No. 13323
I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O MONTANA
OR F F
1976
WESLEY A. LINDGREN,
P e t i t i o n e r and Appellant,
BOARD O TRUSTEES, HIGH SCHOOL
F
DISTRICT NO. 1, FERGUS COUNTY, and
DOLORES COLBURG, SUPERINTENDENT OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,
Respondents and Respondents.
Appeal from:
.
D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable P e t e r Meloy , Judge p r e s i d i n g
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
McKittrick and Duffy, Great F a l l s , Montana
D. P a t r i c k McKittrick argu&d, Great F a l l s , Montana
For Respondents:
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana
Smith, Smith and Sewell, Helena, Montana
Chadwick H. Smith argued, Helena, Montana
Submitted: October 20, 1976
Decided: OEC 2 2 1976
Filed: DEC 2 2 1976
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
Lewis and C l a r k County. The judgment a f f i r m e d a d e c i s i o n o f
t h e Supreintendent of P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n , upholding t h e d e c i -
s i o n o f t h e County S u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f S c h o o l s , F e r g u s County,
i n t h e m a t t e r o f t h e d i s m i s s a l o f Wesley A. L i n d g r e n by t h e
Board o f T r u s t e e s o f S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No. 1, F e r g u s County.
A p p e l l a n t was employed a s a n i n d u s t r i a l a r t s and math
t e a c h e r a t F e r g u s County High S c h o o l . H e had had t e a c h i n g
c o n t r a c t s w i t h F e r g u s County S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No. 1 f o r f o u r t e e n
c o n s e c u t i v e y e a r s and was a t e n u r e t e a c h e r . On A p r i l 2 , 1973,
t h e Board o f T r u s t e e s o f S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No. 1, h e r e i n a f t e r
referred t o a s the Trustees, offered appellant a contract t o
t e a c h f o r t h e 1973-74 s c h o o l y e a r ; h e s i g n e d and r e t u r n e d t h e
c o n t r a c t on A p r i l 3 0 , 1973.
On A p r i l 1 4 , 1973, a p p e l l a n t was a r r e s t e d and c h a r g e d
with t h e v i o l a t i o n s of d r i v i n g while under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n -
t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r ( t h i r d o f f e n s e ) and d r i v i n g w i t h o u t a v a l i d
driver's license. H e plead g u i l t y t o t h e s e charges. Imposition
o f s e n t e n c e was d e f e r r e d f o r o n e y e a r upon c o n d i t i o n t h a t a p p e l -
l a n t c o m p l e t e t h e A l c o h o l R e h a b i l i t a t i o n and T r e a t m e n t Program
a t t h e s t a t e h o s p i t a l a t Galen and t h e r e a f t e r r e g u l a r l y a t t e n d
m e e t i n g s o f A l c o h o l i c s Anonymous f o r a p e r i o d o f o n e y e a r . These
c o n d i t i o n s w e r e s a t i s f i e d and on March 7 , 1975 a p p e l l a n t w a s
a l l o w e d t o w i t h d r a w h i s g u i l t y p l e a and t h e c h a r g e s w e r e d i s m i s s e d .
On August 1 3 , 1973 t h e T r u s t e e s r e s o l v e d t h a t a l e t t e r
o f d i s m i s s a l b e s e n t t o a p p e l l a n t b a s e d upon h i s b e i n g "con-
v i c t e d " f o r d r i v i n g while under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g
l i q u o r and d r i v i n g w i t h o u t a v a l i d d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e . A letter
of d i s m i s s a l and n o t i f i c a t i o n o f h e a r i n g was d i s p a t c h e d t o a p p e l -
l a n t by t h e c h a i r m a n o f t h e Board o f T r u s t e e s .
The T r u s t e e s convened on August 27, 1973, and a p p e l l a n t
a p p e a r e d and s u b m i t t e d t o t h e T r u s t e e s a p r o p o s a l a s k i n g them
t o c o n s i d e r a w r i t t e n agreement which would a l l o w him t o con-
t i n u e teaching. T h i s h e a r i n g was r e c e s s e d u n t i l August 29,
1973. When t h e p a r t i e s f a i l e d t o r e a c h a n agreement a t t h e
second h e a r i n g , t h e T r u s t e e s moved t h a t a h e a r i n g be h e l d on
September 4 , 1973.
On August 31, 1973, t h e chairman o f t h e T r u s t e e s a d d r e s s e d
a l e t t e r t o a p p e l l a n t amending t h e grounds f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s
d i s m i s s a l , l i s t i n g a d d i t i o n a l b a s i s f o r d i s m i s s a l , and o f f e r -
i n g a p p e l l a n t a d d i t i o n a l t i m e f o r p r e p a r a t i o n t o m e e t t h e new
charges. The T r u s t e e s convened on September 4 , 1973, and upon
motion a d o p t e d and r a t i f i e d t h e amended and c o n s o l i d a t e d n o t i c e
for dismissal.
A p p e l l a n t a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e T r u s t e e s on September 4 ,
1973, and o b j e c t e d t o t h e amended l e t t e r o f d i s m i s s a l . H e de-
manded t h a t h e a r i n g be based upon t h e i n i t i a l l e t t e r o f d i s m i s s a l
d a t e d August 1 5 , 1973. A p p e l l a n t withdrew from t h e h e a r i n g when
t h e T r u s t e e s i n d i c a t e d t h e h e a r i n g would be based upon t h e c h a r g e s
c o n t a i n e d i n t h e amended l e t t e r o f d i s m i s s a l . Subsequent t o
a p p e l l a n t ' s withdrawal, t h e T r u s t e e s resolved t h a t a p p e l l a n t
was d i s m i s s e d , based upon c h a r g e s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e amended l e t t e r
of d i s m i s s a l .
A p p e l l a n t a p p e a l e d h i s d i s m i s s a l t o t h e County Super-
i n t e n d e n t o f S c h o o l s and r e q u e s t e d a d e t e r m i n a t i o n l i m i t i n g t h e
scope of t h e hearing. The County S u p e r i n t e n d e n t o f S c h o o l s
ordered t h e scope of t h e hearing t o i n c l u d e t h o s e charges set
f o r t h i n t h e amended l e t t e r o f d i s m i s s a l and s e t t h e h e a r i n g f o r
September 2 1 , 1973.
On September 1 8 , 1973, a p p e l l a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t , F e r g u s County, f o r a w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n , w r i t of mandate
o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e w r i t r e s t r a i n i n g t h e County S u p e r i n t e n d e n t
of S c h o o l s from p r o c e e d i n g t o h e a r i n g on t h e c h a r g e s . The
d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s s u e d , and s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s m i s s e d , an a l t e r n a -
t i v e w r i t of mandate and p r o h i b i t i o n d i r e c t e d t o t h e County
S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of S c h o o l s and t h e T r u s t e e s .
A p p e l l a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t f o r a w r i t of s u p e r -
v i s o r y c o n t r o l on September 26, 1973, and asked t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g t h e a l t e r n a t i v e w r i t be o v e r r u l e d . This
C o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e p e t i t i o n , Lindgren v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 162
Mont. 548, 514 P.2d 767.
The County S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of S c h o o l s h e a r d a p p e l l a n t ' s
a p p e a l on October 2, 1974, and a f f i r m e d t h e T r u s t e e s ' d e c i s i o n
t o dismiss appellant.
A p p e l l a n t a p p e a l e d t o t h e S t a t e S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of P u b l i c
I n s t r u c t i o n who e n t e r e d a d e c i s i o n h o l d i n g t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e County S u p e r i n t e n d e n t
of S c h o o l s based upon t h e amended l e t t e r of d i s m i s s a l . The
d i s t r i c t c o u r t o f Lewis and C l a r k County a f f i r m e d t h e d e c i s i o n
of t h e S t a t e S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of Schools and from t h a t f i n a l judg-
ment Lindgren a p p e a l s and p r e s e n t s two i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w :
1. Did t h e Board o f T r u s t e e s o f High School D i s t r i c t
No. 1, F e r g u s County, d i s m i s s a p p e l l a n t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e
laws of t h e S t a t e of Montana?
2. Was t h e r e s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e on t h e r e c o r d t o
s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g a p p e l l a n t was incompetent and u n f i t t o t e a c h
under h i s 1973-74 s c h o o l c o n t r a c t ?
T h e f i r s t a l l e g a t i o n of e r r o r c o n c e r n s t h e p r o c e d u r a l
manner i n which a p p e l l a n t was d i s m i s s e d from h i s t e a c h i n g d u t i e s .
S e c t i o n 75-6107, R.C.M. 1947, s e t s f o r t h t h e a p p l i c a b l e law i n
Montana p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e d i s m i s s a l of a t e a c h e r under c o n t r a c t :
"The t r u s t e e s o f any d i s t r i c t may d i s m i s s a
t e a c h e r b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n of h i s employment
c o n t r a c t f o r i m m o r a l i t y , u n f i t n e s s , incompetence,
o r v i o l a t i o n of t h e adopted p o l i c i e s of such
trustees. Any t e a c h e r who h a s been d i s m i s s e d
may i n w r i t i n g w i t h i n t e n ( 1 0 ) d a y s a p p e a l s u c h
dismissal t o t h e county superintendent; following
s u c h a p p e a l a h e a r i n g s h a l l be h e l d w i t h i n t e n
(10) days. I f t h e county superintendent, a f t e r
a h e a r i n g , d e t e r m i n e s t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l by t h e
t r u s t e e s was made w i t h o u t good c a u s e , he s h a l l
o r d e r t h e t r u s t e e s t o r e i n s t a t e s u c h t e a c h e r and
t o compensate s u c h t e a c h e r a t h i s c o n t r a c t amount
f o r t h e t i m e l o s t d u r i n g t h e pending of t h e a p p e a l . "
S e c t i o n 75-5930, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
"No b u s i n e s s s h a l l be t r a n s a c t e d by t h e t r u s t e e s
o f a d i s t r i c t u n l e s s it i s t r a n s a c t e d a t a r e g u l a r
meeting o r a p r o p e r l y c a l l e d s p e c i a l meeting."
See: Wyatt v. S c h o o l D i s t r i c t No. 1 0 4 , 148 Mont. 8 3 , 417 P.2d
I t i s a p p e l l a n t ' s contention t h e T r u s t e e s ' a c t of d i s -
m i s s a l is legally ineffective. H e r e a c h e s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n by
c o n s t r u i n g t h e T r u s t e e s ' i n i t i a l l e t t e r o f d i s m i s s a l i n combin-
a t i o n w i t h t h e amended and c o n s o l i d a t e d l e t t e r of d i s m i s s a l as
a single notice t o dismiss. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t s e c t i o n 75-
5930, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e amended l e t t e r o f d i s m i s s a l
"be t r a n s a c t e d a t a r e g u l a r meeting o r p r o p e r t y c a l l e d s p e c i a l
meeting" of t h e Trustees. Appellant concludes t h e attempt t o
d i s c h a r g e him i s v o i d s i n c e t h e amended l e t t e r o f d i s m i s s a l
was m e r e l y a d o p t e d and r a t i f i e d by t h e T r u s t e e s r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g
t r a n s a c t e d a t t h e meeting. W e f i n d t h i s argument w i t h o u t m e r i t .
The i n i t i a l l e t t e r o f d i s m i s s a l n o t i f i e d a p p e l l a n t h e
was d i s m i s s e d and t h a t h i s s e r v i c e s would n o t b e u s e d d u r i n g t h e
1973-74 s c h o o l y e a r . T h i s i n i t i a l l e t t e r based a p p e l l a n t ' s d i s -
m i s s a l on t h e s e g r o u n d s :
" * * * T h i s a c t i o n i s t a k e n b e c a u s e o f your
c o n v i c t i o n on J u l y 1 6 , 1973 f o r d r i v i n g w h i l e
under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i n g l i q u o r ,
t h i r d c o n v i c t i o n , and d r i v i n g w i t h o u t a v a l i d
driver's license. In addition these facts
p l a c e you i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 75-6108,
R.C.M. 1947, a s amended which r e q u i r e s t h a t
'any t e a c h e r under c o n t r a c t w i t h a d i s t r i c t
s h a l l : conform t o and e n f o r c e t h e l a w s * * * . " I
Our initial discussion concerns the basis upon which
the trustees determined appellant should be dismissed. In
the district court record we find the minutes of the August
13, 1973 Trustees' regular meeting. In these minutes appears
this subtitle:
"LETTER OF DISMISSAL TO BE SENT TEACHER:
Trustee Swift moved seconded by Trustee Tresch
that a letter of dismissal be forwarded to Wesley
Lindgren, teacher in Fergus High School, because
of a D.W.I. and driving without a valid license
and conviction on both counts. The motion
carried. "
We conclude from this record that on August 13, 1973 at a regular
meeting of the Trustees, it was resolved that appellant be dis-
missed from his 1973-74 teaching duties on the basis of appel-
lant's above mentioned violations.
Next, we determine whether the basis for dismissal util-
ized by the Trustees is legally sufficient for dismissal. Under
section 75-6107, R.C.M. 1947, the dismissal of a teacher under
contract requires a showing of immorality, unfitness, incompetence,
or violation of the adopted policies of the Trustees. The initial
letter of dismissal failed to substantiate any causal relationship
between appellant's violations and his performance of teaching
duties. This Court does not find, as a matter of law, that vio-
lations for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor
and driving without a valid driver's license are tantamount to
"immorality, unfitness, incompetence, or violation of the adopted
policies of such trustees." Absent such showing, the discharge
of appellant amounted to a breach of contract. Hovland v. School
Dist. No. 52, 128 Mont. 507, 278 P.2d 211.
Respondent Trustees contend appellant's dismissal should
be upheld based upon the amended and consolidated letter of dis-
missal which states:
"Since charges were initially brought against
Mr. Lindgren, additional information has come
to the board. For this reason, amended and
consolidated notice for dismissal is given.
"The causes are: 'immorality, unfitness, in-
competence, and failure to conform to and
enforce the laws * * *.' (See sections
75-6107 and 75-6108, Revised Codes of Montana.)
These causes grow out of Mr. Lindgren's arrest
for DWI and driving without a valid Montana
driver's license on April 14, 1973 and his
conviction thereupon on July 16, 1973. In
addition, the charges stem from Mr. Lindgren's
performance as a teacher in his school, par-
ticularly as to his poor relationship with
students, his lack of willingness to make ade-
quate plan preparation, his failure to accept
responsibility in the school, his lack of
interest in the students, his failure to maintain
adequate class supervision and discipline, his
poor example to students, his failure to convey
skills possessed by him to his students as he
should, his failure to take proper care of the
classroom and the property placed in his charge,
and his arrival at school in a disheveled appear-
ance, smelling of alcoholic beverages."
Respondents argue the clear and unequivocal ratification
of the amended and consolidated letter of dismissal is proper.
Furthermore, they contend appellant was not prejudiced by the
amended notice of dismissal. Respondents cite the holding of
the district court as authority for the proposition that "so
long as there is notice and opportunity for hearing the Board
can amend its charges for dismissal prior to hearing as was
done here". We do not agree.
The additional charges alleged in the amended and con-
solidated letter of dismissal are derived from information which
was available to the trustees at the time of the drafting of
the initial letter of dismissal and at the time the Trustees
accepted a new contract of employment for the 1973-74 year on
April 30, 1973. This Court has already concluded the initial
letter of dismissal did not establish legally adequate grounds
for dismissal. To recognize the amended letter of dismissal
as adequate in law would amount to submitting appellant to the
burden of establishing the invalidity of charges propounded
for the purpose of remedying legally inadequate charges. he
Court concludes appellant incurred substantial legal prejudice
when required to meet these additional charges.
In view of our determination of appellant's first issue,
further discussion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence
is unnecessary.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the
cause remanded for the determination of emoluments due appellant
pursuant to statute and case authority4
--
Justice
oncur :
9
kbn. Jack Green, sitting in
place of Mr. Justice Wesley
Castles.