11-2984-ag
Huang v. Holder
BIA
Weisel, IJ
A089 252 348
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 13th day of May, two thousand thirteen.
PRESENT:
ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
ROBERT D. SACK,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
SHUN FU HUANG,
Petitioner,
v. 11-2984
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
___________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, Yerman & Associates,
LLC, New York, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney General;
Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation
Counsel; Elizabeth R. Chapman, Trial
Attorney, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Shun Fu Huang, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 29, 2011,
decision of the BIA affirming the May 21, 2009, decision of
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Robert Weisel denying her application
for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Shun Fu Huang, No.
A089 252 348 (B.I.A. June 29, 2011), aff’g No. A089 252 348
(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 21, 2009). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
of the case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005).
The applicable standards of review are well-established. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
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For asylum applications like Huang’s, governed by the
REAL ID Act, the agency may, considering the totality of the
circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum
applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of her account, and
inconsistencies in her or her witness’s statements, without
regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s
claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d
at 163-64.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination
that Huang did not testify credibly regarding her claim that
she was arrested and detained in China on account of her
proselytizing. The IJ reasonably relied on inconsistencies in
the record. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu
Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64, 166-67. As the agency noted,
Huang’s testimony regarding when she began attending church in
the United States was inconsistent with the letter from the
assistant pastor of her church. The IJ reasonably declined to
credit Huang’s explanation that the inconsistency was a result
of a typographical error, see Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77,
80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a
plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to
secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-
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finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)(emphasis in original)), particularly
in light of the fact that, if the December 2007 date stated in
the letter was a typographical error, the letter – dated
September 2008 – would have been composed prior to date on
which Huang began attending church. Further, the IJ
reasonably relied on Huang’s omission from her asylum
application of the fact that her friends who were distributing
flyers were also arrested, a fact that she described in her
testimony on the merits of her application. See Xui Xia Lin,
534 F.3d at 166 n.3 (treating an inconsistency and an omission
as “functionally equivalent”). Although Huang argues that
these inconsistencies are not sufficient to form the basis of
an adverse credibility determination, under the REAL ID Act,
these inconsistencies provide substantial support for the
agency’s adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that the agency may base a
credibility determination on inconsistencies between the
applicants statements, and “the consistency of such statements
with other evidence of record”).
Huang also argues that the IJ failed to consider the
totality of the circumstances – specifically that her
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testimony was otherwise consistent with her written statement
– in finding her not credible. The IJ’s decision, however,
reflects that he considered Huang’s testimony in its entirety,
as he reviewed it in his oral decision before denying Huang
relief. Accordingly, the agency did not err in denying
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief insofar as
those claims were based on her practice of Christianity. See
Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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