No. 12106
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1972
GAY ANN COOK,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-VS -
THOMAS NORRIS COOK,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
Honorable Robert H Wilson, Judge presiding.
.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Moulton, Bellingham, Longo and Mather, Billings,
Montana.
Ward Swanser argued, Billings, Montana.
For Respondent :
Kurth, Jones, Davidson, Calton and Bradley,
Billings, Montana.
John R. Da~idson~argued, Billings, Montana.
Submitted: February 16, 1972
Decided : MAR 2 8 1972
Filed: MAR 2 8 1972
*M
Clerk
The Honorable J a c k D . Shanstrom, D i s t r i c t J u d g e , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e
o f M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e and p r o p e r t y
s e t t l e m e n t g r a n t e d i n f a v o r of t h e p l a i n t i f f w i f e a g a i n s t t h e
d e f e n d a n t husband. From t h e p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t p r o v i s i o n s o f
t h e d e c r e e , t h e husband a p p e a l s . No i s s u e i s t a k e n t o t h e g r a n t -
i n g of t h e divorce.
The m a t e r i a l f a c t s are n o t i n s e r i o u s d i s p u t e . The
p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d f o r t e n y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n i n
J a n u a r y , 1971. A t that time, t h e y were 31 and 36 y e a r s o l d
respectively. No c h i l d r e n were born o f t h e m a r r i a g e .
Both p a r t i e s were s t e a d i l y employed t h r o u g h o u t most o f
t h e marriage. A t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v o r c e t h e husband w a s e a r n -
i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y $15,000 p e r y e a r as a n automotive p a i n t e r . The
w i f e l a s t e a r n e d $450 p e r month as a s e c r e t a r y u n t i l s h e r e s i g n e d
from g a i n f u l employment a b o u t one y e a r b e f o r e t h e d i v o r c e . At
t h e t i m e o f t h e t r i a l b o t h p a r t i e s were m e n t a l l y and p h y s i c a l l y
c a p a b l e o f p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e i r own s u p p o r t . The w i f e ' s e d u c a t i o n
c o n s i s t e d of h i g h s c h o o l p l u s one y e a r o f c o l l e g e . The husband's
w a s l i m i t e d t o high school only.
Over t h e y e a r s , t h e w i f e c o n t r i b u t e d from $80 t o $160
p e r month from h e r e a r n i n g s toward t h e food and h o u s i n g needs of
the parties. The husband g e n e r a l l y p a i d t h e remaining l i v i n g
expenses n o t covered by t h e w i f e ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s and saved t h e
rest o f h i s income.
On t h e d a t e of t h e t r i a l , t h e p a r t i e s i n d i v i d u a l l y o r
j o i n t l y owned t h e a s s e t s h e r e i n a f t e r l i s t e d , a l l o f which were
acquired during the marriage. The husband correctly argues
that approximately 69% of these assets were accumulated through
his and not his wife's finances. The properties in dispute on
this appeal are as follows:
JOINT PROPERTY
Investor's Diversified Certificate
Equity in Family Home
HUSBAND'S INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY
Checking account (maintained jointly
with his aunt)
1966 automobile
1968 automobile
WIFE 'S INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY
None
TOTAL
The judgment of the trial court made no provision for
continuing alimony in favor of the wife, but it did in lieu
thereof establish a form of property settlement on the following
terms. It set aside the 1968 automobile to the wife and ordered
the husband to pay her the additional cash sum of $13,317.37.
All remaining property was decreed to the husband. The wife's
cash settlement figure was arrived at by deducting the value of
her automobile from the total assets acquired during the marriage
and dividing the remainder by two. In effect, the wife was given
the cash value of one-half of the assets acquired during the
marriage, including those owned individually by the husband as
w e l l a s by t h e p a r t i e s j o i n t l y . The husband was awarded t h e
r e s t of t h e p r o p e r t y i n k i n d .
The o n l y i s s u e a r g u e d on a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t had t h e a u t h o r i t y t o award t h e w i f e a c a s h sum e q u a l t o
o n e - h a l f o f t h e p r o p e r t y owned i n d i v i d u a l l y by t h e husband. We
a f f i r m t h e judgment o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t . I n d o i n g s o , and con-
t r a r y t o t h e h u s b a n d ' s c o n t e n t i o n , w e d o n o t impose a community
p r o p e r t y s t a n d a r d i n Montana.
The a u t h o r i t y o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o d e a l i n m a t t e r s o f
p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t ( a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from alimony and c h i l d
s u p p o r t ) i n d i v o r c e a c t i o n s w a s most r e c e n t l y a f f i r m e d i n L i b r a
v . L i b r a , 157 Mont. 252, 484 P.2d 748, 28 S t . Rep. 460 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .
In e x e r c i s i n g i t s a u t h o r i t y , w e t h e r e s a i d o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t :
" ( a ) d i v o r c e c o u r t i s a c o u r t of e q u i t y
and o n c e e q u i t y t a k e s j u r i s d i c t i o n ,
it w i l l g r a n t complete r e l i e f ; a l s o , t h a t
property acquired j o i n t l y during t h e
m a r r i a g e may be d i v i d e d by t h e c o u r t
whether t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o i s i n e i t h e r o r
both of t h e p a r t i e s . * * *
" * * * I n t h e s e later cases t h e Court
approved t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s be-
tween t h e p a r t i e s on a n e q u i t a b l e b a s i s a c -
c o r d i n g t o t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n e v e n though
t h i s r e q u i r e d t h a t t i t l e b e d i v e s t e d from o n e
and t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e o t h e r . "
L i b r a f o l l o w e d c l o s e on t h e h e e l s o f Hodgson v . Hodgson,
156 Mont. 469, 482 P.2d 1 4 0 , 28 S t . Rep. 1 9 5 . ( 1 9 7 1 ) w h e r e i n t h e
w i f e was awarded by way o f p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t 71% o f t h e m a r i t a l
a s s e t s , although h e r f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s through i n h e r i t a n c e
w e r e only 59%. W e a f f i r m e d u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h a t case
t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n , e v e n though
i t s o r d e r i n e f f e c t t r a n s f e r r e d t i t l e t o r e a l p r o p e r t y from
t h e husband t o t h e w i f e .
Libra and Hodgson s h o u l d have l a i d t o rest t h e h u s b a n d ' s
argument on a p p e a l h e r e . I t h a s a l r e a d y been a t l e a s t twice
d e c i d e d i n t h i s S t a t e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t may make a n e q u i t -
a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e l i t i g a n t s ' p r o p e r t y i n a d i v o r c e a c t i o n
r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e s t a t e of t i t l e t o t h a t p r o p e r t y and r e g a r d l e s s
of a c t u a l f i n a n c i a l contribution. W e are asked by t h e husband,
however, t o r e t r e a t from t h e s e c a s e s f o r t h e s t a t e d r e a s o n t h a t
t h e r e i s no s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n powers
t h e r e i n granted t h e t r i a l court. Appellant cites t h e v a r i o u s
p r o v i s i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n T i t l e 3 6 , R.C.M. 1947, s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e
c o r r e l a t i v e f i n a n c i a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s o f husband and w i f e
during t h e i r marriage. The s t a t u t e s r e l i e d upon compose what i s
commonly c a l l e d t h e Married Women's A c t .
The a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s e s t a t u t e s t o m a r r i e d c o u p l e s i s
u n d e n i a b l e , b u t t h e r e i s no i n t i m a t i o n t h a t t h e y a r e a t a l l con-
t r o l l i n g upon d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e m a r r i a g e by d i v o r c e . In the
l a t t e r e v e n t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t becomes charged w i t h t h e d u t y of
g r a n t i n g "complete r e l i e f " , i n c l u d i n g p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n , accord-
i n g t o t h e e q u i t i e s o f each i n d i v i d u a l c a s e . Johnson v. Johnson,
137 Mont. 11, 349 P.2d 310. The d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s broad powers
i n t h i s r e g a r d are e x p r e s s e d i n s e c t i o n 21-139, R.C.M. 1947, where-
i n he i s empowered t o make " s u i t a b l e allowance t o t h e w i f e f o r
her support during her l i f e , o r f o r a s h o r t e r period, a s t h e
c o u r t may deem j u s t , having r e g a r d t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e
parties respectively * * *." (Emphasis added.)
A p p e l l a n t a l s o r e f e r s u s t o f o u r Montana d e c i s i o n s
( a l l p r e d a t i n g J o h n s o n , Hodgson and L i b r a ) f o r e a r l y a u t h o r i t y
t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n a d i v o r c e a c t i o n does n o t have t h e
d i s c r e t i o n t o make p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n o f m a r i t a l a s s e t s i n l i e u
of o r i n a d d i t i o n t o alimony. H e cites: R u f e n a c h v. R u f e n a c h ,
120 Mont. 351, 185 P.2d 293; Lewis v . L e w i s , 109 Mont. 4 2 , 94
P.2d 211; Emery v . Emery, 122 Mont. 201, 200 P.2d 251; a n d ,
L e w i s v . Bowman e t a l . , 1 1 3 Mont. 6 8 , 1 2 1 P.2d 1 6 2 .
W e do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y agree t h a t t h e cases last c i t e d
s t a n d f o r t h e r e s t r i c t i v e g u i d e l i n e s on t h e power o f t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t a s s e r t e d by a p p e l l a n t , b u t t o e r a s e a l l d o u b t , w e h e r e b y
expressly overrule these cases insofar a s they are inconsistent
herewith.
The t r i a l j u d g e ' s r e s o l u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n i s
f e t t e r e d o n l y by t h e r a n g e o f r e a s o n and h i s judgment w i l l n o t
be d i s t u r b e d i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . Bickford
v . B i c k f o r d , 117 Mont. 372, 1 5 8 P.2d 796. N o such abuse o f d i s -
c r e t i o n i s shown u n d e r t h e f a c t s p r e s e n t e d h e r e . A l l property
c o n s i d e r e d f o r d i v i s i o n by t h e t r i a l j u d g e w a s a c c u m u l a t e d d u r i n g
t h e marriage. T r u e , t h e husband had s c r u p u l o u s l y k e p t t i t l e t o
t h i s p r o p e r t y p r i m a r i l y i n h i s own name. H e g e n e r a l l y managed
t h e b u s i n e s s a f f a i r s o f t h e c o u p l e , and h e found i t s i m p l e t o
manipulate t i t l e t o h i s b e n e f i t . This does not prevent t h e court
from d e a l i n g t h e w i f e h e r f a i r s h a r e . H e r e t h e c o u r t chose t o
t r a n s f e r a l l t i t l e t o t h e h u s b a n d , b o t h i n d i v i d u a l and j o i n t ,
r e q u i r i n g a cash s e t t l e m e n t e q u a l t o one-half its value to the
wife. T h e r e i s a u t h o r i t y i n Montana f o r p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n i n
those proportions. In Johnson we stated:
"And, equal division under normal conditions
of property accumulated through joint efforts
is not regarded as unreasonable."
The district court apparently considered more in this
case than mere financial contributions. The law has never
confined "joint efforts" to such a narrow meaning. The marital
partnership is more than a business relation. The pecuniary
and proprietary fruits of the marriage are frequently acquired
by joint effort, even though actual financial outlay may be more
the contribution of one spouse than the other.
This holding does not make Montana a community property
state. There is no required percentage of allocation to be
applied in all cases. Each case must be looked at by the trial
court individually with an eye to its unique circumstances. Under
the circumstances here, we are not compelled to state that equal
division of the property is an inequitable result.
The judgment is affirmed.
Jack Shanstrom, district
udge, sitting in place of Mr.
Justice Wesley Castles.
9
,As ociate Justices -