No. 13014
IN THE SUPRLTVIE COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
1975
TYYRA J. ERICKSON and
NILS G. ERICKSON,
P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t ,
LUELL J . PERRETT,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant :
Boone, K a r l b e r g & Haddon, M i s s o u l a , Montana
Sam E. Haddon a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
For Respondent :
Worden, Thane, Haines and W i l l i a m s , M i s s o u l a ,
Montana
S h e l t o n C. W i l l i a m s a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
Submitted: November 5, 1975
Decided: ; ) h ~i b ~
3
l 1
i
Filed: - I
7k
.. . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
This i s an a p p e a l from a judgment f o r defendant e n t e r e d
i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Missoula County. P l a i n t i f f s seek review
of a j u r y v e r d i c t f o r defendant i n a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y and p r o p e r t y
damage a c t i o n . T.lotions by p l a i n t i f f s p u r s u a n t t o Montana Rule
of C i v i l Procedure 5 0 ( b ) , f o r a new t r i a l o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e
f o r judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t were d e n i e d .
The i n s t a n t c a s e grew o u t of an automobile a c c i d e n t
which o c c u r r e d on December 4 , 1972, n e a r t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of
Brooks S t r e e t and South Avenue i n Missoula under extremely i c y
conditions. A automobile d r i v e n by defendant L u e l l J. P e r r e t t
n
c o l l i d e d w i t h t h e r e a r of a c a r d r i v e n by p l a i n t i f f N i l s G.
Erickson i n which h i s w i f e p l a i n t i f f Tyyra J. Erickson was r i d i n g .
A t t h e time of t h e c o l l i s i o n p l a i n t i f f rick sons' v e h i c l e
was headed south on Brooks and was stopped i n t h e r i g h t - h a n d
t r a f f i c l a n e behind o t h e r stopped v e h i c l e s w a i t i n g f o r t h e t r a f f i c
s i g n a l a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of Brooks and South t o t u r n from r e d
t o green. Defendant P e r r e t t ' s c a r was a l s o proceeding s o u t h on
Brooks i n t h e r i g h t - h a n d l a n e , a t t e m p t i n g t o t u r n l e f t i n t o t h e
middle l a n e . A f t e r moving t w o - t h i r d s of t h e way i n t o t h e middle
l a n e , d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e t u r n e d back i n t o t h e r i g h t l a n e because
a p a n e l t r u c k had e n t e r e d t h e middle l a n e i n f r o n t of him. Even
though defendant was t r a v e l i n g slowly, about t e n m i l e s p e r h o u r ,
t h e i c y s t r e e t c o n d i t i o n s prevented him from s t o p p i n g b e f o r e he h i t
p l a i n t i f f s 1 vehicle. P r o p e r t y damage t o d e f e n d a n t ' s and p l a i n t i f f s '
v e h i c l e s a s a r e s u l t of t h e a c c i d e n t was $78 and $94.84, r e s p e c -
tively.
Action was brought f o r p r o p e r t y damage t o p l a i n t i f f s 1
automobile; f o r medical and h o s p i t a l expenses, l o s t wages, p a i n
and s u f f e r i n g and g e n e r a l damages from i n j u r i e s t o p l a i n t i f f Mrs.
E r i c k s o n ; and f o r damages f o r l o s t employment t o M r . Erickson
w h i l e he was c a r i n g f o r h i s w i f e .
The m a t t e r came on f o r t r i a l on November 25, 1974.
p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e
e v i d e n c e was d e n i e d and t h e j u r y found f o r d e f e n d a n t on t h e
i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y . S u b s e q u e n t l y p l a i n t i f f s moved, p u r s u a n t t o
Rule 5 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., f o r a new t r i a l o r judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g
the verdict. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d p l a i n t i f f s ' motions and
they appeal.
Presented f o r review i s t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t ' s r u l i n g s on p l a i n t i f f s ' m o t i o n s , a s w e l l a s w h e t h e r t h e
e v i d e n c e was s u f f i c i e n t t o uphold t h e v e r d i c t .
While t h e t e s t s f o r d i r e c t i n g judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g
t h e v e r d i c t o r a new t r i a l a r e d i s s i m i l a r , w e c o n s i d e r t h e d e n i a l
o f b o t h Rule 5 0 ( b ) motions t o g e t h e r , i n view of t h e d i s c r e t i o n
g r a n t e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and t h i s Court by Rule 5 0 ( b ) . This
d i s c u s s i o n i n 5 ~ o o r e ' sF e d e r a l P r a c t i c e P a r a . 50.11, p.2363,
A
supports t h a t discretion:
"Rule 50 (b) p r o v i d e s f o r t h r e e p o s s i b l e d i s p o s i t i o n s
o f a motion made t h e r e u n d e r . I f t h e r e i s evidence t o
s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t must e n t e r judg-
ment i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e v e r d i c t ; i t c a n n o t o r d e r
a new t r i a l . I f t h e evidence i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o permit
a v e r d i c t t o s t a n d under t h e r i g i d t e s t s h e r e t o f o r e
described, t h e t r i a l court i s given a d i s c r e t i o n a r y
power e i t h e r t o o r d e r judgment f o r t h e moving p a r t y , t o
g r a n t a new t r i a l , o r t o o r d e r d i s m i s s a l w i t h o u t p r e -
j u d i c e u n d e r Rule 41. y y ik": :
Cases from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme Court have h e l d
t h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n F e d e r a l Rule 50 (b) , which ~ o n t a n a ' sr u l e i s
p a t t e r n e d a f t e r , a l s o a p p l i e s t o r e v i e w by a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s .
Bryan v. U n i t e d ' S t a t e s , 338 U.S. 552, 70 S.Ct. 317, 94 L ed 335,
c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l i n Neely v. M a r t i n K. Eby C o n s t r u c t i o n Co.,
386 U.S. 317, 322, 87 S.Ct. 1072, 18 L ed 2d 75.
Appellants argue t h a t t h e r e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o
s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t i n view o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r e a c h o f d u t y
e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e s e Montana s t a t u t e s :
S e c t i o n 32-2144, R.C.M. 1947:
" ( a ) A person o p e r a t i n g o r d r i v i n g a v e h i c l e of any
c h a r a c t e r on a p u b l i c highway of t h i s s t a t e s h a l l
d r i v e i t i n a c a r e f u l and prudent manner, and a t a
r a t e of speed no g r e a t e r t h a n i s r e a s o n a b l e and p r o p e r
under t h e c o n d i t i o n s e x i s t i n g a t t h e p o i n t of o p e r a t i o n ,
t a k i n g i n t o account t h e amount and c h a r a c t e r o f t r a f f i c ,
c o n d i t i o n of b r a k e s , weight of v e h i c l e , g r a d e and w i d t h
of highway, c o n d i t i o n of s u r f a c e , and freedom of o b s t r u c -
t i o n t o view ahead, and he s h a l l d r i v e i t s o a s n o t t o
unduly o r unreasonably endanger t h e l i f e , limb, p r o p e r t y ,
m o t h e r r i g h t s of a person e n t i t l e d t o t h e u s e of t h e
s t r e e t o r highway.
" ( c ) The d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e s h a l l , c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
paragraph ( a ) , d r i v e a t an a p p r o p r i a t e reduced speed when
approaching and c r o s s i n g an i n t e r s e c t i o n o r r a i l w a y grade
c r o s s i n g , when approaching and going around a c u r v e , when
approaching a h i l l c r e s t , when t r a v e l i n g upon a narrow o r
winding roadway, and when a s p e c i a l hazard e x i s t s w i t h
r e s p e c t t o p e d e s t r i a n s o r o t h e r ' t r a f f i c o r by r e a s o n of
weather o r highway c o n d i t i o n . I I
S e c t i o n 32-2153, R.C.M. 1947:
"The f o l l o w i n g r u l e s s h a l l govern t h e o v e r t a k i n g and
p a s s i n g of v e h i c l e s proceeding i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n ,
s u b j e c t t o t h o s e l i m i t a t i o n s , e x c e p t i o n s , and s p e c i a l
rules hereinafter stated:
" ( a ) The d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e o v e r t a k i n g a n o t h e r v e h i c l e
proceeding i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n s h a l l pass t o t h e l e f t
t h e r e o f a t a s a f e d i s t a n c e and s h a l l n o t a g a i n d r i v e t o
t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e roadway u n t i l s a f e l y c l e a r of t h e
overtaken veh3.c l e .
"(b) Except when o v e r t a k i n g and p a s s i n g on t h e r i g h t
i s p e r m i t t e d , t h e d r i v e r of an overtaken v e h i c l e s h a l l
g i v e way t o t h e r i g h t i n f a v o r of t h e o v e r t a k i n g v e h i c l e
on a u d i b l e s i g n a l and s h a l l n o t i n c r e a s e t h e speed of
h i s v e h i c l e &ti1 completely passed by t h e ove;taking
vehicle. II
S e c t i o n 32-2159(a), R.C.M. 1947:
"Whenever any roadway has been d i v i d e d i n t o two (2) o r
more c l e a r l y marked l a n e s f o r t r a f f i c t h e f o l l o w i n g
r u l e s i n addition t o a l l o t h e r s c o n s i s t e n t herewith s h a l l
apply
" ( a ) A v e h i c l e s h a l l be d r i v e n a s n e a r l y a s p r a c t i c a b l e
e n t i r e l y w i t h i n a s i n g l e l a n e and s h a l l n o t be moved from
such l a n e u n t i l t h e d r i v e r has f i r s t a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t
such movement can be made w i t h s a f e t y . I I
S e c t i o n 32-2160 ( a ) , R. C.M. 1947:
" ( a ) The d r i v e r of a motor v e h i c l e s h a l l n o t f o l l o w a n o t h e r
v e h i c l e more c l o s e l y than i s r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t , having
due r e g a r d f o r t h e speed of such v e h i c l e s and t h e t r a f f i c
upon and t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e highway. I I
A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e b r e a c h of d u t y e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e s e
s t a t u t e s i s c o n c l u s i v e a s t o t h e i s s u e o f n e g l i g e n c e and c o u l d
n o t b e o v e r l o o k e d by a j u r y . Respondent s u b m i t s t h a t t h e r e i s
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e j u r y v e r d i c t . However, w e
reverse the d i s t r i c t court.
W n o t e t h a t t h e mere happening o f an a c c i d e n t i s i n -
e
s u f f i c i e n t evidence of negligence. F l a n s b e r g v. Montana Power
Co., 154 Iqont. 5 3 , 5 8 , 460 P.2d 263; F r i e s v. Shaughnessy, 159
Mont. 307, 310, 496 P.2d 1159. F u r t h e r when t h e b r e a c h o f a
s t a t u t o r y d u t y i s a l l e g e d , t h a t d u t y r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e must b e
t h e e f f i c i e n t o r p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e damages f o r n e g l i g e n c e t o
b e p r e d i c a t e d on t h e v i o l a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e . J o k i v . IJlcBri.de,
150 Mont. 378, 436 P.2d 78; Rauh v. J e n s a , 1 6 1 Mont. 443, 445, 507
P.2d 520.
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e above s t a t u t e s do c o n t e m p l a t e
p r o t e c t i o n o f d r i v e r s who a r e s t o p p e d w a i t i n g f o r t r a f f i c s i g n a l s
t o change. ~ e s p o n d e n t ' su n s u c c e s s f u l a t t e m p t t o change l a n e s
and h i s f a i l u r e t o s t o p b e c a u s e o f t h e i c y r o a d c o n d i t i o n s i n v o l v e d
b r e a c h e s o f t h e d u t i e s imposed by t h e s t a t u t e s which l e d p r o x i m a t e l y
t o the accident.
These Montana c a s e s where t h e d e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h a t a
f a c t o r o v e r which h e l a c k e d c o n t r o l excused h i s c o n d u c t - - C u s t e r
B r o a d c a s t i n g Corp. v. Brewer, 163 Mont. 519, 518 P.2d 257 ( s w i r l i n g
snow), F a r r i s v. Clarlc, 158 Mont. 3 3 , 487 P.2d 1307 ( f a i l u r e o f
power s t e e r i n g ) , and 14cDonough v. Smith, 86 Mont. 545, 284 P.
542 (oncoming v e h i c l e ) - - - a r e applicable t o the i n s t a n t case. Thus
through f a i l u r e t o c o n t r o l h i s v e h i c l e negligence per s e w a s
e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e p a r t o f r e s p o n d e n t which t h e j u r y c o u l d n o t
overloolc, McNair v. E e r g e r , 92 Mont. 441, 15 P.2d 834; Burns v.
F i s h e r , 132 Fiont. 26, 313 P.2d 1044; W i l l i a m s v. E'laley, 150 Idont.
261, 434 P.2d 398.
S t i l l r e s p o n d e n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e was a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s
f o r t h e j u r y t o f i n d no n e g l i g e n c e on h i s p a r t b e c a u s e o f t h e
i n t e r v e n i n g n e g l i g e n c e o f a p a n e l truclc which a l l e g e d l y s u d d e n l y
e n t e r e d t h e middle l a n e i n f r o n t o f him. This mysterious panel
t r u c k , which c o u l d n o t b e l o c a t e d n o r i t s d r i v e r produced a t
t r i a l , i s a l s o t h e b a s i s f o r t h e i n j e c t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of
sudden emergency a s s u p p o r t f o r t h e j u r y v e r d i c t . No sudden
emergency i n s t r u c t i o n was g i v e n t h e j u r y i n t h i s c a s e . Thus i t
was n o t t h e law o f t h e c a s e and r e l i a n c e on i t a s s u p p o r t f o r t h e
verdict i s ill-founded.
With r e g a r d t o r e s p o n d e n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of i n t e r v e n i n g
n e g l i g e n c e , we must f i n d t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o
e s t a b l i s h t h a t a new, i n d e p e n d e n t , and u n f o r e s e e a b l e c a u s e produced
the accident i n order t o affirm the jury verdict. Plize v . Roclcy
Itfountain B e l l Telephone Co., 35 Mont. 521, 532, 100 P. 971;
Cowden e t a 1 . v . C r i p p e n , 1 0 1 Mont. 1 8 7 , 206, 53 P.2d 98; 2 R e s t a t e -
ment of T o r t s 2d, 5 5 440,442.
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e e v i d e n c e was n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o
e s t a b l i s h such a s u p e r c e d i n g c a u s e . Respondent w a s t r a v e l i n g on
a b u s y , i c y s t r e e t , a p p r o a c h i n g a t r a f f i c s i g n a l where c a r s
c o n t i n u a l l y change l a n e s t o g e t i n t o t h e p r o p e r p o s i t i o n f o r t h e i r
intended d i r e c t i o n of t r a v e l a t t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . I t was n o t
shown t o b e u n f o r e s e e a b l e t h a t a c a r o r t r u c k would swerve i n
f r o n t o f r e s p o n d e n t a s h e was a t t e m p t i n g t o change l a n e s . Nor was
t h i s m y s t e r i o u s p a n e l t r u c k shown t o b e a n i n d e p e n d e n t c a u s e o f
t h e a c c i d e n t g i v e n t h e . i n a b i l i t y o f r e s p o n d e n t t o s t o p h i s own
v e h i c l e on t h e i c y s t r e e t . Because t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f
of a n i n t e r v e n i n g c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t r e s p o n d e n t must b e h e l d
l e g a l l y responsible f o r t h e established negligence.
Only t h r o u g h a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e o f sudden
emergency c o u l d a j u r y i n t h i s c a s e d e t e r m i n e t h a t t h e r e s p o n d e n t
was n o t l i a b l e f o r h i s c o n d u c t which p r o x i m a t e l y c a u s e d p r o p e r t y
damage. Since t h e j u r y was n o t i n s t r u c t e d on sudden emergency,
t h e r e was an i n s u f f i c i e n t l e g a l b a s i s f o r t h e v e r d i c t . Accordingly,
i t was e r r o r f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t n o t t o s e t a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t
and deny t h e Rule 50 (b) motions.
Since we have s e t a s i d e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s judgment
because of t h e n e g l i g e n c e e s t a b l i s h e d a t t r i a l , t h i s Court, i n
t h e e x e r c i s e of sound d i s c r e t i o n provided f o r i n Rule 5 0 ( b ) ,
M.R.Civ.P., must determine whether t o d i r e c t judgment f o r a p p e l -
l a n t s o r t o o r d e r a new t r i a l . United S t a t e s v. W e i l e r , 385
F.2d 63, 66; Bryan v. United S t a t e s , s u p r a ; Neely v. Martin I<.
Eby C o n s t r u c t i o n Co,, s u p r a .
This Court i s of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t a new t r i a l i n t h e
i n s t a n t c a s e would b e t t e r s e r v e t h e ends of j u s t i c e . Here, t h e r e
i s one a p p e l l a n t w i t h a complex medical h i s t o r y d a t i n g from a
time p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t and e x i s t i n g a t t h e time of t h e a c c i -
dent. For t h e j u r y t o c l e a r l y comprehend t h e e x t e n t of t h e
i n j u r i e s and o t h e r damages r e s u l t i n g proximately from t h i s a c c i -
d e n t , t h e complete c a s e should be b e f o r e i t .
Even though p r o p e r t y damages were s m a l l , t h e proof of them
was c l e a r and n o t d i s p u t e d . The s u b s t a n t i a l damages, i f any,
were r e l a t e d t o t h e a l l e g e d i n j u r i e s and t h e a l l e g e d c o n s e q u e n t i a l
damages a r i s i n g therefrom. Thus, f o r a j u r y t o i g n o r e b o t h proof
of n e g l i g e n c e and proof o f p r o p e r t y damages a r i s i n g t h e r e f r o m
n e c e s s i t a t e s a new t r i a l . By t h e same t o k e n , f o r t h e j u r y t o f u l l y
a p p r e c i a t e t h e e n t i r e a l l e g e d damage s i t u a t i o n , a new t r i a l r a t h e r
than a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y o n l y i s r e q u i r e d .
F i n a l l y , i n view of our d e c i s i o n t o g r a n t a new t r i a l
and r e s p o n d e n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e of sudden emergency,
we f e e l f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of p r o p r i e t y of such an i n s t r u c t i o n
i n the i n s t a n t case necessary. O review of t h e r e c o r d we emphasize
n
c h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d t h e sudden emergency i n -
struction. Such an i n s t r u c t i o n i s n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h o s e whose
n e g l i g e n c e has produced t h e emergency. Peabody v . Northern P a c i f i c
itai.lway Co., 80 Mont. 492, 497,498, 261 P. 261; 2 Restatement of
T o r t s 2d $296. It i s a l s o improper where t h e emergency i s a n t i c i -
pated o r f o r e s e e a b l e . Peabody v. Northern P a c i f i c Railway Co. , supra.
F o r e s e e a b i l i t y of emergencies on highways i s d i s c u s s e d i n P r o s s e r
on T o r t s , 4 t h ed. p. 170:
"A f u r t h e r q u a l i f i c a t i o n which must be made i s
t h a t some 'emergencies' must be a n t i c i p a t e d , and
t h e a c t o r must be prepared t o meet them when he
engages i n an a c t i v i t y i n which t h e y a r e l i k e l y t o
a r i s e . Thus under p r e s e n t day t r a f f i c c o n d i t i o n s ,
any d r i v e r of an automobile must be prepared f o r
t h e sudden appearance of o b s t a c l e s i n t h e highway
o r of o t h e r v e h i c l e s a t i n t e r s e c t i o n s , j u s t a s
one who s e e s a c h i l d on t h e c u r b may be r e q u i r e d
t o a n t i c i p a t e i t s sudden dash i n t o t h e s t r e e t , and
h i s f a i l u r e t o a c t p r o p e r l y when t h e y appear may
be found t o amount t o n e g l i g e n c e . "
I f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s p r e s e n t e d a s i m i l a r r e c o r d on
r e t r i a l , sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n s should be r e f u s e d .
Judgment i s r e v e r s e d and t h e c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t w i t h o r d e r s t o g r a n t a new t r i a l .
Justice /y
21:. Justice ' ' r a ~ i l c I-. i a ~ ~ e LJ , s ~ e ~ ~ c i r ~ g .
i ~
I would a f f i r m t h e judglilent b a s e d on ~11r jury v e i d l ~ i .
Chis c a s e i n v o l v e s an a p p e a l from (1) an o r d e r denying
~ J - d z l c ~ i a snew t r i a l , (2) an o r d e r d e n y i n g e n t r y o f judgment
r
~ ~ i r t w i t h s t a n d i ntg e v e r d i c t , and (3) t h e judgment.
h
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o r d e r d e n y i n g p l a i n t i f f s ' motion
izoi -i r i e w t r i a l is clearly correct. The motion was d e f e c t i v e i n
railing 110 s t a t e t h e grounds w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y . Halsey v. U i t h o f ,
Nor a r e p l a i n t i f f s e n t i t l e d t o e n t r y o f judgment n o t -
w ~ ~ h s r d n d i ntg e v e r d i c t f o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d i n t h e m a j o r i t y
h
pinion.
The m a j o r i t y c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o
j u p p u r t the jury v e r d i c t because d e f e n d a n t ' s negligence i s e s t a b -
I-ished a s a m a t t e r of law and f a i l u r e of proof of i n t e r v e n i n g neg-
l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e d r i v e r o f t h e p a n e l t r u c k . In my
v i e w t h e s e a r e both jury questions decided adversely t o p l a i n t i f f s .
A j u r y c o u l d w e l l c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t h e r e was
nirc c a u s e d by n e g l i g e n t d r i v i n g . The e v i d e n c e viewed i n t h e l i g h t
r u o s t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y shows t h a t d e f e n d a n t was
d r i v i n g a t a speed o f t e n m i l e s an hour on an i c y s t r e e t and was
a b l e t o s t o p t h e forward motion of h i s c a r w i t h o u t i m p a c t , b u t
c h a t i t s l i d o r s k i d d e d sideways when t h e forward momentum c e a s e d
; i r i k i n g t h e r e a r of p l a i n t i f f s ' c a r .
Nor do I b e l i e v e t h a t p r o x i m a t e c a u s e i s e s t a b l i s h e d a s
i n d c i e r of law. This i s p a t e n t l y a jury question resolved a g a i n s t
plaintiffs.
For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , I d i s s e n t .
Justice.