No. 13287
I N T E SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O MONTANA
H OR F H F
RICHARD L. McALEAR,
Claimant and Appellant,
A T U G. McKEE AND COMPANY, EMPLOYER,
RH R
and
GENERAL ACCIDENT FIRE AM) LIFE
ASSURANCE CORPORATION,
Respondents and I n s u r e r s
Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court-Silver Bow County
Honorable William E. Hunt, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
A l l e n L. McAlear argued, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent :
Henningsen, P u r c e l l and Genzberger, B u t t e ,
Montana
James E. P u r c e l l argued, B u t t e , Montana
Submitted: October 13, 1976
Decided: DEC 34 -- 7
-- 16
9
Filed:
:?
l,j E bc u 0 ?,27E.
p Q "
Mr. Chief J u s t i c e James T . H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t
wherein d e f e n d a n t i n s u r e r was o r d e r e d t o pay p l a i n t i f f , Richard
L. McAlear, $614.40 p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y . The f a c t s a r e :
On October 21, 1974, w h i l e employed a s a c a r p e n t e r by
d e f e n d a n t McKee, McAlear s u f f e r e d a broken elbow. It w a s not
d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e i n j u r y a r o s e o u t of and i n t h e s c o p e of h i s
employment. N e i t h e r a r e t h e m e d i c a l r e p o r t s which s t a t e McAlear
s u f f e r e d a 1 5 % permanent l o s s of e x t e n s i o n i n t h a t elbow as a
r e s u l t of t h i s i n j u r y q u e s t i o n e d .
Immediately a f t e r t h e i n j u r y McAlear w a s examined by
Dr. E l l i s of Anaconda, Montana, and t h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o D r .
W h i t f i e l d of D i l l o n , Montana and D r . Losee of E n n i s , Montana.
From October 21, 1 9 7 4 , t o J a n u a r y 20, 1975, McAlear was
p h y s i c a l l y i n c a p a b l e of working and r e c e i v e d $137 p e r week t e m -
p o r a r y t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y from d e f e n d a n t i n s u r e r . On J a n u a r y 20,
1975, D r . Losee r e l e a s e d M c A l e a r t o r e t u r n t o work and McAlear
a d v i s e d d e f e n d a n t i n s u r e r of t h i s release. A t that t i m e tem-
porary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s w e r e discontinued.
McAlear t h e n began t o s e e k employment, l i s t i n g h i s name
with t h r e e union l o c a l s . However, no employment was a v a i l a b l e
and he remained unemployed u n t i l J u n e 1, 1975.
During t h e p e r i o d from h i s r e l e a s e by D r . Losee, J a n u a r y
2 0 , 1975, u n t i l May 2 , 1975, McAlear c o n t i n u e d t o s e e D r . Whit-
f i e l d , r e c e i v i n g a w r i t t e n r e l e a s e from him on May 2 , 1975.
On A p r i l 23, 1975, d e f e n d a n t i n s u r e r o f f e r e d a p a r t i a l
d i s a b i l i t y award o f $1,394.40 t o McAlear f o r t h e conceded permanent
i n j u r y t o h i s elbow. The b a s i s of t h a t award was s t a t e d t o b e
t h a t a n American Medical A s s o c i a t i o n g u i d e t o e v a l u a t i n g i n j u r i e s
i n t e r p r e t e d 1 5 % l o s s of e x t e n s i o n t o elbow e q u i v a l e n t t o 8-1/3%
l o s s of t h e arm; t h a t l o s s of a n arm e n t i t l e s one t o 280 weeks of
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Laws; therefore 8-1/3%
of 280 weeks (23.24 weeks) at a rate of $60 per week equals
$1,394.40. Defendant insurer enclosed $780 with this offer to
,
bring the benefits current to April 21, 1975, and advised McAlear
that if such a final settlement was agreeable the remaining $614.40
' would be paid.
McAlear rejected this offer and filed a claim with the
Workers' Compensation Court seeking an extension of the total
temporary disability from January 20, 1975, to May 2, 1975, and
partial disability beginning May 2, 1975, for 2/3 of his wage
loss at a maximum rate of $60 per week for 280 weeks.
The Workers' Compensation Court's final determination
was in accord with defendant insurer's offer ordering the re-
maining $614.40 paid to McAlear.
Two issues are presented for our review:
1) Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in
refusing to extend the temporary total disability from January
20, 1975, to May 2, 1975?
2) Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in its
partial disability award?
This being one of the first appeals from the Workers'
Compensation Court we refer to Skrukrud v. Gallatin Laundry Co., Inc.,
decided by this Court on December , 1976, Mont .
I
- -
P. 2d-' -St.Rep. , wherein we stated:
" * * * The law as it applied to judicial
review of Workmen's Compensation Division
decisions prior to July 1, 1975 is well
summarized in Miller v. City of Billings,
Mont. , 555 P.2d 747, 749, 33 st.
Rep. 984, 986:
"'The findings and decision of the Workmen's
Compensation Division are presumed to be
correct and if supported by credible evidence
must be affirmed. Section 92-822, R.C.M. 1947
(since repealed); Birnie v. United States
Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 44, 328 P.2d 133;
Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Co., Mont. 538 P.2d
344, 347, 32 St.Rep. 752, 755. The d i s t r i c t
c o u r t must a f f i r m t h e D i v i s i o n o r d e r i f t h e
evidence does n o t c l e a r l y preponderate a g a i n s t
i t s findings. Becktold v . I n d . A c c . Bd., 137
Mont. 1 1 9 , 1 2 5 , 350 P.2d 383; S t o r d a h l v . Rush
Implement Co., 148 Mont. 1 3 , 417 P.2d 95; 3
L a r s o n ' s Workmen's Compensation Law, S 80.20.
S e c t i o n 92-834, R.C.M. 1947 ( i n e f f e c t i n 1966,
but s i n c e r e p e a l e d ) , provided t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
may upon good c a u s e shown a d m i t a d d i t i o n a l e v i -
dence. S e c t i o n 92-835, R.C.M. 1947 ( i n e f f e c t
i n 1966, b u t s i n c e r e p e a l e d ) , p r o v i d e d t h a t i f
t h i s a d d i t i o n a l evidence i s s u b s t a n t i a l , t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t may be j u s t i f i e d i n r e v e r s i n g t h e
D i v i s i o n even though t h e e v i d e n c e adduced b e f o r e
t h e Division c l e a r l y preponderates i n favor of
i t s o r d e r . Murphy v . I n d u s t r i a l A c c i d e n t Board,
93 Mont. 1, 16 P.2d 705; H u r l b u t v . V o l l s t e d t
Kerr Co., s u p r a .
"'Where t h e a p p e a l t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s h e a r d
o n l y on t h e D i v i s i o n ' s c e r t i f i e d r e c o r d o r when
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t permits a d d i t i o n a l evidence
t o be i n t r o d u c e d t h a t i s n o t i m p o r t a n t o r a d d s
n o t h i n g new t o t h e case, t h e c o u r t i s bound by
t h e same r u l e o f a p p e a l which a p p l i e s where t h e
a p p e a l i s h e a r d o n l y on t h e c e r t i f i e d r e c o r d and
t h e D i v i s i o n i s e n t i t l e d t o a presumption t h e
c a s e was d e c i d e d c o r r e c t l y . K e l l y v . West C o a s t
C o n s t r u c t i o n Co., 106 Mont. 463, 78 P.2d 1078;
McAndrews v . Schwartz, 164 Mont. 402, 523 P.2d
1379; E r h a r t v . G r e a t Western Sugar Co., Mont.
546 P.2d 1055, 33 St.Rep. 3 0 2 . '
"See a l s o : Kimball v . C o n t i n e n t a l O i l Co., Mont . I
550 P.2d 912, 33 St.Rep. 517.
"Under t h e law a s it now e x i s t s , t h i s C o u r t
d i r e c t l y reviews t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e workers'
c o u r t , s e c t i o n 9 2 - 8 5 2 ( 2 ) , R.C.M. 1947. The w o r k e r s '
c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s a r e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n n a t u r e and
q u a s i - j u d i c i a l , s e c t i o n s 92-852 (1) and 82A-1016,
R.C.M. 1947. The a p p r o p r i a t e s c o p e o f t h i s C o u r t ' s
r e v i e w s h o u l d be no d i f f e r e n t t h a n it was under
former l a w a s e x p r e s s e d i n t h e above c i t e d c a s e s ;
t h a t i s , w o r k e r s ' c o u r t d e c i s i o n s w i l l n o t be o v e r -
turned i f t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support
i t s f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . "
W e t u r n now t o t h e f i r s t i s s u e . The s t a t u t e s which govern
a r e s e c t i o n 92-701.1, R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s :
" * * * T o t a l temporary d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s s h a l l
be p a i d f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e w o r k e r ' s temporary
disability."
and s e c t i o n 92-439, R.C.M. 1947, which d e f i n e s temporary t o t a l
d i s a b i l i t y as:
" * * * a c o n d i t i o n r e s u l t i n g from a n i n j u r y
a s defined i n t h i s a c t t h a t r e s u l t s i n t o t a l
l o s s of wages and e x i s t s u n t i l t h e i n j u r e d
workman i s a s f a r r e s t o r e d a s t h e permanent
c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n j u r i e s w i l l p e r m i t . "
-- -
(~mphasis added.)
T h e r e f o r e , temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y c e a s e s when t h e workman's
p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n i s as f a r r e s t o r e d a s t h e permanent c h a r a c t e r
of t h e i n j u r i e s w i l l p e r m i t . When t h e c l a i m a n t h a s r e a c h e d t h i s
s t a g e i n h i s h e a l i n g p r o c e s s temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y c e a s e s ,
and p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y b e g i n s i f t h e r e i s permanent p a r t i a l i m -
pairment.
The r e c o r d shows t h a t D r . Losee r e l e a s e d McAlear a s o f
J a n u a r y 20, 1975. F u r t h e r m o r e McAlear h i m s e l f c a l l e d and informed
d e f e n d a n t i n s u r e r t h a t he w a s r e l e a s e d t o r e t u r n t o work on J a n -
u a r y 20, 1975. Dr. Whitfield, i n w r i t t e n correspondence, s t a t e d
t h a t McAlear might have been a b l e t o r e t u r n t o work i n J a n u a r y
b u t t h a t a n o f f i c i a l w r i t t e n r e l e a s e w a s n o t s i g n e d by D r . W h i t f i e l d
u n t i l May 2 , 1975. McAlear f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t he w a s s e e k i n g
work t h r o u g h t h r e e u n i o n l o c a l s from J a n u a r y 20, 1975, t h e d a t e
o f D r . L o s e e ' s release, u n t i l J u n e 1, 1975, when he o b t a i n e d em-
ployment, and t h a t t h e o n l y r e a s o n f o r h i s unemployment d u r i n g
t h i s p e r i o d was t h e u n a v a i l a b i l i t y o f any employment.
C o n s i d e r i n g t h i s e v i d e n c e and t h e l a w g o v e r n i n g temporary
t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y , w e w i l l n o t r e v e r s e t h e h o l d i n g o f t h e Workers'
Compensation C o u r t on t h i s i s s u e , s i n c e w e f a i l t o f i n d any d e n i a l
o f p l a i n t i f f ' s s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s a s s p e c i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 82-4216,
R.C.M. 1947.
Next, w e a r e asked t o r e v i e w t h e Workers' Compensation
C o u r t ' s p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y award.
I n t h e b e g i n n i n g , w e n o t e t h a t t h e r e a r e two d i s t i n c t
t y p e s o f p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s which a c l a i m a n t may s e e k ,
s u c h b e i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n on t h e d a t e of McAlear's i n j u r y . A
c l a i m a n t may e l e c t a d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t under s e c t i o n 92-703.1,
R.C.M. 1947, o r a n i n d e m n i t y b e n e f i t under s e c t i o n 92-709,
R.C.M. 1947.
The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e s e two b e n e f i t s i s t h a t
s e c t i o n 92-703.1 b a s e s t h e b e n e f i t upon a c t u a l l o s s o f e a r n i n g
c a p a c i t y r e s u l t i n g from t h e i n j u r y , whereas s e c t i o n 92-709
awards compensation r e g a r d l e s s of e a r n i n g s t o compensate f o r
p o s s i b l e l o s s of e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y i n t h e f u t u r e . J o n e s v . Glac.
G e n e r a l Assurance Co., 145 Mont. 326, 4 0 0 P.2d 888.
Applying t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h e c a s e a t hand, t h e r e s u l t
i s t h a t McAlear w a s e n t i t l e d t o e l e c t o n e o f two a w a r d s , depend-
i n g upon t h e r e c o r d e s t a b l i s h e d b e f o r e t h e Workers' Compensation
Court .
1) McAlear was e n t i t l e d t o p r o c e e d under s e c t i o n 92-709
whereby t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t c o u l d award, a s compensa-
t i o n f o r t h e p a r t i a l l o s s o f u s e o f h i s arm, t h e f u l l amount a l l o w -
a b l e under s e c t i o n 92-709 t h a t would r e s u l t i f t h e arm had been
permanently l o s t , o r a p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y less amount. Obie v . Obie
S i g n s , I n c . , 1 4 3 Mont. 1, 386 P.2d 68. Defendant i n s u r e r made i t s
o f f e r p u r s u a n t t o t h i s a p p r o a c h and based upon t h e m e d i c a l r e p o r t s
of McAlear's d o c t o r s t h a t he s u s t a i n e d a 1 5 % permanent l o s s of
e x t e n s i o n i n h i s elbow, o f f e r e d t h e f o l l o w i n g e v i d e n c e . An American
Medical A s s o c i a t i o n g u i d e t o e v a l u a t i n g i n j u r i e s s t a t e d s u c h
a l o s s o f e x t e n s i o n i n t h e elbow was e q u i v a l e n t t o 8-1/3% l o s s of
t h e arm. T h e r e f o r e , t h e p r o p o r t i o n a t e amount due w a s c a l c u l a t e d
t o be $1,394.40 [280 weeks (100% l o s s of arm) x 8-1/3% ( a c t u a l
l o s s of u s e i n t h i s c a s e ) x $60 p e r week ( t h e maximum weekly
r a t e a l l o w a b l e a t t h e t i m e o f McAlear's i n j u r y ) ] .
2) The a l t e r n a t e b e n e f i t a v a i l a b l e w a s under s e c t i o n
92-703.1 which would a l l o w McAlear a maximum o f $60 p e r week f o r
t h e maximum number of weeks under s e c t i o n 92-709 f o r t h e l o s s of
a n arm (280 w e e k s ) . However, t o be e l i g i b l e f o r s u c h b e n e f i t s ,
McAlear w a s r e q u i r e d t o show a c t u a l l o s s o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y .
The t e s t t o d e t e r m i n e l o s s o f e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y i s t h a t a c l a i m a n t
must show t h e i n a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n employment d u e t o t h e i n j u r i e s .
S h a f f e r v . Midland Empire Pack. Co., 127 Mont. 2 1 1 , 259 P.2d
M c A l e a r f a i l e d t o f u l f i l l t h i s burden of proof. The
testimony w a s uncontroverted t h a t t h e s o l e reason f o r M c A l e a r l s
unemployment a f t e r J a n u a r y 20, 1975, was t h a t no employment was
available. T h e r e w a s no showing by McAlear t h a t t h e r e d u c t i o n
o f h i s e a r n i n g s a f t e r g a i n i n g employment, a s compared t o h i s
e a r n i n g s p r i o r t o h i s i n j u r y , was d u e t o h i s p h y s i c a l i m p a i r m e n t .
Nor w a s h e , a t a n y t i m e , r e f u s e d employment o r f o r c e d t o r e j e c t
a n y o f f e r e d employment b e c a u s e of h i s p h y s i c a l i m p a i r m e n t from
t h e d a t e o f h i s i n i t i a l r e l e a s e , J a n u a r y 20, 1 9 7 5 , u n t i l t h e t i m e
o f h i s h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t .
W e f i n d no g r o u n d s u n d e r s e c t i o n 82-4216, R.C.M. 1947,
which would p e r m i t r e v e r s a l o f t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n o f t h e Workers'
Compensation C o u r t . The Workers' Compensation C o u r t awarded
McAlear b e n e f i t s i n a c c o r d w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t i n s u r e r ' s o f f e r
u n d e r s e c t i o n 92-709, R.C.M. 1947, i n s t e a d o f d i s a l l o w i n g a n y
b e n e f i t s a t a l l f o r M c A l e a r l s f a i l u r e t o p u t f o r t h any evidence
e n t i t l i n g him t o c o m p e n s a t i o n u n d e r s e c t i o n 92-703.1, R.C. M.
1947.
McAlearls contention i s c o r r e c t t h a t a claimant can elect
t o p r o c e e d u n d e r s e c t i o n 92-703.1 o r s e c t i o n 92-709 when s e e k i n g
p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y benefits. However, w e d o n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e
Workers' Compensation C o u r t s h o u l d be r e s t r a i n e d from making a n
award s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e when t h e c l a i m a n t h a s made a n
i n c o r r e c t e l e c t i o n i n l i g h t of t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d .
The judgment i s a f f i r m e d .
P
Chief J u s t i c e
W e concur:
J u d g e , s i t t i n g in p l a c e o f Mr.
J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s .