No. 13295
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
1976
STATE O M N A A e x re1
F OTN
BURLINGTON NORTHERN I N C . ,
Rela t o r ,
THE DISTRICT COURT O THE EIGHTH
F
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
MONTANA, I N AND FOR THE C U T OF
O NY
CASCADE, THE HON. N T ALLEN, JUDGE
A
PRESIDING,
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING :
Counsel o f Record:
F o r Re l a t o r :
Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena,
Montana
C o r d e l l Johnson a r g u e d , Helena, Montana
F o r Respondents:
Hoyt and Bottomly, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
John Hoyt a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Submitted: March 1 7 , 1976
Decided :
fiPR 1 4 1376
F i l e d : .&PR l4 m'f?
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e
Court.
T h i s i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding. Relator Burlington
N o r t h e r n , I n c . , p e t i t i o n e d t h i s Court f o r a w r i t o f s u p e r v i s o r y
control o r other appropriate order. Ex p a r t e p r e s e n t a t i o n on
March 4 , 1976, was f o l l o w e d by an o r d e r o f t h i s Court f o r a n
a d v e r s a r y h e a r i n g on March 1 7 , 1976. B r i e f s were s u b m i t t e d , t h e
m a t t e r argued and t a k e n under advisement by t h e C o u r t .
This matter involves a Federal ~ m p l o y e r s 'L i a b i l i t y
Act (FELA) c a s e which was b e f o r e t h i s Court p r e v i o u s l y (McGee
v. B u r l i n g t o n N o r t h e r n , I n c . , Mont . , 540 P.2d 298,
32 St.Rep. 847). I n t h a t case r e l a t o r appealed a j u r y v e r d i c t i n
t h e amount o f $525,000 a g a i n s t r e l a t o r t o t h i s Court. Following
t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and judgment, r e l a t o r r a i l r o a d company f a i l e d t o
p o s t a s u p e r s e d e a s bond w i t h i n t h e p e r i o d provided by t h e r u l e s
o f a p p e l l a t e c i v i l p r o c e d u r e and McGee l e v i e d on a p p r o x i m a t e l y
$170,000 o f t h e r e l a t o r ' s a s s e t s b e f o r e such bond was p o s t e d .
T h i s C o u r t , on a p p e a l , v a c a t e d and set a s i d e t h e judgment
and o r d e r e d a new t r i a l on t h e i s s u e o f damages. Following d e n i a l
o f a r e h e a r i n g on September 1 3 , 1975, r e l a t o r f i l e d a motion on
September 1 8 , 1975, f o r a n o r d e r r e q u i r i n g a n a c c o u n t i n g o f funds
l e v i e d on by McGee a f t e r t h e j u r y v e r d i c t and judgment and asked
f o r an o r d e r f o r r e s t i t u t i o n o f such f u n d s and f o r c o s t s on
appeal.
Following t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h i s C o u r t , McGee f i l e d a p e t i t i o n
f o r a w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i i n t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t .
The t r i a l c o u r t o r d e r e d t h a t McGee would n o t have t o f i l e b r i e f s
on t h e a c c o u n t i n g and r e s t i t u t i o n o r c o s t q u e s t i o n s u n t i l 30
days a f t e r a r u l i n g by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court on t h e
w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i i n t h a t Court.
On January 1 9 , 1976, t h e Supreme Court of t h e United
S t a t e s denied t h e p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i .
The t r i a l j u d g e , Judge A l l e n , on J a n u a r y 27, 1976, s e t
t h e c a s e f o r t r i a l on A p r i l 27, 1976. McGee t h e n f i l e d an
amended c o m p l a i n t a l l e g i n g t h e v i o l a t i o n o f t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y
Appliance A c t , which had been i n t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t b u t which
t h e o r i g i n a l t r i a l judge had deemed i t n o t n e c e s s a r y t o r u l e
upon, and i n a d d i t i o n a l l e g e d w i ' l f u l and wanton c o n d u c t by
r e l a t o r r a i l r o a d company a s a b a s i s f o r p u n i t i v e damages.
R e l a t o r r a i l r o a d company f i l e d c o n s o l i d a t e d motions
d i r e c t e d a t t h e amended c o m p l a i n t and renewed i t s p r e v i o u s motion
f o r an a c c o u n t i n g and an o r d e r r e q u i r i n g r e s t i t u t i o n o f t h e f u n d s
McGee e x e c u t e d on f o l l o w i n g t h e judgment a t t h e end o f t h e f i r s t
trial.
The t r i a l judge d e n i e d r e l a t o r ' s c o n s o l i d a t e d motions
and r e l a t o r i n s t i t u t e d t h i s p r o c e e d i n g under Rule 7 and Rule 1 7 ,
Rules o f A p p e l l a t e C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , a s k i n g t h i s Court t o e x e r c i s e
supervisory c o n t r o l over the d i s t r i c t court i n the case. This
Court i s r e q u e s t e d t o e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l o v e r t h r e e m a t t e r s :
(1) Whether r e l a t o r i s e n t i t l e d t o r e s t i t u t i o n o f f u n d s
t a k e n b y McGee on e x e c u t i o n s , where t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judgment
upon which t h e e x e c u t i o n s were b a s e d was s e t a s i d e and v a c a t e d on
appeal.
(2) Whether p u n i t i v e damages c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d f o r any
purpose i n an FELA c a s e .
(3) Whether t h o s e p o r t i o n s o f 1 4 c ~ e e ' s
amended c o m p l a i n t
which do n o t comply w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f Rule 8 , M.R.Civ.P.,
s h o u l d be o r d e r e d s t r i c k e n .
W w i l l f i r s t c o n s i d e r i s s u e s (1) and ( 3 ) .
e These i s s u e s
a r e premature a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e proceedings. I s s u e ( I ) , t h e
r e s t i t u t i o n of funds, W e noe t h a t a t t h e time of t h e f i r s t t r i a l
McGee r e c e i v e d a v e r d i c t i n t h e amount o f $525,000 f o r s e r i o u s
i n j u r i e s received. While t h a t judgment was r e v e r s e d , t h e m a t t e r
was r e t u r n e d f o r r e t r i a l on t h e q u e s t i o n o f damages. Because of
r e l a t o r ' s f a i l u r e t o p o s t a supersedeas bond, c e r t a i n a s s e t s
were l e v i e d upon and t h i s Court f i n d s no e r r o r on t h e p a r t of
t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n n o t g r a n t i n g r e l a t o r ' s motion f o r an accounting
a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e c a s e . R e l a t o r c i t e s and argues Anderson
v. Border, 87 Mont. 4 , 285 P. 174, a s c o n t r o l l i n g on t h e r e s t i -
t u t i o n of monies l e v i e d upon by McGee. W do n o t f i n d Anderson
e
c o n t r o l l i n g f o r i n t h a t c a s e t h e r e was a f i n a l judgment from
which no f u r t h e r appeal was taken. Here, t h e c a s e i s about t o
be r e t r i e d . For t h i s Court t o now c a l l f o r an accounting and
r e s t i t u t i o n would n o t only i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s
handling of t h e c a s e , b u t would cause a d d i t i o n a l d e l a y i n a c a s e
t h a t has been s e t f o r r e t r i a l on A p r i l 27, 1976.
I s s u e (3) i s d i r e c t e d a t t h e amended complaint. We
w i l l n o t i n t e r f e r e a t t h i s p r e t r i a l s t a g e of t h e proceedings w i t h
t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o allow t h e amended complaint t o s t a n d .
While we a g r e e t h a t one of t h e purposes of t h e Montana Rules o f
C i v i l Procedure i s t o provide simple, c o n c i s e and d i r e c t p l e a d i n g s ,
we do n o t f i n d an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e t r i a l judge i n n o t
g r a n t i n g r e l a t o r ' s motion t o s t r i k e M c ~ e e ' samended complaint.
As p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , t h e amended complaint r e i n s t a t e d a count
covering v i o l a t i o n o f t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y Appliance Act (45 U.S.C.
$ 1 e t seq.). F e d e r a l c a s e s c o n s t r u e t h i s Act a s an amendment t o
and a p a r t of FELA (45 U.S.C.551 e t s e q . ) and t h e two a c t s should
be r e a d and a p p l i e d t o g e t h e r . W f i n d t h a t p u n i t i v e damages a r e
e
n o t proper f o r a v i o l a t i o n of t h i s Act. Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L ed 1282, 1 ALR2d 252; Chicago &
1
N.W.Ry.Co. v. Chicago, R . I . & P.R.Co., 179 F.Supp. 33, a f f ' d 280
F.2d 110, c e r t . d e n . 364 U.S. 931; International-G.N.Ry.Co. v.
United S t a t e s , 268 F.2d 409; H o l f e s t e r v. Long I s l a n d R a i l r o a d Co.,
360 F.2d 369; Underwood v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R a i l r o a d Co., 191
Kan. 338, 381 P.2d 510; A t l a n t i c Coast Line R.Co. v . Moore, 135 F l a .
485, 186 So. 210.
The remaining i s s u e , i s s u e ( 2 ) , t h a t of a l l o w i n g McGee
t o plead p u n i t i v e damages i n h i s amended complaint, was e r r o r
on t h e p a r t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . The F e d e r a l ~ m ~ l o ~ eL is 'b i l i t y
r a
Act i s a s i t s name i m p l i e s , a f e d e r a l a c t , and when a p p l i c a b l e
i s t h e e x c l u s i v e remedy a g a i n s t t h e r a i l r o a d s f o r i n j u r i e s t o t h e i r
employees. Metropolitan Coal Company v. Johnson, 265 F.2d 173,
Any s u i t s f o r i n j u r i e s under t h e Act and r i g h t s t o r e c o v e r must be
p r e d i c a t e d on negligence. Herdman v. Penn.R.Co., 228 F.2d 902,
352 U.S. 518, 77 S.Ct. 455, 1 L ed 2d 508.
While t h e FELA provides t h a t s u i t s may be f i l e d i n
e i t h e r f e d e r a l o r s t a t e c o u r t s , t h e r e can be no q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e
r i g h t s c r e a t e d by t h e Act a r e governed by t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e
federal courts. Bowman v. I l l i n o i s C e n t r a l Railroad Co., 1 I11.2d
1
186, 142 N.E.2d 104, c e r t . d e n . 355 U.S. 837, 78 S.Ct.63, 2 L ed
2d 49. With t h e enactment of FELA, Congress took over t h e f i e l d
of employers' l i a b i l i t y t o employees i n i n t e r s t a t e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n by
r a i l , and a l l s t a t e laws upon t h e s u b j e c t were superseded. The
r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of an employee and t h e employer depend on
t h e FEU a s construed by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s . This Court recognized
t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n Resner v. N.P.Ry.Co., 161 Mont. 177, 505 P.2d 86.
See a l s o Davee v. Southern P a c i f i c Company, 25 Cal.Rptr. 445,
375 P.2d 293; D w v. C a r n e g i e - I l l i n o i s S t e e l Corporation, 165 F.
o
2d 777.
T h e r e f o r e , f o r guidance on whether p u n i t i v e damages a r e
an element of damages t o be considered i n FELA c a s e s , we look t o
the federal jurisdiction. W n o t e h e r e , t h a t though FELA has been
e
i n e x i s t e n c e n e a r l y 70 y e a r s , t h e q u e s t i o n of p u n i t i v e damages has
never been considered and passed on by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme
Court. The h i g h e s t c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n was t h e S i x t h
C i r c u i t i n 1971, when i t overturned a r u l i n g of a f e d e r a l D i s t r i c t
Court, and r u l e d t h a t p u n i t i v e damages a r e n o t t o b e c o n s i d e r e d .
I n Kozar v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 449 F.2d 1238,
1240, 1242, t h e Court s a i d :
II Punitive Damages
I1
Since we hold that punitive damages are not
recoverable under the Federal ~mployers'Liability
Act, no purpose would be served by setting forth
the facts upon which the appellee relies to support
the $70,000 award.
II
There are two basic reasons advanced in the
IOmnibus Opinion' of the District Court for sub-
mitting to the jury, under the usual instructions,
the issue of punitive damages. First, it is argued
that the legislative history of the Act indicates
that it was not its purpose to limit or take away
any 1 remedy' available at common law and at common
law punitive damages were available. Second, per-
mitting the recovery of punitive damages advances
the objective of the Act to ' [place] such stringent
liability upon the railroads for injuries to their
employees as to compel the highest safeguarding of the
lives and limbs of men in this dangerous employment. I
We conclude that neither reason is a sound basis for
accepting an interpretation of the Act that would
permit the unprecedented recovery of punitive damages.
"Admittedly, the legislative history of the Act
shows that its provisions were not to limit or take
away any t remedy1 available at common law to an injured
employee. But it is a mistake to characterize the
right to recover punitive damages at common law a
1 common law remedy'. There is an important distinction
between a I remedy1 which Eouvier's Law Dictionary de-
fines as 1 the means employed to enforce a right or
redress an injury1, and 'damages1 which are defined
asl[t]he indemnity recoverable by a person who has
sustained an injury + : 9: and the term includes not
only compensatory, but also exemplary or punitive or
vindictive ;v +i ;k damages. I Damages are simply a measure
of injury, and to say that at common law there was
I punitive damages as a right of action' or there was
available 1 the common law remedy action of punitive
damages' or a I punitive damages remedy' is a misuse of
the legal terminology. Thus, when the legislative history
of the Act is examined and shows that Congress never
intended the Act as a restriction on the remedies available
to an injured employee, if is not referring to a damages
theory. Moreover, the eases cited by the District Court
as examples of early common law cases permitting recovery
of punitive damages are distinguishable from the case of a
railroad employee or an employee's administrator suing
his employer for injuries or death suffered on the job.
Most of the cases relied upon by the District Court are
cases of intentional torts.
he District Court, in its I Omnibus Opinion',
correctly set forth the humanitarian and beneficient
reasons for the adoption of the Federal ~mployers'
Liability Act by Congress. However, no matter how
persuasive this policy argument may be, it cannot stand
as the law in light of the clear, unambiguous state-
ments in the line of Supreme Court authorities holding
that damages recoverable under the Act are compensatory
only.
11
I n Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Company
v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173, 175-176, 33 S.Ct. 426,427,
57 L.Ed. 785 (1913), i t i s s t a t e d :
"'1n a s e r i e s of c a s e s l a t e l y decided by t h i s
c o u r t , t h e a c t i n t h i s a s p e c t has been construed a s
intended only t o compensate t h e s u r v i v i n g r e l a t i v e s
of such a deceased employe f o r t h e a c t u a l pecuniary
l o s s r e s u l t i n g t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r person o r persons f o r
whose b e n e f i t an a c t i o n i s given. The recovery must
t h e r e f o r e be l i m i t e d t o compensating t h o s e r e l a t i v e s f o r
whose b e n e f i t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r s u e s a s a r e shown t o
have s u s t a i n e d some pecuniary l o s s . Michigan C e n t r a l
Railroad v. Vreeland, 227 U,S.59, [33 S.Ct. 192, 57
L.Ed. 4171; American Railroad [Co. of Porto Rico] v.
Didricksen, 227 U.S. 145, 33 S.Ct. 224, 57 L.Ed. 4561.
I n t h e l a s t c i t e d c a s e , speaking of t h e ~ m p l o y e r s '
L i a b i l i t y Act, we s a i d (p.149, [33 S.Ct. p. 2251):
"The cause of a c t i o n which was c r e a t e d i n b e h a l f of
t h e i n j u r e d employ& d i d n o t s u r v i v e h i s d e a t h , nor
pass t o h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . But t h e a c t , i n c a s e of
t h e d e a t h of such an employ& from h i s i n j u r y , c r e a t e s
a new and d i s t i n c t r i g h t of a c t i o n f o r t h e b e n e f i t of
t h e dependent r e l a t i v e s named i n t h e s t a t u t e . The
damages r e c o v e r a b l e a r e l i m i t e d t o such l o s s a s r e -
s u l t s t o them because they have been deprived of a
r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n of pecuniary b e n e f i t s by t h e
wrongful d e a t h of t h e i n j u r e d employe. The damage i s
limited s t r i c t l y t o the f i n a n c i a l l o s s thus sustained."
11 1
The s t a t u t o r y a c t i o n of an a d m i n i s t r a t o r i s
n o t f o r t h e e q u a l b e n e f i t of each of t h e s u r v i v i n g
r e l a t i v e s f o r whose b e n e f i t t h e s u i t i s brought.
Though t h e judgment may b e f o r a g r o s s amount, t h e
i n t e r e s t of each b e n e f i c i a r y must be measured by h i s
o r h e r i n d i v i d u a l pecuniary l o s s . That apportionment
i s f o r t h e j u r y t o r e t u r n . This w i l l , of c o u r s e , exclude
any recovery i n b e h a l f of such a s show no pecuniary l o s s . 1
ii
' >k 9:
I I I n Michigan C e n t r a l Railroad Company v. Vreeland,
227 U.S. 59, 68-69, 33 S.Ct. 192,195, 57 L.Ed. 417 (1913),
i n commenting upon t h e type of a c t i o n c r e a t e d by t h e
F e d e r a l Employers1 L i a b i l i t y Act and t h e damages r e c o v e r a b l e ,
t h e following unequivocal s t a t e m e n t s a r e made:
"'1t i s a l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e l o s s and damage s u s t a i n e d
by r e l a t i v e s dependent upon t h e decedent. It i s t h e r e f o r e
a l i a b i l i t y f o r t h e pecuniary damage r e s u l t i n g t o them,
and f o r t h a t o n l y . * ii *"I
'
McGee c i t e s and argues a number o f c a s e s decided b e f o r e
Kozar: P e t i t i o n of Den Norske Amerikalinje, 276 F.Supp. 163;
Gunnip v. Warner Co., 43 F.R.D. 365, 10 A R Fed 528; P h i l l i p v.
L
United S t a t e s Lines Co., 240 F.Supp. 992; Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L ed 1282. Particular reliance i s
placed i n t h e c a s e of United S t a t e s S t e e l Corporation v. Fuhrman,
407 F.2d 1143, 10 A R Fed 500, c e r t . d e n .
L 398 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct.
These same zrguments were made w i t h no a v a i l t o t h e
S i x t h C i r c u i t i n Kozar, where t h e Court h e l d :
"We do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t United S t a t e s S t e e l
C o r p o r a t i o n v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 ( 6 t h C i r .
1969). which r e v e r s e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n P e t i t i o n
o f Den Norske A m e r i k a l i n j e A/S, 276 F.Supp. 163 (N.
D. Ohio, 1 9 6 7 ) , r e q u i r e s a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t from
t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t p u n i t i v e damages a r e n o t r e c o v e r -
a b l e under FELA. Den Norske d i d h o l d t h a t p u n i t i v e
damages w e r e r e c o v e r a b l e from a t o r t f e a s o r i n a n
a d m i r a l t y proceeding and v o l u n t e e r e d t h e s t a t e m e n t
t h a t S e c t i o n 59 o f FELA p e r m i t t e d a deceased r a i l -
r o a d e r t o s u e f o r p u n i t i v e damages. However, t h e
M i s s i s s i p p i c a s e o f Ennis v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry., 118
Miss. 509, 79 So. 73 (1918), c i t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t
Court a s a l l o w i n g p u n i t i v e damages was a s t a t e
wrongful d e a t h a c t i o n c o n t r o l l e d by s t a t e law, and
a c t u a l l y by way o f n e g a t i v e i n f e r e n c e t h e o p i n i o n o f
t h e M i s s i s s i p p i c o u r t r e c o g n i z e s t h a t compensatory
damages a r e t h e I measure o f damages *** recoverable
under t h e F e d e r a l ~ m p l o y e r s ' L i a b i l i t y Act. 1 Also,
t h e s t a t e m e n t i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court
t h a t S e c t i o n 59 o f t h e Act added by t h e Amendment o f
1910 p e r m i t s r e c o v e r y of p u n i t i v e damages i s r e f u t e d
i n S t . Louis I . M . & S.R. Company v. C r a f t , 237 U.S.
648,658, 35 S . C t . 704, 706, 59 L.Ed. 1160 (1915).
11 I On t h e c o n t r a r y , i t [ § 591 means t h a t t h e r i g h t
e x i s t i n g i n t h e i n j u r e d person a t h i s death--a r i g h t
c o v e r i n g h i s l o s s and s u f f e r i n g w h i l e he l i v e d , b u t
t a k i n g no account o f h i s premature d e a t h o r o f what he
would have e a r n e d o r accomplished i n t h e n a t u r a l span
of l i f e - - s h a l l survive t o h i s personal representative
t o t h e end t h a t i t may b e e n f o r c e d and t h e proceeds
p a i d t o t h e r e l a t i v e s i n d i c a t e d , And when t h i s p r o v i -
s i o n a r d § I a r e r e a d t o g e t h e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n i s un-
avoidable t h a t the personal representative i s t o re-
c o v e r on b e h a l f o f t h e d e s i g n a t e d b e n e f i c i a r i e s , n o t
o n l y such damages a s w i l l compensate them f o r t h e i r own
p e c u n i a r y l o s s , b u t a l s o such damages a s w i l l b e r e a s o n -
a b l y compensatory f o r t h e l o s s and s u f f e r i n g o f t h e i n -
j u r e d person w h i l e he l i v e d . ' (Emphasis added).
I I Den Norske was r e v e r s e d by t h i s Court i n Fuhrman on
t h e grounds t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t upon which t h e
D i s t r i c t Court r e l i e d t o make t h e award o f p u n i t i v e
damages were c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , and any i n f e r e n c e t h a t
may b e e x t r a c t e d from t h e r e a d i n g o f Fuhrman t h a t puni-
t i v e damages may b e r e c o v e r a b l e i n a n a d m i r a l t y proceeding
cannot be regarded a s c o n t r o l l i n g i n t h i s case."
For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s w e h o l d t h a t p u n i t i v e damages
cannot b e c o n s i d e r e d i n a n FELA c a s e .
This opinion s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a w r i t o f supervisory
c o n t r o l f o r t h e guidance of t h e t r i a l c o u r t .
We Concur:
A
'& *
f q1
4
* +
-
.
/ J i
ti,
Justices.
' h o n . Jack Shanstrom, DistrJct Judge,
i
1
sitting for Chief Justice Harrison.
t4r.J u s t i c e 3ene 3. DaLy s p e c i a i l y c o n c u r r i n g i n p a r t and
dissenting i n part:
I concur w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y e x c e p t a s t o t h e r a t i o n a l e
jubi'iiitted t o s u p p o r t i t s h o l d i n g on i s s u e (2), p u n i t i v e damages.
Ne may b e bound by t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e h i g h e s t f e d e r a l c o u r t ,
huwever, I do n o t f i n d t h e r a t i o n a l e i n Kozar p a r t i c u l a r l y
uersuasive .