State v. Garrido

No. 80-219 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1980 T E STATE O MONTANA, H F P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , JOHNNY GARZA GARRIDO, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f C a s c a d e . H o n o r a b l e J o h n McCarvel, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : Lawrence A. Anderson, P u b l i c D e f e n d e r , a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana F o r Respondent : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana Mark J. Murphy a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana R a n d a l l Snyder a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana -- Submitted: November 1 8 , 1980 Decided: JAN 14 'I981 Filed: 1 4.1981' Mr. ~ustice Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . On September 20, 1979, d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t Johnny Garza G a r r i d o was charged i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e o f Montana w i t h two c o u n t s of f e l o n y t h e f t under s e c t i o n 45-5-301(1) ( a ) , MCA. The c o u n t y a t t o r n e y and t h e d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d i n t o a p l e a agreement. Defendant was s u b s e q u e n t l y s e n t e n c e d t o f i v e y e a r s i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n and d e s i g n a t e d a nondangerous o f f e n d e r . Defendant a p p e a l s . Defendant w a s c h a r g e d w i t h two c o u n t s of f e l o n y t h e f t under s e c t i o n 45-5-301 (1)( a ) , MCA. Thereafter, defendant e n t e r e d a p l e a of " n o t g u i l t y " t o e a c h c o u n t . After various p r e t r i a l m o t i o n s , t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y and d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d i n t o a p l e a agreement on J a n u a r y 4 , 1980. The t e r m s of t h e agreement were: (1) d e f e n d a n t would p l e a d " g u i l t y " t o Count I, felony t h e f t ; ( 2 ) t h e S t a t e would d i s m i s s Count I1 o f i t s information, a l s o felony t h e f t ; ( 3 ) d e f e n d a n t would recom- mend t o t h e c o u r t t h a t h e r e c e i v e a d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of sentence; ( 4 ) t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y would make no recommenda- t i o n a s t o s e n t e n c i n g ; and ( 5 ) t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y would i n d i c a t e t o t h e c o u r t a t t h e t i m e of s e n t e n c i n g t h a t d e f e n - d a n t had c o o p e r a t e d w i t h t h e p o l i c e and o t h e r a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h i s c a u s e and i n o t h e r c a u s e s pending b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t Court . P u r s u a n t t o t h e t e r m s o f t h e agreement on J a n u a r y 4 , 1980, d e f e n d a n t p l e a d e d " g u i l t y " t o Count I . The ~ i s t r i c t C o u r t a c c e p t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a and t h e S t a t e d i s m i s s e d Count 1 o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . The c o u r t s e t s e n t e n c i n g f o r 1 F e b r u a r y 5, 1980. Defendant t h e n s u b m i t t e d h i m s e l f t o t h e p r o b a t i o n and p a r o l e d e p a r t m e n t f o r a p r e s e n t e n c e i n t e r v i e w and i n v e s t i g a t i o n . P r i o r t o s e n t e n c i n g a p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t was s u b m i t t e d t o the court. Defense c o u n s e l r e c e i v e d a copy of t h e p r e - s e n t e n c e r e p o r t which s t a t e d , " a l l law e n f o r c e m e n t agency records attached." The p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t concluded by recommending t h a t d e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e a t h r e e - y e a r d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e . A t t h e s e n t e n c i n g on F e b r u a r y 5, 1980, p u r s u a n t t o t h e t e r m s of t h e p l e a agreement, t h e S t a t e a d v i s e d t h e c o u r t t h a t d e f e n d a n t had f u l l y c o o p e r a t e d w i t h p o l i c e and law e n f o r c e m e n t a u t h o r i t i e s and t h a t h i s c o o p e r a t i o n had r e - s u l t e d i n a c o n v i c t i o n i n a n o t h e r c a s e . Defense c o u n s e l a l s o advised t h e c o u r t t h a t defendant b a s i c a l l y accepted t h e recommendations of t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t . The c o u r t t h e n imposed s e n t e n c e s t a t i n g : " I t i s t h e judgment of t h i s c o u r t you be s e n t e n c e d t o t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n f o r a p e r i o d of f i v e years. For t h e p u r p o s e of e l i g i b i l i t y of p a r o l e , you a r e found t o be a nondangerous o f f e n d e r . Anything f u r t h e r ? " "NO, sir." The f o l l o w i n g d a y , F e b r u a r y 6, 1980, t h e G r e a t F a l l s Tribune p r i n t e d a s t o r y s t a t i n g t h e c o u r t ' s reasons f o r imposing t h e s e n t e n c e . The c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f r a c k e t - s t y l e household t h e f t s . Defen- d a n t , t h r o u g h h i s c o u n s e l , t h e n moved t h e c o u r t i n a com- b i n e d motion t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e s e n t e n c e and/or t o withdraw h i s "guilty" plea. The motion w a s based on grounds t h a t t h e a r t i c l e i n t h e Tribune a r t i c u l a t e d t h e c o u r t ' s reasoning f o r imposing t h e s e n t e n c e , whereas no s u c h r e a s o n s w e r e a r t i - c u l a t e d i n open c o u r t b e f o r e d e f e n d a n t and h i s c o u n s e l . The r e a s o n s g i v e n f o r i m p o s i t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e c o u r t o b t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n i n r e g a r d t o t h i s c a s e from s o u r c e s o t h e r t h a n t h e f a c t s and m a t t e r s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e c o u r t f i l e and t h e r e c o r d g e n e r a t e d i n open c o u r t . A h e a r i n g on t h e motion t o r e c o n s i d e r was h e l d on F e b r u a r y 11, 1980. The a u t h o r of t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t w a s c a l l e d a s a witness. The c o u r t t h e n a u t h o r i z e d d e f e n s e counsel t o ask t h e c o u r t questions i n regard t o t h e i n f o r - m a t i o n upon which i t based i t s s e n t e n c i n g d e c i s i o n . Defense c o u n s e l , having assumed t h a t p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t s w e r e n o t i n c l u d e d w i t h i n t h e term " a l l l a w e n f o r c e m e n t agency r e c o r d s , " a s k e d t h e c o u r t how i t o b t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t was i n v o l v e d i n f i v e b u r g l a r i e s and t h r e e thefts. The c o u r t t h e n a s k e d d e f e n s e c o u n s e l whether i t had a copy of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s . Defense c o u n s e l a d v i s e d t h a t h e d i d have c o p i e s of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s , and t h e c o u r t t h e n e x h i b i t e d c o p i e s of t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s c o n t a i n e d i n i t s file. A t t h a t t i m e defense counsel learned t h a t t h e c o u r t r o u t i n e l y received copies of p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i v e r e p o r t s which w e r e n o t g e n e r a l l y a t t a c h e d t o t h e copy of t h e p r e - s e n t e n c e r e p o r t d e l i v e r e d t o t h e d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , b u t de- fense counsel admits t h a t h i s copies a r e generally obtained by d i s c o v e r y . The combined motion was t h e r e a f t e r d e n i e d . The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l a r e : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by imposing s e n t e n c e and judgment w i t h o u t f i r s t a r t i c u l a t i n g the b a s i s f o r i t s decision. 2. Whether t h e f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e d e f e n d a n t w i t h a l l information supplied t o t h e c o u r t i n t h e presentence r e p o r t d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t t h e r i g h t of e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. A s e n t e n c i n g judge i s v e s t e d w i t h d i s c r e t i o n a r y power t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e n t of punishment which may b e imposed. P e t i t i o n o f Amor ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 143 Mont. 305, 389 P.2d 54. In the i n s t a n t c a s e , d e f e n d a n t was charged w i t h and p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o committing t h e c r i m e of f e l o n y t h e f t and w a s s e n t e n c e d t o f i v e years i n t h e S t a t e Prison. The maximum s e n t e n c e which may be imposed f o r t h e c r i m e of f e l o n y t h e f t i s t e n y e a r s . S e c t i o n 45-6-301, MCA. This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t i f a s e n t e n c e i s w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s p r o v i d e d by s t a t u t e , i t i s n o t a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v . Mann ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 306, 546 P.2d 515; S t a t e v. Gussenhoven ( 1 9 4 4 ) , 116 Mont. 350, 152 P.2d 876. The s e n t e n c e which d e f e n d a n t r e c e i v e d was n o t a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n . Defendant, however, c h a l l e n g e s n o t s o much t h e s e n t e n c e a s t h e manner i n which i t was d e t e r m i n e d . The f o u n d a t i o n of h i s c h a l l e n g e i s S t a t e v. Stumpf ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 609 P.2d 298, 37 S t - R e p . 673, which s t a t e s t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t i s r e q u i r e d t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e b a s i s upon which i t s sentencing d i s c r e t i o n i s exercised. Defendant a l l e g e s t h a t by n o t s t a t i n g i t s r e a s o n s f o r imposing t h e f i v e - y e a r sen- t e n c e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . The h o l d i n g of Stumpf, however, h a s p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n o n l y . I t was n o t d e c i d e d u n t i l A p r i l 3, 1980, some t i m e a f t e r t h i s d e f e n - d a n t w a s s e n t e n c e d on F e b r u a r y 5, 1980. Yet, by g r a n t i n g a motion f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , i t would a p p e a r t h a t d e f e n d a n t had access t o any f a c t s h e may d e s i r e . I t i s w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t t h i s C o u r t presumes t h e c o r - r e c t n e s s of t h e lower c o u r t ' s o r d e r on a p p e a l . It is the burden of t h e a p p e l l a n t t o overcome s u c h a presumption. S t a t e v . Lane, Jr. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 175 Mont. 225, 573 P.2d 198; S t a t e e x r e l . S t e v e n s v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 22, 550 P.2d 385, 388. Defendant h e r e h a s f a i l e d t o o v e r - come t h e presumption a n d , t h u s , h a s f a i l e d t o meet h i s burden of p r o o f . - Defendant a l l e g e s t h a t h e was d e n i e d t h e r i g h t t o e f - f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l b e c a u s e he was n o t p r o v i d e d w i t h a l l i n f o r m a t i o n which was s u p p l i e d t o t h e c o u r t i n t h e presentence report. However, t h e t r a n s c r i p t r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t he was i n p o s s e s s i o n of a l l t h e p o l i c e r e p o r t s . This d i s c r e p a n c y i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t any c l a i m e d i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s was n o t due t o t h e c o u r t ' s w i t h h o l d i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n . Rather, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f a i l e d t o i n s p e c t t h e r e p o r t s and, t h u s , proceeded on an i n c o r r e c t assumption of what was c o n t a i n e d therein. There i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t d e f e n d a n t was p r e j u d i c e d by h i s counsel's f a i l u r e t o i n s p e c t the presentence r e p o r t s . Defendant h a s n e v e r a l l e g e d o r a t t e m p t e d t o p r o v e t h a t he d i d n o t engage i n a " b u s i n e s s " o r a s e r i e s of s t e a l - t o - o r d e r t h e f t s o r t h a t he d i d n o t commit f i v e t h e £ t s and t h r e e burglaries. These were t h e r e a s o n s s e n t e n c e was imposed, and i n t h e a b s e n c e of any p r e j u d i c e c a u s e d t h e r e b y , r e l i e f c a n n o t be g r a n t e d . Affirmed. Justice W concur: e M r . C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l , c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and dissenting in part: W h i l e I c o n c u r w i t h t h e r e s u l t r e a c h e d by t h e m a j o r i t y w i t h r e g a r d to t h e r i g h t to c o u n s e l i s s u e , I must r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t f r o m t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e i s s u e of a b u s e of discretion. The m a j o r i t y d e c l i n e t o a p p l y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of S t a t e v. S tumpf ( 1980 ) , Mont . , 609 P.2d 298, 37 S t . R e p . 673, that t h e t r i a l c o u r t m u s t a r t i c u l a t e t h e r e a s o n s u n d e r l y i n g i t s sen- tence determination. The h o l d i n g of Stumpf e x p r e s s l y s t a t e s t h a t i t is t o h a v e p r o s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n o n l y , and f o r t h i s r e a s o n t h e m a j o r i t y f i n d t h e case i n a p p l i c a b l e . Y e t the requirement set f o r t h i n Stumpf was a p p l i e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e r e i n , r e s u l t i n g i n t h e s e t t i n g a s i d e of a s e n t e n c e imposed by a d i s t r i c t j u d g e who was u n a w a r e o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t . I f t h i s d e f e n d a n t ' s a p p e a l had b e e n p r e s e n t e d t o u s p r i o r t o t h e Stumpf c a s e , w e would h a v e a p p l i e d t h e same a n a l y s i s and r e a c h e d t h e same r e s u l t . The r e a s o n s f o r r e q u i r i n g d i s t r i c t judges t o a r t i c u l a t e the b a s i s f o r t h e i r sentencing decisions s t i l l e x i s t , r e g a r d l e s s of w h a t Stumpf s t a t e s w i t h r e g a r d t o prospective application. The i s s u e s a r e i d e n t i c a l . The a n a l y s i s s h o u l d be i d e n t i c a l and t h e r e s u l t s h o u l d be i d e n t i c a l . Chief J u s t i c e Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t s a n d w i l l f i l e a d i s s e n t i n g opinion later. T h i s c a u s e w a s s u b m i t t e d p r i o r t o J a n u a r y 5, 1981.