No, 12919
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF T E STATE O MONTANA
H F
1975
MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY ,
Respondent and P l a i n t i f f ,
-vs -
D N L L. RANSIER,
O AD
Defendant and Appellant,
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable W. W, Lessley, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record :
For Appellant :
McKinley T, Anderson, Jr. argued, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Barry L. H j o r t argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted: May 9 , 1975
Decided : .$/
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Jtl 9 1 k
Filed : 3 ?- !9/5
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from t h e d i s m i s s a l of a n " a p p e a l "
b r o u g h t by Donald L. R a n s i e r i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , G a l l a t i n
County. H e t h e r e c h a l l e n g e d a n a d v e r s e d e c i s i o n of t h e T r a f f i c
Appeals Committee of Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y , which a s s e s s e d
f o u r d o l l a r s i n f i n e s f o r p a r k i n g v i o l a t i o n s on t h e Bozeman
campus. Here, a s i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , most of t h e r e l e v a n t
f a c t s have been s t i p u l a t e d t o by t h e p a r t i e s .
From t h o s e s t i p u l a t i o n s i t a p p e a r s t h a t R a n s i e r was a
s t u d e n t a t Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y i n t h e f a l l of 1973. On
November 8 , he r e c e i v e d two t i c k e t s , o n e f o r p a r k i n g i n a re-
s t r i c t e d a r e a and one f o r f a i l i n g t o r e g i s t e r h i s v e h i c l e . The
t i c k e t s , a t t a c h e d t o h i s w i n d s h i e l d w i p e r , c o n t a i n e d a warning
t h a t t h e f i n e s would be doubled u n l e s s p a i d by November 1 5 , 1973.
R a n s i e r a p p e a l e d t o t h e T r a f f i c Appeals Committee, which u p h e l d
t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e t i c k e t s . He t h e n proceeded i n t o d i s t r i c t
c o u r t where, f o l l o w i n g a h e a r i n g on t h e motion, t h e U n i v e r s i t y ' s
motion f o r d i s m i s s a l was g r a n t e d .
I n addition t o t h e foregoing s t i p u l a t e d f a c t s , Ransier
a l l e g e s t h a t a wheel l o c k was p l a c e d on h i s v e h i c l e and t h e h e a r -
i n g b e f o r e t h e T r a f f i c Appeals Committee was conducted i n c l o s e d
s e s s i o n , excluding t h e general public. Counsel f o r t h e U n i v e r s i t y
refused t o s t i p u l a t e t o these alleged f a c t s , but Ransier t e s t i -
f i e d i n s u p p o r t of them a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h e a r i n g . N con-
o
t r a d i c t i n g e v i d e n c e o r t e s t i m o n y was i n t r o d u c e d by t h e U n i v e r s i t y .
I n bringing h i s appeal t o t h i s Court, Ransier r a i s e s
three issues:
1. Did t h e U n i v e r s i t y exceed i t s s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y
i n i s s u i n g a t i c k e t f o r f a i l u r e t o r e g i s t e r R a n s i e r ' s v e h i c l e and
i n i n c r e a s i n g t h e p e n a l t y i f t h e f i n e was n o t p a i d w i t h i n s e v e n
days?
2. Is t h e s t a t u t o r y g r a n t of a u t h o r i t y t o promulgate
and e n f o r c e v e h i c l e r e g i s t r a t i o n and p a r k i n g r e g u l a t i o n s a n
u n l a w f u l d e l e g a t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ?
3. Is t h e U n i v e r s i t y ' s p r o c e d u r e f o r p r o c e s s i n g t i c k e t s
v i o l a t i v e of t h e due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e United S t a t e s
and Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n s ?
The s t a t u t e s i n v o l v e d a r e :
S e c t i o n 75-8503.2, R.C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s :
"The r e g e n t s of t h e Montana u n i v e r s i t y s y s t e m ,
a r e a u t h o r i z e d t o make r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s
a t e a c h u n i t of t h e u n i v e r s i t y system concern-
i n g t h e p a r k i n g and o p e r a t i o n s of motor v e h i c l e s
upon t h e g r o u n d s , s t r e e t s , d r i v e s and a l l e y s of
each u n i t . "
S e c t i o n 75-8503.3, R.C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s i n p e r -
tinent part:
"The r e g e n t s may a u t h o r i z e t h e p r e s i d e n t of
each u n i t t o :
'!(a) A s s e s s f e e s n o t t o exceed t e n d o l l a r s
( $ 1 0 ) p e r q u a r t e r f o r p a r k i n g on campus.
" ( b ) A s s e s s f i n e s f o r v i o l a t i o n s of motor
v e h i c l e o r p a r k i n g r e g u l a t i o n s of e a c h u n i t
i n an amount n o t t o exceed one d o l l a r ( $ 1 )
per offense * * *
" ( e ) E s t a b l i s h a system of a p p e a l s a t e a c h
u n i t concerning parking v i o l a t i o n s .
The r e g i s t r a t i o n and p a r k i n g r e g u l a t i o n s R a n s i e r a l l e g e d l y
v i o l a t e d were promulgated by t h e p r e s i d e n t o f Montana S t a t e Uni-
v e r s i t y under t h e e x p r e s s a u t h o r i z a t i o n of t h e board of r e g e n t s .
They r e q u i r e r e g i s t r a t i o n of a l l s t u d e n t s ' v e h i c l e s parked on
campus, a s w e l l as d e s i g n a t i n g c e r t a i n l o t s f o r u s e of r e s t r i c t e d
c l a s s e s of s t u d e n t s , f a c u l t y , and u n i v e r s i t y employees. Violators
t o be f i n e d one d o l l a r p e r o f f e n s e , w i t h l a t e payment of f i n e s con-
s t i t u t i n g a separate offense. The T r a f f i c Appeals Committee, com-
posed of f a c u l t y and s t u d e n t s a p p o i n t e d by t h e u n i v e r s i t y p r e s i d e n t ,
is empowered to review the validity of tickets issued for vio-
lation of these regulations.
Review of the record discloses no exercise of authority
in excess of that provided by the quoted statutes. When a stat-
ute grants power in general terms, it includes, by implication,
a grant of all powers incidental and necessary to make the general
grant effective. Panchot v. Leet, 50 Mont. 314, 146 P. 927; 2A
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., § 55.04. Requiring
registration of vehicles parked on campus and limiting the areas
in which they may be parked is incident to the general regulation
of parking on campus and assessment of fees therefor--powers ex-
pressly granted by sections 75-8503.2 and 75-8503.3, R.C.M. 1947.
Similarly, provision that the late payment of a fine
constitutes a separate offense is permissible as within powers
incident to the general grant of regulatory authority. According-
ly, the one dollar fine assessed therefor is within the monetary
limitation of section 75-8503.3(b), R.C.M. 1947.
Having found the regulations which Ransier allegedly
violated are within the legislative authorization, we next consider
the issue of unauthorized delegation of power. Both the 1889 and
1972 Montana Constitutions require that the powers of one branch
of government can not be exercised by another branch. Article IV,
Section 1, 1889 Montana Constitution; Article 111, Section 1, 1972
Montana Constitution. Any purported delegation by the legislature
of powers inappropriate to the recipient branch of government
would be clearly unconstitutional.
In Bacus v. Lake County, 138 Mont. 69, 78, 354 P.2d 1056,
we held :
"'Prescribing of penalties is a legislative
function, and a commission may not be empowered
to impose penalties for violations of duties
which it creates under a statute permitting it
to make rules. However, the legislature may
validly provide a criminal or penal sanction for
the violation of the rules and regulations which
it may empower administrative authorities to
enact.' 42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law,
5 50, p. 355, and authorities cited therein.''
There this Court approved the exercise of a quasi-judicial func-
tion of county or district boards of health, as well as the rule
making powers authorized by the legislature. That ruling was
subsequently recognized as controlling in Pattie v. Oil & Gas
Conservation Commission, 145 Mont. 531, 402 P.2d 596. We find
it to be controlling here as well.
The application of that rule to the instant case is
apparent. The legislature empowered the board of regents to
promulgate regulations controlling vehicles on campus, and pro-
vided a penalty for violations of those regulations. In so doing,
there was no unlawful delegation of power. Another case, in point
and reaching the same result, is Cohen v. Mississippi State Univ.
of Agr. & A. Science, 256 F.Supp. 954, (N.D. Miss. 1966). There,
under similar statutory and constitutional provisions, the promul-
gation and enforcement of registration and parking regulations
by a university was upheld over a challenge that it violated sep-
aration of powers requirements.
The due process argument raised by Ransier, alleging that
his constitutional right to a public hearing before the Traffic
Appeals Committee was denied, is best considered in light of a
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision: Goss v. Lopez, U.S. I
95 S.Ct. , 42 L ed 2d 725, 739, 740, (1975), and cases cited
therein. Although the court in Goss was dealing with disciplinary
proceedings in public high schools, the analysis is pertinent here.
The state's authority to regulate conduct in its schools was rec-
ognized as broad, but nonetheless limited by certain constitutional
safeguards. The limitation applied by the court in Goss was the
requirement of due process in the suspension of a student for ten
days as a disciplinary measure.
We find the due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 11,
Section 17, 1972 Montana Constitution, are applicable to the
instant facts. However, our inquiry cannot end there. The
fundamental requirements of due process have long been recog-
nized as "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L ed 865. That standard was
applied in - where the Court held:
GOSS,
" * * * due process requires * * * that the
student be given oral or written notice of
the charges against him, and if he denies them,
an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his side of
the story."
Recognizing that the nature of the due process required depended
in some degree on the facts surrounding the charge and the interests
involved, the Court went on to say:
"We stop short of construing the Due Process
Clause to require, countrywide, that hearings
in connection with short suspensions must afford
the student the opportunity to secure counsel,
to confront and cross-examine witnesses support-
ing the charge or to call his own witnesses to
verify his version of the incident. * * * To
impose in each such case even truncated trial
type procedures might well overwhelm administrative
facilities in many places and, by diverting re-
sources, cost more than it would save in educa-
tional effectiveness."
Here, examination of the constitutional requirements in-
volved and the guidelines apparent in Goss prompts the conclusion
that due process requirements have been satisfied by the notice
and hearing afforded to Ransier. In so finding, we need not
consider the factual dispute involving presence or absence of
the public at the hearing. On the uncontroverted facts, the con-
stitutional due process requirements have been satisfied. The
full panoply of a trial type procedure is not constitutionally
required in a case such as this--traffic fines of only four dollars.
A f r l r r r ~ i r i y tna Jiscrlcl; soure's i t i s m i s s a i we need i ~ o t
reach tae ~ o n s t i t u t i o n a lc o n s i d e r a t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e Uiziver-
s i t y c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s o f t h e b o a r d of r e g e n t s .
W e recognize t h e board of r e g e n t s a t t a i n e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t a t u s
under t h e 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , b u t d e f i n i t i o n o f t h a t s t a t u s
is u n n e c e s s a r y i n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h i s a p p e a l . A s t h i s Court
has o f t e n s t a t e d , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s s u e s w i l l not be reached i f t h e
c a s e may be d e t e r m i n e d on n o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g r o u n d s . Douglas v .
District C o u r t , 1 6 1 Mont. 525, 507 P.2d 1 0 5 5 ; S t e n b e r g v. S t e n b e r g ,
l o 1 Mont. 1 6 4 , 505 P.2d 1 1 0 ; N a t i o n a l S u r e t y Corp. v . K r u s e , 1 2 1
240nt. 202, 192 P . 2 d 317.
Affirmed.
Justice
W e concur;
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Chief J u s t i c e
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