UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4865
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANDRE LAMONT SUITT, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00029-CCE-1)
Submitted: May 23, 2013 Decided: May 28, 2013
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eugene E. Lester, III, SHARPLESS & STAVOLA, PA, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States
Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Andre Lamont Suitt, Jr., pled guilty pursuant to a
written plea agreement to possession with intent to distribute
cocaine hydrochloride, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2006),
carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2006). He was sentenced to 180 months in prison.
Suitt now appeals, claiming that the district court erred when
it applied the kidnapping cross reference under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) §§ 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), 2X1.1(a), 2A4.1
(2011), to calculate his Guidelines range. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). In determining procedural reasonableness, we
consider whether the district court properly calculated Suitt’s
Sentencing Guidelines range. Id. at 49–51. The court reviews
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d
381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010).
Suitt contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the kidnapping cross reference, USSG
§§ 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), 2X1.1(a), 2A4.1, was incorrectly applied to
2
him. The cross reference applies “[i]f the defendant used or
possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with the
commission . . . of another offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(c)(1).
Suitt argues that the district court improperly deemed
kidnapping as “another offense” for purposes of the cross
reference when the underlying conduct in this case did not
constitute a violation of the federal kidnapping statute.
Instead, Suitt maintains, the district court should have used
the guideline for the offense of robbery to calculate his
Guidelines range.
We reject this argument. First, the commentary to
USSG § 2K2.1 states that “ ‘[a]nother offense’ . . . means any
federal, state, or local offense, other than the explosive or
firearms possession or trafficking offense . . . regardless of
whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction
obtained.” USSG § 2K2.1, cmt. n.14(C). Additionally, we have
held that the cross reference in USSG § 2K2.1 applies to conduct
amounting to a violation of state law. United States v.
Carroll, 3 F.3d 98, 103 (4th Cir. 1993).
With these standards in mind, we find no error in the
district court’s application of the cross reference.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
3
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4