No. 13119
I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A
OR F F OTN
1976
GERALD R. HARLAND,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
ROY ANDERSON and LOTTIE ANDERSON,
husband and w i f e , and ANDERSON
RANCH CO., a c o r p o r a t i o n , and t h e
STATE OF MONTANA,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Cure, Borer and Lynch, Great F a l l s , Montana
Edward W. Borer argued, Great F a l l s , Montana
For Respondents:
G r a y b i l l , Ostrem, Warner & C r o t t y , Great F a l l s ,
Montana
Donald L. Ostrem argued, Great F a l l s , Montana
Submitted: March 1, 1976
Decided : 9P)i 9 - 1976
Filed: ;~.PR $ * m996
Yr. J u s c L c e ~ o h l iJonway d a r r i s o n L e l l v e r e d :he J p i n i u r ~~i he
Court.
P l a i n t i f f Gerald R. Harland a p p e a l s from a summary
judgmenc g r a n t e d on two o f t h r e e c o u n t s i n a c o m p l a i n t f i l e d
i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Cascade County, s e e k i n g t o e s t a b l i s h a n
5asernent a c r o s s p r o p e r t y owned by d e f e n d a n t s Roy Anderson and
L o t t i e Anderson, husband and w i f e , and Anderson Ranch Co. (herein-
d f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s Andersons). The c o m p l a i n t s e t f o r t h t h r e e
counts: Count I , s e e k i n g t o e s t a b l i s h an easement by p r e s c r i p -
tion. Count 11, a l l e g i n g damages f o r w r o n g f u l i n t e r f e r e n c e .
Count 111, r e q u e s t i n g a r o a d o r r i g h t o f way b e condemned o v e r
defendants' land f o r p l a i n t i f f ' s use. O motion o f Andersons
n
p r o c e e d i n g s on Count T I 1 were s t a y e d , pending t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
o f Counts I and 11.
The a c t i o n was commenced J a n u a r y 25, 1972. Andersons
answered and t o o k d e p o s i t i o n s from Harland and one C l i f f o r d
O b r e c h t , ~ a r l a n d ' sp r e d e c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t . O t h e b a s i s of t h e s e
n
two d e p o s i t i o n s and Andersons' answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s ,
Andersons moved f o r summary judgment which was d e n i e d . Thereafter,
Andersons s e c u r e d t h e d e p o s i t i o n s of t h r e e o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s
whose t e s t i m o n y c o u l d a l l e g e d l y d e m o n s t r a t e t h e l o n g and c o n t i n u e d
u s e of a r o a d l e a d i n g t o ~ a r l a n d ' sp r o p e r t y . The p r o p e r t y was
viewed by t h e p r e s i d i n g judge and c o u n s e l f o r b o t h p a r t i e s . Ander-
s o n s renewed t h e i r motion f o r summary judgment. The d i s t r i c t
c o u r t on A p r i l 21, 1975, e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h a t motion.
Harland a p p e a l s t h a t o r d e r .
The r e c o r d b e f o r e t h i s Court c o n s i s t s of t h e p l e a d i n g s ,
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s t o Andersons, t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d d e p o s i t i o n s and
memoranda of c o u n s e l c o n c e r n i n g t h e motion f o r summary judgment.
From t h i s i t a p p e a r s t h a t s i n c e e a r l y 1971, Harland h a s been t h e
owner of a b o u t 3580 a c r e s o f l a n d l o c a t e d i n Township 16 N o r t h ,
Range 1 West, Cascade County, Montana. I n a d d i t i o n he l e a s e s
a b o u t 2360 a c r e s owned by t h e United S t a t e s and a d m i n i s t e r e d by t h e
Bureau ~ . ~ c l r i d:.lanagernenC,
f t h e s e !ancis 3re I-ocaced i-n and a r e
i d n t i g u o u s w i t h t h e mountain a r e a s s o u t h e a s t o f Cascade, Montana.
They a r e surrounded by o t h e r r a n c h p r o p e r t i e s owned by v a r i o u s
p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e Andersons, who c o n t r o l l a n d s t o t h e w e s t and
northwest. For o v e r 50 y e a r s a two t r a c k d i r t r o a d h a s r u n a c r o s s
;3nJersons1 l a n d t o t h e r e a l e s t a t e which i s t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s
appeal. The r o a d i s c r o s s e d a t s e v e r a l p o i n t s by f e n c e s and c l o s e d
g a t e s owned and c o n t r o l l e d by t h e Andersons.
~ a r l a n d ' sp r e d e c e s s o r i n i n t e r e s t , C l i f f o r d O b r e c h t ,
a c q u i r e d t h e p r o p e r t y i n 1945. I n June 1948, an agreement was
e x e c u t e d between Obrecht and Andersons which g r a n t e d a r i g h t t o
u s e t h e c o n t e s t e d r o a d by p e r m i s s i o n . T h i s agreement was t e r -
minated i n 1959 and n e v e r renewed. Harland a f f i r m s t h a t any c l a i m s
he may have toward t h e u s e of t h i s r o a d e x i s t o n l y by v i r t u e o f
t h o s e r i g h t s which Obrecht may have had. Y e t , Obrecht a d m i t t e d i n
h i s d e p o s i t i o n t h a t h e had n o t used t h e r o a d c o n t i n u o u s l y f o r t h e
f i v e years precedent t o t h e f i l i n g of t h i s a c t i o n . It i s clear
c h a t no p o s i t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n
easement were e v e r made t o Harland d u r i n g t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s which
led t o t h e s a l e of t h e property.
Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P., p r o v i d e s t h a t summary judgment
i s proper i f :
"* 7k * t h e p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , answers t o
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and a d m i s s i o n s on f i l e 'show t h a t
t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t
and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment
3s a m a t t e r o f law. * 9~ *I'
This Court h a s on many o c c a s i o n s commented upon t h e n a t u r e
a f che jurcien of proof imposed on t h e moving p a r t y under Rule 56.
Fhe Court h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e p a r t y moving f o r summary
judgment h a s t h e burden o f showing t h e complete a b s e n c e of any
genuine i s s u e a s t o a l l f a c t s which a r e deemed m a t e r i a l i n l i g h t
o f t h o s e s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s which e n t i t l e d him t o a judgment a s
a m a t t e r of law. W have a l s o h e l d t h e r u l e o p e r a t e s t o h o l d t h e
e
II
rnovant t o a s t r i c t s t a n d a r d " and t h a t :
"I* +:To s a t i s f y h i s burden t h e movant must make
a showing t h a t i s q u i t e c l e a r what t h e t r u t h i s ,
and t h a t excludes any r e a l doubt a s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e
of any genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . **
*"'
Kober & K y r i s s v. Stewart & B i l l i n g s Deaconess
H o s p i t a l , 148 Mont. 1 1 7 , 122, 417 P.2d 476.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t does n o t f u n c t i o n t o a d j u d i c a t e genuine i s s u e s
o f f a c t on a motion f o r summary judgment c a u s e - - i t merely d e t e r -
mines whether such i s s u e s e x i s t . Thus t h e p a r t y opposing t h e
motion w i l l be indulged t o t h e e x t e n t of a l l i n f e r e n c e s which may
be reasonably drawn from t h e o f f e r e d proof. Mally v. Asanovich,
149 Mont. 99, 105, 423 P.2d 294; Johnson v. S t . p a t r i c k ' s H o s p i t a l ,
148 Mont. 125, 417 P. 2d 469.
The primary p o l i c y and g e n e r a l purpose underlying Rule 56,
M.R.Civ.P., i s t o encourage j u d i c i a l economy through t h e prompt
e l i m i n a t i o n of q u e s t i o n s n o t deserving of r e s o l u t i o n by t r i a l .
Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167. Thus
while t h e i n i t i a l burden of proof must a t t a c h t o t h e movant, t h a t
burden s h i f t s where t h e r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s no genuine i s s u e of
material f a c t . Under t h e s e circumstances, t h e p a r t y opposing t h e
motion must come forward w i t h s u b s t a n t i a l evidence r a i s i n g t h e
issue. Rickard v. P a r a d i s , Mon t . , 539 P.2d 718, 32
St.Rep. 834; Roope v. The Anaconda Company, 159 Mont. 28, 494
P.2d 922; Flansberg v. Montana Power Company, 154 Mont. 53, 460
P.2d 263. Once t h e burden has s h i f t e d , t h e p a r t y opposing t h e
motion i s h e l d t o a s t a n d a r d o f proof about e q u a l t o t h a t i n i t i a l l y
imposed upon t h e moving p a r t y :
llI+c * +<
t h e p a r t y opposing motion must p r e s e n t f a c t s
i n proper form - conclusions of law w i l l n o t s u f f i c e ;
and t h e opposing p a r t y ' s f a c t s must be m a t e r i a l and
of a s u b s t a n t i a l n a t u r e , n o t f a n c i f u l , f r i v o l o u s ,
gauzy, nor merely s u s p i c i o u s . I I t Silloway v. Jorgenson,
146 Mont. 307, 310, 406 P.2d 167.
To e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e of an easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n ,
th3 p a r t y so claiming must show open, n o t o r i o u s , e x c l u s i v e , a d v e r s e ,
continuous and u n i n t e r r u p t e d use of t h e easement f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y
period p r e s c r i b e d by s e c t i o n 93-2507, R. C.M. 1947.
I n support of h i s claims t o t h i s Court, Harland s e t s
f o r t h s e v e r a l arguments. The d e p o s i t i o n s of Warehime, P e r r i n e ,
and James a r e o f f e r e d i n an attempt t o e s t a b l i s h u s e of t h e road
by t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c f o r t h e y e a r s 1916-1948, f o r r e c r e a t i o n a l
and o c c a s i o n a l o t h e r purposes. He c i t e s S c o t t v. Weinheimer, 140
Mont. 554, 374 P.2d 91, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e unexplained
use o f an easement f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d w i l l be presumed t o be
under a c l a i m of r i g h t and t h e r e f o r e adverse. But S c o t t i s
i n a p p l i c a b l e h e r e , where t h e u s e of t h e road was more than a d e q u a t e l y
explained i n t h e r e c o r d . Deponents a d m i t t e d l y owned no land i n
t h e a r e a and could n o t t h e r e f o r e have used t h e road t o g a i n a c c e s s
t o t h e i r holdings. There i s no doubt deponents and o t h e r s used
t h e road f o r r e c r e a t i o n , hunting, f i s h i n g and o c c a s i o n a l timbering
o p e r a t i o n s , but t h i s i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o r a i s e t h e presumption of
a d v e r s e u s e , o r a c l a i m of r i g h t under t h e r u l e i n S c o t t . The
d i s t r i c t c o u r t s o found and we s e e no reason t o o v e r r u l e i t .
W next examine t h e c l a i m t h a t an easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n
e
may e x i s t by v i r t u e of adverse use by t h e Obrechts d u r i n g t h e time
they owned t h e p r o p e r t y now i n q u e s t i o n . A t t h e o u t s e t , we
d i s c o u n t any u s e o f t h e road between 1948 through 1959 i n d e t e r -
mining t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e claim. This u s e was
allowed under a d u l y executed agreement which Andersons terminated
i n 1959. Any u s e which i s permissive i n i t s i n c e p t i o n may n o t
r i p e n i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t , u n l e s s t h e r e has been a d i s t i n c t
and p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n by t h e claimant owner of a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o
t h e owner of t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e . Drew v. Burggraf, 141 Mont. 405,
378 P.2d 232. I t i s c l e a r t h e r e was no such p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n
here. I n f a c t , t h e r e c o r d and O b r e c h t l s d e p o s i t i o n d i s c l o s e . t o
the contrary:
"Q. Were you permitted t o u s e t h i s road a s a c c e s s
t o your mountain p r o p e r t i e s ? A . Formerly, yes.
"Q. H w about i n t h e l a s t few y e a r s ? A . Well, I
o
haven't taken c a t t l e up o r anything. There was too
much f i g h t i n g and s t u f f l i k e t h a t .
"(2. '\lo p r o b l e m w i t h Mr. ,inderson i f you went up
t h e r e t o f i x a f e n c e o r a n y t h i n g ? A . No. Not
a t f i r s t . II
'Che d i s t r i c t c o u r t found:
1 IA
,
.
, ,
, ,
-1-
t h e r e c o r d i s e n t i r e l y d e v o i d o f any
-1-
e v i d e n c e o f open, common, n o t o r i o u s , e x c l u s i v e ,
ddverse, continuous o r uninterrupted use of s a i d
roadway by any p a r t i e s * + +< which c o n s i s t s o f more
:
than f i v e y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e Complaint
herein. fl
Chis t i n d i n g i s s u s t a i n e d by t h e r e c o r d . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t
a i s o found t h e Andersons had m a i n t a i n e d " t o t a l dominion" o v e r
c h e roadway. T h i s f i n d i n g conforms t o t h e r u l i n g i n P e a s l e y v.
Crosper, 103 Mont. 401, 64 P.2d 109, w h e r e i n t h e Court h e l d t h a t
t h e p r e s e n c e of g a t e s which must b e opened by t h e u s e r i s s t r o n g
evidence of permissive r a t h e r than adverse use.
F i n a l l y , Harland c o n t e n d s t h a t a s t h e l e s s e e o f t h e
U n i ~ e c l S t a t e s he i s e n t i t l e d t o u s e any easement a p p u r t e n a n t t o
the leasehold property. But t h i s s t a t e m e n t i s made w i t h o u t a
s c i n t i l l a o f e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t a n easement h a s e i t h e r been
ciaimed o r e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e f e d e r a l government. The a l l e g a t i o n
i s t h e r e f o r e s t r i c t l y c o n c l u s o r y and s p e c u l a t i v e . A s s u c h , i t was
p r o p e r l y r e s o l v e d i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g s f o r summary judgment.
The judgment i s a f f i r m e d .
s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e H a r r i s o n .