SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
DOUGLAS AUTO & EQUIPMENT, ) Arizona Supreme Court
) No. CV-01-0239-PR
Petitioner Employer, )
) Court of Appeals
) Division Two
) No. 2 CA-IC 00-0053
STATE COMPENSATION FUND, )
) Industrial Commission
Petitioner Insurer, ) of Arizona
) No. 20000-310435
v. ) Insurer No. 00-01472
)
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF )
ARIZONA, )
)
Respondent, )
)
CARLOS ZAZUETA, ) O P I N I O N
)
Respondent Employee. )
)
____________________________________)
Industrial Commission of Arizona
The Honorable LuAnn Haley, Administrative Law Judge
AWARD AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________
Opinion of the Court of Appeals
Division Two
200 Ariz. 37, 21 P.3d 855 (App. 2001)
VACATED
_________________________________________________________________
State Compensation Fund
James F. Crane, Chief Counsel Phoenix
By Robert A. Schuler Tucson
Attorneys for State Compensation Fund
and Douglas Auto & Equipment
The Industrial Commission of Arizona
Anita R. Valainis, Chief Counsel Phoenix
Les Gilbertson Tucson
Attorney for Carlos Zazueta
_________________________________________________________________
M c G R E G O R, Vice Chief Justice
I.
¶1 Douglas Auto & Equipment (Douglas Auto) employed Carlos
Zazueta as a mechanic. On Wednesday, January 19, 2000, Zazueta
slipped on some oil and twisted his left knee. Zazueta worked all
of Wednesday, as well as Thursday and Friday. After taking two
scheduled days off and missing work on Monday, Zazueta reported the
knee injury to his employer on Tuesday, January 25, 2000. Douglas
Auto sent Zazueta for medical care that day and immediately began
its investigation of the injury. On April 5, 2000, a physician
diagnosed Zazueta’s knee injury as a torn medial meniscus. On May
15, 2000, Zazueta underwent surgery to repair his knee injury.
¶2 When Zazueta sought workers’ compensation benefits,
Douglas Auto argued that Zazueta’s failure to forthwith report his
injury, as required by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section
23-908.D, made him ineligible for benefits. After concluding that
Zazueta had complied with the statute, an administrative law judge
awarded compensation. Douglas Auto requested administrative
review, arguing that the judge had not considered whether the delay
in reporting prejudiced Douglas Auto. On review, the
administrative law judge found no prejudice and affirmed the award.
¶3 Douglas Auto filed a statutory special action in the
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court of appeals. The court concluded that the administrative law
judge’s findings lacked the specificity required by Post v. Indus.
Comm’n, 160 Ariz. 4, 770 P.2d 308 (1989), and set aside the award.
¶4 We granted review to determine whether the administrative
law judge’s findings were sufficient to justify excusing Zazueta
from complying with the forthwith reporting requirement of A.R.S.
section 23-908.D. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona
Constitution Article VI, Section 5.3 and Arizona Rules of Procedure
for Special Actions 8(b).
II.
¶5 To be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, an
employee who is injured on the job must “forthwith report the
accident and the injury resulting therefrom to [his] employer.”
A.R.S. § 23-908.D. This reporting requirement prevents prejudice
to an employer in two ways. First, a prompt report of injury
allows an employer to ensure that the injured employee receives
early medical treatment, which prevents aggravation of the injury.
Thompson v. Indus. Comm’n, 160 Ariz. 263, 266, 772 P.2d 1116, 1119
(1989)(quoting 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation
§ 78.20 (1988)). Second, timely notice affords the employer an
opportunity to investigate the accident close in time to its
occurrence. Id.
¶6 Section 23-908, however, also allows the Commission to
excuse an employee’s failure to forthwith report his injury:
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The commission may relieve the injured person . . . from
the loss or forfeiture of compensation if it believes
after investigation that the circumstances attending the
failure . . . to report the accident and injury are such
as to have excused them.
A.R.S. § 23-908.E.
¶7 We have recognized at least two instances in which the
Commission may excuse non-compliance with section 23-908.D: 1)
when the employee “had no way of knowing either that the injury had
occurred or that the injury was causally related to employment;” or
2) when the employer has not been prejudiced by the employee’s lack
of diligence in reporting the injury. Pacific Fruit Express v.
Indus. Comm’n, 153 Ariz. 210, 217, 735 P.2d 820, 827 (1987)(supp.
op.); Magma Copper Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 139 Ariz. 38, 43-44, 676
P.2d 1096, 1101-02 (1983).1
¶8 In this case, the administrative law judge expressly
found that Zazueta’s non-compliance with section 23-908 could be
excused both because he did not know a compensable injury had
occurred before the time he reported the injury and because Douglas
Auto suffered no prejudice from the reporting delay. We conclude
that the judge’s findings underlying these conclusions, while not
as detailed as we would prefer, meet the requirements of Post.
1
The burden of proving an excuse rests with the injured
employee, who must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.
Pacific Fruit, 153 Ariz. at 216, 135 P.2d at 826.
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III.
¶9 To excuse a claimant’s failure to timely report an
injury, the administrative law judge must make findings that
support the excuse:
[A]dministrative law judges should explicitly state their
resolution of conflicting evidence on material and
important issues, find the ultimate facts, and set forth
their application of law to those facts.
Post, 160 Ariz. at 8, 770 P.2d at 312. findings must be
specific, not only to encourage judges to consider their
conclusions carefully, but also to permit meaningful judicial
review. Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors, 175 Ariz. 296, 299, 855 P.2d
1357, 1360 (1993); Shelby Sch. v. Arizona State Bd. of Educ., 192
Ariz. 156, 163 ¶ 24, 962 P.2d 230, 237 ¶ 24 (App. 1998). Although
findings need not be exhaustive, they cannot simply state
conclusions. Judges must make factual findings that are
sufficiently comprehensive and explicit for a reviewing court to
glean the basis for the judge’s conclusions. Post, 160 Ariz. at 8,
770 P.2d at 312; Shelby Sch., 192 Ariz. at 163 ¶ 22, 962 P.2d at
237 ¶ 22.
¶10 The administrative law judge’s findings adequately
support her decision to excuse Zazueta from complying with the
prompt reporting requirements of section 23-908. An employee need
not report every bruise or scrape to his employer. Rather, an
employee must report an injury only when, with the exercise of
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reasonable care, he should have known that he suffered a
compensable injury. See Pacific Fruit, 153 Ariz. at 213-14, 735
P.2d at 823-24; English v. Indus. Comm’n, 73 Ariz. 86, 91, 237 P.2d
815, 818 (1951) (discussing when the right to workers’ compensation
accrues); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 43 Ariz.
50, 55-56, 29 P.2d 142, 144 (1934) (“[I]f [the injury] is slight or
trivial at the time and noncompensable and later on develops
unexpected results . . . the statute runs, not from the date of the
accident, but from the date the results of the injury become
manifest and compensable.”).
¶11 The administrative law judge expressly found not only
that Zazueta testified credibly and that all conflicts in testimony
would be resolved in his favor, but also that he “credibly
testified he delayed reporting the injury with the hope that it
would heal on its own.” Zazueta v. Douglas Auto & Equip., No.
20000-310435, Decision upon Hr’g at finding 14 (Aug. 16, 2000).
That finding, which in essence means that Zazueta had “no way of
knowing . . . that [a compensable] injury had occurred,” provides
sufficient basis for excusing him from complying with section 23-
908.D. Pacific Fruit, 153 Ariz. at 217, 735 P.2d at 827.
¶12 The findings also support the alternative ground for
excusing non-compliance by providing an adequate basis for the
judge’s conclusion that “the totality of the evidence established
that the employer was not prejudiced by the 6 day delay.” Zazueta
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v. Douglas Auto & Equip., No. 20000-310435, Decision upon Review at
finding 2 (Sept. 21, 2000). We note initially that, while the
number of days between injury and the employee’s report of the
injury is not decisive, the fact that a short period of time lapses,
as occurred in this instance, makes prejudice to the employer less
likely. The judge found that Douglas Auto investigated the accident
immediately after Zazueta’s report. Douglas Auto has not suggested
that the six-day reporting delay hampered its investigation, and
other facts found by the judge provide some indication why no
prejudice resulted. Because no one other than Zazueta witnessed the
accident, the passage of time could not have resulted in the loss
of relevant memories.2 The findings also show that the reporting
delay did not aggravate Zazueta’s injury. Although Douglas Auto
sent Zazueta to a physician the day he reported the knee injury,
Zazueta did not undergo surgery to repair the medial meniscus tear
until more than four months later. The fact that months elapsed
between Zazueta’s initial physician’s visit and his eventual surgery
certainly undermines any suggestion that a six-day delay aggravated
the injury.
¶13 Although the decision upon review did not expressly
combine the finding that Douglas Auto experienced no prejudice with
the facts supporting that conclusion, this lack of clarity does not
2
In addition, although the reports of some co-workers
varied from Zazueta’s statements, the administrative law judge
expressly adopted Zazueta’s version of events as the most credible.
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automatically defeat the award. The original factual findings were
sufficiently specific to support the no prejudice finding.
IV.
¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the opinion of the
Court of Appeals and affirm the award.
_______________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice
CONCURRING:
___________________________________
Charles E. Jones, Chief Justice
____________________________________
Stanley G. Feldman, Justice
____________________________________
Thomas A. Zlaket, Justice
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