No. 1.3008
L N THE 5UPREME COlJKT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
1975
-
EVELYN GRABS ,
P l a i n r i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
-vs -
MISSOULA CARTAGE COMPANY, I N C . ,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Hon. Edward T. D u s s a u l t , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
Tipp and Hoven, M i s s o u l a , Montana
Douglas G . S k j e l s e t a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
For ~ e s p o n d e n t :
G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn and Robinson, M i s s o u l a , Montana
L a r r y E. R i l e y a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
Submitted: December 2 , 1975
Decided: FF_b - 2 1376
M r . J u s t d c e John Conway f l a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court,
P l a i n t i f f Evelyn Grabs a p p e a l s from a judgment i n
f a v o r of defendant Missoula Cartage Company, I n c . , based on a
j u r y v e r d i c t rendered i n R a v a l l i County, January 3 , 1975. The
r e l e v a n t f a c t s were agreed t o by t h e p a r t i e s and a r e g e n e r a l l y
s e t f o r t h i n the p r e t r i a l order.
O May 2 , 1973, p l a i n t i f f Grabs was d r i v i n g h e r 1972
n
Chrysler automobile from Hamilton, Montana, toward Missoula
proceeding n o r t h on U. S. Highway 93. Her d e s t i n a t i o n was h e r
home l o c a t e d northwest of a p l a c e commonly known a s Beer Can H i l l ,
which can b e reached by t u r n i n g a t t h e B l o d g e t t Creek Road,
approximately one and one-half m i l e s from Hamilton, n e a r an e x i t
l e a d i n g t o t h e Tolman Meat Company premises. It was a c l e a r
a f t e r n o o n and v i s i b i l i t y was normal.
A t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t a l o n g t h e r o u t e , U.S. Highway
93 t m m s t e m p o r a r i l y 90" t o t h e west f o r about 1,000 f e e t . The
n e x t 360 f e e t of highway i s occupied by a b r i d g e , and 360 f e e t from
t h e end of t h e b r i d g e t h e highway a g a i n bends 90" and r e t u r n s t o
i t s n o r t h e r l y course. I n t h e approximate middle of t h i s f i n a l
c u r v e toward t h e n o r t h , l i e s t h e B l o d g e t t Creek R o a d c e x i t l e a d i n g
toward Beer Can H i l l and p l a i n t i f f ' s r e s i d e n c e .
O t h e day of t h e c o l l i s i o n , p l a i n t i f f s i g n a l e d a l e f t
n
t u r n a s s h e passed t h e middle of t h e b r i d g e and glanced i n h e r r e a r
view mirror. She then saw d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e , a 1969 Auto Car
s e m i - t r a c t o r w i t h t r a i l e r , c a r r y i n g 39 t o n s of wood c h i p s , which
a t t h a t moment was p a s s i n g a l o c a l b a r about o n e - f i f t h of a m i l e
from p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n . p l a i n t i f f ' s c a r rounded t h e c u r v e and ,V
-td.
slowed n e a r t h e B l o d g e t t Creek Road t u r n o f f . It stopped t o w a i t
f o r a r e d pickup t r u c k which appeared t o b e approaching a t a
speed, l a t e r e s t a b l i s h e d , a t about 50 m i l e s p e r hour. Moments
l a t e r , s h e was h i t from b e h i n d by d e f e n d a n t ' s v e h i c l e . The
c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d i n t h e r i g h t hand l a n e o f t r a f f i c . Both
v e h i c l e s were p o i n t e d n o r t h a t t h e t i m e o f t h e a c c i d e n t . Plaintiff
r e c e i v e d t r e a t m e n t from b o t h a g e n e r a l p r a c t i t i o n e r and a n
orthopedic surgeon s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t . She a l s o r e c e i v e d
c e r t a i n t r e a t m e n t as an o u t p a t i e n t a t a h o s p i t a l i n Hamilton.
A t t r i a l , defendant admitted t h e negligence of i t s d r i v e r ,
b u t contended t h e c a s e was p r o p e r f o r j u r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n on t h e
i s s u e of w h e t h e r o r n o t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t .
p l a i n t i f f ' s motions f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and f o r judgment n o t -
w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t were d e n i e d by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .
P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h e s e r u l i n g s were improper and t h a t h e r con-
d u c t c o u l d n o t have c o n s t i t u t e d c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e as a
m a t t e r o f law. W agree.
e
The power of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o d i r e c t a j u r y v e r d i c t
i s c o n t r o l l e d by s e c t i o n 93-5205, R.C.M. 1947, which s t a t e s :
11Where, upon t h e t r i a l o f a n i s s u e by a j u r y ,
t h e c a s e p r e s e n t s o n l y q u e s t i o n s of law, t h e
j u d g e may d i r e c t t h e j u r y t o r e n d e r a v e r d i c t
i n f a v o r of t h e p a r t y e n t i t l e d t h e r e t o . "
The c l a s s i c t e s t employed t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a q u e s t i o n
i s one of f a c t o r law, i n v o l v e s t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e o f r e a s o n .
Where r e a s o n a b l e men c o u l d draw d i f f e r e n t c o n c l u s i o n s from t h e
p r e s e n t e d e v i d e n c e , t h e q u e s t i o n i s one o f f a c t . But i f o n l y one
c o n c l u s i o n c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y b e drawn, t h e q u e s t i o n i s one o f l a w ,
properly r e s o l v a b l e through t h e procedural device of d i r e c t e d
verdict. S h i e l d s v. Murray, 156 Mont. 493, 4 8 1 P.2d 680; P i c k e t t
v . Kyger, 1 5 1 Mont. 8 7 , 439 P.2d 57; B r i d g e s v. M o r i t z , 149 Mont.
2 7 3 , 425 P.2d 721; P a r i n i v. Lanch, 148 Mont. 188, 418 P.2d 861;
Holland v . Konda, 142 Mont. 536, 385 P.2d 272.
Reduced t o i t s f u n d a m e n t a l s t h e d e f e n s e o f c o n t r i b u t o r y
n e g l i g e n c e must b e s u p p o r t e d by p r o o f t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n e g l i g e n t ,
and t h a t such n e g l i g e n c e was t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e o f t h e i n j u r i e s .
G i l l e a r d v. D r a i n e , 159 Mont. 167, 496 P.2d 8 3 ; D e , V e r n i e r o v.
Eby, 159 Mont. 146, 496 P.2d 290; Jackson v. William Dingwall
Co., 145 Mont. 127, 399 P.2d 236; Thompson v. Llewellyn, 136
Mont. 167, 346 P.2d 561.
Defendant a r g u e s t h a t p l a i n t i f f was c o n t r i b u t o r i l y
n e g l i g e n t i n t h a t s h e f a i l e d t o make h e r turn,though s h e might
r e a s o n a b l y have done so i n l i g h t of t h e uncontested f a c t s .
Defendant p o i n t s o u t t h e oncoming pickup t r u c k was approximately
300 y a r d s from p l a i n t i f f ' s c a r when i t stopped f o r t h e t u r n , and
a t t h e r a t e of 50 m i l e s p e r hour t h e pickup would n o t have reached
t h e t u r n o f f f o r a n o t h e r twenty seconds. F i r s t , we determine whether
o r n o t p l a i n t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o t u r n could reasonably c o n s t i t u t e
n e g l i g e n c e under t h e law. Does t h e law permit such an i n f e r e n c e
under t h e s e circumstances?
I n Montana, t h e t e r m "negligence" i s d e f i n e d as a
want of such a t t e n t i o n t o t h e n a t u r e o r probable consequences of
t h e a c t o r ommission a s a prudent man o r d i n a r l y bestows i n a c t i n g
i n h i s own concerns. S e c t i o n 19-103 ( 1 6 ) , R. C.M. 1947; Flansberg
v. Montana Power Co., 154 Mont. 53, 60, 460 P.2d 263. The s t a n d a r d
o f conduct imposed on t h o s e a l l e g e d t o have been c o n t r i b u t o r i l y
n e g l i g e n t h a s h i s t o r i c a l l y been t h e same a s t h a t imposed on t h e
n e g l i g e n t defendant. 2 Restatement of T o r t s 2d, 5 464, Comment a.
The d r i v e r of a motor v e h i c l e i n Montana may n o t f o l l o w
a n o t h e r v e h i c l e "more c l o s e l y than i s r e a s o n a b l e and prudent''
under t h e circumstances, s e c t i o n 32-2160, R.C.M. 1947. The law
imposes s e v e r a l d u t i e s on t h e a t t e m p t i n g l e f t t u r n s on two-way
roadways. Such t u r n s must b e made from " t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e r i g h t
h a l f o f t h e roadway n e a r e s t t h e c e n t e r l i n e t h e r e o f " , s e c t i o n 32-
2164(b), R.C.M. 1947, and only a f t e r t h e proper s i g n a l has been
made, s e c t i o n 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947. The d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e
i n t e n d i n g t o t u r n l e f t " s h a l l y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way t o any
v e h i c l e approaching from t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n " which i s c l o s e
enough t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n t o c o n s t i t u t e an immediate hazard,
s e c t i o n 32-2171, R.C.M. 1947. Section 32-2171 a l s o has been
i n t e r p r e t e d a s i n c l u d i n g a duty t o maintain a proper lookout
f o r v e h i c l e s approaching from t h e r e a r . Bellon v. Heinzig,
347 F.2d 4.
Defendant s u b s c r i b e s t o t h e view t h a t under t h e s e f a c t s
a j u r y should decide whether p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct f e l l below t h e
standard of c a r e by f a i l i n g t o i n some way remove h e r s e l f from
t h e path of t h e oncoming t r u c k by beginning t h e t u r n o r a t l e a s t
by moving t o some o t h e r place. Yet, defendant does n o t s u g g e s t ,
and t h e r e i s no evidence, t h a t p l a i n t i f f was i n v i o l a t i o n of any
of t h e s t a t u t e s c i t e d h e r e t o f o r e , o r t h a t she was i n any way
n e g l i g e n t , o t h e r than h e r f a i l u r e t o t u m , a g a i n s t h e r b e t t e r judg-
ment, i n f r o n t of a v e h i c l e approaching a t t h e r a t e of 50 miles
p e r hour.
It cannot be s a i d , under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t h a t an
o r d i n a r i l y prudent person would apprehend o r a n t i c i p a t e , under
t h e uncontested f a c t s , t h e f a i l u r e o r i n a b i l i t y of t h e t r u c k d r i v e r
t o s t o p h i s v e h i c l e b e f o r e what became t h e p o i n t of impact. It has
been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t one i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o a n t i c i p a t e t h e negligence
of another. Merithew v. H i l l , 167 F.Supp. 320; Fulton v. Choyteau
County Farmers' Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d 1025. Regarding p l a i n -
t i f f ' s f a i l u r e t o begin h e r t u r n , we quote t h e words of M r . J u s t i c e
Stewart i n Stevens v. C i t y of B u t t e , 107 Mont. 354, 365, 85 P.26
339:
If
I n making a choice between two c o u r s e s t o pursue,
one i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o make t h e c o r r e c t choice i n
l i g h t of a f t e r - e v e n t s , b u t only such choice a s a
reasonably prudent person might make under t h e
known o r obvious circumstances. * * *"
The law does n o t contemplate a standard of c a r e s o l o f t y
a s t o r e q u i r e t h e d r i v e r of a preceding v e h i c l e t o v a c a t e i t s
lawful l o c a t i o n i n o r d e r t o c l e a r t h e way f o r an admittedly n e g l i -
gent d r i v e r approaching from t h e r e a r . Such a r u l e , when c a r r i e d
t o i t s l o g i c a l extreme, would impose upon a l l v e h i c l e s l e g i t i m a t e l y
stopped f o r purposes of t u r n i n g , t h e a f f i r m a t i v e duty t o s t a y
c l e a r of approaching t r a f f i c , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e circumstances.
To be s u r e , r e a s o n a b l e , s a f e and prudent d r i v e r s must always b e
aware of t h e t r a f f i c behind them, e s p e c i a l l y , a s Bellon p o i n t s
o u t , when an approaching v e h i c l e a t t e m p t s t o pass a preceding
v e h i c l e a t t e m p t i n g t o t u r n . But, t h e primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
must b e on t h o s e d r i v e r s who have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e t e c t t h e
p o t e n t i a l l y hazardous s i t u a t i o n ahead, s e c t i o n s 32-2160 and
32-2171, R.C.M. 1947. Erickson v. P e r r e t t , Mon t . s
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n denying t h e motion f o r a
directed verdict. Cause i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t .
GD-
hief Justice-
M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d i s s e n t i n g :
I dissent. This i s t h e second time i n t h e p a s t month
t h a t a m a j o r i t y of t h i s Court has r e v e r s e d a j u r y d e t e r m i n a t i o n
concerning n e g l i g e n c e and proximate cause. See: Erickson v.
Perrett, Mon t . 9 P.2d , 33 St.Rep. 109.
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e m a j o r i t y has decided a s a
m a t t e r of law t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t g u i l t y of c o n t r i b u t o r y
n e g l i g e n c e when s h e stopped on a curve i n t h e highway r a t h e r
t h a n completing a l e f t t u r n onto a s i d e road. Whether t h i s
conduct c o n s t i t u t e d o r d i n a r y c a r e under a l l t h e circumstances
o f t h e c a s e was f o r t h e j u r y t o decide. So was t h e q u e s t i o n
of proximate cause. Where d i f f e r e n t conclusions a r e p o s s i b l e
under t h e evidence, t h e c o u r t may n o t d e c i d e l i a b i l i t y a s a
m a t t e r of law. These a r e m views of t h e law.
y
I would a f f i r m t h e judgment based on t h e j u r y v e r d i c t .
Justice.