No. 12966
I N T E SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
H F F OTN
1975
I N THE STATE O M N A A by and through t h e
F OTN
DEPARTMENT O SOCIAL AND REHABILITATION
F
SERVICES, and t h e DEPARTMENT O REVENUE,
F
P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents,
ROXANNE HULTGREN ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable J a c k D, Shanstrom, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record :
For Appellant:
J. Dennis Moreen argued, Helena, Montana
Swandal and Douglas, L i v i n g s t o n , Montana
For Respondents :
Margaret L. Borg, argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted: September 24, 1975
Decided : N O V - 3 1975
Filed: NDV -'
$475
Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the district
court, Park County.
On September 28, 1969, defendant Roxanne Hultgren applied
for and began receiving Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) payments
through the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS),
stating her children were without support.
On February 29, 1972, defendant was divorced from her
husband, Paul Arnold Hultgren. The divorce judgment and decree
required Hultgren to pay defendant $50 per month for the support
and maintenance of each of the seven minor Hultgren children,
with payments to commence March 15, 1972. Hultgren made no pay-
ment and defendant continued to receive ADC payments through SRS.
On May 1, 1973, defendant initiated proceedings under the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), section 93-
2601-41 et seq., R.C.M. 1947, to recover back due child support
from her former husband, then a resident of Wyoming. The URESA
claim was settled by an agreement that Hultgren would pay the sum
of $4,900. This sum was deposited with the Park County district
court pending a determination as to whether SRS or defendant is
entitled to the money. Defendant demanded release of the claim
to the money by SRS and was refused.
Hultgren made his first current support payment in October
1973, and remained current. At the time he began regular support
payments, Hultgren was responsible for 19 months back-due support,
totaling $6,650. Defendant received ADC payments from March 1972
through October 1973, totaling $6,188.
The State, acting through SRS and the Department of Revenue,
brought suit in the district court to recover the deposited money.
Judgment was granted for the State; defendant appeals.
The issue presented to this Court is whether the district
c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g judgment t o t h e S t a t e .
The S t a t e a l l e g e s it h a s t h e r i g h t t o t h e URESA p r o c e e d s
p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 93-2601-48, R.C.M. 1947:
" I f a state o r a p o l i t i c a l subdivision furnishes
s u p p o r t t o a n i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e it h a s t h e same
r i g h t t o i n i t i a t e a p r o c e e d i n g under t h i s a c t a s
t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of s e c u r i n g
reimbursement f o r s u p p o r t f u r n i s h e d and o f o b t a i n -
ing continuing support."
This section c l e a r l y gives t h e S t a t e t h e r i g h t t o i n i t i a t e
URESA p r o c e e d i n g s and i n f e r e n t i a l l y g i v e s t h e S t a t e t h e r i g h t t o
j o i n i n any such p r o c e e d i n g s i n i t i a t e d by t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e ,
b u t t h i s s e c t i o n c a n n o t s e r v e a s t h e b a s i s f o r an a c t i o n a g a i n s t
t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b l i g e e o v e r sums r e c o v e r e d under URESA. The
S t a t e d i d n o t choose t o i n i t i a t e a URESA p r o c e e d i n g o r j o i n i n
d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e it c a n n o t now c l a i m t h e b e n e f i t o f
t h i s s e c t i o n t o r e c o v e r from d e f e n d a n t , h a v i n g v o l u n t a r i l y waived
t h e r i g h t granted thereunder.
The S t a t e a r g u e s s e c t i o n 61-115, R.C.M. 1947, g i v e s t h e
S t a t e t h e r i g h t t o r e c o v e r t h e URESA p r o c e e d s . The s t a t u t e r e a d s :
" I f a p a r e n t n e g l e c t s t o p r o v i d e a r t i c l e s nec-
e s s a r y f o r h i s c h i l d under h i s c h a r g e , a c c o r d i n g
t o h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a t h i r d p e r s o n may i n good
f a i t h s u p p l y s u c h n e c e s s a r i e s , and r e c o v e r t h e
r e a s o n a b l e v a l u e t h e r e o f from t h e p a r e n t . "
The S t a t e m a i n t a i n s it i s a " t h i r d p e r s o n " which s u p p l i e d neces-
s a r i e s i n t h e form o f ADC payments, t h e r e f o r e it h a s t h e r i g h t t o
r e c o v e r under s e c t i o n 61-115.
A " t h i r d p e r s o n " i s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 1 9 - 1 0 3 ( 1 2 ) , R.C.M.
1947, t o :
" * * * i n c l u d e all who are n o t parties to t h e
o b l i g a t i o n o r t r a n s a c t i o n c o n c e r n i n g which t h e
phrase i s used."
I f t h e S t a t e i s a " p e r s o n " , it would c l e a r l y q u a l i f y a s
a " t h i r d p e r s o n " i n t h e c o n t e x t of s e c t i o n 61-115, R.C.M. 1947.
Montana s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 19-103, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s :
" * * * the word person includes a corporation
as well as a natural person * * * I 1 .
Since the State is not specifically included in this statutory
construction language, we must look further to determine whether
the State is a person in the context of section 61-115.
The general rule of statutory construction is set out in
82 C.J.S. Statutes 8317, p. 554:
"The government, whether federal or state, and
its agencies are not ordinarily to be considered
as within the purview of a statute, however general
and comprehensive the language of act may be, un-
less intention to include them is clearly manifest,
as where they are expressly named therein, or in-
cluded by necessary implication."
This is the rule followed in the 1912 case In re Beck's Estate,
44 Mont. 561, 574, 121 P. 784, in which this Court stated:
"Therefore, the rule to be observed in the con-
struction of statutes is, that the state is not
included by general words therein creating a
right and providing a remedy for its enforce-
ment. "
Subsequent to Beck, there has been a trend to include the
state within the general language of a statute beneficial to the
state. This trend is referred to in 82 C.J.S. Statutes 8317, p.
"On the other hand, it has been said that the
general rule has been relaxed in modern times.
Accordingly, the state may have the benefit of
general laws; and the general rule has been
held not to apply to statutes by which the
government or a part or agency thereof is given
powers rather than deprived of them, or where
no impairment of the sovereign powers will
result * * *".
This rule has been applied in a growing number of states,
including California, wherein it was stated in In re Bevilacqua's
Estate, 31 Cal.2d 580, 191 P.2d 752, 756, quoting from Hoyt v.
Board of Civil Service Com'rs, 21 Cal.2d 399, 132 P.2d 804, 806:
"'Where, however, no impairment of sovereign powers
would result, the reason underlying this rule of
construction [the general rule stated above] ceases
to exist and the Legislature may properly be held
t o have i n t e n d e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e a p p l y t o govern-
m e n t a l b o d i e s even though it used g e n e r a l s t a t u t o r y
language o n l y . ' "
See a l s o : West Norman Timber v . S t a t e , 37 Wash.2d 467, 224
P.2d 635, which c o n t a i n s a n e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e r e l a x -
a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l r u l e , c i t i n g c a s e s from many f e d e r a l and
s t a t e courts.
I n c l u d i n g t h e S t a t e a s a " p e r s o n " i n t h e c o n t e x t of
s e c t i o n 61-115, would be b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e S t a t e and g e n e r a l
p u b l i c by p e r m i t t i n g t h e S t a t e t o r e c o v e r t o a l i m i t e d e x t e n t
amounts p a i d t h r o u g h ADC f o r t h e s u p p o r t and n e c e s s a r i e s o f
children. T h e r e f o r e , w e f i n d t h e S t a t e may p r o p e r l y be h e l d
t o be a " p e r s o n " f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f s e c t i o n 61-115, R.C.M.
1947.
The S t a t e , a s a t h i r d p e r s o n , may, p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n
61-115, r e c o v e r t h e r e a s o n a b l e v a l u e f o r t h e n e c e s s a r i e s pro-
v i d e d from t h e p a r e n t who n e g l e c t s t o p r o v i d e t h e n e c e s s a r i e s .
The l i t i g a t i o n g i v i n g rise t o t h i s appeal, does not involve t h e
neglectful parent. H u l t g r e n i s r e q u i r e d t o make s u p p o r t pay-
ments p u r s u a n t t o t h e d i v o r c e judgment and d e g r e e . The S t a t e
had t h e r i g h t under s e c t i o n 93-2601-48, R.C.M. 1947, t o i n i t i a t e
o r j o i n a n URESA p r o c e e d i n g , b u t v o l u n t a r i l y waived t h i s r i g h t
by t a k i n g no a c t i o n . Defendant d i d commence a n URESA a c t i o n .
The S t a t e c a n n o t r e l y on s e c t i o n 61-115 t o r e c o v e r t h e URESA
p r o c e e d s from d e f e n d a n t , a s s e c t i o n 61-115 o n l y p r o v i d e s f o r
r e c o v e r y from H u l t g r e n , t h e n e g l e c t f u l p a r e n t .
The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o c e e d s s h o u l d be r e c o v e r a b l e
by t h e S t a t e under t h e d o c t r i n e o f e q u i t a b l e s u b r o g a t i o n .
S u b r o g a t i o n i s a c r e a t u r e o f e q u i t y , it i s a n e q u i t a b l e
r i g h t and n o t a l e g a l r i g h t . 83 C.J.S. S u b r o g a t i o n 5 2 , pp. 578,
580. 83 C.J.S. S u b r o g a t i o n 56, p. 594, s t a t e s t h a t due t o
i t s equitable nature:
"The o r d i n a r y e q u i t y maxims a r e a p p l i c a b l e
t o t h e e q u i t a b l e remedy o f s u b r o g a t i o n . Thus,
s u b r o g a t i o n i s n o t a l l o w e d where t h e r e i s a n
a d e q u a t e remedy a t law * * *".
The S t a t e d i d have t h e r i g h t t o i n i t i a t e a n URESA
p r o c e e d i n g under s e c t i o n 93-2601-48, o r t h e S t a t e c o u l d have
b r o u g h t d i r e c t a c t i o n a s a t h i r d p e r s o n a g a i n s t H u l t g r e n under
s e c t i o n 61-115. The S t a t e c h o s e n e i t h e r o f t h e s e means o f re-
c o v e r y , t h u s it c a n n o t r e c o v e r under a n e q u i t a b l e d o c t r i n e what
it v o l u n t a r i l y c h o s e n o t t o r e c o v e r under t h e l e g a l r e m e d i e s
provided i n t h e s t a t u t e s .
The judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s r e v e r s e d and t h i s
c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o o r d e r
t h e r e l e a s e and payment o f t h e URESA proceeds, now b e i n g h e l d
by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , t o d e f e n d a n t , Roxanne, H u l t g r e n .
.
----------------1A-----------------
Chief J u s t i c e
W e concur:
...............................
Justices
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Here the State having supported
a family by ADC payments during a period when the father failed
to make support payments is denied an opportunity of partial
reimbursement, following a USERA recovery, on what I believe to
be a technical failure to join in the USERA action against the
husband. The majority state that the litigation does not involve
a neglectful parent. I disagree. If the father had lived up to
his obligations, as provided for in the divorce decree, then ADC
support would not have been required, nor would a USERA action
have been necessary.
In my opinion the results here call for legislative action
similar to that in California, to protect the already overburdened
taxpayer. In the interim every county attorney in this State
should note the result and join every USERA action filed.
.............................
Justice