IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 34015
DEON and ETHEL ANDERSON, husband )
and wife, dba D&E UPHOLSTERY, )
) Boise, April 2008 Term
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
) 2008 Opinion No. 62
v. )
) Filed: May 7, 2008
REX HAYES FAMILY TRUST, REX )
HAYES, Trustee, and REX AND DEVONNE ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
HAYES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, )
)
Defendants-Respondents. )
)
)
Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Caribou County. Hon.
Don L. Harding, District Judge.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.
Nick L. Nielson, Pocatello, for appellants.
S. Criss James, Soda Springs, for respondents.
___________________________________
W. JONES, Justice
I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case involves a boundary dispute between Rex Hayes (Hayes), the trustee for the Rex
Hayes Family Trust, and the married couple Deon and Ethel Anderson (the Andersons). Hayes and
the Andersons are record owners of adjacent parcels of property in Soda Springs, with Hayes’
property bordering the Andersons’ property on the north and west. The Andersons, who also own
D&E Upholstery, purchased their property from Donald and Karen Tate on September 19, 1994.
The property in dispute includes a chain link fence erected in 1989 by Donald and Karen Tate. The
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Andersons assert that the fence serves as the correct boundary line between their property and
Hayes’ and they therefore appeal the district court’s decision not to quiet title in their favor.
On September 9, 1999, the Andersons signed a putative lease that Hayes apparently had
prepared. The relevant paragraphs read as follows:
Rex Hayes Family Trust agrees to lease property that D&E Upholstery fence
is on to D&E Upholstery for $10.00 per year.
D&E Upholstery can keep fence on property until Rex Hayes Family Trust
needs the fence moved. D&E Upholstery will be given 60 days notice if the fence
needs to be moved.
Deon Anderson admitted to signing the lease agreement, but claimed not to be aware that it was to
be notarized. The Andersons never paid any money on the purported lease agreement. Moreover, as
the Andersons stress, Deon Anderson testified that Hayes never approached them to insist that the
fence was on Hayes’ property, or to demand that Anderson remove the fence. On May 14, 2004,
Hayes attempted to terminate this purported lease, demanding that the Andersons remove all
property from the area. On August 22, 2005, Hayes indicated that he would be moving the fence
within thirty days of that date.
The Andersons hired Alex Hudson in 2001 to determine the true boundary line. Through his
survey work, Hudson concluded that the fence was not located on the actual boundary line. After
further survey work in 2006, Hudson determined the actual boundary line. Hudson found that the
fence completely enclosed Hayes’ property to the west of the Andersons’ land, and that the west
side of the fence was located on state property. The correct boundary, according to Hudson’s work,
would place the western fence line thirty-one feet further east. The map below illustrates the
location of the parties’ land, as well as the location of the fence and the state property.
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On July 29, 2005, the Andersons filed a Complaint for Quiet Title, requesting, among other
things, that the court quiet title to the property in their favor and to declare the nonexistence of the
above-mentioned lease agreement. The district court refused to quiet title in the Andersons’ favor,
in part on the basis that the above-mentioned lease agreement indicated that Hayes owned part of
the property in dispute, and in part because the district court found that the State of Idaho owned
part of the disputed property, which meant that title could not be quieted in the Andersons’ favor,
since the State was not a party to the proceedings.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s findings of fact will be set aside only if clearly erroneous, which means that
they were not supported by substantial, competent evidence. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506,
65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003).
This Court exercises free review over questions of law. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred when it found that no agreement established the fence as the
appropriate boundary between the Hayes’ and Andersons’ property.
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Legal Framework
The holder of title to property is the presumed legal owner of that property. Hettinga v.
Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994); therefore, if someone else claims
ownership of such property, he must establish his claim by clear, satisfactory, and convincing
evidence. Russ Ballard & Family Achievement Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572,
579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976). One who purchases property is put on notice of title disputes that a
reasonable investigation would reveal. Duff v. Seubert, 110 Idaho 865, 870, 719 P.2d 1125, 1130
(1985).
Boundary by agreement consists of two elements: the boundary is disputed or uncertain, and
there was a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 494-95, 50
P.3d 987, 989-90 (2002). Neither party contests the district court’s finding that the first element is
satisfied. The “agreement” element of “boundary by agreement” can be implied by the surrounding
circumstances and the landowners’ conduct. Id. at 495, 50 P.3d at 990. The “long existence and
recognition of a fence as a boundary, in the absence of any evidence as to the manner or
circumstances of its original location, strongly suggests that the fence was located as a boundary by
agreement.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). But, acquiescence is “merely regarded as competent
evidence of the agreement,” and an agreement therefore “is essential to a claim of boundary by
acquiescence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
If a boundary by agreement is established, “the parties to the agreement are no longer
entitled to the amount of property provided for in their deeds and must absorb the effect of any
increase or decrease in the amount of their property as a result of the new boundary.” Stafford v.
Weaver, 136 Idaho 223, 225, 31 P.3d 245, 247 (2001). The new boundary then is binding on
successors in interest who purchase with notice of the agreement. Duff v. Seubert, 110 Idaho at 870,
719 P.2d at 1130 (1985).
Application
In this case, the district court found that the first element of “boundary by agreement” was
satisfied, but that the second element — the element requiring an agreement — was not. The
Andersons claim that “the trial court blatantly failed to address the issue of whether an implied
agreement existed between Hayes and Andersons’ predecessors in interest, the Tates.” (emphasis in
original). The Andersons are incorrect. In the district court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, it stated that the “presumptions of agreement, which the doctrine of acquiescence may raise in
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this case, do not trump a written agreement to the contrary.” The district court found of greater
significance the purported agreement between the Andersons and Hayes. It considered the effect of
Hayes’ purported acquiescence with regard to the fence and it did not find it persuasive in light of
the contrary evidence. The district court did not issue a “clearly erroneous” finding when it found
that the lease agreement “trumped” the effects of Hayes’ acquiescence.
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred when it failed to quiet title in favor of the Andersons.
The Andersons argue that “if the trial court had properly recognized the boundary
agreements that existed, it could have quieted title to the 25 foot strip without ever needing to
address the west fence,” and the trial court “could have simply ruled that Hayes acquiesced all
rights and title to the 25-foot strip and quieted title to the strip in favor of the Andersons.”
Hayes responds by asserting that the Andersons did not advance this argument previously,
did not cite authority suggesting that this recommended course of action would be correct, and did
not supply any substantial competent evidence supporting their recommendation.
The Andersons counter by arguing that the trial court focused on the wrong side of the fence
when it focused on the west side rather than the north and south sides. The Andersons state that the
“trial court should have focused on the north and south sides of the fence to determine whether
Hayes acquiesced to the boundary lines along these sides and thus implied a boundary by
agreement.”
So, the Andersons’ argument relies on their proof of acquiescence by Hayes, an issue
already addressed above. Since the Andersons’ argument relies on a failed premise, the argument
must fail.
Issue 3: Whether the lease Anderson signed served as evidence of who owned the disputed
property.
The Andersons complain that the district court considered the September 9, 1999 written
lease as evidence of who owned the property. The district court held that
The document, at very least, is an acknowledgement as to the true ownership of the
land. The lease document favors the Hayes’ ownership of the land, (sic) thus it
cannot be construed to meet the Anderson’s (sic) second prong of boundary by
agreement. The Andersons claim ownership of the land, but the signed document is
strong evidence of Anderson’s awareness that the property belonged to the Hayes.
In addition, the lease document is relevant to show that the Andersons were on notice
that there was a dispute as to the fence line.
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The Andersons contend that the court’s finding that the agreement is “strong evidence of
Anderson’s awareness that the property belonged to the Hayes” was contrary to Mr. Anderson’s
testimony that he did not sign the agreement to acknowledge that Hayes owned the property. This
gripe, of course, is merely that the district court did not reach the same conclusion reached by the
Andersons. The signed agreement served as evidence that the property was Hayes’ property, and
Anderson’s testimony served as evidence that the agreement was not as it may have seemed. The
district court obviously chose to trust the written agreement over Anderson’s contrary self-serving
statements. This decision was supported by substantial competent, albeit conflicting evidence, on
which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied; therefore, it was not clearly erroneous and will
not be overturned. This Court will overturn a lower court’s finding of fact only if clearly erroneous,
and the existence of merely conflicting evidence does not meet this standard. It is not this Court’s
role to reweigh facts already found by the designated fact finder.
The Andersons also take issue with the district court’s logic when it held that “the validity of
the lease is irrelevant to the matter at hand.” This logic is flawed, the Andersons exclaimed,
because the district court “should not be allowed to rule that the lease was a valid acknowledgment
of ownership and that all other matters regarding the document are irrelevant! Such selectivity
severely prejudices the Andersons.” It is true that the evidence of a lease clearly contradicts the
Andersons’ position, but contrary to the Andersons’ assertion, it is not inconsistent to hold that the
document may be used as evidence of a valid acknowledgement of the property’s ownership, while
conceding that the lease may not have been enforceable 1 .
Issue 4: Whether either party is entitled to attorney’s fees.
Both parties request attorney’s fees on appeal. It is Hayes who prevails on this appeal,
which forecloses the possibility of the Andersons receiving attorney’s fees. Hayes requests
attorney’s fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), arguing that the “Andersons have presented no
substantial and competent evidence to demonstrate the trial courts (sic) findings were erroneous and
must be reversed.” Idaho Code § 12-120(3) states that
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise
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For example, a contract on someone’s life is clearly unenforceable for illegality. Yet, this unenforceable contract
nevertheless could be used at trial as evidence of the terms of the contract, i.e., as evidence that the parties to the
unenforceable contract intended to place a hit on a third party. Similarly, the unenforceable contract in this case may be
used as evidence of the terms of the contract, i.e., that the parties agreed that the property belonged to the Hayes.
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provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term “commercial transaction” is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term “party” is defined to
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
This statute does not apply to the facts of this case. This Court has upheld a lower court’s
ruling that commercial transactions generally do not include real estate transactions or issues
involving the ownership of property, such as an action to quiet title. Treasure Valley Concrete, Inc.
v. State, 132 Idaho 673, 677, 978 P.2d 233, 237 (1999). Therefore, the statute under which Hayes
requests attorney’s fees is inapplicable. Neither party may receive attorney’s fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is affirmed. Costs to
respondents.
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BRUDICK, J. JONES and HORTON, CONCUR.
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