No. 133.03
TN THE SUPREME COlJRT OF THE STA'I'E i)E' MONTANA
1976
MYRA A . DUNHAM,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
SOUTHSIDE NATIONAL BANK OF MISSOULA,
and J I M O'HOYTAND TEDDY JOHNSON d / b / a
JOHNSON BROTHERS,
Defendants and Respondents.
A p p e a l from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
Boone, K a r l b e r g , and Haddon, M i s s o u l a , Montana
Sam Haddon a r g u e d , Missoula , Montana
%or Sespondents:
G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn and Robinson, M i s s o u l a , Montana
Sherman V. Lohn argued and L a r r y E. R i l e y a r g u e d ,
Missoula , Montana
Vor Amicus C u r i a e :
Marra, Wenz and Iwen, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Joseph R. Marra a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Poore, McKenzie, Roth, Robischon and Robinson, B u t t e , Montana
David Wing argued and James A . P o o r e , 1 1 a r g u e d ,
1
B u t t e , Montana
Submitted: March 1 0 , 1976
-t --h- 1, 2 r'fx;
*
Decided :
, b ;:j",'%-
/ yg
b'iled :
Mr. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a n o r d e r g r a n t i n g summary judgment
e n t e r e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Missoula County.
P l a i n t i f f , Myra R. Dunham, went t o S o u t h s i d e N a t i o n a l
Bank on J a n u a r y 4 , 1972, f o r t h e p u r p o s e of making a l o a n pay-
ment. While walking t h r o u g h t h e bank p a r k i n g l o t , toward a
customer e n t r a n c e t o t h e bank, s h e s l i p p e d and f e l l on a n accumu-
l a t i o n o f i c e and snow.
I t had been snowing i n Missoula t h e n i g h t b e f o r e t h e
a c c i d e n t and c o n t i n u e d t o snow t h r o u g h o u t t h e n e x t day. The park-
i n g l o t had been c l e a r e d b e f o r e b u s i n e s s h o u r s by d e f e n d a n t s
Johnson B r o t h e r s under a maintenance agreement w i t h t h e bank.
The area where p l a i n t i f f f e l l was n o t c l e a r e d of i c e o r snow, a s
n e i t h e r of t h e defendants considered t h i s a r e a a sidewalk o r p a r t
of t h e p a r k i n g l o t .
P l a i n t i f f b r o u g h t t h i s a c t i o n f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s on
May 1 5 , 1974. D e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r summary judgment w a s g r a n t e d
on September 1 6 , 1975, on t h e grounds (1) p l a i n t i f f w a s c o n t r i b u -
t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t as a m a t t e r o f l a w , and ( 2 ) t h e Montana compara-
t i v e negligence s t a t u t e d i d n o t apply t o accidents occurring p r i o r
t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e act.
P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s t h e g r a n t i n g of summary judgment.
Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w :
(1) Does a g e n u i n e i s s u e of material f a c t e x i s t on t h e
q u e s t i o n o f whether p l a i n t i f f w a s n e g l i g e n t t h e r e b y p r e c l u d i n g
summary judgment?
(2) Does t h e Montana c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e s t a t u t e ,
s e c t i o n 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, a p p l y t o c l a i m s which a r o s e p r i o r
t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e o f t h e a c t , J u l y 1, 1975?
Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., s t a t e s a summary judgment s h a l l
be r e n d e r e d o n l y i f :
" * * * t h e p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , answers t o
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and a d m i s s i o n s on f i l e show
t h a t t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o any
m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y i s
e n t i t l e d t o a judgment a s a m a t t e r o f l a w . * * *"
The moving p a r t y h a s t h e burden of showing t h e a b s e n c e
of any g e n u i n e f a c t u a l i s s u e . A s s t a t e d i n 6 Moore's F e d e r a l
P r a c t i c e , 1156.15[31, p . 56-463:
"The c o u r t s a r e i n e n t i r e agreement t h a t t h e moving
p a r t y f o r summary judgment h a s t h e burden o f showing
t h e a b s e n c e o f any g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o a l l t h e
material f a c t s , which, under a p p l i c a b l e p r i n c i p l e s
of s u b s t a n t i v e law, e n t i t l e him t o judgment a s a
matter of law."
See Kober & K y r i s s v . B i l l i n g s Deaconess H o s p i t a l , 148 Mont. 1 1 7 ,
I n h e r d e p o s i t i o n p l a i n t i f f a d m i t t e d t h e s l i p p e r y cond-
i t i o n of t h e p a r k i n g l o t was "obvious" and t h a t s h e b e l i e v e d t h e
a c c u m u l a t i o n of ice and snow on t h e walkway was a n a t u r a l accurnu-
l a t i o n due t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s . She s t a t e d t h e c o n d i t i o n
was n o t hidden and a g r e e d s h e must have s t e p p e d on a n i c y s p o t
t h e wrong way.
T h i s C o u r t r e c e n t l y s t a t e d t h e l a w r e g a r d i n g s l i p and
f a l l under s i m i l a r c o n d i t i o n s i n Uhl v . Abrahams, 160 Mont. 426,
429, 430, 503 P.2d 26, t h e l a n g u a g e t h e r e a p p l i e s e q u a l l y w e l l
here :
"Directing our a t t e n t i o n t o t h e a p p l i c a b l e substan-
t i v e l a w , a p o s s e s s o r o f l a n d owes a d u t y t o a n
i n v i t e e t o u s e o r d i n a r y care t o keep t h e p r e m i s e s
i n a r e a s o n a b l y s a f e c o n d i t i o n and t o warn t h e
i n v i t e e o f any hidden o r l u r k i n g d a n g e r s t h e r e i n ,
b u t he i s n o t a n i n s u r e r a g a i n s t a l l a c c i d e n t s
and i n j u r i e s t o i n v i t e e s on t h e p r e m i s e s . Cassady
v. C i t y of B i l l i n g s , 135 Mont. 390, 340 P.2d 509;
Luebeck v . Safeway S t o r e s , I n c . , 152 Mont. 8 8 , 446
P.2d 921; and a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d t h e r e i n .
" I n Luebeck w e d i r e c t l y h e l d t h a t ' * * * where
d a n g e r c r e a t e d by t h e e l e m e n t s s u c h a s t h e forming
of i c e and f a l l i n g o f snow a r e u n i v e r s a l l y known,
o r a s h e r e , a c t u a l l y known, t h e r e i s n o t l i a b i l i t y .
* * * ' W e based t h i s h o l d i n g on a l i n e of c a s e s
from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s s o h o l d i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y
q u o t i n g w i t h a p p r o v a l t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t from
Crawford v . Soennichsen, 175 Neb. 8 7 , 120 N.W.2d
" ' * * * However, t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s e e m s c l e a r l y
t o be t h a t a s t o r e owner c a n n o t be c h a r g e d w i t h
n e g l i g e n c e by r e a s o n o f n a t u r a l a c c u m u l a t i o n o f
i c e and snow where t h e c o n d i t i o n i s a s w e l l known
t o t h e p l a i n t i f f a s t h e defendant.' * * *
" * * * I n s h o r t , nothing b u t a n a t u r a l i c i n g
c o n d i t i o n d u e t o t h e e l e m e n t s was i n v o l v e d and
such condition prevailed throughout t h e c i t y .
A c c o r d i n g l y , Luebeck c o n t r o l s t h e s i t u a t i o n i n
t h e i n s t a n t c a s e ; t h e r e i s no b r e a c h o f d u t y , no
n e g l i g e n c e , and no l i a b i l i t y a s a m a t t e r o f law."
A p p e l l a n t c i t e s W i l l i s v . S t . P e t e r ' s H o s p i t a l , 157 Mont.
4 1 7 , 486 P.2d 593. W i l l i s c a n be r e a d i l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n t h e
i n s t a n t c a s e , a s it w a s i n Uhl.
- I n W i l l i s t h e r e w a s a j u r y ques-
t i o n a s t o whether t h e h o s p i t a l c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s l i p p e r y con-
d i t i o n by a t t e m p t i n g t o m e l t t h e ice and whether t h e p l a i n t i f f
had knowledge of t h e c o n d i t i o n . N e i t h e r of t h e s e i s s u e s o f
m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t i n t h e i n s t a n t case.
W e f i n d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t properly granted respondents'
motion f o r a summary judgment.
On a p p e a l a p p e l l a n t a s k s t h i s C o u r t t o g i v e t h e new
Montana c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e l a w r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t . In other
words, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e s h o u l d a p p l y t o a n
a c c i d e n t o c c u r r i n g p r i o r t o t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n
but not t r i e d u n t i l a f t e r the effective date.
P r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1975, t h e l a w o f c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e
i n Montana was s e c t i o n 58-607, R.C.M. 1947:
"Every one i s r e s p o n s i b l e , n o t o n l y f o r t h e
r e s u l t of h i s w i l l f u l a c t s , b u t a l s o f o r a n i n j u r y
o c c a s i o n e d t o a n o t h e r by h i s want o f o r d i n a r y care
o r s k i l l i n t h e management o f h i s p r o p e r t y o r
person, except s o f a r a s t h e l a t t e r has, w i l l f u l l y
o r by want of o r d i n a r y c a r e , b r o u g h t t h e i n j u r y
upon h i m s e l f . The e x t e n t of l i a b i l i t y i n s u c h
c a s e s i s d e f i n e d by t h e t i t l e on compensatory
relief. "
On J u l y 1, 1975, Montana's c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e s t a t -
u t e , s e c t i o n 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, (Chap. 60, Laws of 1975)
became e f f e c t i v e . It reads:
"Contributory negligence s h a l l n o t bar recovery
i n a n a c t i o n by any p e r s o n o r h i s l e g a l r e p r e s e n -
t a t i v e t o r e c o v e r damages f o r n e g l i g e n c e r e s u l t -
ing i n death o r i n j u r y t o person o r property,
i f s u c h n e g l i g e n c e was n o t g r e a t e r t h a n t h e
n e g l i g e n c e o f t h e p e r s o n a g a i n s t whom r e c o v e r y
i s s o u g h t , b u t any damages a l l o w e d s h a l l be d i s -
missed i n t h e p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e amount of n e g l i -
gence a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e p e r s o n r e c o v e r i n g . "
S e c t i o n 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, d i d n o t amend o r r e p e a l
s e c t i o n 58-607, R.C.M. 1947. S e c t i o n 58-607.1 m o d i f i e s t h e
t o t a l d e f e n s e of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e by a p p o r t i o n i n g damages,
i f t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s n e g l i g e n c e i s n o t g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t of t h e
defendant. There i s no l e g i s l a t i v e d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t s e c t i o n
58-607.1 s h a l l be o n l y p r o s p e c t i v e i n o p e r a t i o n , n o r i s t h e r e
d e c l a r a t i o n t h e s t a t u t e s h a l l have r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t .
There i s a presumption i n Montana a g a i n s t c o n s t r u i n g a
s t a t u t e retroactively, unless s p e c i f i c a l l y declared r e t r o a c t i v e .
S e c t i o n 12-201, R.C.M. 1947,provides:
"No l a w c o n t a i n e d i n any o f t h e c o d e s o r o t h e r
s t a t u t e s of Montana i s r e t r o a c t i v e u n l e s s e x p r e s s l y
SO d e c l a r e d . "
The f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h i s presumption w a s s e t f o r t h i n S u l l i v a n
v . C i t y of B u t t e , 65 Mont. 495, 498, 211 P. 301, w h e r e i n t h e
Court s a i d :
"While o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n d o e s n o t f o r b i d t h e e n a c t -
ment of r e t r o s p e c t i v e laws g e n e r a l l y , it i s a
r u l e r e c o g n i z e d by t h e a u t h o r i t i e s everywhere
t h a t r e t r o s p e c t i v e l a w s a r e looked upon w i t h d i s -
favor. I t i s a maxim s a i d t o be a s o l d a s t h e
l a w i t s e l f t h a t a new s t a t u t e o u g h t t o be p r o s p e c -
t i v e , not retrospective, i n its operation. * * *
The maxim h a s i t s f o u n d a t i o n i n t h e presumption
t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d o e s n o t i n t e n d t o make a
new r u l e f o r p a s t t r a n s a c t i o n s and e v e r y r e a s o n -
a b l e d o u b t w i l l be r e s o l v e d a g a i n s t a r e t r o s p e c t i v e
operation. "
See S t a t e e x r e l . M i l l s v. Dixon, 68 Mont. 526, 219 P. 637; S t a t e
ex r e l . C i t y of B i l l i n g s v . O s t e n , 91 Mont. 76, 5 P.2d 562; S t a t e
ex r e l . Whitlock v . S t a t e Board o f E q u a l i z a t i o n , 100 Mont. 72,
45 P.2d 684; S t a t e v. J . C. Maguire Const. Co., 113 Mont. 324,
125 P.2d 433; 82 C.J.S. S t a t u t e s 8414; Anno. 37 ALR3d 1438, 1440;
Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, S8.4.
I n C i t y of Harlem v. S t a t e Highway Comm'n, 149 Mont. 281,
284, 425 P.2d 718, t h i s C o u r t i n t e r p r e t e d s e c t i o n 12-201, R.C.M.
1947, s t a t i n g :
" * * * This s e c t i o n provides a r u l e of construc-
t i o n which r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e i n t e n t i of t h e l e g i s -
l a t u r e i s t o be g a i n e d from t h e a c t i t s e l f and
from no o t h e r s o u r c e . I'
W f i n d n o t h i n g i n s e c t i o n 58-607.1,
e R.C.M. 1947, ( o r
Chap. 60, Laws of 1 9 7 5 ) , which e x p r e s s l y d e c l a r e s a l e g i s l a t i v e
i n t e n t t o a p p l y t h e law r e t r o a c t i v e l y .
Appellant argues t h e comparative negligence l a w i s
p r o c e d u r a l i n n a t u r e , t h u s it may be a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y .
Respondents r e p l y t h a t t h e l a w i s s u b s t a n t i v e i n n a t u r e . A
s u b s t a n t i v e law may be d e f i n e d as t h a t law which c r e a t e s d u t i e s ,
r i g h t s , o b l i g a t i o n s , and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . S t a t e ex r e l . Johnson
v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , 148 Mont. 22, 417 P.2d 109.
T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d on more t h a n o n e o c c a s i o n , t h a t pro-
c e d u r a l laws may be g i v e n r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e
presumption a g a i n s t r e t r o a c t i v i t y i n s e c t i o n 12-201, R.C.M. 1947.
S t a t e e x r e l . Johnson v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s u p r a ; S t a t e Department
of Highways v . O l s e n , 166 Mont. 1 3 9 , 531 P.2d 1330, 32 St.Rep. 110.
The Oregon Supreme C o u r t i n J o s e p h v . Lowery, 261 O r e .
545, 495 P.2d 273, 275, 276, f a c e d t h e q u e s t i o n of r e t r o a c t i v i t y
of i t s c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e law, which i s i d e n t i c a l t o Montana's
i n a l l relevant areas. It stated:
"Under t h e c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e s t a t u t e , a
p l a i n t i f f whose n e g l i g e n c e i s l e s s t h a n t h a t o f
t h e d e f e n d a n t i s n o t b a r r e d from r e c o v e r y by
v i r t u e of h i s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e , b u t i s
allowed r e c o v e r y r e d u c e d by t h e d e g r e e o f h i s
fault. here fore, i f a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y , t h e
a c t would a f f e c t l e g a l r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s
a r i s i n g o u t of p a s t a c t i o n s . A s a r e s u l t , s t r i c t l y
f o r t h e p u r p o s e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n h e r e , t h e
p r o v i s i o n s of t h e a c t a r e ' s u b s t a n t i v e 1 and
not 'procedural o r remedial' i n nature. I f applied
r e t r o a c t i v e l y , t h e s t a t u t e could c r e a t e a duty t o
pay which d i d n o t e x i s t a t t h e t i m e t h e damage was
i n £l i c t e d . * * *
" * * * W b e l i e v e t h e r e i s m e r i t i n t h e p r i o r view
e
of t h i s c o u r t * * * t h a t , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f a n
indication t o the contrary, l e g i s l a t i v e a c t s
s h o u l d n o t be c o n s t r u c t e d i n a manner which c h a n g e s
l e g a l r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a r i s i n g o u t o f
t r a n s a c t i o n s which o c c u r p r i o r t o t h e p a s s a g e of
such a c t s . "
W e a g r e e w i t h t h e r e a s o n i n g of t h e Oregon c o u r t , and f i n d t h e
Montana c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e law s u b s t a n t i v e i n n a t u r e w i t h
a presumption a g a i n s t r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t .
The Montana and Oregon c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e l a w s a r e
nearly identical. These l a w s were c o p i e d from t h e Wisconsin
s t a t u t e f i r s t p a s s e d i n 1931 and amended t o i t s p r e s e n t form
( c o p i e d by Montana and Oregon) i n 1971. Montana f o l l o w s t h e r u l e
of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t i n borrowing a s t a t u t e from a n o t h e r
s t a t e , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e presumably borrows t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n p l a c e d
upon it by t h e h i g h e s t c o u r t o f t h e s t a t e from which i t i s borrowed.
S t a d l e r v. F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank, 22 Mont. 190, 56 P. 111; E s t e r l y
v . Broadway Garage Co., 87 Mont. 64, 285 P. 172; R o b e r t s v .
R o b e r t s , 135 Mont. 1 4 9 , 338 P.2d 719; Lowe v. Root, 166 ~ o n t . 1 5 0,
531 P.2d 674, 32 St.Rep. 122.
I n 1931 Wisconsin became t h e f i r s t s t a t e t o e n a c t a
m o d i f i e d c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e l a w ( t h e t y p e e n a c t e d i n Montana
i n 1975). Schwartz, Comparative N e g l i g e n c e , 5 3 . 5 ( A ) . I n 1933
t h e Wisconsin Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h e s t a t u t e d i d n o t a p p l y r e t r o -
actively. B r e w s t e r v. Ludtke, 211 Wisc. 344, 247 N.W. 449; Crane
v . Weber, 2 1 1 Wisc. 294, 247 N.W. 882. Both c a s e s s i m p l y s t a t e d
t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o t h e enactment of t h e c o m p a r a t i v e
negligence a c t , thus contributory negligence w a s a t o t a l defense.
These h o l d i n g s w e r e r e a f f i r m e d i n 1935 by P e t e r s v , Milwaukee
E l e c t r i c Ry. & L i g h t Co., 217 Wisc. 481, 259 N.W. 724.
I n 1971 Wisconsin f o l l o w e d t h e l e a d o f N e w Hampshire and
a d o p t e d t h e 50% system o f c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e . Schwartz,
Comparative N e g l i g e n c e , § 3 . 5 ( B ) . I n 1972 t h e Wisconsin Supreme
C o u r t h e l d t h e 1971 m o d i f i c a t i o n c o u l d n o t o p e r a t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y ,
c i t i n g B r e w s t e r and Crane a s p r e c e d e n t . Lupie v . Hartzheim, 54
Wisc.2d 415, 195 N.W.2d 461; Holzem v . M u e l l e r , 54 Wisc.2d 388,
195 N.W.2d 635. These h o l d i n g s were r e a f f i r m e d i n Schuh v . Fox
River T r a c t o r Co., 63 Wisc.2d 728, 218 N.W.2d 279. See J o n e s
v. J o n e s , 113 N.H. 553, 311 A.2d 522, h o l d i n g t h e N e w Hampshire
law n o t r e t r o a c t i v e .
I n J o s e p h v . Lowery, s u p r a , t h e Oregon Supreme C o u r t
c i t e d t h e Wisconsin h o l d i n g s a s b e i n g h i g h l y p e r s u a s i v e on t h e
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e Oregon s t a t u t e . W e f e e l e q u a l l y persuaded
i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e Montana s t a t u t e .
Amicus on b e h a l f o f a p p e l l a n t , d i r e c t s t h e C o u r t t o t h e
many h o l d i n g s of t h i s C o u r t t h a t w e w i l l n o t b l i n d l y f o l l o w t h e
c o n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u t e by t h e c o u r t o f a n o t h e r
s t a t e from which t h e Montana 1 , e g i s l a t u r e borrowed t h e s t a t u t e ,
when s u c h c o u r t d e c i s i o n d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o be founded on r i g h t
r e a s o n i n g o r when s u c h d e c i s i o n would n o t be i n harmony w i t h t h e
s p i r i t and p o l i c y of t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e and d e c i s i o n s o f
t h i s Court, e.g. Grady v . C i t y of L i v i n g s t o n , 115 Mont. 4 7 , 1 4 1
P.2d 346; I n r e Kay's E s t a t e , 127 Mont. 172, 260 P.2d 391; C a h i l l -
Mooney Const. Co. v . Ayres, 140 Mont. 464, 373 P.2d 703. In the
i n s t a n t case, we do n o t f e e l t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s a r e r e l e v a n t , t h e r e -
f o r e w e f o l l o w Wisconsin, New Hampshire and Oregon c o u r t s i n deny-
i n g r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t t o Montana's c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e l a w .
A p p e l l a n t d i r e c t s u s t o t h e l e a d i n g cases g i v i n g compara-
t i v e negligence s t a t u t e s r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t : Peterson v. C i t y of
M i n n e a p o l i s , 285 Minn. 282, 173 N.W.2d 353, 355, 37 ALR3d 1431;
Godfrey v . S t a t e , 84 Wash.2d 959, 530 P.2d 630, 633.
P e t e r s o n i s based on t h e Minnesota c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e
l a w which s t a t e s t h e s t a t u t e " s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e i n any a c t i o n t h e
t r i a l of which i s commenced a f t e r J u l y 1, 1969." Minnesota
r e c o g n i z e d t h e p r e c e d e n t v a l u e of t h e Wisconsin d e c i s i o n s , b u t
p a r t e d from t h o s e d e c i s i o n s due t o t h e d i f f e r e n t wording o f
the statutes. T h i s wording d i s t i n c t i o n a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h e s
P e t e r s o n from t h e i n s t a n t c a s e .
Godfrey, a s d i d P e t e r s o n , d e a l t w i t h l e g i s l a t i v e a b r o g a t i o n
of t h e common law r u l e of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e . The Washington
c o u r t r e f e r r e d t o t h e common law s t a t u s o f i t s c o n t r i b u t o r y neg-
l i g e n c e r u l e on more t h a n one o c c a s i o n i n i t s o p i n i o n . I n Montana
t h e contributory negligence r u l e i s s t a t u t o r y i n nature, i n
e f f e c t u n t i l J u l y 1, 1975, and r e m a i n i n g i n e f f e c t a f t e r t h a t
d a t e , a l t h o u g h m o d i f i e d by t h e c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e s t a t u t e .
The Washington l e g i s l a t u r e , a l t h o u g h n o t p r o v i d i n g a s p e c i f i c
d i r e c t i o n a s t o r e t r o a c t i v e o r p r o s p e c t i v e e f f e c t of t h e s t a t u t e ,
d i d e n t i t l e t h e s t a t u t e : "An A c t r e l a t i n g t o c i v i l p r o c e d u r e . "
A s s t a t e d above, t h e Montana c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e l a w i s sub-
s t a n t i v e i n n a t u r e and e n t i t l e d t o t h e presumption t h a t it was
meant t o be p r o s p e c t i v e i n e f f e c t .
A p p e l l a n t a l s o r e f e r s t o c o u r t d e c i s i o n s i n F l o r i d a and
C a l i f o r n i a adopting comparative negligence as a p a r t of t h e
d e v e l o p i n g common law p r i n c i p l e s : Hoffman v . J o n e s , ( F l a . 1973)
280 So.2d 431; Nga L i v . Yellow Cab Company o f C a l i f o r n i a , 119
Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226. These d e c i s i o n s d e a l t w i t h judge-
made law modifying judge-made law. The c o u r t s were f r e e t o
d e t e r m i n e what e f f e c t t h e i r d e c i s i o n s would have on c a u s e s of
action arising prior t o the decisions.
I f t h i s C o u r t w e r e t o d e c l a r e t h a t t h e Montana c o m p a r a t i v e
n e g l i g e n c e law h a s r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t , w e would be l e g i s l a t i n g
r e t r o a c t i v e l y and h a s t e n i n g t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e c o n t r i b u t o r y
n e g l i g e n c e law w i t h o u t s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i v e d i r e c t i o n and c o n t r a r y
t o t h e common law r u l e s of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n and s e c t i o n
12-201, R.C.M. 1947. T h i s C o u r t r e c e n t l y s a i d i n Wilson v .
Swanson, Mont . f - 2d
P. , 33 St.Rep. 216, 221,
r e g a r d i n g a r e q u e s t t o d e c l a r e t h e Montana g u e s t s t a t u t e ,
r e p e a l e d e f f e c t i v e J u l y 1, 1 9 7 5 , r e t r o a c t i v e l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l :
"Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s [ r e p e a l o f t h e law] w e
d e c l i n e t o h a s t e n i t s d e m i s e by j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n .
W e d e c l i n e t o l e g i s l a t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y a s condemned
i n Montana Horse P r o d u c t s Co. v . G r e a t N o r t h e r n
Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 1 9 4 , 7 P.2d 919; S u n b u r s t 0 . &
R. Co. v . G r e a t N o r t h . Ry. Co., 91 Mont. 216, 7
P.2d 927, a££ ' d 28'7 U.S. 358, 53 S . C t . 1 4 5 , 77
L ed 360, 85 ALR 254; 1 0 ALR3d 1371, S e c . 7 ( a ) . "
Neither w i l l we l e g i s l a t e r e t r o a c t i v e l y i n t h i s matter.
The o r d e r o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g r a n t i n g summary judgment
i s a f f i r m e d , a s i s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e Montana
c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e law s e c t i o n 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, s h a l l
n o t a p p l y t o a c a u s e o f a c t i o n a r i s i n g p r i o r t o J u l y 1, 1975.
IJ u s t i c e
;
W e concur:
Hon. h r t h u r M a r t i n , d i s t r i c t j u d g e ,
s i t t i n g i n p l a c e o f M r . Chief Jus-
t i c e James T. H a r r i s o n .
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d i s s e n t i n g :
I respectfully dissent. As I view t h i s c a s e t h i s Court
had an o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e c i d e t h e c a s e i n such a manner a s t o provide
f o r u n i f o r m i t y i n t h e t r i a l of a l l pending negligence c a s e s .
Admittedly t h e arguments of a l l p a r t i e s t o t h e c a s e a r e l e g a l i s t i c a l l y
sound. The i s s u e , a s I view i t , i s which argument i s morally
sound and j u s t , To me, t h e r e can be b u t one choice.
The m a j o r i t y , c i t i n g c a s e s from t h i s and o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,
namely Oregon, Wisconsin and New Hampshire, found t h a t n o t h i n g
i n s e c t i o n 58-607.1, R.C.M. 1947, o r Chapter 60, Laws of 1975,
e x p r e s s l y d e c l a r e s a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o apply t h e law r e t r o -
a c t i v e l y , on t h e b a s i s t h a t such a change would b e a change i n
our s u b s t a n t i v e law. I b e l i e v e t h e change i s a p r o c e d u r a l , n o t
s u b s t a n t i v e change. S t a t e v. Olsen, 166 Mont. 139, 531 P.2d 1330,
32 St.Rep. 110; S t a t e ex r e l . Johnson v. D i s t r i c t Court, 148 Mont.
22, 417 P.2d 109; 82 C.J.S. S t a t u t e s § 422. As I view i t , under
~ o n t a n a ' sRule 8 (b) , M.R.Civ. P., t h e defense of c o n t r i b u t o r y
negligence i s a procedural m a t t e r which t h e defense must plead and
prove. It a f f e c t s t h e lai in tiff's remedy r a t h e r than t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
substantive obligation t o the p l a i n t i f f .
The adoption of ~ o n t a n a ' sc i v i l r u l e s of procedure, y e a r s
a f t e r t h e enactment o f s e c t i o n 58-607, R.C.M. 1947, t o m c l e a r l y
e
i n d i c a t e s t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence i s a procedural m a t t e r
a f f e c t i n g t h e remedy only.
Recognizing t h a t h e r e we have a c o n f l i c t of p h i l o s o p h i e s
a s s e t f o r t h i n the c i t e d supporting cases of the majority, I believe
t h e b e t t e r reasoned and more d e s i r a b l e i s s e t f o r t h i n t h e r e c e n t
c a s e of t h e Supreme Court of Washington holding t h a t t h a t s t a t e ' s
s t a t u t e on comparative negligence was a p p l i c a b l e t o pending c a s e s .
I n Godfrey v. S t a t e , 84 Wash.2d 959, 530 P.2d 630, 634, t h a t Court
said :
'It ~ r ~ o u ib e incongruous i-ncieed t o frustrate
d
i n i s dbvious l e g i s l a t i v e change i n p o l i c y by a d o p t i n g
= o s i t i o n t h a t would p e r m i t t h e r e j e c t e d b a r t o
p
i
r e c o v e r y t o c o n t i n u e i n o p e r a t i o n f o r y e a r s t o come
,
; ** i f we were t o a c c e p t r e s p o n d e n t ' s areument t h a t
r h e s t a t u t e i s p r o s p e c t i v e i n o p e r a t i o n t h l s s t a t e would,
f o r many y e a r s , f a c e t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f h a v i n g l i t i g a n t s
2nd o u r c o u r t s s u b j e c t e d t o a d u a l s y s t e m o f r e c o v e r y a s
t h e s e t y p e s o f c a s e s come t o l i g h t . Such c o u l d h a r d l y
have been t h e i n t e n t o r purpose of a l e g i s l a t u r e t h a t
c l e a r l y abolished contributory negligence a s a b a r t o
I-eco v e r y .
" e h o l d 9 9 9 t h a t t h e s t a t u t e was i n t e n d e d t o b e
W : ~ :
~ p e r a t i v eon t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e s e t f o r t h t h e r e i n ; a n d ,
r h a t t h e s t a t u t e was d e s i g n e d t o a p p l y t o a l l c a u s e s of
a c t i o n having a r i s e n during t h e a p p l i c a b l e period o f
l i m i t a t i o n p r i o r t o t h a t d a t e though t r i a l s may have been
e e a i s v !A v. Yellow Cab Company o f C a l i f o r n i a , 119 C a l . R p t r . 858,
5 3 2 P.2d 1226; P e t e r s o n v . C i t y o f M i n n e a p o l i s , 285 Minn. 282, 173
N.W.2d 353; Schwartz, Comparative N e g l i g e n c e , $ 8 . 5 , pp. 149-151.
I n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e comparative negligence s t a t u t e r e c e n t l y
a d o p t e d by t h e 1975 l e g i s l a t u r e i s n o t r e t r o a c t i v e , t h e m a j o r i t y ,
I f e e l , may w e l l have c r e a t e d a s t a t e o f c o n f u s i o n i n ~ o n t a n a ' s law
t h a t w i l l t a k e y e a r s t o overcome. To me i t i s n o t i n t h e s p i r i t
o f immediate s o c i a l r e f o r m , s o l o n g i n coming t o t h i s s t a t e , a s was
i n t e n d e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e .
I would r e v e r s e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .
Mr. J u s t i c e Sene R. Daly:
/ I
I c o n c u r i n t h e f o r e g o i p g d i h s e n t o f M. J u s t i c e John
r
Zonway H a r r i s o n .
Yr. ! u s c i c e 'ia~well, p e c i a l l y ~ o l l c u r r i n g :
s
I concur i n a l l t h a t i s s a i d i n t h e m a j o r i t y 3pinior1,
S u t would add a s h o r t r e s p o n s e t o t h e d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n .
The i s s u e i s n o t Itwhich argument i s m o r a l l y sound and
j u s t " as s t a t e d i n t h e d i s s e n t . N e i t h e r p a r t y n o r amicus con-
tends t h i s i s t h e i s s u e . I f ~ o n t a n a ' sc o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e s t a t u t e
i-s n o t s u b s t a n t i v e a s t h e d i s s e n t c o n c l u d e s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o
f o l l o w j u s t how a mere p r o c e d u r a l r u l e can b e . j u s t i f i e d on moral
The i s s u e i s whether t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d
co g i v e o u r c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e s t a t u t e r e t r o a c t i v e e f f e c t .
The d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n d o e s n o t c i t e a s i n g l e r u l e o f s t a t u t o r y
c o n s t r u c t i o n t o s u p p o r t such an i n t e n t i o n by t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e .
Llr o n l y s t a t e s t h a t " t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n e d and more d e s i r a b l e "
~ h i l o s o p h yo f r e t r o a c t i v i t y i s s e t f o r t h i n t h e Washington c a s e of
J o d f r e y v. S t a t e , 84 Wash.2d 959, 530 P.2d 630; t h e C a l i f o r n i a
:dse o f L i v. Yellow Cab Company of C a l i f o r n i a , 119 C a l . R p t r . 858,
532 P.2d 1226; and t h e Minnesota c a s e of P e t e r s o n v. C i t y o f
~ l n n e a p o l i s , 285 Minn. 282, 173 N.W.2d 353. A l l three cases a r e
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h e s i t u a t i o n i n Montana i n t h e m a j o r i t y
2pinion.
A d d i t i o n a l l y t h e supposed c o n f u s i o n t h a t would r e s u l t from
! J r o s p e c t i v e r a t h e r t h a n r e t r o a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n does n o t s q u a r e
w i t h Montana e x p e r i e n c e . For decades Montana t r i a l c o u r t s and
i u r i e s have been h e a r i n g a c c i d e n t c a s e s i n v o l v i n g c o m p a r a t i v e
i l e g l i g e n c e under FELA d u r i n g t h e same j u r y term a s o t h e r a c c i d e n t
cases involving contributory negligence p r i n c i p l e s without incident.
!.'his b a s i s i s n o t h i n g b u t a p u f f o f smoke.
I f t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e r e a l l y i n t e n d e d t o a l t e r t h e
l i a b i l i t y >f p a r t i e s t o a c c i d e n t s t h a t o c c u r r e d p r i o r t o t h e
odssage of o u r comparative n e g l i g e n c e s t a t u t e , i t : would have been
2 simple matter t o say so. This Court's function i s t o construe the
L a w a s i t f i n d s i t , n o t t o i n s e r t what h a s been o m i t t e d . Section
9 3 - 4 0 1 - 1 5 , X.C.M. 1947; Dunphy v . The Anaconda Company, 1 5 1 Mont. 76,
t 3 d 1 . 2 d 660, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n .