IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc
STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Supreme Court
) No. CR-00-0569-PC
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
v. ) Pima County
) Superior Court
CHRISTOPHER JOHN SPREITZ, ) No. CR-27745
)
Defendant-Petitioner. )
_________________________________) O P I N I O N
Appeal from the Superior Court of Pima County
Honorable Paul S. Banales, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART
__________________________________________________________________
Janet Napolitano, Attorney General Phoenix
by Kent Cattani, Chief Counsel,
Capital Litigation Section,
Criminal Appeals Division
and
Jon G. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
Bruner & Upham, P.C. Tucson
by Sean Bruner
Attorneys for Appellant
__________________________________________________________________
J O N E S, Chief Justice
Facts and Procedural History
¶1 Christopher John Spreitz (defendant) was convicted of the
first degree murder, sexual assault, and kidnapping of Ruby Reid.
He was sentenced to death for the murder and to consecutive
fourteen-year prison terms for the other crimes. Those convictions
and sentences were upheld by this court on direct appeal in State v.
Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 129, 945 P.2d 1260 (1997). The facts of the case
were stated in our earlier opinion and need not be repeated here.
¶2 In the direct appeal, the defendant raised a single claim
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. That claim was based on
trial counsel having admitted Spreitz’ responsibility for the death
of the victim in his opening statement, but arguing that legally the
defendant was guilty only of lesser offenses. This court found that
claim to be without merit. Spreitz at 146-47, 945 P.2d at 1277-78.
¶3 Spreitz also claimed several additional instances of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his subsequent petition
for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Because the single claim was raised and
addressed in the direct appeal, the trial court held that Spreitz
had waived any further claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel under Rule 32(a)(3). However, because Spreitz also alleged
that his appellate counsel was ineffective, the trial court
alternatively considered the ineffective assistance of trial counsel
-2-
claims on the merits. The trial court ultimately concluded that no
colorable claims had been raised and denied relief. We granted
review on the question whether by raising one claim of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel in the direct appeal, all later
ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims are precluded. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4031 and Rule 32.9, Arizona
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.
Analysis
¶4 Rule 32.2 precludes relief when: (1) an issue can be
raised on direct appeal or on post-trial motion; (2) an issue has
been finally adjudicated on the merits on appeal or in any previous
collateral proceeding; or (3) an issue was waived at trial, on
appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding. Our basic rule is
that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or
could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief
proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be
deemed waived and precluded. See State v. Conner, 163 Ariz. 97,
100, 786 P.2d 948, 951 (1990).
¶5 In analyzing the preclusive effect, if any, of Rule 32 for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in an appeal, we
briefly review our recent cases in this area. In 1989, this court
recommended that ineffectiveness claims be raised in Rule 32
proceedings and consolidated with the direct appeal. State v.
Valdez, 160 Ariz. 9, 15, 770 P.2d 313, 319 (1989); see also State v.
-3-
Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 599, 832 P.2d 593, 616 (1992)
(ineffectiveness claims should be brought in Rule 32 proceedings).
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 32
petition where a colorable claim is presented. State v.
Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 63, 859 P.2d 169, 173 (1993); State v.
Shurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 57-59, 859 P.2d 156, 167-69 (1993). The trial
court is the most appropriate forum for such evidentiary hearings.
¶6 However, we later determined to stop delaying the direct
appeal for the resolution of Rule 32 proceedings in the trial court
below when that procedure became unworkable. Krone v. Hotham, 181
Ariz. 364, 366, 890 P.2d 1149, 1151 (1995). We repeated our
statement that Rule 32 set forth the proper procedure for resolving
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and reminded
practitioners that the normal rules of preclusion would apply to
subsequent petitions for post-conviction relief. Id. Under rules
implemented in 1992, the clerk of the supreme court automatically
files a notice of post-conviction relief when the capital conviction
and sentence are affirmed. Rule 32.4(a), Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure. When an earlier petition has been filed, the petition
filed pursuant to the automatic notice will be a second and
subsequent petition.
¶7 Despite these repeated requests to resolve ineffectiveness
claims through the Rule 32 process, practitioners have continued to
raise them in direct appeals, as in the present case. The effect of
-4-
doing so has been problematic, not always yielding consistent
results. At one time, a colorable ineffective assistance of counsel
claim raised in a Rule 32 petition which had been consolidated with
the direct appeal was remanded to the trial court for a full factual
determination with no discussion of preclusion or waiver. State v.
Watson, 114 Ariz. 1, 15-16, 559 P.2d 121, 135-36 (1979). This
occurred despite the fact that other ineffective assistance of
counsel claims had been raised and otherwise considered in the
direct appeal.
¶8 Later, we differentiated between trial ineffectiveness
claims and sentencing ineffectiveness claims. State v. Carriger,
132 Ariz. 301, 645 P.2d 816 (1982) (where trial ineffectiveness
claims were raised and addressed in the direct appeal, subsequent
sentencing ineffectiveness claims were neither waived nor
precluded). A subsequent trial ineffectiveness claim was precluded,
however, where similar claims had been previously raised and
adjudicated on the merits in the direct appeal, and a full
examination of the record did not reveal inadequate efforts by trial
counsel. State v. Raymond Tison, 142 Ariz. 454, 690 P.2d 755
(1984). Moreover, this court has indicated that it would only
consider meritless claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
appeal. Spreitz at 146, 945 P.2d at 1277; State v. Maturana, 180
Ariz. 126, 133, 882 P.2d 933, 940 (1994). Admittedly, Rule 32
waters have become murky.
-5-
¶9 We endeavor today to clarify this issue for trial courts
and practitioners. Accordingly, we reiterate that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are to be brought in Rule 32
proceedings. Any such claims improvidently raised in a direct
appeal, henceforth, will not be addressed by appellate courts
regardless of merit. There will be no preclusive effect under Rule
32 by the mere raising of such issues. The appellate court simply
will not address them. This ensures criminal defendants a timely
and orderly opportunity to litigate ineffectiveness claims and, we
believe, promotes judicial economy by disallowing piecemeal
litigation.
Conclusion
¶10 To the extent that the trial court in this case ruled
otherwise, we reverse that part of its ruling. The trial court
alternatively addressed the merits of the ineffectiveness claims,
and we affirm those findings. There was no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s determination of the substantive issues.
¶11 We modify and clarify State v. Tison, 142 Ariz. at 454,
690 P.2d at 755, State v. Carriger, 132 Ariz. at 301, 645 P.2d at
816, and State v. Watson, 114 Ariz. at 1, 559 P.2d at 121, to the
extent the holdings of those cases differ from the rule announced
here. We disapprove of State v. Scrivner, 132 Ariz. 52, 643 P.2d
1022 (App. 1982), where it is inconsistent.
-6-
¶12 We reverse the trial court’s determination that the
subsequent ineffectiveness claims were waived. We affirm the
substantive findings on those claims.
_________________________________
Charles E. Jones
Chief Justice
CONCURRING:
____________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Vice Chief Justice
____________________________________
Stanley G. Feldman, Justice
____________________________________
Thomas A. Zlaket, Justice
____________________________________
Frederick J. Martone, Justice
-7-