Petition of Meidinger

No. 1J09b

IN L'HE 5UPREN6 JOUK'I' OF THE STAfE 3P XONrJ'ANA

LN THE LNAI"L'EK d h ' 1:HE !'J3Tl'I'ION OF
LEON 0. MEIDINGER,

Petitioner.

i o u ~ l s e lof Record:

For P e t i t i o n e r :

Moses, Kampfe, T o l l i v e r dnci W r ~ g h r , 8 i l l i n g s ,
Pfontana
Yruce Barnard a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana

Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena,
Montana
Thomas A . Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
a r g u e d , Helena, Montana
'idilllam K r u t z f e l d t , County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , M i l e s
C i t y , Montana

Submitted: August 9 , 1975

! ) a i d e d: SEP 1 1 ?9/5
li'i led : >LY 'I J
M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion
of t h e Court.

T h i s i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding wherein p e t i t i o n e r
seeks a w r i t of habeas corpus. Upon t h e f i l i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n
t h i s Court ordered an a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g t o be h e l d on J u l y 30,
1975, and t h a t copy of t h e p e t i t i o n , memorandum i n s u p p o r t , and
copy of t h e o r d e r s e t t i n g t h e h e a r i n g be s e r v e d upon t h e a t t o r n e y
g e n e r a l and t h e d i s t r i c t judge b e f o r e whom t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
proceedings were had. Such a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g was h e l d and a
p e r i o d of t e n days g r a n t e d c o u n s e l f o r submission of b r i e f s .
The b r i e f s have been f i l e d and t h e m a t t e r i s now b e f o r e t h e
Court f o r d e c i s i o n .
P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s t h a t on J u l y 9 , 1973, he was con-
v i c t e d of t h e crime of b u r g l a r y i n t h e f i r s t d e g r e e , and sen-
tenced t o e i g h t y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p e n i t e n t i a r y , a l l b u t two
y e a r s b e i n g suspended. The s e n t e n c e commenced on November 1,
1971, and w i t h good time earned a t t h e p r i s o n h i s p r o b a t i o n
was due t o e x p i r e on May 5 , 1979.
As h e r e a f t e r a p p e a r s i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s
of f a c t , p e t i t i o n e r was p r e v i o u s l y t r i e d f o r t h e same crime,
c o n v i c t e d , and sentenced b u t t h a t c o n v i c t i o n was s e t a s i d e by
t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t and on t h e 1973 c o n v i c t i o n he was g i v e n c r e d i t
f o r t h e time s e r v e d on t h e previous c o n v i c t i o n from November 1,
1971.
P e t i t i o n e r was placed on p r o b a t i o n under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n
of t h e Board of Pardons and P a r o l e and was a s s i g n e d t o t h e
s p e c i f i c s u p e r v i s i o n of M r . P h i l i p E. Sanderson, a p a r o l e and
p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r from B i l l i n g s .
O March 17, 1975, Sanderson f i l e d a v i o l a t i o n r e p o r t
n
a l l e g i n g c e r t a i n v i o l a t i o n s of t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s of
p r o b a t i o n had been committed by p e t i t i o n e r .
 That r e p o r t of v i o l a t i o n of t h e terms and c o n d i t i o n s
of h i s p a r o l e were:

1) S t a t e Rule #l - Respect and obey law - O 12/8/1974,
n
he p l e d g u i l t y t o a c h a r g e of d i s t u r b i n g t h e peace a t B r i d g e r ,
Montana, and was f i n e d $100.

2) S t a t e Rule #3- Departure from a s s i g n e d d i s t r i c t w i t h o u t
permission - O 1/4/1975 he was a r r e s t e d i n Elko, Nevada, and
n

d i d n o t have permission from h i s p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r t o l e a v e t h e
state. O 2/22/1975 he was i n t h e c i t y of Santa Monica, C a l i f o r n i a ,
n
when he was supposed t o be i n C l o v i s , New Mexico, a s s t a t e d on
h i s t r a v e l permit which was i s s u e d by h i s p a r o l e o f f i c e r f o r
t r a v e l by a i r , b u t i n s t e a d he took h i s own c a r . (Noteworthy h e r e ,
when a r r e s t e d i n Santa Monica he had t h i r t y - f i v e $100 b i l l s ) .
3) S t a t e Rule #5 - Possession of b u r g l a r y t o o l s o r
d e a d l y weapons - O 2/22/1975, when he was a r r e s t e d by t h e Santa
n
Monica p o l i c e i n h i s room were an i n s t r u m e n t f o r l i s t e n i n g t o
p o l i c e c a l l s , one handgun c a s e , s e t of a l a r m jumper c a b l e s , one
Ace Lock Pick and one Ace Hollow B i t .

4) S t a t e Rule #6 - Use t o e x c e s s of b e e r o r i n t o x i c a t i n g
liquors - O 3/6/1975, he r e p o r t e d t o h i s p a r o l e o f f i c e r n o t i c e a b l y
n
i n t o x i c a t e d , smelled of l i q u o r on h i s b r e a t h , and h i s speech was
slurred.
5) S t a t e Rule #7. - Steady employment. - He r e f u s e d
t o f i l l o u t monthly r e p o r t s showing h i s s o u r c e s of income. At
no time h a s h i s p a r o l e o f f i c e r known of h i s h o l d i n g a j o b , b u t
s t i l l manages t o s u p p o r t h i s family. Be s t a t e d t o t h e o f f i c e r
t h a t h i s w i f e was t h e owner of a b a r and s h e was s u p p o r t i n g him.
The p a r o l e o f f i c e r recommended p e t i t i o n e r ' s suspended
s e n t e n c e be revoked.
The county a t t o r n e y f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r t h e i m p o s i t i o n
of f i n a l judgment and s e n t e n c e based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g r e p o r t .
A motion t o d i s m i s s was f i l e d by p e t i t i o n e r ' s counsel; a h e a r i n g
was s e t f o r May 7, 1975, continued a t t h e r e q u e s t of p e t i t i o n e r ' s
counsel t o May 19. O May 19 a t t h e r e q u e s t of p e t i t i o n e r ' s
n
counsel i t was a g a i n continued t o June 4. O t h a t day t h e h e a r i n g
n
was h e l d , p e t i t i o n e r and h i s counsel were p r e s e n t . A t t h e con-
c l u s i o n of t h e h e a r i n g t h e m a t t e r was taken under advisement and
t h e r e a f t e r on June 20, 1975, t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d an o r d e r and sen-
t e n c e revoking t h e suspended sentence of s i x y e a r s , g i v i n g c r e d i t
f o r 618 days t h e r e o n , and d e p r i v i n g him of c e r t a i n s p e c i f i e d
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s d u r i n g t h e remaining term of h i s sentence.
The c o u r t a l s o made and e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions
of law. The f i n d i n g s were:
"I. Defendant was sentenced on J u l y 9, 1973,
on a g u i l t y plea t o t h e crime charged, b u r g l a r y , t o
e i g h t y e a r s i n t h e S t a t e P e n i t e n t i a r y . The term
was t o commence November 1, 1971; and s i x y e a r s of t h e
sentence was suspended. The s e n t e n c e was d r a f t e d i n
t h a t f a s h i o n so t h a t t h e defendant would b e given
c r e d i t f o r time s p e n t i n t h e p e n i t e n t i a r y , on a
previous c o n v i c t i o n of t h e same crime which was s e t
a s i d e by t h e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t Court, and would n o t
have t o s e r v e any p r i s o n time on t h i s c o n v i c t i o n .
"11. That s a i d defendant v i o l a t e d t h e terms and
c o n d i t i o n s of s a i d p a r o l e i n t h a t he:
"1. F o r f e i t e d 'a $100.00 bond t o a charge
of d i s t u r b i n g t h e peace i n B r i d g e r , Montana,
on December 8 , 1974.
"2. Left the S t a t e without t h e p r i o r permission
of h i s p a r o l e o f f i c e r on January 4 , 1975, and
t h a t he drove t o C a l i f o r n i a when h i s permission
was t o f l y t o C l o v i s , New Mexico, on February 22,
1975.
"IV. That defendant was charged w i t h o t h e r v i o l a t i o n s
of t h e r u l e s of p a r o l e , b u t proof of such t e c h n i c a l
v i o l a t i o n s a r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y r e v o c a t i o n of
d e f e n d a n t ' s suspended sentence. r 1
The conclusions of law were:
"I. That d e f e n d a n t ' s conduct v i o l a t e d t h e terms of
h i s suspended s e n t e n c e and h i s p a r o l e should be
revoked. I l
As a b a s i s f o r h i s p e t i t i o n Meidinger contends t h a t t h e
o r d e r revoking h i s suspended sentence should i t s e l f be revoked
because :
 (1) He was n o t a f f o r d e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o a
preliminary h e a r i n g t o e s t a b l i s h probable cause f o r t h e f i l i n g
of t h e p e t i t i o n f o r imposition of f i n a l judgment and sentence.
(2) That s e c t i o n 94-9831, R.C.M. 1947, (95-3213), i s
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s t h e r e a r e no e s t a b l i s h e d g u i d e l i n e s f o r
e s t a b l i s h i n g a v i o l a t i o n and, due t o i t s vagueness, he could n o t
adequately defend himself. A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e same s t a t u t o r y
s e c t i o n s do n o t r e q u i r e nor a f f o r d him a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g t o
e s t a b l i s h probable cause.
(3) The o r d e r signed by t h e judge d i d n o t s e t f o r t h t h e
reasons and f i n d i n g s of f a c t upon which t h e f i n a l r e v o c a t i o n
o r d e r was i s s u e d a s r e q u i r e d by t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n
a s s e t f o r t h i n Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593,
33 L ed 2d 484 and Gagnon v. S c a r p e l l i , 411 U . S . 778, 93 S. C t .
1756, 36 L ed 2d 656.
(4) The c o u r t cannot c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y impose f i n a l
judgment and sentence simply because he f a i l e d t o have s t e a d y
employment.
P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s h i s c o n t e n t i o n s a r e based on t h e
Fourth, F i f t h , S i x t h and Fourteenth Amendments t o t h e United
Scates C o n s t i t u t i o n ; S e c t i o n s 17, 24, and 27, A r t . 1 1 , 1972
Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ; S e c t i o n s 94-9831, 95-3212, 95-2227 and
95-1503, R.C.M. 1947; and Morrissey and Gagnon.
P e t i t i o n e r c i t e s two United S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n s
which s e t f o r t h t h e law t o b e followed by t h e v a r i o u s s t a t e s , a s
w e l l a s by t h e f e d e r a l j u d i c i a l system. The f i r s t i s Morrissey.
I n t h i s d e c i s i o n , i n an opinion w r i t t e n by Chief J u s t i c e Berger,
i t was h e l d t h a t t h e minimum requirements o f due process i n

revoking p a r o l e s i n c l u d e : (a) w r i t t e n n o t i c e of t h e claimed
p a r o l e v i o l a t i o n s ; (b) d i s c l o s u r e of t h e evidence a g a i n s t him t o
t h e p a r o l e e ; (c) o p p o r t u n i t y t o be heard i n person and t o p r e s e n t
w i t n e s s e s and documentary evidence; (d) t h e r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t
and cross-examine adverse w i t n e s s e s ( u n l e s s t h e h e a r i n g o f f i c e r
s p e c i f i c a l l y f i n d s good cause f o r n o t allowing c o n f r o n t a t i o n ) ;

( e ) a n e u t r a l and detached h e a r i n g body such a s a t r a d i t i o n a l
p a r o l e board, members of which need n o t b e j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s o r
lawyers; and ( f ) a w r i t t e n statement by t h e f a c t f i n d e r s a s t o
t h e evidence r e l i e d on and reasons f o r revoking p a r o l e .
The second c a s e r e l i e d on i s Gagnon where i t was h e l d
t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n e r was e n t i t l e d t o both a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g
t o determine whether t h e r e was probable cause t o b e l i e v e t h a t he
had v i o l a t e d h i s probation and a f i n a l h e a r i n g p r i o r t o t h e
u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n whether h i s probation should be revoked and
t h a t t h e s t a t e was n o t under a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l duty t o provide
counsel f o r i n d i g e n t s i n a l l probation r e v o c a t i o n c a s e s .
W have no q u a r r e l w i t h t h e minimum due process r e -
e
quirements e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e two c i t e d c a s e s b u t a s i g n i f i c a n t
d i s t i n c t i o n e x i s t s between t h o s e c a s e s and t h i s c a s e . Both
Morrissey, d e a l i n g w i t h p a r o l e r e v o c a t i o n , and Gagnon, d e a l i n g
w i t h probation r e v o c a t i o n , involved d e c i s i o n s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
boards such a s ~ o n t a n a ' sBoard of Pardons. The i n s t a n t c a s e
however, i n v o l v e s a probation which was revoked by t h e o r i g i n a l
sentencing judge a s a u t h o r i z e d by s e c t i o n 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947.
That d i s t i n c t i o n i n i t s e l f provides an i n h e r e n t s o r t of f a i r n e s s
which i s n o t achieved through a s o l e l y a d m i n i s t r a t i - v e process.
II I
One of t h e requirements s e t out by Morrissey a n e u t r a l and
detached' h e a r i n g body such a s a t r a d i t i o n a l p a r o l e board, members
of which need not be j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s o r lawyers", demonstrates
t h a t t h e method used i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e f u r n i s h e s much more than
II
what t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court c o n s i d e r s minimum s t a n d a r d s
of due process".
 P e t i t i o n e r c o n t e n d s t h a t he s h o u l d have had n o t i c e of t h e
time and p l a c e of a p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g and which c o n d i t i o n s o f
p r o b a t i o n h e was a l l e g e d t o have v i o l a t e d and t h a t h e was denied
due p r o c e s s b e c a u s e of t h e f a i l u r e of t h e s t a t e t o do s o .
However, we do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n s i n M o r r i s s e y
and Gagnon were i n t e n d e d t o b e i n f l e x i b l e r u l e s t o b e a p p l i e d
t o e v e r y r e v o c a t i o n a c t i o n w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e f a c t s a t hand.
A s t h e Court s t a t e d f o l l o w i n g i t s l i s t of minimum due p r o c e s s ,
II
W have no t h o u g h t t o c r e a t e an i n f l e x i b l e s t r u c t u r e f o r p a r o l e
e
1l
revocation procedures.
I n Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 559-561, 94 S.Ct.

2963, 4 1 L ed 2d 935, 953, 954, t h e Supreme Court o f t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s commented:
II
Following t h e d e c i s i o n i n M o r r i s s e y , i n Ga.gnon v ,
S c a r p e l l i , 411 U.S. 778, 36 L Ed 2d 656, 93 S.Ct.
1756 (1973), t h e Court h e l d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f due
p r o c e s s e s t a b l i s h e d f o r p a r o l e r e v o c a t i o n were
a p p l i c a b l e t o probation revocation proceedings.
"* 7': *
II
W a g r e e w i t h n e i t h e r p e t i t i o n e r s n o r t h e Court
e
of Appeals: t h e Nebraska p r o c e d u r e s a r e i n some
respects constitutionally deficient but the
M o r r i s s e y - S c a r p e l l i p r o c e d u r e s need n o t i n a l l
r e s p e c t s b e followed i n d i s c i p l i n a r y c a s e s i n
s t a t e prisons.
" e have o f t e n r e p e a t e d t h a t ' [ t l h e v e r y n a t u r e o f
W
due p r o c e s s n e g a t e s any c o n c e p t o f i n f l e x i b l e p r o c e d u r e s
u n i v e r s a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o every imaginable s i t u a t i o n . 1
C a f e t e r i a Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. a t 895, 6 L Ed
2d 1230. ' [ C l o n s i d e r a t i o n of what p r o c e d u r e s due p r o c e s s
may r e q u i r e under any g i v e n s e t of c i r c u m s t a n c e s must
begin with a determination of t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e of
t h e government f u n c t i o n i n v o l v e d a s w e l l a s of t h e
p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t t h a t h a s been a f f e c t e d by governmental
a c t i o n . t I b i d . ; M o r r i s s e y , 408 U.S., a t 481, 33 L Ed
2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Viewed i n t h i s l i g h t i t i s
immediately a p p a r e n t t h a t one c a n n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y
apply procedural r u l e s designed f o r f r e e c i t i z e n s i n
an open s o c i e t y , o r f o r p a r o l e e s o r p r o b a t i o n e r s u n d e r
only limited r e s t r a i n t s , t o t h e very d i f f e r e n t s i t u a -
t i o n p r e s e n t e d by a d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o c e e d i n g i n a s t a t e
prison.

"In s t r i k i n g t h e b a l a n c e t h a t t h e Due P r o c e s s C l a u s e
demands, however, we t h i n k t h e major c o n s i d e r a t i o n
m i l i t a t i n g a g a i n s t adopting t h e f u l l range of procedures
 s u g g e s t e d by Y o r r i s s e y f o r a l l e g e d p a r o l e v i o l a t o r s
i s t h e very d i f f e r e n t s t a k e t h e S t a t e has i n t h e
s t r u c t u r e and c o n t e n t o f t h e p r i s o n d i s c i p l i n a r y
h e a r i n g . That t h e r e v o c a t i o n of p a r o l e b e j u s t i f i e d
and based on an a c c u r a t e a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e f a c t s i s
a c r i t i c a l matter t o the State a s well a s the parolee;
b u t t h e p r o c e d u r e s by which i t i s determined w h e t h e r
t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p a r o l e have been breached do n o t
themselves t h r e a t e n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t s t a t e i n t e r e s t s ,
parole o f f i c e r s , the police, o r witnesses--at l e a s t
no more s o t h a n i n t h e c a s e of t h e o r d i n a r y c r i m i n a l
t r i a l , II

Under t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n t h e r e i s no p r o v i s i o n

r e q u i r i n g a preliminary hearing b e f o r e proceedings f o r revocation
, ~ p a r o l e o r suspended s e n t e n c e a r e i n s t i t u t e d .
i A s t h i s Court

s c a t e d i n r e P e t i t i o n o f Doney, Mont . 522 P.2d 92,
3 1 St.Rep. 442, d e a l i n g w i t h c o u n s e l a t a r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g ,

a l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d i s fundamental f a i r n e s s and t h e r e c o r d

establishes t h a t here.
Here, p e t i t i o n e r Meidinger was n o t under a r r e s t a t any

rune f o r p r o b a t i o n v i o l a t i o n and i n f a c t was n o t a r r e s t e d u n t i l
a bench w a r r a n t was i s s u e d p u r s u a n t t o t h e f i n a l o r d e r of r e v o c a -

c i o n made by Judge Coate on June 20, 1975. The i n d i v i d u a l s i n -
volved i n b o t h t h e M o r r i s s e y and Gagnon d e c i s i o n s had been p l a c e d

under a r r e s t and d e t a i n e d by t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r s
~ r i o r o any o f f i c i a l a c t i o n t a k e n toward r e v o c a t i o n .
t In that

p e r s p e c t i v e i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of a p r e l i m i n a r y
h e a r i n g was n e c e s s a r y t o i n s u r e t h a t some n e u t r a l body c o u l d
h e a r t h e e v i d e n c e and p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t s o f t h e a c c u s e d i f t h e
c h a r g e s were p a t e n t l y f a l s e o r u n j u s t . Where no d e t e n t i o n i s i n -

v o l v e d , no such purpose c a n be s e r v e d .
P e t i t i o n e r n e x t a l l e g e s t h a t s e c t i o n 94-9831 (95-3213),
9.i.Y. 1947, i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague f o r n o t e s t a b l i s h i n g
s u i d e l i n e s f o r "establishing a violation".

The r e v o c a t i o n h e a r i n g i s n o t a c r i m i n a l t r i a l b u t a
sunurlary h e a r i n g t o e s t a b l i s h a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e

p r i s o n e r ' s probation. The p r o b a t i o n e r a l r e a d y s t a n d s c o n v i c t e d
of a crime no m a t t e r what t h e grounds f o r r e v o c a t i o n may b e ,

whether i t i s t h e commission of a n o t h e r crime o r unauthorized
travel.

S e c t i o n 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s :

II
Any judge who h a s suspended t h e e x e c u t i o n of a
s e n t e n c e o r d e f e r r e d t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a s e n t e n c e of
imprisonment under t h i s s e c t i o n , o r h i s s u c c e s s o r .
i s - a u t h o r i z e d t h e r e a f t e r , i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , during
t h e period of such suspended s e n t e n c e o r d e f e r r e d
i m p o s i t i o n o f s e n t e n c e t o revoke such suspension o r
impose s e n t e n c e and o r d e r such person committed, o r may,
i n h i s d i s c r e t i o n , o r d e r t h e p r i s o n e r placed under t h e
j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e s t a t e board of pardons a s provided
by law, o r r e t a i n such j u r i s d i c t i o n - w i t h t h i s c o u r t .
P r i o r t o t h e r e v o c a t i o n of an o r d e r suspending o r
d e f e r r i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e , t h e person
a f f e c t e d s h a l l be given a h e a r i n g . I' (Emphasis s u p p l i e d ) .
W w i l l not overturn a d i s c r e t i o n a r y decision without a
e
showing of an abuse of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n . N such showing has
o

been made h e r e ,
A s t o t h e f a i l u r e of t h e o r d e r suspending s e n t e n c e t o
enumerate t h e r i g h t s which p e t i t i o n e r would be deprived of a s
r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-2227, R.C.M. 1947, t h i s s t a t u t e became
e f f e c t i v e January 1, 1974, a s a p a r t of t h e new Montana Criminal
Code. The Code provided t h a t a l l i t s p r o v i s i o n s a p p l i e d t o a l l
o f f e n s e s a l l e g e d t o have been committed on o r a f t e r t h a t d a t e .
The o r d e r complained of h e r e was made on J u l y 9 , 1973.

As t o t h e complaint t h a t t h e f i n a l o r d e r d i d n o t c o n t a i n

t h e r e a s o n s and f i n d i n g s of f a c t , Judge C o a t e ' s f i n a l o r d e r
i n c l u d e d an a t t a c h e d document e n t i t l e d "Findings o f Fact". In
t h a t document t h e judge s t a t e d two r e a s o n s f o r revoking Meidin-
g e r ' s p r o b a t i o n a r y s t a t u s : (1) f o r f e i t u r e of a $100 bond i n
R r i d g e r , P,lontana, f o r d i s t u r b i n g t h e peace; and ( 2 ) u n a u t h o r i z e d
t r a v e l o u t s i d e t h e s t a t e of Montana. Both f i n d i n g s were supported
by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence produced a t t h e h e a r i n g i n which p e t i t i o n e r

was r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l .
 I t i s n o t e v i d e n t why t h e judge used t h e term " f o r f e i t e d

bond1' i n l i g h t of t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e j u s t i c e c o u r t proceedings
which makes i t c l e a r t h a t Meidinger pled g u i l t y t o t h a t charge.
I n any e v e n t , i t i s c l e a r t h e judge was s a t i s f i e d a s t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s
guilt i n that action.
Since t h e c o n d i t i o n s of Meidinger ' s probation included
t h e s t a n d a r d r u l e t h a t he "obey t h e laws of t h e United S t a t e s
and of t h e s t a t e of ~ o n t a n a " , and one of Judge C o a t e ' s r e a s o n s
f o r r e v o c a t i o n was ~ e i d i n g e r ' sproven g u i l t of a new crime,
d i s t u r b i n g t h e peace, t h e r e i s no doubt whatsoever a s t o what
v i o l a t i o n was charged and r e l i e d upon f o r r e v o c a t i o n .
R e f e r r i n g t o t h e l a c k of s t e a d y employmeqt, nowhere i n
t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r i s t h i s used a s a ground f o r r e v o c a t i o n . There
were many a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s contained i n t h e p a r o l e o f f i c e r ' s
r e p o r t of v i o l a t i o n s and t h e c o u r t h e l d i n Paragraph I V of i t s
f i n d i n g s of f a c t t h a t t h e "proof of such t e c h n i c a l v i o l a t i o n s a r e
n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y r e v o c a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s suspended
1I
sentence.
It i s our opinion t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t observed t h e

requirements of Morrissey and Gagnon and t h a t p e t i t i o n e r had a
f a i r h e a r i n g , r e p r e s e n t e d by counsel a t every s t e p .
The w r i t of habeas corpus i s denied.

W Concur:
e

-

-J-y------------------..------
Hon. Jack L. Green, D i s t r i c t
Judge, s i t t i n g f o r J u s t i c e
Gene B . Daly.