relied primarily upon its conclusion that

the tax court “failed to require evidence of disproportionate

__________________
or changed the use of the property, or the assessor manually
changed the property’s value.

7
valuation with respect to the properties’ full cash value.”4

Aileen H. Char Life Interest v. Maricopa County, 1 CA-TX 02-0003

& 1 CA-TX 02-0013 at ¶ 11 (Ariz. App. Sept. 2, 2003) (mem.

decision).

¶6 The Taxpayers petitioned this court for review. We

accepted review to clarify the proper standard to apply in

determining whether unlawful discrimination has occurred under

Arizona’s Uniformity Clause. We will not set aside the tax

court’s findings unless clearly erroneous. Ariz. R. Civ. Proc.

52(a). Whether the tax court applied the proper legal standard,

however, presents a question of law reviewed de novo. Transp.

Ins. Co. v. Bruining, 186 Ariz. 224, 226, 921 P.2d 24,

26 (1996).

II.

¶7 The Arizona Constitution requires that “all taxes

shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the

territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.” Ariz.

4
The court of appeals also held that the tax court erred in
allowing the Taxpayers to voluntarily dismiss Parcel 158-02-005.
The court concluded that the dismissal of Parcel 158-02-005 did
not comply with Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) because
“the dismissal was entered in the absence of a stipulation
signed by the County and the ADOR, and occurred after the court
had issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Aileen H.
Char Life Interest, 1 CA-TX 02-0003 & 1 CA-TX 02-0013, mem. dec.
at ¶ 33; see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) (“[A]n action may be
dismissed . . . by order of the court pursuant to a stipulation
of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the

8
Const. art. IX, § 1. Arizona’s Uniformity Clause provides

greater protection for taxpayers than does the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is designed “to ensure

‘that each taxpayer’s property bear the just proportion of the

property tax burden.’” Am. West Airlines, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t

of Revenue, 179 Ariz. 528, 530-31, 880 P.2d 1074, 1076-77 (1994)

(quoting Merris v. Ada County, 593 P.2d 394, 398 (Idaho 1979)).

¶8 Four general elements comprise the formula by which

Arizona measures a property tax: classification, valuation,

assessment ratio, and tax rate. See, e.g., Berge Ford, Inc. v.

Maricopa County, 172 Ariz. 483, 485, 838 P.2d 822, 824 (Tax Ct.

1992). The first step, classification, involves the exercise of

legislative power. Exercising this power, the Arizona

legislature has established statutory classes of property. See

A.R.S. §§ 42-12001 to -12010 (Supp. 2003). For most property in

Arizona, a county assessor carries out the second step,

valuation. An assessment ratio, dictated by the legislative

classification, is then applied to the valuation. See A.R.S. §§

42-15001 to -15010 (Supp. 2003). This result represents the

property’s assessed value. Finally, the applicable tax rate is

applied to the property’s assessed value to produce the amount

of taxes due.

__________________
action.”). We agree and adopt this holding of the court of
appeals.

9
¶9 In this case, the Taxpayers’ challenge involves the

second step in the property tax formula, the county assessor’s

valuation of their properties. The Taxpayers do not argue that

the assessor valued their properties in excess of full cash

value, placed them in the wrong legislative classification, or

applied a discriminatory tax rate or assessment ratio. Instead,

the Taxpayers argue that the alleged undervaluation of similarly

situated properties resulted in the Taxpayers being forced to

bear a disproportionate share of the property tax burden. We

use the term “discriminatory valuation” to describe this type of

case.

¶10 We defined the elements a taxpayer must prove to make

out a case of discriminatory valuation in McCluskey v. Sparks,

80 Ariz. 15, 19, 291 P.2d 791, 793 (1955). In McCluskey,

without determining whether the particular facts presented

amounted to discrimination in violation of the Uniformity

Clause, we concluded that the “[d]eliberate and systematic

undervaluation of [a taxpayer’s] property at a figure greatly in

excess of the undervaluation of other like properties amounts to

a violation of the Arizona [C]onstitution.” Id. To prove

discriminatory valuation, then, a taxpayer must establish (1)

that the taxing officials engaged in deliberate and systematic

conduct and (2) that such conduct resulted in “great

inequality,” a finding that requires the court to define the

10
appropriate class of property for evaluating the claim of

discriminatory valuation and then to find greatly

disproportionate tax treatment within the defined class.

¶11 The County asserts that the Taxpayers must prove each

element of their prima facie case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The authority upon which the County relies for that proposition,

however, refers to challenges to the constitutionality of a

statute. See, e.g., Magellan S. Mountain Ltd. v. Maricopa

County, 192 Ariz. 499, 968 P.2d 103 (App. 1998) (holding that

statute, which allowed revaluation of real property after

January 1 of the valuation year, did not violate the federal

Equal Protection Clause or the Uniformity Clause); Tucson Elec.

Power Co. v. Apache County, 185 Ariz. 5, 912 P.2d 9 (App. 1995)

(holding that provision of tax statute taxing mining and utility

properties at a higher rate than other properties to be an

unconstitutional special law). This matter involves not a

challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, but a claim

that the County imposed a discriminatory tax on the Taxpayers.

We perceive no reason to depart from the usual rule that a

plaintiff must establish each element of a civil action by a

preponderance of the evidence, and we hold that standard

applies.

11
 A.

¶12 In a discriminatory valuation case, “there must be

something more than a dispute between the taxpayers and the

taxing officials as to the valuation placed upon their

properties.” McCluskey, 80 Ariz. at 19, 291 P.2d at 794.

“Before the court will interfere, it must be clearly shown that

assessments which are unequal are the result of systematic and

intentional conduct and not mere error in judgment.” Id. at 20,

291 P.2d at 794. Moreover, “[t]he mere fact that the assessing

officials believed their conduct was valid does not render it

less vulnerable to attack as discriminatory.” Id. Finally,

deliberate and systematic conduct need not be malicious, only

purposeful.

¶13 The County does not seriously dispute that the

challenged valuations resulted from systematic and intentional

conduct. At the time in question, Arizona statutes limited the

circumstances under which an assessor could “roll over” a

property valuation:

In the year subsequent to an appeal, the valuation or
classification of property shall be the valuation or
classification that was determined in the prior year at
the highest level of appeal unless the assessor reviews
the current facts which apply to a revaluation or a
change in the classification and determines that an
adjustment in the valuation or a change in the
classification is appropriate.

12
A.R.S. § 42-247.A (Supp. 1997), repealed by 1997 Ariz. Sess.

Laws, Ch. 150, § 9 (repeal effective 1999); see also A.R.S. §

42-16002.B (Supp. 2003). Despite the language of A.R.S. § 42-

247.A, the County developed and implemented a policy to “roll

over” property values on certain apartment parcels for more than

one year. To do so, the assessor programmed the County’s

computer system to roll over the value of certain properties,

while using the cost model to determine the valuation of other

properties. The evidence at trial indicated that this program

resulted in the County rolling over the values of approximately

fifty percent of the apartment parcels but valuing more than

forty percent of the apartment parcels, including the Taxpayers’

properties, using the cost model. The Taxpayers, therefore, met

their burden of establishing that the County intentionally and

systematically used a method of valuing their property different

from that the County used to value the roll-over properties.

¶14 As we made clear in McCluskey, however, “different

modes of assessment on the same class of property will not

render the same invalid unless in fact they operate to produce

discriminatory inequality.” 80 Ariz. at 20, 291 P.2d at 794;

see also Sec. Props. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Prop. Valuation, 112

Ariz. 54, 56, 537 P.2d 924, 926 (1975) (“Neither the change in

value of a particular parcel of property nor the total changes

in assessments considered in the aggregate raise any question as

13
to the legality of the assessment. There must be more.”). We

therefore turn to the issue of whether the County’s program

resulted in great inequality. To make this determination, we

must first determine the appropriate class for evaluating the

Taxpayers’ claim of discriminatory valuation.

B.

¶15 Arizona’s Uniformity Clause requires that taxes be

uniform upon the same class of property. Ariz. Const. art. IX,

§ 1. We examined the meaning of the word “class,” for

Uniformity Clause purposes, in Apache County v. Atchison, Topeka

and Santa Fe Railway Co., 106 Ariz. 356, 476 P.2d 657 (1970).

In that case, we stated:

A class may be the grouping together of persons or
things for a common purpose or it may be a ranking of
persons or things possessing the same attributes. . . .
The word “class,” however, in Article IX, § 1 is
obviously used in the latter sense, meaning the
grouping of persons or things possessing common
attributes.

Id. at 359, 476 P.2d at 660 (citations omitted). As Apache

County and our subsequent decisions make clear, the proper class

of property to use in evaluating claims of discriminatory

valuation consists of those similarly situated properties

possessing common attributes “based on the nature of the

property or on some other real difference in its use, utility,

or productivity.” Am. West Airlines, Inc., 179 Ariz. at 535,

880 P.2d at 1081.

14
¶16 In this case, the tax court found that the “multi-

family residential property classification is a valid

classification to which an unlawful tax discrimination analysis

can be applied.” Relying on Hillock v. Bade, 22 Ariz. App. 46,

523 P.2d 97 (1974), aff'd, 111 Ariz. 585, 535 P.2d 1302 (1975),

the County argues that the tax court erred by not defining the

relevant class as all property in Maricopa County.5 We disagree.

In Hillock, a taxpayer challenged Pima County’s three-year

cyclical revaluation plan mandated by a statewide revaluation

program. 22 Ariz. App. at 49, 523 P.2d at 100. In holding that

“the Pima County cyclical revaluation plan did not involve

intentional and arbitrary discrimination,” the court explained

that a number of factors were relevant to this determination,

5
The County also argues that the inclusion of some
“horizontal regimes” and “associated parcels” destroys the
homogeneity of the “multi-family residential” classification.
According to the tax court’s findings, “horizontal regimes” are
individual apartment units with separate parcel numbers.
“Associated parcels,” on the other hand, contain a portion of an
apartment complex, but have separate parcel numbers from the
rest of the complex. Although the County presented evidence
that the existence of these properties rendered the Taxpayers’
proffered class improper, the tax court, after considering the
County’s arguments, found that “the County failed to show how
the inclusion and exclusion of these properties has any
significant effect on the necessary discrimination analysis.”
We find no error in the tax court’s finding. In addition,
contrary to the County’s assertions, the tax court’s finding
does not indicate that the tax court improperly shifted the
burden of proof to the County. Instead, the record is clear
that the tax court placed the burden of proof on the Taxpayers
to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory valuation.

15
including any discrimination that would result if the cyclical

plan were not instituted immediately. Specifically, the court

examined and rejected the taxpayer’s proposed alternative that

“the taxing authorities should have waited until the completion

of the three year revaluation program so that all new valuations

could be placed on the assessment rolls at the same time.” Id.

at 53-54, 523 P.2d at 104-05. The court reasoned:

[The taxpayer’s] discrimination claim must be viewed in
a context involving all property situated in the State
of Arizona subject to ad valorem property taxation. . .
. Therefore to the extent that any particular type of
property is undervalued, there is discrimination
against all other property within the state, not just
against property of that particular class within the
particular county involved. When these circumstances
are considered, we do not believe that the taxing
authorities acted arbitrarily in adopting a cyclical
three year plan requiring that the new valuations be
placed on the assessment rolls yearly as developed,
rather than waiting until all of the new valuations
could be placed upon the rolls at the same time at the
completion of the three year program.

Id. at 54, 523 P.2d at 105.

¶17 The language of Hillock, taken out of context, can be

read as supporting the broad proposition the County advances.

Hillock, however, did not mandate the use of geographic criteria

to define a peer group of properties to prove discriminatory

valuation. Instead, Hillock recognized the distinction between

systematic reappraisal and intentional discrimination.6 Indeed,

6
At the time the Taxpayers brought suit, A.R.S. § 42-221.B
stated:

16
if the tax court in this case had found the appropriate class to

be all properties in Maricopa County, we doubt that class would

have possessed common attributes “based on the nature of the

property or on some other real difference in its use, utility,

or productivity.” Am. West Airlines, Inc., 179 Ariz. at 535,

880 P.2d at 1081; Apache County, 106 Ariz. at 359, 476 P.2d at

660.

¶18 As the County points out, the legislature has not

exercised its power to create statutory classes of property to

create a separate classification for “multi-family residential”

property. The “multi-family residential” classification adopted

__________________
In the case of property that is classified as class
four, five or six pursuant to § 42-162, the assessor
may use the same valuation for up to three consecutive
tax years if the assessor files a specific plan for
such valuations with the department and the plan is
implemented uniformly throughout the county.

A.R.S. § 42-221.B (Supp. 1997), repealed by 1997 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, Ch. 150, § 9 (repeal effective 1999); see also A.R.S. §
42-13052 (Supp. 2003). Class six property, at the time,
encompassed real and personal property “devoted to use as leased
or rented property solely for residential purposes.” A.R.S. §
42-162.A.6(a) (Supp. 1997), repealed by 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws,
Ch. 150, § 9 (repeal effective 1999); see also A.R.S. § 42-
12004.A.1 (Supp. 2003) (classifying real and personal property
“used solely as leased or rented property for residential
purposes” as class four property). Had the County followed the
dictates of A.R.S. § 42-221.B in this case, Hillock very well
may have supported reaching a different result. Arguably, if
the County had filed a three-year valuation plan with the ADOR
and implemented the plan uniformly throughout the county, its
conduct would not have caused intentional and systematic
discrimination. Because the record contains no evidence that

17
by the tax court, however, comes directly from the coding system

the County uses to identify property within the county for

assessment purposes.

¶19 Arizona’s statutes give the ADOR general oversight

responsibilities for Arizona’s property tax system. A.R.S. §

42-141 (Supp. 1997), repealed by 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 150,

§ 9 (repeal effective 1999); see also A.R.S. §§ 42-11051 to -

11056 (1999); A.R.S. § 42-13002 (1999). At the time in

question, the relevant statute directed that the county assessor

“determine through the use of the manuals furnished and

procedures described by the department the full cash value of

all such property, as of January 1 of the next year.” A.R.S. §

42-221.B (Supp. 1997), repealed by 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch.

150, § 9 (repeal effective 1999); see also A.R.S. § 11-542

(Supp. 2003) (requiring the county assessor to determine “all

the taxable property in said county at its full cash value”);

A.R.S. § 42-13051.B.2 (1999). To carry out this directive, the

County uses the ADOR’s Property Use Code Manual (the Manual),

which contains those codes that the ADOR authorizes for use in

the Arizona property tax system. The ADOR intends that county

assessors and others use the Manual for the purpose of

__________________
the County filed such a plan in this case, we do not resolve
this issue.

18
identifying property according to use. Arizona Department of

Revenue, Property Use Code Manual at Foreword (1994).

¶20 According to the Manual, “[t]he purpose of property

use codes is to group and code like properties for

identification.” Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Consistent with

this purpose, the Manual sets out property use codes beginning

with the prefix “03” to identify properties with multi-family

residential property characteristics. The tax court found that

the Taxpayers’ properties fit within this group and, in fact,

had been so coded by the assessor. Because the identification

of property as “multi-family residential” accurately reflects

the property’s use, we agree with the tax court that this class

is appropriate for evaluating the Taxpayers’ claim of

discriminatory valuation. We therefore turn to the tax court’s

determination that the Taxpayers’ properties were subject to a

disproportionate valuation when compared to other properties

within the same class.

C.

¶21 To determine the proper standard for deciding whether

the government’s actions have produced a greatly

disproportionate valuation, we turn again to the language of the

Uniformity Clause, which requires that “all taxes shall be

uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial

limits of the authority levying the tax.” Ariz. Const. art. IX,

19
§ 1. As this language makes clear, it is the tax paid, not the

numerical values assigned to property, that must be uniform.

Accordingly, to prevail in a valuation discrimination case, a

plaintiff must show tax treatment greatly unequal7 to that

afforded others in the same class and must do so by reference to

full cash value. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Cochise County, 92

Ariz. 395, 377 P.2d 770 (1963); McCluskey, 80 Ariz. at 19, 291

P.2d at 793. In McCluskey, we summarized the plaintiffs’

argument as follows:

Plaintiffs’ lawsuit in this case is based upon the
alleged proposition that plaintiffs have been
discriminated against by valuing other properties at
below full cash value and, by the use of a method
different from that used in valuing other properties,
assessing or attempting to assess plaintiffs’
properties at a greatly disproportionate valuation.

80 Ariz. at 19, 291 P.2d at 793. We then concluded that

“[a]ssessing officials cannot systematically and intentionally

use different rules for measuring the value of property of the

same class if by the use thereof great inequality results.” Id.

at 20, 291 P.2d at 794.

¶22 Similarly, in Southern Pacific, the challenging

taxpayer alleged that “its property was assessed at not less

7
The requirement that a taxpayer show greatly unequal
treatment reflects the fact that the “valuation of real
property, whether done for taxation or investment purposes, is
not subject to mathematical certainty” and that the assessment
of taxes, therefore, need not be exactly equal. Bus. Realty of

20
than 89 per cent of full cash value but that other property

subject to assessment by the respective county assessors was

assessed at no more than 20 per cent of full cash value on the

average.” 92 Ariz. at 398, 377 P.2d at 772. We concluded that

“[i]f [a taxpayer] establishes that its property is being

assessed at a higher percentage of full cash value than other

properties, then . . . discrimination . . . will have been

shown.” Id. at 403, 377 P.2d at 776.

¶23 Although neither McCluskey nor Southern Pacific holds

that a taxpayer can show disproportionate valuation only by

reference to full cash value, the structure of Arizona’s tax

system requires that taxpayers in a discriminatory valuation

case demonstrate disproportional valuation using full cash

value.

¶24 For tax purposes, Arizona values all real property at

full cash value. A.R.S. § 42-221.B (Supp. 1997), repealed by

1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 150, § 9 (repeal effective 1999); see

also A.R.S. § 42-13051.B (1999). Under Arizona statutes, “full

cash value,” for property tax purposes, means “that value

determined as prescribed by statute. If no statutory method is

prescribed, full cash value is synonymous with market value

which means that estimate of value that is derived annually by

__________________
Ariz., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 181 Ariz. 551, 557, 892 P.2d
1340, 1346 (1995).

21
the use of standard appraisal methods and techniques.” A.R.S. §

42-201.4 (Supp. 1997), repealed by 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch.

150, § 9 (repeal effective 1999); see also A.R.S. § 42-11001.5

(Supp. 2003).

¶25 To establish a greatly disproportionate valuation, a

taxpayer must present evidence from which the court can compare

the valuation of the disfavored properties as a percentage of

their full cash value and the valuation of other similarly

situated properties within the same class as a percentage of

their full cash value. The taxpayer bears the burden of

demonstrating the difference between a property’s valuation and

what the property’s value should have been.8 Once the taxpayer

presents such evidence, the court can determine whether the

taxpayer’s property was valued “greatly in excess of the

undervaluation of other like properties.” McCluskey, 80 Ariz.

at 19, 291 P.2d at 793.

¶26 In this case, the tax court found that “the improper

roll over of valuation for properties similarly situated to [the

Taxpayers’] properties resulted in a disproportional valuation

of [the Taxpayers’] properties.” Although the tax court did not

specify the legal standard upon which it based this finding,

8
“Valuation” refers to the final value placed upon a piece
of property by the taxing authority. “Full cash value” refers
to the amount required by statute or, otherwise stated, the
amount a valuation should have been.

22
evidence of record, measured against the standard defined above,

supports the trial court’s finding.9 The assessor valued the

Taxpayers’ properties by using the cost approach.10 As our

statutes instruct, we presume that the County’s determination of

the value of a taxpayer’s property is correct. See A.R.S. § 42-

16212.C (Supp. 2003). Applying that presumption, the assessed

values for the Taxpayers’ properties, taken from the County’s

data, show both what the valuation of the Taxpayers’ properties

should have been and the valuation, in fact, given those

properties. Because, as to the Taxpayers’ properties, the

measures are the same, the Taxpayers’ properties were valued at

one hundred percent of their full cash value.

¶27 As noted above, the County used a different method to

value the roll-over properties and left the 1996 valuation of

these properties unchanged. To establish their claim of

disproportionate valuation, the Taxpayers needed to present

9
We will uphold a trial court’s factual findings if they
are supported by competent evidence. See, e.g., Federoff v.
Pioneer Title & Trust Co. of Ariz., 166 Ariz. 383, 388, 803 P.2d
104, 109 (1990).
10
The assessor used the cost approach method to determine
“full cash value” in compliance with A.R.S. § 42-11001.5, which
states, in part, that “[i]f no statutory method [for determining
full cash value] is prescribed, full cash value is synonymous
with market value which means the estimate of value that is
derived annually by using standard appraisal methods and
techniques.” The County apparently regarded the cost method as
being a standard appraisal technique and thus in compliance with

23
evidence to support their claim that the roll-over valuations

differed from the full cash value of those properties. The

Taxpayers made this showing by introducing as evidence the

values derived by applying the cost model to calculate the full

cash value of the improvements to the roll-over properties. The

Taxpayers then combined this recalculated improvement value with

the full cash value of the roll-over properties’ land, again as

determined by the County’s own figures. Taken together, this

evidence shows that the roll-over properties were valued at

sixty-six percent of their full cash value while the Taxpayers’

properties were valued at one hundred percent of full cash

value. Through this evidence, the Taxpayers established the

elements of their claim of greatly disproportionate valuation.

¶28 The County, of course, was free to disprove any of the

Taxpayers’ contentions when it presented its defense. Rather

than do so, the County incorrectly insisted that the Taxpayers,

as part of their case in chief, bore the burden of disproving

all potential explanations for the disparity in valuation

between the two groups of properties.

¶29 The County’s primary argument involves the Taxpayers’

failure to show the value of the land portion of the roll-over

properties. As the County points out, the land values for the

__________________
the statutory requirement, and the Taxpayers do not dispute the
use of the cost method to determine full cash value.

24
Taxpayers’ properties decreased approximately twenty-five

percent from 1996 to 1997, while the land values for the roll-

over properties apparently remained unchanged. The County

argues that because the Taxpayers failed to present evidence

indicating what the land values of the roll-over properties

would have been had they also been revalued, the tax court could

not determine the extent to which the roll-over properties’ land

values were overvalued. Because the Taxpayers did not

accurately evaluate both the land and the improvements of the

roll-over properties, the County asserts, the Taxpayers’ proof

violates the unitary theory of valuation. Transamerica Dev. Co.

v. County of Maricopa, 107 Ariz. 396, 399, 489 P.2d 33, 36

(1971) (“[P]roperty valuation must be considered one subject,

not to be broken into separate components of land and

improvements. . . . In other words, if the total valuation

represents the full cash value of the property, it is immaterial

for purposes of appeal that one part is overvalued and the other

is undervalued.”).

¶30 The County could have presented evidence, if such were

available,11 to rebut the Taxpayers’ evidence showing

11
Our own review of the evidence of record suggests that,
even if the land values for the roll-over properties were
reduced by twenty-five percent, the greatly disproportionate
valuation found by the trial court remains. In fact, because
land values account for less than twenty percent of the value of

25
disproportionate valuation. But the responsibility for doing so

rested with the County as its defense to the showing made by the

Taxpayers. The tax court, having heard and weighed the evidence

presented by the Taxpayers and the County, accepted the

Taxpayers’ proffered evidence of disproportionate valuation.

The evidence of record provides a sufficient basis to support

the tax court’s finding that the Taxpayers were the subject of a

disproportionate valuation in violation of the Uniformity

Clause.

III.

¶31 The County also challenged the tax court’s choice of

remedy. The tax court ordered that “the County refund [the

Taxpayers] the difference between the 1996 property valuations

and the 1997 increased property valuations of their properties.”

In so ordering, the tax court relied on Gosnell Development

Corp. v. Arizona Department of Revenue, 154 Ariz. 539, 744 P.2d

451 (App. 1987), in which the court stated:

There can be no question that under applicable case
law, Gosnell has been the victim of unconstitutional
discrimination. That unequal treatment must be
remedied. In the numerous cases in which a taxpayer
was adjudged to have been deprived of equal protection
under the law as a result of unequal tax treatment, the
taxpayer’s remedy is that which places him on a par
with the favored taxpayers. . . . “If a ruling is or
should be prospective only, the past tax can no longer
be said to be validly imposed even though, by itself,
__________________
both groups of properties, a greatly disproportionate valuation
would likely remain even if the land values are reduced to zero.

26
 it falls squarely under the coverage of some tax-
imposing [law]. . . . Conversely, to the extent the
amount of the tax has already been collected, it
becomes an ‘overpayment’ which is subject to refund . .
. .”

Id. at 542, 744 P.2d at 454 (quoting Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp. v.

United States, 343 F.2d 914, 920 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (emphasis

added)); see also A.R.S. § 42-11005.B (1999) (“If the court

determines that the tax due is less than the amount paid, the

excess shall be refunded . . . .”).

¶32 The court of appeals again reached that conclusion in

Scottsdale Princess Partnership v. Department of Revenue, 191

Ariz. 499, 958 P.2d 15 (App. 1997). The Scottsdale Princess

Partnership sought a refund of property taxes paid under protest

for the 1993 and 1994 tax years. The Partnership argued that

Arizona’s possessory interest taxing scheme violated the

Uniformity Clause because it impermissibly created a taxing

classification based on the time period at which the property

interest was created12 instead of the “nature, use, utility, or

productivity of the taxed property.” Id. at 502, 958 P.2d at

18. After agreeing that the time-based classification violated

Arizona’s Uniformity Clause, the court, relying on McKesson

12
The taxing scheme taxed property interests differently,
depending on whether the property interest was created before or
after April 1, 1985. Scottsdale Princess, 191 Ariz. at 502, 958
P.2d at 18.

27
Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18

(1990), and Gosnell, concluded:

The appropriate remedy for such discrimination is a
refund in the amount necessary to make [the non-favored
taxpayer’s] tax burden uniform with that of the
unconstitutionally favored taxpayers; that is, a refund
of the difference between the amount of taxes . . .
actually paid and the amount it would have paid had it
qualified for the special treatment . . . .

Scottsdale Princess, 191 Ariz. at 505, 958 P.2d at 21.

¶33 We apply the approach taken in Gosnell and Scottsdale

Princess for a number of reasons. Most importantly, Arizona law

requires a taxpayer to pay any taxes due before challenging the

validity or amount of the tax. See A.R.S. § 42-11004 (1999).13

In McKesson, the United States Supreme Court, addressing the

appropriate remedy for a Florida liquor tax scheme that

unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce in

13
A.R.S. § 42-11004 states:

A person on whom a tax has been imposed or levied under
any law relating to taxation may not test the validity
or amount of tax, either as plaintiff or defendant, if
any of the taxes:
1. Levied and assessed in previous years against the
person’s property have not been paid.
2. That are the subject of the action are not paid
before becoming delinquent.
3. Coming due on the property during the pendency of
the action are not paid before becoming delinquent.

A.R.S. § 42-11004; see also A.R.S. § 42-204.A (Supp. 1997),
repealed by 1997 Ariz. Sess. Laws, Ch. 150, § 9 (repeal
effective 1999).

28
violation of the Commerce Clause,14 concluded that if a state

“relegates [a taxpayer] to a postpayment refund action in which

he can challenge the tax’s legality, the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide

meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any

unconstitutional deprivation.” 496 U.S. at 31 (footnote

omitted). Although McKesson involved a challenge brought under

the federal Commerce Clause, denying any refund to the Taxpayers

could raise constitutional due process issues. In addition to

raising due process concerns, denying the Taxpayers a refund

provides limited incentive for taxing authorities to adhere to

the Arizona constitutional mandate that all taxes “be uniform

upon the same class of property within the territorial limits of

the authority levying the tax.” Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 1. The

relatively minor costs associated with defending against a

taxpayer’s suit to recover illegally collected taxes provide

only limited incentive for taxing authorities to refrain from

imposing taxes questionable under the Uniformity Clause.

Finally, the County presented no proof that ordering a refund to

the Taxpayers will do great harm to the public coffers. See S.

Pac. Co., 92 Ariz. at 406, 377 P.2d at 778.

¶34 For the foregoing reasons, to place the Taxpayers’

properties on par with the favored roll-over properties, we

14
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

29
conclude that the appropriate remedy is that which the tax court

ordered: The County must refund the difference between the

amount the Taxpayers paid as property taxes in 1997 and the

amount they would have paid had they been treated in the same

manner as the roll-over properties. We remand to the tax court

to determine the appropriate refund for each property.

IV.

¶35 The court of appeals reversed the tax court’s judgment

because it concluded that the tax court failed to require

evidence of disproportionate valuation with respect to the

properties’ full cash value. Consequently, the court of appeals

did not reach a number of other issues raised on appeal,

including whether the County’s actions were intentional and

systematic, whether a new trial was necessary on the issue of

alleged new evidence, whether the tax court properly awarded

attorney fees and expert witness fees, and whether the tax court

improperly defined the appropriate class or ordered an

inappropriate remedy.

¶36 We have concluded that the tax court properly defined

the appropriate class, acted within its discretion in finding

discrimination and that the County’s actions were intentional

and systematic, and ordered a proper remedy. We can resolve the

remaining issues on the record before us. Therefore, we

consider whether the tax court abused its discretion in denying

30
the County’s motion for new trial and the parties’ arguments

regarding attorney fees and expert witness fees.

A.

¶37 The County appealed the tax court’s judgment in favor

of the Taxpayers. After identifying “new evidence,” however,

the County moved to suspend the appeal and revest jurisdiction

in the tax court to allow that court to consider a motion for

relief from judgment brought pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(c). The court of appeals granted the motion and

revested jurisdiction in the tax court.

¶38 The County based its Rule 60(c) motion on its claim

that, after trial, it discovered that 4,002 of the roll-over

properties “were rolled over as the result of a mistake, not as

a matter of intent.” The County maintained that a mistake in

encoding these properties resulted in the tax court erroneously

finding that the “values for 4,297 properties were rolled over

because the properties had been subject to a September increase

in value.” The County claimed that its discovery of this

mistake warranted Rule 60(c) relief.

¶39 The tax court denied the County’s motion, stating

first that the County’s claimed “new evidence,” even if true,

would not have changed the court’s decision. The tax court also

concluded that the County “did not establish that with due

diligence it could not have discovered this evidence in time to

31
move for a new trial.” We review a trial court’s denial of a

motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(c) for an abuse of

discretion. City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328, 697

P.2d 1073, 1078 (1985); De Gryse v. De Gryse, 135 Ariz. 335,

336, 661 P.2d 185, 186 (1983).

¶40 Rule 60(c) allows a court to relieve a party from a

final judgment for, among other reasons, “mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect,” on the basis of “newly

discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(d),”15

or for “any other reason justifying relief from the operation of

the judgment.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), (2), (6). “The

standard for determining whether conduct is ‘excusable’ is

whether the neglect or inadvertence is such as might be the act

of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.”

Geyler, 144 Ariz. at 331, 697 P.2d at 1081.

¶41 The record in this case supports the tax court’s

ruling. The County possessed the evidence on which it relied in

its Rule 60(c) motion throughout the lengthy litigation,

although it apparently determined its purported significance

only after the court entered judgment. As a result, the tax

15
Rule 59(d) states: “A motion for new trial shall be filed
not later than 15 days after entry of the judgment.” Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 59(d).

32
court acted within its discretion in denying the County’s

motion.

B.

¶42 Arizona’s statutes permit the Taxpayers, as the

prevailing parties in an action challenging the assessment or

collection of taxes, to recover reasonable attorney fees and

other expenses. A.R.S. § 12-348.B (2003). Using this statutory

authority, a court “may award fees and other expenses to any

party . . . which prevails by an adjudication on the merits in

an action brought by the party against this state or a city,

town or county challenging . . . [t]he assessment or collection

of taxes.” A.R.S. § 12-348.B.1. “Fees and other expenses”

“include the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses” along with

“reasonable and necessary attorney fees.” A.R.S. § 12-348.I.1.

¶43 Subsection E of the statute, however, provides that

such an award for fees “shall not exceed thirty thousand dollars

for fees incurred at each level of judicial appeal.” A.R.S. §

12-348.E.5. The tax court, based on its interpretation of

section 12-348, awarded the Taxpayers, as the prevailing party,

$30,000.00 as attorney fees. The Taxpayers appealed their

award, arguing that the plain language of A.R.S. § 12-348.B,

E.3, and E.5 contemplates multiple awards when there are

multiple plaintiffs and that public policy goals support its

interpretation of the statute, which would permit each of

33
multiple plaintiffs represented by the same attorney to recover

up to $30,000.00 for attorney fees. The County contends that

multiple parties represented by the same attorney can receive

only one award, capped at $30,000.00, for each level of appeal.

To hold otherwise, the County argues, would be to grant

plaintiffs a windfall. The proper interpretation of a statute

is a question of law that we review de novo. See Bilke v.

State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464 ¶ 10, 80 P.3d 269, 271 (2003).

¶44 In resolving this question, we look first to the

language of the statute, which supports the argument that each

party is entitled to an award of attorney fees, up to

$30,000.00. Id. at ¶ 11 (“The court’s chief goal in

interpreting a statute is ‘to fulfill the intent of the

legislature that wrote it.’ In determining the legislature’s

intent, we initially look to the language of the statute

itself.” (citations omitted)). Subsection B expressly refers to

an award of fees to “any party.” A.R.S. § 12-348.B. Similarly,

subsection E, in describing the limitations imposed upon

attorney fees, refers to “awards,” apparently contemplating

multiple awards. Nothing in the statute indicates that the

legislature intended the cap on fees to apply to each “action”

brought to challenge the collection of taxes, rather than to

each “party.” We think that, if the legislature had intended to

limit the statute as the County urges, it would have used

34
language making that limitation clear. Bilke, 206 Ariz. at 465

¶ 15, 80 P.3d at 272.

¶45 Interpreting section 12-348 as applying to each party

rather than to a single action also furthers another important

interest. We encourage plaintiffs to consolidate their actions,

and thereby further judicial economy, when we allow each party

to recover fees even if the same attorney represents multiple

plaintiffs. Were we to interpret the statute as the County

urges, we would encourage each of many plaintiffs to file a

separate action with separate representation. The result not

only would reduce judicial economy but also, because several

attorneys would perform duplicative work, actually could cause

additional, unnecessary expense to the County.16

¶46 Contrary to the Taxpayers’ approach, however, the

statute does not envision setting the maximum recoverable fee by

simply multiplying the number of plaintiffs represented by the

same attorney by $30,000.00. Instead, the fee recovered by each

party must reflect only the effort expended on behalf of that

party. When the same attorney represents multiple plaintiffs,

therefore, recovery is limited to the incremental increase in

fees related to the representation of each additional plaintiff,

16
We note that the statute, by capping an attorney’s billable
rate at $175.00 per hour, imposes another restriction that
guards against a party receiving a windfall as attorney fees.
A.R.S. § 12-348.E.3.

35
because only that incremental increase in effort reflects time

spent on behalf of that party. Thus, if the reasonable attorney

fee associated with establishing the claim of the first of

multiple plaintiffs is $50,000.00, that party can recover

$30,000.00, but the additional portion of the fee does not “roll

over” to the second plaintiff represented. Rather, that party

must establish the additional reasonable attorney fee associated

with the representation of the second party. In many actions,

the incremental increase will be relatively small; in others,

such as actions in which establishing the damages of each party

requires complex calculations, the incremental increase may be

relatively large. In all instances, the prevailing party must

establish the amount of reasonable attorney fees.

¶47 The clear language of A.R.S. § 12-348 permits each

party to receive an award of attorney fees up to $30,000.00 for

each level of appeal. Therefore, the tax court erred in

construing section 12-348 as permitting only a single award

regardless of the number of individual plaintiffs involved in an

action, and we reverse the court’s judgment limiting the fees

award. Consistent with this opinion, the tax court, on remand,

must determine the appropriate amount of the attorney fee award

36
due the Taxpayers as prevailing parties under the test set out

above.17

¶48 The final issue we address involves the tax court’s

finding that $4,000.00 was “a reasonable sum for Mr. Abrams’

expert witness expenses.” See A.R.S. § 12-348.B (permitting a

prevailing party to recover the reasonable expenses of expert

witnesses). The County argues that the tax court erred in

finding that Mr. Abrams qualified as an expert and was of

assistance to the tax court.18 We find no clear error in the tax

court’s findings.

¶49 Mr. Abrams offered testimony explaining the County’s

tax roll data. The tax court found that Mr. Abrams’ testimony

“assisted the trier of fact to understand the evidence and

determine facts in issue.” Because the tax court was the trier

of fact, that court could determine better than we whether Mr.

Abrams was of assistance. Accordingly, we conclude that the tax

court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable expert

witness fees.

17
The Taxpayers also request this court to award them
reasonable attorney fees incurred before this court pursuant to
A.R.S. § 12-348.B. We conclude that the Taxpayers, as the
prevailing parties, are entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney fees incurred in this proceeding. See ARCAP 21.
18
Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 allows “a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education” to testify in order to “assist the trier of fact to

37
 IV.

¶50 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the court of

appeals’ memorandum decision, affirm in part and reverse in part

the judgment of the tax court, and remand to the tax court to

determine the appropriate amount of refund and attorney fees.

____________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice

CONCURRING:

__________________________________
Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice

__________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Justice

__________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

__________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

__________________
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Ariz.
R. Evid. 702.

38