No. 14564
IN THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MXIYiP7A
F F
1979
PIERRE DUO?T (deceased)
VIRGINIA m ,
C l a h t and Appellant,
and
AE;TNA FIRE -
,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: Wrkers ' Ccanpensation Court
Hon. W i l l i a m E. Hunt, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Torger S. Oaas argued, Lewistuwn, Mntana
For Respondent :
Andrew J. Utick argued, H e l e n a , Mntana
Sulmnitted: June 6, 1979
Decided : AU G - 9 1979
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
t h e Court.
Through a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e Workers' Compensation
C o u r t on December 1, 1977, c l a i m a n t , V i r g i n i a Dumont, s o u g h t
c o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s f o r t h e d e a t h o f h e r husband which s h e
a l l e g e d was t h e r e s u l t o f a n i n j u r y h e r e c e i v e d i n t h e
c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s employment by Wickens B r o s . C o n s t r u c -
t i o n Company on O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1976. The Workers' Compensation
Court denied t h e c l a i m . Claimant p e t i t i o n e d f o r a r e h e a r i n g
b e f o r e t h e l o w e r c o u r t , and o r a l argument was h e a r d a s t o
whether a rehearing should be granted. By o r d e r d a t e d and
f i l e d on September 29, 1978, t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t
denied claimant's request f o r a rehearing. On O c t o b e r 31,
1978, 3 1 days a f t e r t h e d a t e of d e n i a l of t h e r e h e a r i n g , t h e
Workers' Compensation C o u r t r e c e i v e d and f i l e d c l a i m a n t ' s
n o t i c e of appeal t o t h i s Court.
Respondent i n s u r a n c e company moved t o d i s m i s s t h i s
a p p e a l on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h i s C o u r t l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n
because claimant f a i l e d t o f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal w i t h i n
t h e t i m e a l l o w e d by law. This Court ordered t h e appeal set
f o r o r a l argument a n d t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s a s w e l l as t h e
m e r i t s o f t h e a p p e a l were a r g u e d .
P i e r r e ( P e t e ) Dumont d i e d o n o r a b o u t O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1976,
o f a h e a r t a t t a c k i n h i s bed i n h i s t r a i l e r home which had
b e e n moved t o a j o b s i t e n e a r F o r s y t h , Montana, from ~ u m o n t ' s
home i n Lewistown. H i s body was d i s c o v e r e d i n bed by o t h e r s
who i n v e s t i g a t e d when h e d i d n o t r e p o r t f o r work. On Octo-
b e r 1 4 , 1976, a n a u t o p s y w a s p e r f o r m e d on t h e body of t h e
deceased. The f i n a l a n a t o m i c a l d i a g n o s i s c o n t a i n e d i n s u c h
autopsy r e p o r t r e v e a l s the following findings:
" I . Marked s t e n o s i n g a r t e r i o s c l e r o s i s o f
coronary arteries with:
"A. R e c e n t t h r o m b o s i s o f p o s t e r i o r r i g h t
coronary a r t e r y .
"B. Old o c c l u s i o n , a n t e r i o r d e s c e n d i n g b r a n c h
of l e f t coronary a r t e r y .
"C. No g r o s s e v i d e n c e o f r e c e n t o r p a s t myo-
cardial infarction.
"11. Hyperemia o f l u n g s and l i v e r .
"111. C h r o n i c pulmonary emphysema.
"IV. Obesity.
"V. Compression f r a c t u r e o f f i r s t lumbar
vertebra, clinical."
I n h e r c l a i m , c l a i m a n t a l l e g e d t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d was
s u b j e c t e d by h i s j o b t o u n u s u a l s t r a i n and s u f f e r e d a n
i n j u r y a s d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 39-71-119 MCA, and t h a t such
i n j u r y a r o s e o u t o f and w a s i n t h e c o u r s e of h i s employment.
The c l a i m f o r compensation l i s t e d t h e d a t e o f s u c h a l l e g e d
i n j u r y a s O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1976.
A t the hearing several lay witnesses w e r e called t o
t e s t i f y c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e c e a s e d ' s job a c t i v i t i e s and p a r t i c u -
l a r l y c o n c e r n i n g h i s a c t i v i t i e s o n O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1976. In
g e n e r a l s u c h w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s a c t i v i t i e s on t h e
d a y of h i s d e a t h w e r e q u i t e normal.
C l a i m a n t , who w a s n o t p r e s e n t on t h e j o b s i t e on Octo-
b e r 1 2 , 1976, a t t e m p t e d t o p a i n t a n e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t p i c -
ture. She t e s t i f i e d i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l a b o u t t h e d u t i e s ,
t h e l o n g h o u r s , and stresses and s t r a i n s t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d
was s u b j e c t e d t o d u r i n g t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n s e a s o n of 1976.
However, on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n s h e a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d ,
a n employee o f Wickens Bros. C o n s t r u c t i o n Company f o r many
y e a r s , was s u b j e c t e d i n p r e c e d i n g y e a r s t o s i m i l a r stresses
and s t r a i n s and worked l o n g h o u r s , i n c l u d i n g weekends.
C l a i m a n t f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d , on J u l y
21, 1976, s u f f e r e d an i n j u r y t o h i s back and l e g i n a n on-
t h e - j o b i n c i d e n t and was h o s p i t a l i z e d f o r a b o u t t h r e e d a y s
f o l l o w i n g which h e remained home f o r one week. Claimant
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d r e t u r n e d t o work b e f o r e h e was
r e l e a s e d by h i s p h y s i c i a n and worked w i t h p a i n . She s t a t e d
t h a t s h e s p e n t t i m e on t h e job s i t e s o s h e c o u l d a s s i s t w i t h
d r i v i n g and t r e a t h i s i n j u r e d l e g . She s t a t e d t h a t d u r i n g
September 1976 t h e d e c e a s e d had been h a v i n g problems w i t h
h i s s l e e p and on o c c a s i o n s when h e c o u l d n o t s l e e p would
a r i s e i n t h e n i g h t and go o u t on t h e job.
On O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1976, c l a i m a n t was n o t on t h e job s i t e
a t Forsyth. Over o b j e c t i o n of t h e r e s p o n d e n t , c l a i m a n t w a s
a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y t h a t on t h e morning of October 1 2 , 1976,
h e r husband c a l l e d h e r a t Lewistown a b o u t two h o u r s l a t e r
than usual p r i o r t o h i s t r i p t o Billings. She s t a t e d t h a t
h e seemed u p s e t and had s t a t e d t o h e r t h a t " a l l h e l l b r o k e
loose." When a s k e d what had happened, h e s t a t e d t h a t i t
would t a k e t o o l o n g t o e x p l a i n and h e would do s o on t h e
weekend. She f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t h e d e p a r t e d from h i s
customary s t a t e m e n t i n c l o s i n g a t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n by
s a y i n g goodbye w i t h o u t s a y i n g t h a t h e l o v e d h e r . Claimant
was u n a b l e t o e x p l a i n what t h e d e c e a s e d w a s r e f e r r i n g t o i n
h i s phone c o v e r s a t i o n . She s t a t e d t h a t s h e had a t t e m p t e d t o
d e t e r m i n e from o t h e r employees what had o c c u r r e d t o g i v e
r i s e t o t h e s t a t e m e n t made t o h e r by h e r husband on t h e
t e l e p h o n e b u t had l e a r n e d n o t h i n g .
Respondent i n s u r a n c e company s t a t e s t h a t t h e c r u c i a l
s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e e v e n t s of October 1 2 , 1976, was e x p l a i n e d
by t h e m e d i c a l w i t n e s s . D r . H o l l i s K. Lefever, t e s t i f y i n g
on b e h a l f of c l a i m a n t , was p r o v i d e d w i t h a copy of t h e
autopsy report. H e was a s k e d , o v e r r e s p o n d e n t ' s c o n t i n u i n g
o b j e c t i o n , t o r e s p o n d t o a h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n based i n
l a r g e d e g r e e on c e r t a i n d i s p u t e d f a c t s of t h e c a s e a n d ,
r e s p o n d e n t c o n t e n d s , on c e r t a i n f a c t s which were n o t i n
evidence. The h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n asked of D r . Lefever
c o n t a i n e d r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d e c e a s e d ' s back i n j u r y of J u l y
2 1 , 1976; i t c o n t a i n e d r e f e r e n c e t o a n a l l e g e d i n c i d e n t n i n e
d a y s b e f o r e t h e d e a t h when t h e d e c e a s e d l o a d e d some a n t i -
f r e e z e i n t o h i s p i c k u p ; i t c o n t a i n e d r e f e r e n c e t o an a l l e g e d
i n c i d e n t two days b e f o r e t h e d e a t h when t h e d e c e a s e d a l l e g e d l y
h u r t h i m s e l f w h i l e l o a d i n g a r a d i a t o r i n t o h i s p i c k u p ; and
i t c o n t a i n e d r e f e r e n c e t o c l a i m a n t ' s v e r s i o n of t h e e v e n t s
o f October 1 2 , 1976, and t h e d e c e a s e d ' s t r i p t o B i l l i n g s f o r
parts. On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , Dr. Lefever s t a t e d :
"Q. D o c t o r , i n t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l t h a t M r . Oaas
a s k e d you t o assume, i s t h e r e any one i n c i d e n t
o r any one day i n t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n g i v e n t o
you, t h a t you c o u l d p o i n t t o a s t h e c a u s e of
t h i s d e a t h , o r i s i t j u s t a b u i l d - u p of a l l of
t h e s e t h i n g s ? A. W e l l , I t h i n k t h e o n l y day
s t a t e d i n t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n i n which
t h e r e was any c h a i n of e v e n t s t h a t I m i g h t re-
l a t e t o t h i s is, i f I r e c a l l the hypothetical
q u e s t i o n c o r r e c t l y , concerning t h e h a s t y t r i p
t o B i l l i n g s and t h e h a n d l i n g of heavy equip-
ment. . ."
Thus, a r g u e s r e s p o n d e n t , D r . Lefever, claimant's expert
w i t n e s s , made t h e e v e n t s o f October 1 2 , 1976, c r i t i c a l t o
t h e case. Throughout t h e r e b u t t a l t e s t i m o n y of D r . L e f e v e r ,
h e k e p t r e f e r r i n g t o t h e e v e n t s of " t h a t d a y " - - r e f e r r i n g to
October 1 2 , 1976. Dr. S t e p h e n Cade, r e s p o n d e n t ' s e x p e r t
w i t n e s s , when asked t h e same h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n a s had
been a s k e d o f D r . L e f e v e r , d i d n o t f e e l t h a t t h e r e was any
p r o b a b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e e v e n t s of October 1 2 and
the death. However, h e d i d e x p l a i n t h a t t h e c l o s e r i n t i m e
t h a t e v e n t s o f p h y s i c a l o r e m o t i o n a l stress were t o t h e
d e a t h , t h e more l i k e l i h o o d t h e r e was o f some r e l a t i o n s h i p
between t h e two.
Based o n t h e above, t h e h e a r i n g s examiner summarized
t h e t e s t i m o n y s u r r o u n d i n g t h e e v e n t s o f O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1976, a s
follows:
"18. That f o u r witnesses t e s t i f i e d t h a t they
had s e e n and t a l k e d w i t h P e t e Dumont on t h e day
o f h i s d e a t h b u t t h a t none of them o b s e r v e d him
t o b e showing a n y s i g n s o f stress o r s t r a i n ,
p h y s i c a l o r e m o t i o n a l . None o f t h o s e w i t n e s s e s
w e r e aware o f any u n u s u a l problems a t t h e job,
and none of them r e c a l l Pierre Dumont h a v i n g
mentioned any u n u s u a l problems.
"19. T h a t t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d
was u n d e r g o i n g u n u s u a l stress o r s t r a i n i s
t h a t from t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e c l a i m a n t , t h e
widow o f P i e r r e Dumont, who s t a n d s t o g a i n ,
and t h a t l i t t l e o r none of t h a t t e s t i m o n y
i s c o r r o b o r a t e d by o t h e r e v i d e n c e . "
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d on a p p e a l :
1. Should t h i s a p p e a l b e d i s m i s s e d s i n c e t h i s C o u r t
l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n because claimant f a i l e d t o timely f i l e a
n o t i c e of a p p e a l ?
2. Did t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t err i n d e n y i n g
b e n e f i t s t o c l a i m a n t u n d e r t h e Workers' Compensation A c t ?
The f i r s t i s s u e i s d i r e c t e d a t c l a i m a n t ' s f a i l u r e t o
timely f i l e a n o t i c e of appeal. T h i s C o u r t h a s n e v e r been
c a l l e d upon t o r u l e i n a c a s e i n v o l v i n g t h e i s s u e o f t h e
t i m e l i n e s s o f f i l i n g a n o t i c e of a p p e a l from a d e c i s i o n o f
t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t .
S e c t i o n 39-71-2904 MCA p r o v i d e s :
" N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g 2-4-701 t h r o u g h 2-4-704, an
a p p e a l from a f i n a l d e c i s i o n o f t h e w o r k e r s '
compensation judge s h a l l b e f i l e d d i r e c t l y w i t h
t h e supreme c o u r t o f Montana i n t h e manner p r o -
v i d e d by law f o r a p p e a l s from t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t i n c i v i l cases."
A s t o what c o n s t i t u t e s a " f i n a l d e c i s i o n " o f t h e Workers'
Compensation judge, R u l e 1 9 o f t h e Workers' Compensation
C o u r t R u l e s ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s WCCR) p r o v i d e s :
"19A. The C o u r t w i l l , a f t e r t h e h e a r i n g ,
i s s u e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law
and a n o r d e r s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e C o u r t ' s d e t e r -
mination of t h e disputed i s s u e s . The p a r t i e s
t o t h e d i s p u t e may c o n s i d e r t h i s o r d e r a s a
f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e C o u r t f o r a p p e a l s pur-
poses. However, any p a r t y t o t h e d i s p u t e may
r e q u e s t a rehearing before t h e Court within
t w e n t y ( 2 0 ) d a y s a f t e r a p a r t y r e c e i v e s a copy
o f t h e o r d e r , and i f any p a r t y s u b m i t s a r e -
q u e s t f o r r e h e a r i n g , t h e o r d e r i s s u e d by t h e
Court s h a l l n o t be considered a f i n a l decision
of t h e Court f o r appeals purposes.
"19B. I f a request f o r a rehearing i s f i l e d ,
the p a r t i e s requesting the rehearing s h a l l set
f o r t h s p e c i f i c a l l y and i n f u l l d e t a i l t h e
g r o u n d s upon which t h e p a r t y c o n s i d e r s t h e
o r d e r t o be i n c o r r e c t . I f t h e Court denies
the request f o r rehearing, the o r i g i n a l order
i s s u e d by t h e C o u r t s h a l l b e c o n s i d e r e d t h e
f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e C o u r t as of t h e d a y t h e
rehearing i s denied. I f a rehearing i s granted
t h e matter w i l l b e s e t f o r h e a r i n g . The m a t t e r
w i l l b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e t e s t i m o n y t a k e n a t
t h e i n i t i a l h e a r i n g and a t t h e r e h e a r i n g . Af-
ter t h e rehearing, t h e Court w i l l i s s u e an o r d e r
s e t t i n g f o r t h the Court's f i n a l determination
of t h e disputed issues."
F i n a l l y , R u l e 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., states i n pertinent
part:
"The t i m e w i t h i n which a n a p p e a l from a judg-
ment o r a n o r d e r must b e t a k e n s h a l l b e 3 0 d a y s
from t h e e n t r y t h e r e o f . . ."
The f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w i n t h i s
m a t t e r w e r e a d o p t e d by t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t by
o r d e r d a t e d J u n e 1 9 , 1978. C l a i m a n t had 3 0 d a y s t h e r e a f t e r
w i t h i n which t o f i l e a n o t i c e of a p p e a l ( R u l e 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P.)
o r 20 d a y s w i t h i n which t o f i l e a r e q u e s t f o r r e h e a r i n g
( R u l e 1 9 , WCCR). On J u n e 29, 1978, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c e r t i -
f i c a t e o f m a i l i n g , c l a i m a n t m a i l e d t o t h e c l e r k of t h e
Workers' Compensation C o u r t , a r e q u e s t f o r r e h e a r i n g . The
f i l i n g o f a r e q u e s t f o r r e h e a r i n g suspended t h e t i m e f o r
f i l i n g of a n o t i c e of appeal.
Thereafter, respondent f i l e d formal o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e
s u f f i c i e n c y o f c l a i m a n t ' s r e q u e s t f o r r e h e a r i n g , and c l a i m a n t ,
i n r e s p o n s e t o s u c h o b j e c t i o n s , f i l e d a n amendment t o h e r
request f o r rehearing. On August 23, 1978, t h e Workers'
Compensation C o u r t h e a r d o r a l argument on w h e t h e r a r e h e a r -
i n g should be granted. The Workers' Compensation C o u r t
e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r d e n y i n g r e h e a r i n g and r e t u r n i n g t h e f i l e
t o t h e D i v i s i o n o f Workers' Compensation on September 29,
1978. I n a d d i t i o n t o d e n y i n g t h e r e h e a r i n g , t h i s o r d e r had
t h e e f f e c t o f making t h e o r i g i n a l o r d e r o f t h e Workers'
Compensation C o u r t t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n o f t h e c o u r t f o r
a p p e a l p u r p o s e s a s o f t h e d a y t h e r e h e a r i n g was d e n i e d - -
September 29, 1978. Thus, t h e l a s t s u s p e n d e d day f o r t h e
f i l i n g o f a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was September 29, 1978, and
c l a i m a n t ' s f i r s t d a y t o f i l e a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l was, and t h e
t i m e l i m i t t o f i l e t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l commenced r u n n i n g ,
a s of September 30, 1978. S i n c e September h a s o n l y 30 d a y s ,
t h e 30-day t i m e l i m i t o f c l a i m a n t t o f i l e a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l
e x p i r e d on O c t o b e r 29, 1978. However, s i n c e O c t o b e r 29,
1 9 7 8 , was a Sunday, i t i s n o t c o u n t e d and t h e 30-day t i m e
l i m i t t o f i l e a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l would e x p i r e on O c t o b e r 30,
1978. I t was n o t u n t i l t h e f i n a l day o f t h e a p p e a l p e r i o d ,
o n O c t o b e r 30, 1978, t h a t c l a i m a n t m a i l e d h e r n o t i c e o f
a p p e a l f o r f i l i n g , a n d t h e same was n o t r e c e i v e d by t h e
c l e r k o f t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t u n t i l Tuesday,
O c t o b e r 31, 1978.
Under R u l e 2 0 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., a n o t i c e of appeal i s
n o t deemed f i l e d u n l e s s t h e n o t i c e i s a c t u a l l y r e c e i v e d by
the clerk within the t i m e fixed f o r f i l i n g . Thus, t h e
n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w a s n o t r e c e i v e d f o r f i l i n g by t h e c l e r k of
t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t u n t i l t h e day a f t e r t h e
appeal t i m e expired. A c c o r d i n g l y , it i s r e s p o n d e n t ' s p o s i -
t i o n t h a t claimant has n o t timely perfected her appeal; t h a t
t h i s Court i s without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r t a i n t h e appeal;
and t h a t c l a i m a n t i s b a r r e d from s e e k i n g t o have t h e Workers'
Compensation C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n changed o r i n any way r e v e r s e d
o r modified.
Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., which i s made a p p l i c a b l e t o
a Workers' Compensation C o u r t p r o c e e d i n g by s e c t i o n 39-71-
2904 MCA, p r o v i d e s :
". . . An a p p e a l s h a l l b e t a k e n by f i l i n g a
n o t i c e of a p p e a l i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . F a i l u r e
of a n a p p e l l a n t t o t a k e any s t e p o t h e r t h a n t h e
t i m e l y f i l i n g of a n o t i c e of a p p e a l d o e s n o t
a f f e c t t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e appeal, b u t i s
ground o n l y f o r s u c h a c t i o n a s t h e Supreme
C o u r t deems a p p r o p r i a t e , which may i n c l u d e d i s -
missal o f t h e a p p e a l . "
Rule 4 , M.R.App.Civ.P., i s p a t t e r n e d a f t e r Rule 3 of t h e
F e d e r a l R u l e s of A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e . The second s e n t e n c e
of Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., is i d e n t i c a l t o a l i k e provi-
s i o n of Rule 3 ( a ) of t h e F e d e r a l R u l e s . 9 Xoore's Federal
P r a c t i c e 11203.10 s t a t e s :
"The n o t i c e of a p p e a l i s f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k
when i t i s r e c e i v e d i n t o h i s c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l .
S i n c e t i m e l y f i l i n g o f t h e n o t i c e i s h e l d t o be
e s s e n t i a l t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t of
a p p e a l s , t h e p r e c i s e t i m e t h a t t h e n o t i c e was
f i l e d c a n b e of overwhelming i m p o r t a n c e . The
most c e r t a i n way t o e f f e c t t i m e l y f i l i n g i s t o
d e l i v e r t h e n o t i c e t o t h e o f f i c e of t h e c l e r k
p e r s o n a l l y on o r b e f o r e t h e d a t e f i x e d f o r
f i l i n g . But s i n c e p e r s o n a l d e l i v e r y i s o f t e n
i n c o n v e n i e n t and e x p e n s i v e , m a i l i n g i s v e r y
f r e q u e n t l y r e s o r t e d t o . When d e l i v e r y i s t o
b e e f f e c t e d by m a i l , i t must b e b o r n e i n mind
t h a t t h e n o t i c e must b e r e c e i v e d by t h e c l e r k
w i t h i n t h e t i m e allowed f o r i t s f i l i n g . This
i s q u i t e contrary t o t h e usual r u l e respecting
t h e s e r v i c e of p a p e r s r e q u i r e d t o b e s e r v e d ,
which i s t h a t t i m e l y m a i l i n g c o n s t i t u t e s t i m e l y
service. "
I t i s l i k e w i s e s t a t e d i n 9 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 11204.02:
" D i s c u s s i o n of t h e t i m e f o r a p p e a l must b e g i n
by d i r e c t i n g a t t e n t i o n t o a h o s t of c a s e s hold-
i n g w i t h unanimity t h a t u n l e s s a n a p p e a l i s
timely taken t h e reviewing c o u r t l a c k s j u r i s -
d i c t i o n t o h e a r i t . Although t h a t h o l d i n g i s
n o t a s l o g i c a l l y c o m p e l l i n g a s i t o n c e was, t h e
n e c e s s i t y of p r o v i d i n g a p r e c i s e l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e
p o i n t o f t i m e a t which l i t i g a t i o n comes t o a n
end s t r o n g l y m i l i t a t e s a g a i n s t i t s o v e r t h r o w .
A s t h e Committee Note accompanying R u l e 3 [ o f
t h e F e d e r a l R u l e s ] admonishes:
" ' R u l e 3 and R u l e 4 combine t o r e q u i r e t h a t
a n o t i c e of appeal be f i l e d with t h e c l e r k of
the d i s t r i c t court within the t i m e prescribed
f o r taking an appeal. Because t h e t i m e l y
f i l i n g o f a n o t i c e o f a p p e a l i s "mandatory
a n d j u r i s d i c t i o n a l " , U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Robinson,
361 U.S. 220, 224 ( 1 9 6 0 ) , c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h o s e r u l e s i s of t h e utmost
importance.'
"So c a r e must b e t a k e n t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e
n o t i c e of a p p e a l i s f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e r k of
the d i s t r i c t court within the t i m e fixed for
t h e p a r t i c u l a r a p p e a l by R u l e 4 . . ."
T h i s i s l i k e w i s e t h e l a w o f Montana. The above-mentioned
a u t h o r i t i e s w e r e c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l and s p e c i f i c a l l y
a d o p t e d by t h e Montana Supreme C o u r t i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a
Workers' Compensation a p p e a l b e f o r e t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e
Workers' Compensation j u d g e i n L e i t h e i s e r v . Montana S t a t e
P r i s o n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Yont. 343, 505 P.2d 1203, where t h i s
C o u r t d i s m i s s e d a n a p p e a l f i l e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t upon t h e
g r o u n d s t h a t t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l had b e e n f i l e d t h r e e d a y s
late. Respondent a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y
followed t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e above-stated r u l e s many
times. S t a t e v . Wibaux County Bank ( 1 9 2 9 ) , 85 Mont. 532,
281 P . 341; R e i d v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 126 Mont. 489,
255 P.2d 693; McVay v . McVay ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 128 Mont. 31, 270 P.2d
393; J a c k s o n v . T i n k e r ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 51, 504 P.2d 692;
F i r s t N a t i o n a l o f Lewistown v . F r a y ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . I
C l a i m a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t r e s p o n d e n t h a s f a i l e d t o compute
t h e t i m e f o r f i l i n g t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l c o r r e c t l y . Claimant
i n i t i a l l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e Montana R u l e s o f A p p e l l a t e C i v i l
P r o c e d u r e became e f f e c t i v e on J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 6 8 , a p p r o x i m a t e l y
e i g h t y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e p r e s e n t d a y Workers' Compensation
A c t ( e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1 9 7 5 ) . Therefore, claimant argues,
t h e r e i s n o i n t e r p l a y between t h e R u l e s o f A p p e l l a t e C i v i l
P r o c e d u r e a n d t h e Workers' Compensation A c t e v e n t h o u g h
a p p e a l s from a d e c i s i o n o f t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t
a r e t a k e n d i r e c t l y t o t h e Supreme C o u r t i n t h e manner p r o -
v i d e d by l a w f o r a p p e a l s from a D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n c i v i l
cases. S e c t i o n 39-71-2904 MCA.
The o b v i o u s example o f t h i s i s t h a t i t i s n o t e v e n
e x a c t l y c l e a r from a r e a d i n g o f R u l e 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P.,
where t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l i s t o b e f i l e d i n t h e case o f a n
a p p e a l from a d e c i s i o n o f t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t .
Of c o u r s e , t h e r e a s o n a b l e a n d common s e n s e u n d e r s t a n d i n g and
p r a c t i c e i s t o f i l e i t w i t h t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ,
t r e a t i n g it, i n e f f e c t , a s a " D i s t r i c t Court" w i t h i n t h e
s c o p e and p u r p o s e o f R u l e 4 ( a ) .
Respondent c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t t h a t p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e
Workers' Compensation C o u r t a r e n o t g o v e r n e d by t h e R u l e s o f
C i v i l Procedure and t h e r e f o r e i s t e c h n i c a l l y c o r r e c t i n
a s s e r t i n g t h a t R u l e 7 7 ( d ) a n d R u l e 5, M.R.Civ.P., h a v e no
a p p l i c a t i o n here.
R e s p o n d e n t ' s argument i g n o r e s t h e f a c t t h a t p r o c e e d i n g s
i n t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t a r e g o v e r n e d by t h e
Montana A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e A c t by d i r e c t mandate o f
s e c t i o n 39-71-2903 MCA. Thus, s e c t i o n 2-4-623 MCA of t h e
Administrative Procedure A c t a p p l i e s . The p e r t i n e n t p a r t o f
this statute states:
". . . P a r t i e s s h a l l be n o t i f i e d e i t h e r per-
s o n a l l y o r by m a i l o f a n y d e c i s i o n o r o r d e r
. . . 11
This provision o f t h e above-cited s t a t u t e i s i d e n t i c a l
t o R u l e 7 7 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., i n s o f a r a s r e q u i r i n g n o t i c e of
d e c i s i o n s i n Workers' Compensation c a s e s .
W h o l d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a p e r s o n who a p p e a l s from a
e
f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t s h o u l d i n
a l l fundamental f a i r n e s s b e g i v e n t h e same b e n e f i t of t h a t
p r o v i s i o n of Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P., which s t a t e s t h a t :
". . . e x c e p t t h a t i n c a s e s where s e r v i c e of
n o t i c e o f e n t r y of judgment i s r e q u i r e d by
Rule 7 7 ( d ) o f t h e Montana R u l e s of C i v i l Proce-
d u r e t h e t i m e s h a l l be 30 d a y s from t h e s e r v i c e
of n o t i c e of e n t r y o f judgment."
T h i s would mean, a s i s a l r e a d y t h e c a s e where Rule 7 7 ( d ) ,
M.R.Civ.P., i s a p p l i c a b l e , t h a t when s e r v i c e of t h e n o t i c e
o f t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t i s
made a s mandated by s e c t i o n 2-4-623 MCA and t h a t s e r v i c e was
made by m a i l , t h e p r o v i s i o n s of Rule 2 1 ( c ) , M.R.App.Civ.P.,
a r e automatically p u t i n t o play adding t h r e e days t o t h e
p r e s c r i b e d 30-day t i m e l i m i t f o r f i l i n g t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l .
Thus, when one c o r r e c t l y adds t h e t i m e l i m i t s e t by
Rule 4 ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P., a s e x t e n d e d by Rule 2 1 ( c ) ,
M.R.App.Civ.P., t h e 3 0 t h day from September 29, 1978, i s
October 2 9 , 1978. S i n c e t h a t day happened t o be a Sunday,
Rule 2 1 ( a ) , M.R.App. Civ.P., comes i n t o p l a y making t h e 3 0 t h
day October 30, 1978. However, a s p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , Rule
2 1 ( c ) comes i n t o p l a y a d d i n g t h r e e d a y s t o t h e p r e s c r i b e d
p e r i o d and t h e 33rd and f i n a l day f o r f i l i n g t h e n o t i c e o f
a p p e a l was November 2 , 1978. Thus, c l a i m a n t ' s a p p e a l was
timely--not one day l a t e as r e s p o n d e n t c l a i m s .
The second i s s u e c o n c e r n s t h e m e r i t s of t h e d e c i s i o n of
t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t i n denying c l a i m a n t ' s b e n e f i t s .
This Court s t a t e d , a t an e a r l y d a t e , i n Birdwell v.
Three F o r k s P o r t l a n d Cement Co. ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 98 Mont. 483, 495,
" I n o r d e r f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f t o p r e v a i l i t was
n e c e s s a r y f o r h e r t o p r o v e by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e
of t h e evidence t h a t Birdwell s u f f e r e d an indus-
t r i a l a c c i d e n t , and t h a t t h e i n j u r y w a s t h e
p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of h i s d e a t h . "
P e r h a p s t h e most s u c c i n c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e r u l e i s
found i n Aho v . B u r k l a n d S t u d s ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 153 Mont. 1, 7 , 452
P.2d 415, 418, where t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d : "The c l a i m a n t h a s
t h e b u r d e n of p r o v i n g h i s c a s e . . ."
Not o n l y m u s t c l a i m a n t p r o v e h e r c a s e by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e
o f t h e e v i d e n c e , s h e must d o s o by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e
p r o b a t i v e c r e d i b l e evidence. I n L a F o r r e s t v . Safeway S t o r e s ,
Inc. ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 Mont. 431, 437, 414 P.2d 200, 203, t h i s
Court s t a t e d :
"The c l a i m a n t h a s t h e burden t o e s t a b l i s h by a
preponderance of t h e evidence t h a t h e r condi-
t i o n r e s u l t e d from a n i n j u r y and n o t from a
disease. [Citation omitted.] She h a s n o t s u s -
t a i n e d t h e b u r d e n of p r o o f ... By a d r o i t
q u e s t i o n i n g , c l a i m a n t ' s c o u n s e l was a b l e t o g e t
D r . Davidson t o a d m i t t o a ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' o f a
s u p r a s p i n a t u s t e n d o n t e a r . However, s u c h a
' p o s s i b i l i t y ' i s n o t probative c r e d i b l e testi-
mony and w i l l n o t , w i t h o u t more, s u p p l y e v i -
dence. "
The b u r d e n was upon c l a i m a n t t o e s t a b l i s h by a p r e -
ponderance of t h e p r o b a t i v e c r e d i b l e evidence t h a t h e r
husband had d i e d a s t h e r e s u l t o f a n i n j u r y which h e s u s -
t a i n e d i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s employment. The
Workers' Compensation C o u r t h e a r d e x t e n d e d t e s t i m o n y from
many w i t n e s s e s . The t e s t i m o n y was c o n f l i c t i n g . The lower
c o u r t had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b s e r v e t h e demeanor of t h e
w i t n e s s e s and t o judge t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y . Following t h e
h e a r i n g , t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t e n t e r e d v e r y de-
t a i l e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w . After
c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r i n g t h e e v i d e n c e , t h e lower c o u r t r u l e d i n
f a v o r of t h e i n s u r e r and d e n i e d b e n e f i t s t o c l a i m a n t . That
d e c i s i o n comes t o t h i s C o u r t w i t h t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t i t i s
correct. S e d l a c e k v . Ahrens ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 165 Mont. 479, 485, 530
P.2d 424, 427; Montana Farm S e r v i c e Co. v . M a r q u a r t ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,
Mont. , 578 P.2d 315, 316, 35 St.Rep. 1066, 1068.
The s c o p e o f r e v i e w o f a d e c i s i o n o f t h e Workers'
Compensation C o u r t upon a p p e a l h a s been s t a t e d many t i m e s .
The r u l e i s w e l l summarized i n J e n s e n v . A r g o n a u t I n s u r a n c e
Company ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 582 P.2d 1 1 9 1 , 1 1 9 3 , 35
St.Rep. 1066, 1068, i n t h e f o l l o w i n g l a n g u a g e :
"The s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w a p p l i c a b l e i n d e t e r -
m i n i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o sup-
p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e Workers' Compensation
C o u r t h a s been s t a t e d i n t h i s l a n g u a g e :
"'Our f u n c t i o n i n reviewing a d e c i s i o n of t h e
Workers' Compensation C o u r t i s t o d e t e r m i n e
w h e t h e r t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o sup-
p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h a t c o u r t .
W e c a n n o t s u b s t i t u t e o u r judgment f o r t h a t o f
t h e t r i a l c o u r t a s t o t h e w e i g h t of e v i d e n c e on
q u e s t i o n s o f f a c t . Where t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e Workers'
Compensation C o u r t , t h i s C o u r t c a n n o t o v e r t u r n
t h e decision.' S t e f f e s v . 93 L e a s i n g Co. I n c .
(U.S.F.&G.) ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont. , 580 P.2d
450, 452, 35 S t . R e p . 816, 818."
Applying t h i s s t a n d a r d t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e respondent
a r g u e s i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e l o w e r c o u r t must
be affirmed. T h e r e was a s h a r p c o n f l i c t i n t h e f a c t s ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e g a r d t o t h e e v e n t s o f O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1976.
I n i t s s t a t e m e n t o f t h e c a s e , r e s p o n d e n t s e t f o r t h a summary
o f t h e testimony of each w i t n e s s t o t h e e v e n t s of October
1 2 , 1976, t a k e n a l m o s t v e r b a t i m from t h e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t o f
t h e lower c o u r t . Following each sentence a r e c i t a t i o n s t o
t h e r e c o r d which s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g . Each and e v e r y f a c t
f o u n d by t h e lower c o u r t i s amply s u p p o r t e d i n t h e r e c o r d .
A t t h e bottom l i n e , t h e lower c o u r t chose t o b e l i e v e t h e
t e s t i m o n y o f Tom Wickens, J o s e p h Wickens, Myron Oakland, and
A r l y n McJunkin r a t h e r t h a n t h a t o f c l a i m a n t . The d e c i s i o n
a s t o t h e w e i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e o n q u e s t i o n s of f a c t i s
w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e o f t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t and
w h e r e , as h e r e , i t i s s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ,
t h i s Court cannot overturn t h a t decision.
The d e c i s i o n o f t h e lower c o u r t was a l s o c o r r e c t i n i t s
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c l a i m a n t f a i l e d t o p r o v e a compensable
i n j u r y and t h a t s u c h a n i n j u r y c a u s e d t h e d e a t h of h e r
husband. F o r a n i n j u r y t o b e compensable u n d e r t h e Workers'
Compensation A c t , i t m u s t m e e t t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s
of the s t a t u t e . S e c t i o n 39-71-119 MCA d e f i n e s i n j u r y a s :
" ' I n j u r y ' o r ' i n j u r e d ' means:
" (1) A t a n g i b l e h a p p e n i n g of a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e
from a n u n e x p e c t e d c a u s e , o r u n u s u a l s t r a i n ,
r e s u l t i n g i n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l phy-
s i c a l harm, and s u c h p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n a s a
r e s u l t t h e r e f r o m and e x c l u d i n g d i s e a s e n o t
traceable t o injury . . ."
A d i s c u s s i o n o f what c o n s t i t u t e s a n i n j u r y h a s r e c e i v e d
a g r e a t d e a l of a t t e n t i o n . Lupien v . IYlont. Record P u b l i s h i n g
Co. ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 3 Mont. 415, 390 P.2d 455; M i l l e r v . C i t y o f
B i l l i n g s ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 91, 555 P.2d 747; H u r l b u t v .
V o l l s t e d t Kerr Co. ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 167 Mont. 303, 538 P.2d 344;
E r h a r t v. G r e a t W e s t e r n S u g a r Co. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 375, 546
The m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e s u p p o r t s t h e
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d d i e d as t h e r e s u l t o f a d i s e a s e
process, progressive i n nature, t h a t i s not "traceable t o
injury." I n h i s r e b u t t a l testimony, D r . Lefever accurately
c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e t e s t i m o n y o f D r . Cade as f o l l o w s :
". . . The f a c t o f t h e m a t t e r i s t h a t D r . Cade
s a i d t h a t t h e d e a t h r e s u l t e d from t h e normal
s e q u e n c e o f e v e n t s from t h e d i s e a s e . "
When p r e s s e d o n t h i s p o i n t , D r . L e f e v e r s t a t e d :
"Q. What e v i d e n c e i s t h e r e i n t h e record--by
t h e r e c o r d , I mean t h e t e s t i m o n y t h a t you w e r e
a b l e t o o b s e r v e and h e a r a t t h e h e a r i n g on D e -
cember l s t , t o s u p p o r t a m e d i c a l o p i n i o n t o a
reasonable degree of medical c e r t a i n t y t h a t M r .
Dumont's d e a t h w a s m e r e l y t h e t e r m i n a l e v e n t
i n t h e series o f d i s e a s e p r o c e s s e s ? A . Well,
t h e o r i g i n a l t e s t i m o n y showed t h e e x t e n t of
t h e atherosclerotic process i n h i s a r t e r y , t h e
p r e s e n c e o f a t h e r o s c l e r o t i c p l a q u e s and p r e v i -
o u s l y d i s e a s e d v e s s e l s , and I t h i n k t h a t i t
would b e a l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a t some t i m e
t h i s d i s e a s e p r o c e s s would h a v e p r o g r e s s e d t o
t h i s e v e n t o r a s i m i l a r e v e n t a t sometime.
"Q. Is t h e r e any way t h a t m e d i c a l s c i e n c e c a n
p o i n t a f i n g e r a t a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e and s a y when
t h i s w i l l o c c u r ? A. No, I d o n ' t b e l i v e s o . I
t h i n k t h a t f r e q u e n t l y w e see t h i s d i s e a s e a s ad-
vanced o r more advanced t h a n t h i s a n d see peo-
p l e who s u r v i v e many y e a r s . I don't think there
i s any way o f p r e d i c t i n g w i t h c e r t a i n t y what t h e
outcomes a r e . . ."
Dr. Cade was a l i t t l e more e m p h a t i c . He testified:
". . . i t seems a b u n d a n t l y c l e a r t o m e t h a t h e
d i e d o f a d i s e a s e p r o c e s s t h a t had b e e n o c c u r r i n g
f o r y e a r s and y e a r s and t h a t h e had r e a c h e d t h e
t y p i c a l end o f t h a t d i s e a s e p r o c e s s . "
Respondent b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t case i n
t h e i n s t a n t m a t t e r i s H u r l b u t v . V o l l s t e d t Kerr Co., supra.
H u r l b u t was d e c i d e d a f t e r t h e 1967 amendment t o t h e i n j u r y
d e f i n i t i o n which added t h e words " o r u n u s u a l s t r a i n " t o t h e
d e f i n i t i o n o f a n i n j u r y c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 39-71-119 MCA.
The f a c t s o f H u r l b u t a r e s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t a n t
c a s e and r e s p o n d e n t s u b m i t s t h a t H u r l b u t i s c o n t r o l l i n g .
I n H u r l b u t t h e c l a i m a n t was a b o u t 59 y e a r s o l d and had
been employed by t h e lumber m i l l f o r t e n y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e
alleged accident--the l a s t e i g h t of t h o s e t e n y e a r s a s a
superintendent. The p o l i c y o f t h e employer was t o n o t
o p e r a t e t h e m i l l when t h e t e m p e r a t u r e was t o o c o l d f o r t h e
men and t h e m a c h i n e r y , a n d , i n t h e l a t t e r p a r t o f December
1 9 7 2 , t h e m i l l had been s h u t down d u e t o t h e c o l d f o r more
t h a n a week. On t h e a f t e r n o o n o f J a n u a r y 5, 1973, t h e
t e m p e r a t u r e r o s e t o a b o u t -12OF and t h e owner o f t h e m i l l
o r d e r e d c l a i m a n t t o s t a r t up t h e o p e r a t i o n t h e n e x t d a y , a n d
t h e c l a i m a n t began c o n t a c t i n g men t o r e p o r t f o r work. The
n e x t morning, J a n u a r y 6 , 1973, c l a i m a n t a r r i v e d a t work a n d
w a i t e d i n t h e o f f i c e f o r t e l e p h o n e c a l l s from t h e employees
t o d e t e r m i n e how many men would r e p o r t . The t e m p e r a t u r e i n
t h e o f f i c e was 50°F a n d c l a i m a n t had h i s c o a t on. The
o u t s i d e t e m p e r a t u r e was -6OF, w i t h low wind v e l o c i t y . While
s i t t i n g i n t h e o f f i c e , t h e c l a i m a n t became d i z z y a n d went
o u t s i d e t o see i f a l i t t l e f r e s h a i r would h e l p , b u t t h e n
became n a u s e a t e d . H e w e n t home and h i s w i f e d r o v e him t o
t h e h o s p i t a l where h i s d o c t o r d i a g n o s e d a m y o c a r d i a l i n f a r c -
tion (heart attack). The c l a i m a n t a r g u e d t h a t h e was en-
t i t l e d t o c o m p e n s a t i o n b e c a u s e t h e m i l l had n e v e r b e f o r e
been o p e r a t e d i n w e a t h e r a s c o l d as i t was t h a t morning. He
maintained t h a t t h i s condition c o n s t i t u t e d "unusual s t r a i n "
b e c a u s e i t was a u n i q u e , new, d i f f e r e n t and u n u s u a l demand
p l a c e d upon c l a i m a n t by t h e company. This Court, speaking
through J u s t i c e Daly, a f f i r m e d a d e n i a l o f compensation
benefits, stating:
"Any i n j u r y , t o b e compensable u n d e r t h e Work-
m e n ' s Compensation A c t , must m e e t t h e d e f i n i -
t i o n a l requirements of t h e s t a t u t e . Section
92-418, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , d e f i n e s i n j u r y a s
" ' a t a n g i b l e happening o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e
from a n u n e x p e c t e d c a u s e , o r u n u s u a l s t r a i n ,
r e s u l t i n g i n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l phy-
s i c a l harm, and s u c h p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n a s a
r e s u l t t h e r e f r o m and e x c l u d i n g d i s e a s e n o t
traceable t o injury * * *'
"Thus, t h e r e a r e two e l e m e n t s i n the statute
which m u s t b e m e t (1) t h e r e m u s t be a t a n g i b l e
happening o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e , and ( 2 ) t h i s
m u s t b e shown t o b e t h e c a u s e o f p h y s i c a l harm.
" A s i d e from t h e t e s t i m o n y t h a t i t was a few
d e g r e e s c o l d e r t h a n normal s t a r t i n g t e m p e r a t u r e
a n d t h e m i l l had n o t p r e v i o u s l y o p e r a t e d i n
t e m p e r a t u r e s t h a t c o l d , t h e r e was no t e s t i m o n y
t h i s imposed upon c l a i m a n t any d u t y which was
u n u s u a l i n k i n d o r amount. The d u t i e s performed
by c l a i m a n t on t h e d a y b e f o r e h i s a t t a c k and
o n t h e d a y o f t h e a t t a c k , J a n u a r y 6 , 1973,
w e r e d u t i e s h e had p e r f o r m e d f o r t h e p r e v i o u s
e i g h t years a s p l a n t superintendent. Simply
o p e n i n g a m i l l on a d a y c o l d e r t h a n w a s c u s t o -
mary, w i t h no i n o r d i n a t e k i n d o r amount o f work
on h i s p a r t , c a n n o t b e s a i d t o c o n s t i t u t e ' a
t a n g i b l e happening o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e . '
Claimant has f a i l e d t o c a r r y t h e burden of proof
t h a t h e was i n j u r e d , w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n s o f t h e
s t a t u t e . " H u r l b u t , 167 Mont. a t 306-07, 538
P.2d a t 346.
Applying t h e test enunciated i n Hurlbut t o t h e i n s t a n t
c a s e , i t would seem t h a t weak a s t h e f a c t s were i n H u r l b u t ,
they w e r e stronger than those i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Claim-
a n t ' s own m e d i c a l w i t n e s s s t a t e d : "Well, I t h i n k t h e o n l y
d a y s t a t e d i n t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l q u e s t i o n i n which t h e r e was
a n y c h a i n of e v e n t s t h a t I m i g h t r e l a t e t o t h i s i s , i f I
r e c a l l t h e hypothetical question c o r r e c t l y , concerning t h e
h a s t y t r i p t o B i l l i n g s [which o c c u r r e d on O c t o b e r 1 2 , 19761
. . ." Thus, D r . L e f e v e r r u l e d o u t any p o s s i b l e c a u s a l
c o n n e c t i o n between t h e d e a t h and any o f t h e e v e n t s which
a l l e g e d l y p r e c e d e d O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1976. A s e a r c h of t h e e n t i r e
record f a i l s t o d i s c l o s e anything unusual t h a t occurred t o
t h e d e c e a s e d on O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1976, o r e v e n , f o r t h a t m a t t e r ,
t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d ' s t r i p t o B i l l i n g s was " h a s t y . " The o n l y
t e s t i m o n y t o t h e c o n t r a r y w a s t h e widow's t e s t i m o n y con-
c e r n i n g h e r h u s b a n d ' s phone c a l l t o h e r .
I n h e r b r i e f , c l a i m a n t r e l i e s on t h e c a s e s o f J o n e s v .
B a i r ' s C a f e ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 1 3 , 445 P.2d 923; Robins v .
O g l e ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 157 Mont. 328, 485 P.2d 692; a n d Love v . R a l p h ' s
Food S t o r e ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. 234, 516 P.2d 598. Claimant
a r g u e s , i n c o r r e c t l y , t h a t t h e s e c a s e s o n l y r e q u i r e a showing
o f some " u n u s u a l s t r a i n , " e i t h e r from t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f a
c a u s e o r e f f e c t , t o m e e t t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l requirements of an
i n j u r y under t h e a c t . Claimant's a n a l y s i s t o t a l l y ignores
t h e i n d e p e n d e n t r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a s t r a i n m u s t r e s u l t from a
t a n g i b l e happening o f a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e . The f o l l o w i n g
l a n g u a g e from E r h a r t v . G r e a t Western S u g a r Co. ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169
Mont. 375, 380-81, 546 P.2d 1055, 1 0 5 8 , q u i c k l y d i s p o s e s o f
c l a i m a n t ' s argument:
"Not o n l y m u s t c l a i m a n t show a n u n u s u a l s t r a i n ,
b u t t h a t t h e s t r a i n must r e s u l t from a t a n g i b l e
happening of a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e . [ C i t a t i o n s
omitted.] I n Love v . R a l p h ' s Food S t o r e , 163
Mont. 234, 516 P.2d 598, w e s t a t e d t h a t J o n e s
and Robins made t h i s r u l e c l e a r . See, a l s o ,
t h e e a r l i e r cases: Lupien v . Montana Record
P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1 4 3 Mont. 415, 390 P.2d 455;
James v . V.K.V. Lumber Co., s u p r a : M i l l e r v - - -
Sundance R e c r e a t i o n , I n c . , l ~ l - ~ o n 223, 4 4 1
t .
P.2d 194."
C l a i m a n t must s t i l l p r o v e t h a t h e r h u s b a n d ' s d e a t h was t h e
r e s u l t o f a " t a n g i b l e h a p p e n i n g of a t r a u m a t i c n a t u r e " ,
which s h e t o t a l l y f a i l e d t o do.
Finally, i n her b r i e f , claimant takes issue with t h e
lower c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s i n connection w i t h t h e medical testi-
mony i n t h e c a s e a s i t r e l a t e s t o t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p
between stress and sudden c o r o n a r y d e a t h . She c i t e s some
p a s s a g e s from D r . Lefever's o r i g i n a l testimony a t t h e
December 1, 1977, h e a r i n g which, when t a k e n o u t o f c o n t e x t
a s they a r e , appear t o support her p o s i t i o n . Respondent
c o n t e n d s , and w e a g r e e , t h a t c l a i m a n t i g n o r e s D r . L e f e v e r ' s
t e s t i m o n y i n r e b u t t a l which, a s q u o t e d p r e v i o u s l y , was
d i f f e r e n t from h i s o r i g i n a l t e s t i m o n y when c o n f r o n t e d w i t h
t h e t e s t i m o n y o f D r . Cade. On r e b u t t a l , D r . L e f e v e r ad-
mitted: " . . . t h e r e i s more t h a n o n e o p i n i o n a b o u t t h e
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f stress i n sudden d e a t h . " On r e d i r e c t exam
during the r e b u t t a l deposition, D r . Lefever s t a t e d :
"Q. And g o i n g back t o what M. U t i c k s a i d , i s
r
t h e r e a n a c u t e d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n among t h e
m e d i c a l community a s t o t h e c a u s e o f t e n s i o n
between stress and t h e i n i t i a t i n g e v e n t s and
t h e o r i g i n a l hemorrhage? A. Yes.
"Q. T h e r e a r e t h o u g h t s o n t h a t b o t h ways? A.
T h e r e are more t h a n o n e o p i n i o n a b o u t t h e s i g -
n i f i c a n c e o f stress w i t h r e l a t i o n t o i n t i m a l
hemorrhage."
As Dr. Cade summarized:
". . . I t i s n o t c l e a r what t h e r o l e o f c h r o n i c
stress i s on t h e c a r d i o v a s c u l a r s y s t e m . It is
n o t c l e a r w h e t h e r stress c a n p l a y a r o l e i n
sudden d e a t h , i n a c c e l e r a t i o n of c o r o n a r y a r t e r y
d i s e a s e process. The s t u d i e s a r e c o n f l i c t i n g
o r t h e problem h a s n o t been a d e q u a t e l y s t u d i e d
o r no good s t u d y shows t h i s a n d t h a t o r t h e
other thing. "
I n summary, t h e t e s t i m o n y o f b o t h d o c t o r s a g r e e t h a t
t h e m e d i c a l community j u s t d o e s n o t know w h e t h e r stress
p l a y s a r o l e i n sudden d e a t h o r a c c e l e r a t e s c o r o n a r y a r t e r y
disease. The l o w e r c o u r t had a l l t h e m e d i c a l t e s t i m o n y
before it. A review of t h e e n t i r e testimony of both d o c t o r s
r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t q u i t e a d e q u a t e l y summarized
s u c h t e s t i m o n y i n i t s f i n d i n g s and d i d n o t err i n i t s f i n d -
ings. T h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s
of t h e c o u r t i n d e n y i n g b e n e f i t s t o c l a i m a n t .
The judgment o f t h e c o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
W e concur: