No. 12996
I N T E SUPREME C U T OF T E STATE O M N A A
H OR H F OTN
1976
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO 4, Lincoln County,
Montana,
R e l a t o r and A p p e l l a n t ,
DOLORES COLBURG, Superintendent
of P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n , S t a t e of
Montana, and JAMES G. SICHTING,
Respondents and Respondents.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Robert K e l l e r , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Smith, Smith & Sewell, Helena, Montana
Chadwick H. Smith argued, Helena, Montana
William A. Douglas appeared, Libby, Montana
For Respondents :
Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,
Montana -- --
- - W H + z f i W ~ ~ ~ - r C : 3 e ~ ~ ~ a
C a r r o l l C. Blend argued, Great F a l l s , Montana
Fennessey, Crocker and Harman, Libby, Montana
David W. Harman argued, Libby, Montana
Submitted: February 4 , 1976
Decided: fd:t.r .r .
, :
M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
T h i s appeal i s from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
Lincoln County, which a f f i r m e d a d e c i s i o n of respondent S t a t e
Superintendent of Public I n s t r u c t i o n i n a m a t t e r where a p p e l l a n t ,
Board of T r u s t e e s of School D i s t r i c t No. 4 , Lincoln County, de-
c i d e d n o t t o renew a teaching c o n t r a c t and t h e County Superintendent
and t h e S t a t e Superintendent r e v e r s e d t h a t holding.
The Board of T r u s t e e s of School D i s t r i c t No. 4 , Lincoln
County, r e l a t o r and a p p e l l a n t , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s T r u s t e e s ,
determined a t a ~ r u s t e e s ' meeting on March 20, 1972, t h a t t h e
t e a c h i n g c o n t r a c t of James G. S i c h t i n g would n o t be renewed f o r
t h e 1972-73 school y e a r . A l e t t e r from t h e D i s t r i c t Superintendent
informed S i c h t i n g of t h i s a c t i o n taken by t h e T r u s t e e s . Following
a r e q u e s t from S i c h t i n g f o r a statement o f r e a s o n s f o r t h e ~ r u s t e e s '
d e c i s i o n pursuant t o s e c t i o n 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, t h e D i s t r i c t
Superintendent r e p l i e d by a l e t t e r s t a t i n g s i x r e a s o n s f o r t h e
t e r m i n a t i o n on A p r i l 1, 1972. A t s i c h t i n g l s request a hearing before
t h e T r u s t e e s was h e l d A p r i l 24, 1972. A t t h a t hearing t h e Trustees
r e a f f i r m e d t h e i r d e c i s i o n n o t t o renew ~ i c h t i n g ' sc o n t r a c t .
That d e c i s i o n was appealed by S i c h t i n g t o t h e Lincoln
County Superintendent o f Schools. P r i o r t o t h e h e a r i n g , counsel
f o r t h e T r u s t e e s and f o r S i c h t i n g met i n an e f f o r t t o d e f i n e t h e
i s s u e s t o be heard. Subsequently, a t t h e h e a r i n g c o u n s e l f o r t h e
Trustees read a s t i p u l a t i o n i n t o t h e record. Counsel f o r S i c h t i n g
made no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e s t i p u l a t i o n . When a t t h e h e a r i n g counsel
f o r t h e T r u s t e e s i n t r o d u c e d l e t t e r s which r e l a t e d t o the s t i p u l a t i o n ,
S i c h t i n g ' s a t t o r n e y s t a t e d t h e y were a c c e p t a b l e "to show t h e procedural
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steps. Following testimony o f w i t n e s s e s f o r both p a r t i e s , t h e
County Superintendent r e v e r s e d t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e T r u s t e e s because
t h e l e t t e r of A p r i l 1, 1972 t o S i c h t i n g f a i l e d t o meet r e q u i r e -
ments o f s e c t i o n 75-6104. This d e c i s i o n was appealed t o t h e S t a t e
Superintendent who affirmed t h e County Superintendent on August 10,
1972.
The T r u s t e e s then sought t o have t h e d e c i s i o n s o f
t h e S t a t e Superintendent and County Superintendent s e t a s i d e
by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . That c o u r t remanded t h e m a t t e r t o t h e
County Superintendent f o r f u r t h e r testimony r e g a r d i n g t h e
s t i p u l a t i o n , and whether S i c h t i n g was given s u f f i c i e n t n o t i c e
by t h e A p r i l 1, 1972 l e t t e r . T h e r e a f t e r t h e County Superintendent
a g a i n r e v e r s e d t h e ~ r u s t e e s 'd e c i s i o n . On appeal t o t h e S t a t e
Superintendent, t h e County s u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' s d e c i s i o n was a f f i r m e d .
The n e x t p r o c e d u r a l s t e p was a p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i
f o r review of t h e S t a t e S u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' s d e c i s i o n - * t a k e nby . t h e
Trustees t o the d i s t r i c t court. Affirmance o f t h e S t a t e Superin-
tendent's decision precipitated t h i s appeal.
These i s s u e s a r e s e t f o r t h on a p p e a l , b u t a c o n s i d e r a t i o n
o f I s s u e No. 3 i s a c t u a l l y d e t e r m i n a t i v e . W discuss the others
e
i n t h a t context.
1) Whether t h e l e t t e r of A p r i l 1, 1972, from D i s t r i c t
Superintendent Watkins t o S i c h t i n g p u r p o r t i n g t o s t a t e t h e r e a s o n s
f o r t e r m i n a t i o n was s u p p l i e d by t h e Board of T r u s t e e s of t h e School
D i s t r i c t a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947?
2) Whether t h e l e t t e r of A p r i l 1, 1972, was a statement
d e c l a r i n g c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y t h e s p e c i f i c r e a s o n s f o r termina-
t i o n , a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947?
3) Whether a s t i p u l a t i o n e n t e r e d i n t o by t h e counsel of
r e c o r d a t t h e h e a r i n g on May 1 6 , 1972, was b i n d i n g and e f f e c t i v e l y
precluded c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e s e c t i o n 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, r e -
quirement t h a t t h e A p r i l 1, 1972 l e t t e r d e c l a r e " c l e a r l y and
e x p l i c i t l y t h e s p e c i f i c reason o r r e a s o n s f o r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of
hfs services. * *.*."
Simply p u t , t h e b a s i s f o r t h i s a p p e a l from t h e r e v e r s a l of
t h e T r u s t e e s A p r i l 24, 1972 d e c i s i o n t o r e a f f i r m t h e i r e a r l i e r
d e c i s i o n n o t t o renew ~ i c h t i n g ' st e a c h i n g c o n t r a c t r e v o l v e s about
t h e ~ r u s t e e s 'compliance w i t h s t a t u t o r y procedures of n o t i f i c a t i o n
t o the teacher. Only t h e h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e T r u s t e e s on A p r i l 24,
1972, a c t u a l l y reached t h e m e r i t s of t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e nonrenewal
o f ~ i c h t i n g ' sc o n t r a c t .
- 3 -
W d i s c u s s f i r s t t h e m a t t e r of t h e s t i p u l a t i o n b e f o r e
e
t h e County Superintendent. There i s no d i s p u t e t h a t p r i o r t o t h e
h e a r i n g c o u n s e l f o r t h e T r u s t e e s and counsel f o r t h e t e a c h e r met
w i t h t h e County Superintendent concerning management o f t h e h e a r i n g .
I t i s a l s o n o t d i s p u t e d t h a t t h e s e same c o u n s e l , w i t h t h e a d d i t i o n
of Gary C h r i s t i a n s e n , co-counsel f o r S i c h t i n g , were p r e s e n t a t
t h e h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e County Superintendent on May 26, 1972. A t that
time t h e County Superintendent r e a d t h i s statement i n t o t h e r e c o r d :
" A t a p r e - h e a r i n g conference, t h e f o l l o w i n g
s t i p u l a t i o n s were agreed upon by c o u n s e l o r s :
" ( I ) That M r . S i c h t i n g , an I n d u s t r i a l A r t s
Teacher i n t h e Libby J u n i o r High School, i s e n t i t l e d
t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e Teacher Tenure S t a t u t e s ;
"(2) That t h e Board of T r u s t e e s r e s o l v e d by
m a j o r i t y v o t e of i t s membership t o t e r m i n a t e h i s
s e r v i c e s a t t h e end of t h e c u r r e n t school y e a r , and
t h a t he was s o n o t i f i e d ;
" ( 3 ) That t h e r e a f t e r he r e q u e s t e d and r e c e i v e d
a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t , c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y d e c l a r i n g
t h e s p e c i f i c r e a s o n f o r t e r m i n a t i o n of h i s s e r v i c e s ;
"(4) That he then r e q u e s t e d a h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e
Board t o r e c o n s i d e r i t s d e c i s i o n ;
"(5) That t h e Hearing s o r e q u e s t e d was h e l d and
t h e Board r e a f f i r m e d i t s d e c i s i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s
services.
"It now becomes t h e d u t y of t h e County Superintendent
t o determine t h e t r u t h of t h e c h a r g e s , and t h e i r s u f f i -
c i e n c y t o support t h e t e r m i n a t i o n . I n t h e t r i a l of t h i s
i s s u e , t h e burden of proof i n i t i a l l y r e s t s upon t h e Respon-
d e n t School Board, With t h a t , M r . Douglas, you may
begin." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
Counsel f o r S i c h t i n g r a i s e d no o b j e c t i o n t o t h e s t i p u l a -
tions. Statements from M r . C h r i s t i a n s e n o n l y c l a r i f i e d t h a t , h e
was n o t p r e s e n t a t t h e prehearing conference and explained t h e
p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e summation of ~ i c h t i n g ' sc a s e .
L a t e r a t t h e May 26, 1972 h e a r i n g , C h r i s t i a n s e n made t h i s
s t a t e m e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o l e t t e r s r e f e r r i n g t o Items (2) and ( 3 )
of t h e s t i p u l a t i o n :
"MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, i f t h e s e a r e o f f e r e d
s o l e l y t o show t h e procedural s t e p s , we have no
o b j e c t i o n p I f t h e y a r e o f f e r e d t o show t h e proof o f
any basis for the action, we would object to them
on that grounds.
"MR. DOUGLAS: Your Honor, or Mr. Superintendent,
excuse me, we offer these only to show the procedural
steps that were taken.
"MR. CHRISTIANSEN: With that explicit understanding,
we would have no objection"(Emphasis supplied.)
Taken together with the understanding of the stipulation
indicated by Mr. Christiansen in his deposition, it appears clear
that counsel intended to limit the issues to be considered at
the hearing before the County Superintendent. On review of the
State superintendent's affirmance of the County superintendent's
decision, the district court was bound by the stipulation of the
parties unless contrary to law, court rule, or public policy.
Capital Nat. Bank of Sacramento v. Smith, 62 C.A.2d 328, 144 P.2d 665.
Here, both parties agreed the issue to be resolved
was the substance and truth of the charges against Sichting and
whether they merited his termination. Of such a stipulation the
Supreme Court of Kansas in Manhattan Bible College v. Stritesky,
192 Kan. 287, 387 P.2d 225,228, said:
"* * * Astipulation that only one issue, or only
particular issues, are involved authorizes entry
of judgment for the one party or the other as the
stipulated fact or issue is decided. ik * * Where
parties by stipulation prescribe the issues on which
the case is to be tried, they are estopped from
thereafter asserting that the case was tried or
submitted on the wrong theory; and a stipulation of
this nature, unlike a stipulation which merely
eliminates a single issue, amounts to a binding
waiver or elimination of all i.ssues not included. I I
In the instant case, counsel for Sichting waived any
objections to the sufficiency of the notice in the April 1, 1972
letter; such waiver of an advantage of any provision of a law
intended solely for his benefit is proper. Section 49-105, R.C.M.
1947; Shea v. North-Butte Min. Co., 55 Mont. 522, 538, 179 P.
499; Commercial Credit Co. v. O'~rien,115 Mont. 199, 216, 146
P.2d 637.
Thus the district court erred, as a matter of law, in
basing its judgment on a conclusion of law concerning a claim
not within the stipulation made by the parties concerning the
issue to be determined. Frye v. Switzer, 145 Colo. 401, 359
P.2d 370,371.
Further discussion of the sufficiency of the notice
in the April 1, 1972, letter is unnecessary in view of our
determination the parties stipulated to its completeness.
Next, we consider the conclusion reached by the district
court that the statement of reasons given to Sichting by the
District Superintendent did not satisfy the requirement of section
75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, which provides that such a statement shall
be supplied by the Trustees. In our view such an argument exalts
form over substance. The stipulation noted heretofore states
in part :
"2
() That the Board of Trustees resolved by
majority vote of its membership to terminate
his services at the end of the current school
year, and that he was so notified". (Emphasis
supplied.)
It cannot be disputed then that the Trustees did resolve not to
renew ~ichting's contract.
Considering whether the delegation of the statutory
responsibility to notify the teacher was proper, we take note of
the discussion in the Anno. 92 ALR2d 751,763:
"The statutes requiring that a teacher who is to
be discharged, or whose contract is not to be
renewed, be given notice of the matter, ordinarily
specify the person or officials to give the notice
in question, and the sufficiency of such notice has
sometimes been attacked, although with little success,
on the ground that the action was taken by one other
than the authorized officials." (Emphasis supplied.)
The annotation cites two cases. In Baugh v. Board of Education,
244 Ala. 522, 14 S.2d 508, and Knickerbocker v. Redlands High
School District, 49 Cal.App.2d 722, 122 P.2d 289, the courts held
that notification of a decision already reached by the school board
and sent by the superintendent did not constitute an improper
delegation. The superintendent's action here was purely a
ministerial one by the chief executive officer of the Trustees.
Hence the conclusion of the district court on this issue was
error, as a matter of law.
In sum, section 75-6104, R.C.M. 1947, was fully complied
with by the Trustees in their action notifying Sichting of the
nonrenewal of his teaching contract. There is thus no legal
basis for the reversal of that decision by the County Superintendent
and the subsequent affirmance of the County Superintendent by the
State Superintendent. Similarly, it was reversible error for the
district court on certiorari to base its judgment on noncompliance
with the procedures provided for in that statute and for it to
neglect a valid stipulation of the parties.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the
cause remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with this
opinion and the ~rustees'decision of April 24, 1972.
,.- - We Concur: +I
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Chief Justaice
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Justices.