IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 34888
MARK VAN, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) Boise, June 2009 Term
)
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, PAT ) 2009 Opinion No. 92
HERMANSON, Hospital Administrator, )
PAM HUMPHREY, EMS Program Director, ) Filed: July 7, 2009
GARY ALZOLA, Director of Operations, )
RON FERGIE, Chief Pilot/Safety Officer, ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
BARRY NIELSON, Pilot, and DOES I-X, )
)
Defendants-Respondents. )
_______________________________________ )
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Bannock County. Honorable Peter D. McDermott, District Judge.
The summary judgment order of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and the case is remanded.
Nick L. Nielson, Pocatello, for appellant.
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered, Boise, for respondents. Paul
D. McFarlane argued.
________________
J. JONES, Justice
Mark Van appeals the district court‟s grant of summary judgment on his claims for
wrongful termination. We affirm the district court‟s decision with respect to Van‟s contract
claims, vacate with regard to the Whistleblower Act claim, and remand for further proceedings
on the latter claim.
I.
Portneuf Medical Center (PMC) hired Mark Van in 1986 as a mechanic for its Life Flight
Program. In 1997 he became the director of maintenance for Life Flight and was responsible for
the maintenance of PMC‟s Life Flight helicopter. In 2001, the Life Flight helicopter crashed
while attempting a rescue mission. Van witnessed the crash and rushed to the scene to rescue the
1
pilot. The National Transportation Safety Board ultimately determined that the crash was caused
by pilot error and not maintenance issues. Nevertheless, Van felt that the media and the public
blamed the crash on the maintenance department and he became protective of its reputation.
After the helicopter crash, Van began reporting numerous perceived violations of state
and federal law in what he felt was a defense of the maintenance department‟s image. Among
other things, Van reported his beliefs that pilots had: accumulated too much time on duty; flown
the helicopter too low; taken off with ice on the helicopter‟s rotor blades; and overflown the
helicopter by exceeding inspection time intervals. Additionally, while PMC was negotiating the
purchase of a new helicopter, Van was asked to review the proposed maintenance contract (the
COMP contract) with the vendor, Agusta Helicopter, and recommend what aircraft would be
best suited for Life Flight. After reviewing the COMP contract, Van notified PMC he thought
there were several loopholes by which Agusta could escape its maintenance responsibilities and
he therefore asserted that entering into the COMP contract amounted to a waste of public funds.
Several meetings were scheduled to address the mounting concerns expressed by Van.
Shortly after a meeting in April 2005, Van was terminated. PMC asserts that its decision to
terminate Van was due to his inability to maintain positive interpersonal relations with his
colleagues and to foster a positive team environment. In response, Van filed this lawsuit and
alleged in count one that he had been wrongfully terminated in violation of Idaho‟s
Whistleblower Act. I.C. §§ 6-2101 to 2109. In count two Van alleged breach of his employment
contract and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
During the discovery process Van requested, and PMC refused to provide, a copy of the
COMP contract between PMC and Agusta. PMC moved for a protective order and, after Van
failed to object, the district court granted PMC‟s motion. Six months later Van moved for
reconsideration, arguing that the COMP contract was relevant, but the district court denied that
motion. Van appeals that determination to this Court.
PMC moved for summary judgment against Van arguing that Van (1) did not comply
with the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), (2) failed to establish a prima
facie case of wrongful termination under Idaho‟s Whistleblower Act, and (3) failed to establish a
prima facie case of breach of employment contract. The district court granted PMC‟s motion
and Van appeals that decision to this Court.
II.
2
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review used by this
Court is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. P.O. Ventures, Inc.
v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). Summary
judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden of
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with the party
moving for summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P.3d 695, 697
(2007).
This Court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party‟s favor. Id. If reasonable people could
reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id.
However, the nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. Id. at 896-97, 155 P.3d at 697-98. A mere
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment. Id. at 897, 155 P.3d at 698. Instead, the
nonmoving party must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial. Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84,
87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000).
B. The District Court Erred in Holding that Van’s Whistleblower Act Claim was Subject
to the Idaho Tort Claims Act
In its memorandum decision and order, the district court, noting that PMC “is a
governmental entity or political subdivision covered under the ITCA,” found that Van‟s
“wrongful termination claims, including his whistleblower claims, were covered under the
[ITCA] since the Whistleblower Act created an action separate from the public policy exception
to the at-will employment doctrine and is not exempt from the notice requirements of the ITCA.”
The district court emphasized that it deemed liability under the Whistleblower Act to be a
separate cause of action from the wrongful termination cause of action predicated on the alleged
breach of Van‟s at-will employment contract. It did not, however, explain why it deemed Van‟s
Whistleblower Act claim to be an action covered by the ITCA.
3
Van argues the district court erred by dismissing his whistleblower claim on the basis that
he had not complied with the notice requirements of the ITCA. Van insists that his
whistleblower claim is a contract claim and not a tort claim, and therefore is not subject to the
ITCA. PMC asserts the district court correctly recognized that Van‟s whistleblower claim is
governed by the ITCA and, therefore, Van‟s undisputed failure to comply with the notice
provisions of the ITCA defeats his claim.1
The ITCA, found at Idaho Code sections 6-901 through -929, was enacted in 1971. The
Act abrogates sovereign immunity and renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising
out of its negligent acts or omissions. Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d
330, 334 (1994). Generally, the ITCA makes governmental entities subject to liability for money
damages under specified circumstances.2 Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 419, 196 P.3d 325,
337 (2008). In order to bring a lawsuit against a governmental entity under the ITCA, a plaintiff
must comply with the ITCA‟s notice requirements.3 Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618, 620,
586 P.2d 1062, 1064 (1978). Pursuant to the ITCA:
All claims against a political subdivision [subdivision] arising under the
provisions of this act and all claims against an employee of a political subdivision
for any act or omission of the employee within the course or scope of his
employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the
political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim
arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.
I.C. § 6-906. Not all actions are covered by the ITCA. Instead, the ITCA covers any “claim,”
which it defines as “any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity
1
PMC bases its argument in large part on Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 104 P.3d 367 (2004), which involved
claims under the Whistleblower Act. However, that case is not controlling because it did not address the issue of
whether Whistleblower Act claims are covered by the ITCA, thereby requiring compliance with its notice
provisions. Id.
2
The ITCA nonetheless preserves the traditional rule of immunity in certain specified situations, none of which are
at issue in this appeal. Lawton, 126 Idaho at 458, 886 P.2d at 334.
3
The primary function of notice under the ITCA is to “put the governmental entity on notice that a claim against it
is being prosecuted,” and notice serving that function is sufficient unless the governmental entity is “misled to its
injury.” Huff v. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 276, 647 P.2d 730, 732 (1982) (quoting Smith v. City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618,
621-22, 586 P.2d 1062, 1066-67 (1978)). Further, the purpose of the statute is to “(1) save needless expense and
litigation by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences between parties, (2) allow
authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the state‟s
liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses.” Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 486,
887 P.2d 29, 31 (1994) (quoting Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991)).
4
or its employee which any person is legally entitled to recover under this act as compensation for
the negligent or otherwise wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity or its employee
when acting within the course or scope of his employment.” I.C. § 6-902(7).
It is undisputed that Van did not give adequate notice of his claims under the ITCA.
However, such notice is only required if the claims he asserts are covered by the ITCA. Van‟s
complaint alleged two causes of action: wrongful termination of employment in violation of the
Whistleblower Act and breach of an at-will employment contract, including breach of the
“implied contract of good faith and fair dealing.” Clearly, the second claim – involving contract
claims – is not subject to the notice requirements of the ITCA. See Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho
274, 280, 923 P.2d 981, 987 (1996); City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 203,
899 P.2d 411, 416 (1995) (“Because Chubbuck‟s claim is based on Pocatello‟s breach of a
contractual obligation, rather than negligent or wrongful conduct, the Idaho Tort Claims Act is
inapplicable”); County of Kootenai v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Idaho 908, 916, 750 P.2d 87, 95
(1988) (“Since this action is based upon rights held and responsibilities due under an insurance
contract, it is unnecessary to pursue the issue of the applicability of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.”).
Therefore, our decision on this question will not affect count two. The remaining question is
whether count one, a claim for wrongful termination under the Whistleblower Act is covered by
the ITCA.
Idaho‟s Whistleblower Act was enacted in 1994 and “seeks to „protect the integrity of
government by providing a legal cause of action for public employees who experience adverse
action from their employer as a result of reporting waste and violations of a law, rule or
regulation.‟” See Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004). An
employee‟s cause of action under the Whistleblower Act is defined in Idaho Code section 6-
2105(4):
To prevail in an action brought under the authority of this section, the employee
shall establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee has
suffered an adverse action because the employee, or a person acting on his behalf
engaged or intended to engage in an activity protected under section 6-2104,
Idaho Code.
I.C. § 6-2105(4); see also Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 2008 Opinion No. 112
(2008). We hold that a whistleblower claim is an action based on a specific statute and therefore
it is unnecessary to classify a Whistleblower Act claim as either a contract or tort. Although the
5
district court focused on the fact that the statute establishes “an action separate from” the usual
breach of employment contract claim, the statutory nature of the cause of action does not
automatically render it subject to the ITCA. In fact, we hold the opposite to be true: the
whistleblower claim is purely a statutory remedy against governmental employers and there is no
reason to assume that the Legislature intended those alleging claims under the statute to have to
comply with the notice provision of the ITCA where the Legislature did not specifically require
it. In fact, the Legislature has acknowledged statutory claims as a separate category of claims by
setting a separate statute of limitations, Idaho Code section 5-218(1),4 as opposed to contract
actions, Idaho Code sections 5-216 & 17, and claims sounding in tort, Idaho Code section 5-
219(4). Therefore, the district court erred in holding that compliance with the notice provision in
Idaho Code section 6-906 was a prerequisite to bringing suit under the Whistleblower Act.
C. The District Court Erred in Finding that Van Failed to Establish a Prima Facie Case
for Retaliatory Discharge Under the Whistleblower Act
Under Idaho‟s Whistleblower Act, a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge requires
Van to show: (1) he was an “employee” who engaged or intended to engage in protected activity;
(2) his “employer” took adverse action against him; and (3) the existence of a causal connection
between the protected activity and the employer‟s adverse action. Curlee, 2008 Op. No. 112 at
8. The district court held that Van failed to demonstrate an issue of material fact regarding two
elements: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; and (2) that Van‟s termination was caused
by his engagement in the protected activity. These two issues will be considered in turn.
1. Van Demonstrated Issues of Material Fact Regarding Whether He Engaged in Protected
Activities
PMC‟s primary arguments are that nothing Van reported involved a violation or
suspected violation of laws, rules, or regulations and that PMC itself cured or investigated any
potential violations in response to Van‟s reports. Van contends that his complaints did involve
violations of laws, rules, or regulations and that PMC‟s actions prompted by his reports of
violations or waste are irrelevant to whether or not the Whistleblower Act was violated.
Protected activities under the Whistleblower Act are described as follows:
4
This is the general limitations provision for liabilities created by statute. It applies unless the Legislature has
provided a specific limitations period for a specific statutory liability, as it has with the Whistleblower Act. Idaho
Code section 6-2105(2) provides a limitations period of 180 days from the occurrence of the alleged violation.
6
(1)(a) An employer may not take adverse action against an employee
because the employee, or a person authorized to act on behalf of the employee,
communicates in good faith the existence of any waste of public funds, property
or manpower, or a violation or suspected violation of a law, rule or regulation
adopted under the law of this state, a political subdivision of this state or the
United States. Such communication shall be made at a time and in a manner
which gives the employer reasonable opportunity to correct the waste or violation.
I.C. § 6-2104.
Van asserts that his protected activities include, among other things, communications
regarding: PMC‟s failure to furnish each of his employees a place of employment free from
hazards which are causing or likely to cause serious injury, death, or physical harm to
employees;5 pilots taking off in aircraft with frost, ice, or snow on any rotor blade;6 pilots flying
too low;7 and pilots flying the helicopter in unairworthy conditions.8
PMC admits that two suspected violations do, in fact, implicate federal regulations.9
Nonetheless, PMC argues that because the incidents reported by Van were investigated and
resolved, Van‟s conduct in reporting the suspected violations does not qualify as a protected
activity. This reasoning is contrary to the Whistleblower Act – which applies regardless of any
action or inaction on the employer‟s part after the protected communication is made. As to the
other communications that Van insists were protected activity, although many of them involve
suspected violations rather than confirmed violations, many of them implicate laws, rules and
regulations and do qualify as protected activities under the Whistleblower Act.
Even the district court in this case recognized that some of Van‟s reports involved laws,
rules and regulations but nonetheless concluded that because they occurred months or years
before Van‟s termination, those communications could not be protected activities. It appears the
district court misunderstood the law, and ruled that suspected violations had to be confirmed in
order to constitute protected activity; and that any reported violations later cured removed the
original communication from the protection of the Whistleblower Act. This interpretation of the
5
See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a). Van bases this on pilots who flew too many hours and therefore, in his estimation,
endangered other crew members.
6
14 C.F.R. § 135.227(a).
7
14 C.F.R. §§ 91.13 & 91.119(a)-(d).
8
14 C.F.R. § 91.7.
9
In its brief before this Court, PMC states: “The only real safety issues involved Van‟s allegation that [a pilot] took
off with ice on the rotor blades . . . , and his report that two pilots had overflown airworthiness directives.”
7
law was incorrect, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment to PMC on the
basis that Van had not engaged in protected activity.
The district court was correct, however, regarding Van‟s communications about the
COMP contract. Van contends that the district court erred by holding that he “provided no
evidence that the Life Flight helicopter actually missed a flight or that PMC lost revenue because
the helicopter was unable to fly.” Although Van insists that the COMP contract involved
government waste, his focus was on potential future waste, rather than past or present waste.10
This distinction is important because the relevant statute, Idaho Code section 6-2104(1)(a)
speaks of the “existence” of any waste of public funds, meaning an existing or present waste, not
a potential future waste. To hold that the Whistleblower Act protects employee communications
regarding potential waste that may occur in the future based on an employee‟s subjective beliefs
might subject any government contract to allegations of potential future waste of funds. Van‟s
allegations regarding the COMP contract do not constitute a protected activity under the Act.
2. Issues of Material Fact Remain Regarding Causation
As a general rule, causation is an issue of fact for the jury and only rarely can the issue be
determined on a motion for summary judgment. See Curlee, 2008 Op. No. 112 at 7 (“If Curlee
presented a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, the district court was not free to accept as
true the employer‟s testimony that she was fired for some other legitimate reason.”). Here, Van
was fired – purportedly due to his distrust of the pilots and inability to accept solutions other than
his own – after a series of complaints and reports of occurrences implicating federal law, rules,
and regulations. Drawing all inferences in favor of Van, a reasonable person could conclude that
Van was terminated for his insistence on reporting violations and suspected violations over a
period of time. Similar to this Court‟s holding in Curlee, the district court erred by simply
accepting PMC‟s proffered reasons for firing Van once he had demonstrated a prima facie case
of retaliatory discharge; instead questions of material fact remained to be tried by the jury. This
is true even though, as PMC points out, a number of Van‟s reports occurred years before his
termination. The district court erred in granting summary judgment on this basis.
10
In his opening brief, Van asserts that his claims of waste involving the COMP contract “were that PMC was
paying for a maintenance service up-front that was not secure, and that assets of the hospital were at risk. Agusta
could legally refuse to provide services PMC was paying for due to untrained mechanics working on the aircraft and
that some parts costing over $100 were not listed in the addendum to the COMP contract.” (emphasis added). His
concerns focused on the potential for future waste resulting from “loopholes” he perceived in the contract.
8
D. The District Court Properly Denied Van’s Motion for Reconsideration
Van contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of the
court‟s protective order regarding the COMP contract because it was relevant to Van‟s claims of
waste. PMC asserts that the COMP contract is irrelevant because Van‟s concerns regarding
potential public waste have proven unfounded. PMC also points out that when it first filed its
motion for a protective order, Van failed to object. It was not until six months later that Van
filed his motion for reconsideration.
PMC‟s motion for a protective order – which included Van‟s Request for Production of
the COMP contract – was granted on March 16, 2007. Van did not oppose the motion, and the
district court entered the order on the grounds that the requests were duplicative, burdensome,
and irrelevant. On September 10, 2007, Van moved the district court to reconsider its order
protecting the COMP contract from discovery. Van argued that the production of the COMP
contract was not burdensome because the request was specific and limited in scope, it was not
duplicative because its contents had not been discovered, and it was relevant because it related to
his whistleblower claim that the COMP contract was a waste of taxpayer money.
The district court heard both the motion for summary judgment and the motion for
reconsideration at the same hearing, and dealt with both motions in the same decision. After
discussing the issues presented in PMC‟s motion for summary judgment, the district court stated:
“This Court also DENIES [Van‟s] Motion for Reconsideration since [PMC] prevailed on the
summary judgment motion, and [Van‟s] concerns regarding the COMP contract were
unfounded.” In its earlier discussion of Van‟s argument that PMC‟s failure to incorporate his
recommendations into the COMP contract resulted in waste, the district court found that Van had
presented no evidence demonstrating that the COMP contract had resulted in any actual waste.
Therefore, the district court ruled that Van had failed to show a prima facie case on this part of
his whistleblower claim.
A decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P.3d
955, 959 (2008). In reviewing whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court applies a
three-part test, which asks whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion; and (3) reached its decision
9
by an exercise of reason. Id. Further, whether or not to grant a motion for a protective order is
discretionary. Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 104, 996 P.2d 798, 804 (2000).
While the district court did not expressly state it recognized that its decision on Van‟s
motion for reconsideration was discretionary, the court nonetheless perceived the issue as such.
Likewise, the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Although the court based its decision on the substantive law –
namely, whether or not Van‟s assertions regarding the COMP contract constituted a protected
activity under the Whistleblower Act – the court‟s ruling effectively concluded that the COMP
contract was irrelevant because it was not related to a protected activity.
Production of the COMP contract would not establish facts proving that the COMP
contract resulted in waste. The discussion above explains why Van‟s report regarding the
COMP contract is not a protected activity under the Whistleblower Act and therefore the issue is
irrelevant and the district court properly denied Van‟s motion for reconsideration.
E. The District Court Properly Dismissed Van’s Claims for Breach of Employment
Contract and Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
1. The District Court Properly Granted PMC Summary Judgment on Van’s Breach of
Employment Contract Claim
Van asserts that he demonstrated the existence of an issue of material fact by presenting
evidence that he had been fired in contravention of the Whistleblower Act, which establishes the
public policy upon which he bases his claim for breach of at-will employment contract.
Generally, an employer may discharge an at-will employee at any time for any reason
without incurring liability. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 240, 108 P.3d 380,
387 (2005). However, the right to discharge an at-will employee is limited by considerations of
public policy, such as when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy. Mallonee,
139 Idaho at 621, 84 P.3d at 557. The determination of what constitutes public policy sufficient
to protect an at-will employee from termination is a question of law. Id. The public policy
exception to the employment at-will doctrine has been held to protect employees who refuse to
commit unlawful acts, who perform important public obligations, or who exercise certain legal
rights and privileges. Id. An employer may not discharge an at-will employee without cause
when the discharge would violate public policy. Id. Once the court defines the public policy, the
question of whether the public policy was violated is one for the jury. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho
10
893, 900, 104 P.3d 367, 374 (2004).
Van insists that, in addition to giving rise to his Whistleblower Act claim, termination in
violation of the Whistleblower Act also gives rise to a breach of contract claim by way of the
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. However, when the Legislature enacted the
Whistleblower Act, the resulting statutory cause of action displaced the common law cause of
action for breach of an at-will employment contract premised on the protected activities outlined
in the Act. See I.C. § 6-2105(4) (outlining what constitutes a protected activity); 82 AM. JUR. 2D
Wrongful Discharge § 62 (2009) (stating that when “the relevant public policy is contained in a
statute and the statute provides a remedy, the [common law cause of action] of wrongful
discharge is not available.”). Idaho‟s Whistleblower Act provides for specific remedies for
violations of the Act, including civil fines and attorney fees. See I.C. §§ 6-2106 & 2107. Under
the Act a court is authorized to “order any or all of the following”:
(1) An injunction to restrain continued violation of the provisions of [the] act;
(2) The reinstatement of the employee to the same position held before the
adverse action, or to an equivalent position;
(3) The reinstatement of full fringe benefits and seniority rights;
(4) The compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration;
(5) The payment by the employer of reasonable costs and attorneys‟ fees;
(6) An assessment of a civil fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500)
I.C § 6-2106. Clearly, the Act itself authorizes specific remedies, and therefore its provisions
cannot also be used to establish the public policy upon which a breach of at-will employment
contract claim is based. To hold otherwise would allow plaintiffs to recover twice for the same
underlying facts. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Van‟s breach of
employment contract claim.
2. The District Court Properly Granted PMC’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Van’s
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim
Van argues that the district court erred by failing to address his breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing claim. He insists PMC did not act in good faith toward him because
its employees responded to his complaints with disdain and treated him differently than they
treated the pilots. PMC argues that the district court properly dismissed Van‟s breach of
covenant claim because Van provided no evidence to support the claim.
A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in all employment agreements –
including at-will employment relationships. Jenkins, 141 Idaho at 242-43, 108 P.3d at 389-90.
11
The covenant requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations contained in their
agreement, and a violation occurs when either party violates, qualifies, or significantly impairs
any benefit or right of the other party under the contract – whether express or implied. Id. at 243,
108 P.3d at 390. However, the covenant does not create a duty for the employer to terminate the
at-will employee only for good cause. Id. The covenant only arises in connection with the terms
agreed to by the parties, and does not create new duties that are not inherent in the employment
agreement. Jones v. Micron Tech., Inc., 129 Idaho 241, 247, 923 P.2d 486, 492 (Ct. App. 1996).
In this case, the only alleged wrongful conduct was Van‟s termination. Because Van‟s
employment contract was at-will and no agreement was made regarding termination only for
cause, Van has failed to allege facts sufficient to create an issue of material fact. To the extent
Van argues that PMC‟s employees treated him with disdain, or ignored his complaints of alleged
violations – such conduct does not involve any term of his employment agreement with PMC.
PMC did not agree to provide an atmosphere where no employee ever treated Van in a less than
ideal manner. Therefore, the district court properly granted PMC summary judgment on the
issue of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
III.
The district court‟s decision is affirmed with regard to Van‟s contract claims, vacated
with regard to his Whistleblower Act claim, and remanded for further proceedings on the
Whistleblower Act claim. The district court‟s award of attorney fees and costs is vacated. We
award no costs or attorney fees on appeal. The district court may award costs and fees incurred
with respect to the appeal to the party that prevails on remand.
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK, W. JONES, and HORTON
CONCUR.
12