No. 12526
I N T E SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O MONTANA
H OR F H F
1974
DEAN A. RUDE,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
JAMES N A and WILBERT KERR,
EL
d / b / a KERR TRUCKING SALES,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth ~ u d i c i a lD i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana
Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and P h i l l i p s , K a l i s p e l l ,
Montana
1. James Heckathorn, argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana
Goldman, McChesney and Datsopolous, Missoula,
Montana
Ronald B. MacDonald argued, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
H a r r i s , Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana
Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana
Worden, Thane, Haines and Williams, Missoula,
Montana
~ h e l & o nC. Williams argued, Missoula , Montana
Submitted: November 12, 1974
Decided : 3 0 i974
Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the district
court, Lake County, in an automobile accident damage suit.
Plaintiff Dean A. Rude was the driver of a Chevrolet involved
in a collision with a Ford driven by defendant James Neal, in
which the owner defendant William Kerr was a front seat passenger.
The accident occurred about 6:40 p.m., September 16,
1970, in front of Sam White's Bar on U. S. 12 near Elliston,
Montana. Rude was driving east toward Helena when the west-
bound Ford driven by Neal made a left turn across the highway
to enter the private driveway at the bar. Rude applied his
brakes, but was unable to avoid the collision. All three parties
were injured in the accident.
Rude filed a complaint, alleging the negligence of Neal
and imputing that negligence to Neal's passenger Kerr on the
basis of joint venture. The complaint also charged Kerr with
negligence on his own part. Kerr crossclaimed against Neal,
alleging gross negligence and counterclaimed against Rude alleg-
ing negligence on his part. The jury returned a verdict award-
ing $10,000 to Rude in his claim against Neal and Kerr. The
jury denied Kerr's claims and, in response to special inter-
rogatories, found that:
1. Neal was negligent and his negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident.
2. Neal was neither grossly negligent nor guilty of
willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.
3. Rude was not negligent.
4. Kerr was negligent and his own negligence was the
proximate cause of his own injuries.
5. Neal and Kerr were engaged in a joint venture at the
time of the accident.
Neal and K e r r a p p e a l from t h e combined judgment and
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f t h e i r motions f o r judgment
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t o r a new t r i a l . The i s s u e s r a i s e d
by N e a l w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d f i r s t . They a r e :
1. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y
on Montana law p r o h i b i t i n g d r i v i n g on t h e l e f t s i d e o f t h e r o a d
i n a no-passing zone o r when a p p r o a c h i n g t h e c r e s t of a g r a d e ?
2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t err i n a d m i t t i n g o p i n i o n
t e s t i m o n y a s t o t h e speed of t h e v e h i c l e s and t h e c a u s e of t h e
accident?
Although N e a l a l s o p r e s e n t s argument on t h e i s s u e of
j o i n t v e n t u r e , h e a d m i t s n o t b e i n g p r e j u d i c e d by t h a t a l l e g e d e r r o r .
W t h e r e f o r e w i l l c o n s i d e r t h a t i s s u e when w e d i s c u s s K e r r ' s a p p e a l .
e
Neal does n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s complained of
a r e a n i n c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law. It i s apparent t h a t they
merely s e t f o r t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of s e c t i o n s 3 2 - 2 1 5 6 ( a ) ( l ) and
32-2157, R.C.M. 1947. N e a l a r g u e s , however, t h a t t h o s e s t a t u t e s
do n o t a p p l y t o l e f t t u r n s i t u a t i o n s . H e contends t h a t giving
t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s , oombined w i t h g i v i n g a n i n s t r u c t i o n making
s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s n e g l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r o f l a w , amounts t o
a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h e i s s u e of Neal's n e g l i g e n c e .
S e c t i o n 32-2156, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s , i n p e r t i n e n t
part:
I' ( a ) No v e h i c l e s h a l l a t any t i m e be d r i v e n t o
t h e l e f t s i d e c f t h e roadway under t h e f o l l o w i n g
conditions:
'1. When a p p r o a c h i n g t h e c r e s t o f a g r a d e o r
upon a c u r v e i n t h e highway where t h e d r i v e r ' s
view i s o b s t r u c t e d w i t h i n s u c h d i s t a n c e a s t o
c r e a t e a hazard i n t h e event another v e h i c l e
m i g h t a p p r o a c h from t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n * * *".
S e c t i o n 32-2157, R.C.M. 1947, a s amended by S e c t i o n 1,
C h a p t e r 97, Laws of Montana, 1957, and i n e f f e c t a t t h e t i m e of
t h i s a c c i d e n t , provided:
"(a) The commission is hereby authorized to
determine those portions of any highway where
overtaking and passing or driving to the left
of the roadway would be especially hazardous
and may by appropriate signs or markings on the
roadway indicate the beginning and end of such
zones and when such signs or markings are in
place and clearly visible to an ordinarily ob-
servant person every driver of a vehicle shall
obey the directions thereof.
" (b) Where signs or markings are in place to
define a no-passing zone as set forth in para-
graph (a) no driver shall at any time drive on
the left side of the roadway within such no-pass-
ing zone or on the left side of any pavement
striping designed to mark such no-passing zone
throughout its length."
Both statutes provide that, under certain circumstances,
no vehicle shall be driven on the left side of the road "at any
time". Here, Neal turned left,in a no-passing zone within 500
feet of the crest of a hill. However, we are not persuaded that
these statutes apply.
In Wilburn v. Simons, 302 Ky. 752, 196 S.W.2d 356, 358,
the Kentucky court dealt with statutory provisions virtually
identical to section 32-2156, R.C.M. 1947. In applying their
statute, the court said:
" * * * It is the duty of a car driver to keep
off the left side of a highway when he approaches
the crest of a hill. KRS 189.340. While this
does not mean that a driver could not turn left
to enter a driveway just in front of the crest
of a hill, yet it does mean, we think, that a
driver should necessarily exercise care under
these circumstances and turn at a reasonably
safe angle.* * * "
In Green v. Boney, 233 S.C. 49, 103 S.E.2d 732, 66 ALR2d
1370, the South Carolina court was called upon to apply a stat-
ute similar to section 32-2157, R.C.M. 1947. That court held
that it was not always negligence to turn left across a yellow
barrier line for the purpose of entering a private driveway,
but depended upon the circumstances of each case. While Rude
has urged that we not follow this rationale, he has cited no
c a s e s holding t h a t s i m i l a r s t a t u t e s p r o h i b i t l e f t t u r n s .
I n 1957, t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e amended s e c t i o n 32-2157,
R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , a d d i n g t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h a s i t a p p e a r s i n t h e
s e c t i o n quoted above. S e c . 1, Ch 97, L. 1 9 5 7 . The t i t l e o f
t h a t a c t is:
"An A c t t o Amend [ S e c t i o n 32-2157, R.C.M.
19471 by P r o h i b i t i n g P a s s i n g Over Pavement
S t r i p i n g D e s i g n a t i n g No-Passing Zones * * *".
( B r a c k e t e d words and e m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d ) .
The l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t t o p r o h i b i t p a s s i n q i s f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e d
by t h e p o s i t i o n i n g o f t h i s s e c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s d e a l i n g w i t h o v e r -
t a k i n g and p a s s i n g . ( S e c t i o n s 32-2153 t h r o u g h 32-2157, R.C.M.
1 9 4 7 ) . S t a t u t e s g o v e r n i n g l e f t t u r n s a r e g r o u p e d t o g e t h e r else-
where i n t h a t c h a p t e r . ( S e c t i o n s 32-2104 t h r o u g h 32-2167, R.C.M.
1947). F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e v e r y p h r a s e " n o - p a s s i n g zone" s u g g e s t s
a p r o h i b i t i o n of p a s s i n g , n o t t u r n i n g .
The s e c t i o n g o v e r n i n g N e a l ' s l e f t t u r n h e r e i s s e c t i o n
32-2167, R.C.M. 1947. I n Sumner v. Amacher, 150 Mont. 544, 437
P.2d 630, w e r e c o g n i z d t h a t t h i s s t a t u t e g o v e r n e d a l e f t t u r n
made i n a n o - p a s s i n g z o n e , a l t h o u g h t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d t h e r e were
n o t t h e same a s i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . Here t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d
g i v e a n i n s t r u c t i o n b a s e d on s e c t i o n 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947, b u t
e r r e d i n a l s o g i v i n g t h e two i n s t r u c t i o n s c o v e r i n g d r i v i n g on
t h e l e f t s i d e o f t h e roadway. When combined w i t h t h e i n s t r u c t i o n
t h a t s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s a r e negligence a s a m a t t e r of law, t h e
e r r o r was c l e a r l y p r e j u d i c i a l . McDonough v . S m i t h , 86 Mont. 545,
284 P. 542; 1 3 B l a s h f i e l d , Automobile Law a n d P r a c t i c e , 3 r d E d . ,
S463.3.
Neal a l s o c o n t e n d s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n a l l o w i n g
S g t . Dale Hanson o f t h e Montana Highway P a t r o l t o e x p r e s s h i s
o p i n i o n a s t o t h e s p e e d o f t h e v e h i c l e s and t h e c a u s e o f t h e
accident. The c h a l l e n g e i s n o t t o S g t . H a n s o n ' s e x p e r t q u a l i f i -
c a t i o n s , b u t t o t h e a l l e g e d i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e upon
which h e b a s e d t h o s e o p i n i o n s .
S g t . Hanson was t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r , a r r i v i n g a t
t h e s c e n e a p p r o x i m a t e l y one h a l f hour a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t t o o k
place. H e observed t h e r o a d and w e a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s , measured
t h e s k i d marks, viewed t h e damage done t o t h e v e h i c l e s , ques-
t i o n e d w i t n e s s e s a t t h e s c e n e and t h e p a r t i e s l a t e r . Based on
t h i s e v i d e n c e and c h a r t s which he had been t r a i n e d t o u s e , he
e s t i m a t e d t h a t Rude was t r a v e l i n g a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y f i f t y m i l e s
p e r hour b e f o r e he a p p l i e d h i s b r a k e s . He concluded t h a t Neal
was t r a v e l i n g a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w e n t y - f i v e m i l e s p e r hour when
h e began h i s l e f t t u r n . H e a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t i n h i s opinion
speed was n o t a f a c t o r i n t h i s a c c i d e n t , b u t t h a t it had been
c a u s e d by N e a l ' s f a i l u r e t o o b s e r v e oncoming t r a f f i c and h i s
f a i l u r e t o y i e l d r i g h t of way.
The p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h i s o n l y a summary of t h e r a t h e r
e x t e n d e d t e s t i m o n y of t h e o f f i c e r . O t h e b a s i s of t h e e n t i r e
n
t r a n s c r i p t , w e f i n d t h a t S g t . Hanson was p r o p e r l y q u a l i f i e d a s
a n e x p e r t , and was i n p o s s e s s i o n of s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s t o w a r r a n t
t h e c o n c l u s i o n s which he s t a t e d . A s t h i s Court r e c e n t l y noted
i n Pachek v . Norton C o n c r e t e Co., 160 Mont. 1 6 , 4 9 9 P.2d 766,
e x p e r t opinion evidence i s admissible i n explaining t h e cause of
a particular accident. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t err i n ad-
m i t t i n g it h e r e .
Kerr, t h e passenger i n Neal's v e h i c l e , a l s o appeals. He
a l l e g e s t h e following e r r o r s :
1. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y on
t h e l a w of j o i n t v e n t u r e .
2. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y t h a t
a p a s s e n g e r ' s f a i l u r e t o warn h i s d r i v e r of imminent d a n g e r can
be c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e i n an a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h a t d r i v e r .
3. There was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g
of Kerr's c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e .
The c h a l l e n g e t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on j o i n t v e n t u r e i s
n o t t h a t it i s a n i n c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law, b u t t h a t t h e r e
was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o p r e s e n t t h e i s s u e t o t h e j u r y . The
e l e m e n t s which must be p r e s e n t b e f o r e j o i n t v e n t u r e c a n be
found have been s u c c i n c t l y s t a t e d i n Sumner v. Amacher, 150
Mont. 544, 554, 437 P.2d 630, where t h e C o u r t s t a t e d :
"The e l e m e n t s which are e s s e n t i a l t o a j o i n t
v e n t u r e a r e * * *: (1) a n a g r e e m e n t , e x p r e s s
o r i m p l i e d among t h e members of t h e group;
(2) a common p u r p o s e t o be c a r r i e d o u t by t h e
group; ( 3 ) a community of p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t
i n t h a t p u r p o s e among t h e members; and ( 4 ) a n
e q u a l r i g h t t o a v o i c e i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e
e n t e r p r i s e , which g i v e s a n e q u a l r i g h t of
c o n t r o l . I'
See a l s o , Rae v. Cameron, 1 1 2 Mont. 159, 1 1 4 P.2d 1060; Restate-
ment, T o r t s 2d, S491, Comment (c) .
Although Neal would have b e n e f i t e d by a f i n d i n g of j o i n t
v e n t u r e , b o t h by h a v i n g h i s c o d e f e n d a n t s h a r e t h e burden of a
p o s s i b l e judgment and by u s i n g i t a s a d e f e n s e a g a i n s t Kerr's
c r o s s c l a i m , Neal t e s t i f i e d t h e r e w a s no j o i n t v e n t u r e . Kerr
t e s t i f i e d t h e r e was no j o i n t v e n t u r e .
Both Neal and K e r r d e n i e d any common p u r p o s e o r community
of p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t i n t h e t r i p which ended i n t h e c o l l i s i o n .
The o n l y agreement e x p r e s s e d was t h a t Kerr a g r e e d t o r i d e a l o n g
t o " g e t away from m [Kerr's] b u s i n e s s f o r a day and e n j o y t h e
y
outing". The o n l y e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d which even r e m o t e l y sug-
g e s t s a community of p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t w a s t h a t on a t l e a s t one
p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n , Kerr had t r a v e l e d t o a c o n s t r u c t i o n s i t e t o
s e e t h e t y p e of u s e t h e c o n t r a c t o r would make of t r u c k s r e n t e d
from K e r r . Although c o u n s e l f o r Rude made v a l i a n t e f f o r t s t o
e l i c i t f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n from N e a l , K e r r , and b u s i n e s s a s s o c i a t e s
o f K e r r , t h e r e i s s i m p l y no s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t i n g a
common p u r p o s e o r community of p e c u n i a r y i n t e r e s t . Accordingly,
w e h o l d t h a t t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e , a s a m a t t e r of law,
t o submit t h e i s s u e of j o i n t v e n t u r e t o t h e j u r y . McDonough
v . Smith, 86 Mont. 545, 284 P. 542; 1 3 B l a s h f i e l d , Automobile
Law and P r a c t i c e 3d 3d., § 463.3.
F i n a l l y , w e c o n s i d e r K e r r ' s c l a i m of e r r o r i n t h e i n -
s t r u c t i o n s on t h e q u e s t i o n of K e r r ' s c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and
t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of c o n t r i b -
utory negligence. Although t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d err i n i t s
i n s t r u c t i o n s on d r i v i n g on t h e l e f t s i d e of t h e r o a d and on j o i n t
v e n t u r e , t h a t e r r o r d i d n o t t a i n t t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g s t h a t Rude
was n o t n e g l i g e n t and N e a l was n o t g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t . Thus K e r r
c a n n o t r e c o v e r on h i s c o u n t e r c l a i m a g a i n s t Rude i n any e v e n t .
L i k e w i s e , Kerr c a n n o t r e c o v e r a g a i n s t h i s h o s t , Neal, b e c a u s e t h e
j u r y found t h a t Neal was n o t g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t o r r e c k l e s s i n h i s
o p e r a t i o n of t h e Ford under Montana's g u e s t p a s s e n g e r s t a t u t e .
S e c t i o n 32-1113, R.C.M. 1947. T h i s b a r s any r e c o v e r y by Kerr
a g a i n s t Neal, i r r e s p e c t i v e of K e r r ' s freedom from n e g l i g e n c e .
W e a f f i r m t h e judgments i n f a v o r of Rude and Neal r e s -
p e c t i v e l y on K e r r ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m and c r o s s c l a i m . W e dismiss
Rude's claim a g a i n s t Kerr. W v a c a t e t h e judgment of Rude a g a i n s t
e
Neal and remand t h a t c l a i m t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a new t r i a l .
Justice
W concur:
e
A -
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