No. 12369
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
1973
FAK J
RN . SCHULTZ ,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs -
RICHARD CHARLES A A S and DAVID AMSK,
DM
Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s .
Appeal from: District Court of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
Bennett and Bennett, Bozeman, Montana
Lyman H. Bennett Jr. and Lyman H , Bennett, I11 argued,
Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent :
Berger, Anderson, S i n c l a i r and Murphy, B i l l i n g s
Montana
Arnold A . Berger argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana
Submitted: February 28, 1973
Decided : MAR f. 4.2973
Filed :
MAR 1.4 lm
M . Chief J u s t i c e James T. H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
r
t h e Court.
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a n o r d e r g r a n t i n g summary judgment
i n a n a c t i o n f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s a s t h e r e s u l t of a n a u t o m o b i l e
accident. The o r d e r w a s g r a n t e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t upon motion
by t h e r e s p o n d e n t i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Park County. It w a s
o r d e r e d by t h e c o u r t :
" * * * T h a t P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion f o r Summary
Judgment, b e , and t h e same i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d ,
on t h e q u e s t i o n of l i a b i l i t y i n t h i s c a s e . "
T h i s motion was made on J u l y 26, 1972, p u r s u a n t t o Rule
5 6 , M.R.Civ.P., i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t p o r t i o n of s u b s e c t i o n ( c ) ,
which r e a d s :
" * * * A summary judgment, interlocutory i n
c h a r a c t e r , may be r e n d e r e d on t h e i s s u e o f l i a -
b i l i t y alone although t h e r e i s a genuine i s s u e
a s t o t h e amount o f damages."
The motion was opposed by t h e a p p e l l a n t s and a h e a r i n g had and
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r on August 1 8 , 1972. This
appeal followed.
The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e i s whether t h e o r d e r
i s an appealable order. Respondent h a s f i l e d a motion r e q u e s t -
i n g t h a t t h e a p p e a l be d i s m i s s e d . The ground f o r t h i s motion
i s t h a t t h e o r d e r was a summary judgment which i s n o t a n a p p e a l -
able order. The a p p e l l a n t s resist t h e motion, c o n t e n d i n g t h a t
under Rule l ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., t h i s i s a f i n a l judgment. They
u r g e t h i s C o u r t t o a d o p t a s a d e f i n i t i o n of "a f i n a l judgment"
t h e meaning g i v e n t o t h a t t e r m by Chief J u s t i c e B r a n t l y i n State
e x r e l . Heinze v . D i s t . C t . , 28 Mont. 227, 234, 72 P . 613, where-
i n he held:
" I * * * A judgment t h a t i s c o n c l u s i v e of any q u e s t i o n
i n a case i s f i n a l a s t o t h a t question.'"
T h i s C o u r t must p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n i n t h a t e a s e w a s made
under t h e code p r a c t i c e s y s t e m and t o make s u c h a h o l d i n g i n t h i s
i s t h e e f f e c t which t h e r u l e s t a t e s . T h e r e f o r e we must h o l d
t h a t t h e o r d e r by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was i n e f f e c t an " i n t e r -
l o c u t o r y summary a d j u d i c a t i o n " , and a s a r e s u l t it i s n o t an
appealable order.
I n S t a t e e x r e l . G.F. Nat. Bk. v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,
154 Mont. 336, 463 P.2d 326, a n o r i g i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s e e k i n g a
w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l , we h e l d :
"The f i r s t i s s u e i n v o l v e s p r o c e d u r a l m a t t e r s o n l y .
Relator here seeks supervisory c o n t r o l t o review
two o r d e r s of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t : * * * and ( 2 ) t h e
o r d e r g r a n t i n g p l a i n t i f f summary judgment on t h e
i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y . These o r d e r s are n o t d i r e c t l y
a p p e a l a b l e , n e i t h e r b e i n g denominated a n a p p e a l a b l e
o r d e r i n Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P., presumably be-
c a u s e e a c h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r y i n c h a r a c t e r and review-
a b l e on a p p e a l from f i n a l judgment."
While w e f u r t h e r h e l d i n t h a t c a s e t h a t an a p p e a l from
t h a t f i n a l judgment would impose undue h a r d s h i p on t h e r e l a t o r
and would be wholly i n a d e q u a t e a s a remedy, we do n o t f e e l t h a t
such a s i t u a t i o n e x i s t s i n t h i s cause.
Case l a w a r i s i n g under t h e F e d e r a l Rule and which i s ap-
p l i c a b l e h e r e due t o t h e i d e n t i c a l l a n g u a g e s u p p o r t s t h i s d e c i s i o n .
I n a c a s e where t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d judgment
f o r p l a i n t i f f and o r d e r e d t h e c a s e t o p r o c e e d t o t r i a l on t h e
i s s u e of damages, t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s , i n g r a n t i n g a motion t o
dismiss t h e appeal held:
" * * * The motion must be g r a n t e d s i n c e t h e o r d e r
a p p e a l e d from, a l t h o u g h it d e t e r m i n e s t h e l i a b i l i t y
of t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e p l a i n t i f f , w i l l n o t become
a f i n a l a d j u d i c a t i o n of t h e c o n t r o v e r s y between them
u n t i l t h e damages t o which t h e p l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d
have been a s s e s s e d . " R u s s e l l v . Barnes F o u n d a t i o n ,
136 F.2d 654, 655 (3d. C i r . 1 9 4 3 ) .
T h i s same r e s u l t was r e a c h e d i n Tye v. H e r t z D r i v u r s e l f S t a t i o n s ,
173 F.2d 317 (3d C i r . 1 9 4 8 ) , on t h e q u e s t i o n whether t h e a p p e a l
had been t i m e l y f i l e d , t h e c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e t i m e would n o t
r u n from t h e d a t e of e n t r y o f t h e " p a r t i a l summary judgment", on
t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y f o r o v e r t i m e wages, b e c a u s e t h e o r d e r
case would do serious harm to the intent of the Montana Rules
of Civil Procedure.
It is apparent after extensive research that the drafters
of the Federal Rules and the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure
had a different result in mind than that urged by the appellants.
The wording of the federal rule and last sentence of subsection
(c) of Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. are identical. Professor Moore in
his treatise on Federal Practice writes:
" * * * If, however, there is no genuine issue
of material fact relative to defendant's liability
and claimant is entitled to a favorable adjudica-
tion thereon as a matter of law, but there is a
genuine factual issue as to the amount of damages
that are recoverable, the court may summarily ad-
judicate the issue of liability, and remit the
issue of damages for trial. In that event the
summary adjudication in favor of the claimant is
interlocutory, as the Rule states, and non-appeal-
able, unless there is some special statutory pro-
vision authorizing an appeal from such an inter-
locutory order." 6 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d.,
1 56.18, pages 2732-2733.
1
Following the clear wording of the rule this Court cannot
see how one can reach any other conclusion than that expressed
above. The rule clearly states that a judgment made pursuant to
the rule is "interlocutory in character". Black's Law Dictionary,
4th Ed. 1968, defines interlocutory in the following manner:
"Provisional; temporary; not final". Under our system of prac-
tice such an order is not appealable unless there is some special
provision making it so. Such a special provision if it existed
would be found in Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P., subsections (b) and
(c). In reading those sections this Court is of the opinion
that nothing contained therein would permit the appeal of the
instant order.
While the order of the district court sets out no.specific
authority for its decision, this Court will presume it was made
in reliance upon Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. The effect of the order
was not final.
In a suit to recover for advance payments for goods
bought the Court of Appeals held in Leonidakis v. International
Telecoin Corp., 208 F.2d 934, 936 (2d Cir. 1953), in dismissing
the appeal:
" * * * Moreover, the specific authority for enter-
ing a partial summary judgment on the issue of
liability alone, leaving the issue of damages for
trial, is F.R. 56(c), which designates this type
of summary judgment as 'interlocutory in character.'
The appeal is therefore premature."
This is not to say that the appellants are foreclosed
from ever presenting these issues on appeal. Professors Wright
and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 9 2715, p.
422, in their treatise discuss this issue:
" * * * Similarly, an interlocutory summary judg-
ment on the issue of liability, which is authorized
by the last sentence in Rule 56(c), is not appeal-
able until after the damage issue has been resolved."
For the foregoing reason the motion of the respondent to
dismiss the appeal is granted a
missed,
We concur: I I
f P 1
A sociate Justices