No. 13547
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF M N A A
O T N
1977
THE STATE O F MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
RANDALL C R A I G BAUGH,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l
District,
Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant:
Donald L. S h a f f e r argued, Libby, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
Montana
A l l e n B. C h r o n i s t e r a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y
G e n e r a l , I-lelena, Montana
W i l l i a m A. D o u g l a s a r g u e d , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y ,
L i b b y , Montana
Submitted: September 29, 1977
Decided: YO\I i 5 ]gn
Filed: lU\( ,S :~fl
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
I n August 1975, t h e body of ~ a v i d s c c a
was discovered
i n an i s o l a t e d a r e a of Lincoln County, Montana. Sometime a f t e r
t h a t , warrants of a r r e s t were issued f o r Randall Craig Baugh,
defendant h e r e i n , and William Beechman. William Beechman has
never been found. I n November 1975, Randall Craig Baugh turned
himself i n t o t h e a u t h o r i t i e s . Defendant was arraigned and
plead n o t g u i l t y t o t h e charge of d e l i b e r a t e homicide i n t h e
D i s t r i c t Court, Lincoln County.
P r e t r i a l motions were made by t h e s t a t e and t h e defense.
Among t h e s e was a motion by t h e s t a t e t o amend the Information
a s t o the alleged d a t e o f t h e crime and motions f o r discovery
made by defendant. Two prospective witnesses were a r r e s t e d
by t h e s t a t e f o r t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide of D a v i d m c c a . One,
Randy Jacobsen, was a r r e s t e d before t h e defense could t a l k t o
him and held over n i g h t . I t was a week a f t e r t h i s i n c i d e n t
t h a t Jacobsen consented t o an interview by t h e defense. The
o t h e r w i t n e s s , William P h i l l i p S t u a r t , was a r r e s t e d i n N w Mexico
e
and then released. The defense requested t h e c o u r t t o h e l p
locate Stuart.
The c o u r t ordered t h e Lincoln County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e t o
cooperate with t h e Lincoln County public defender's o f f i c e i n
l o c a t i n g S t u a r t because t h e Lincoln County p u b l i c defender has
no budget o r personnel t o pursue such matters. The Lincoln
County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e located S t u a r t i n N w Mexico, d i d n o t
e
inform t h e public defender, but i n s t e a d informed t h e Lincoln
County a t t o r n e y , who then flew t o N w Mexico, interviewed S t u a r t ,
e
a r r e s t e d him, gave him a polygraph examination, r e l e a s e d him,
flew back t o Montana, and then informed t h e defense and t h e c o u r t
of t h e whereabouts of S t u a r t .
T r i a l was had i n Lincoln County, Montana, s t a r t i n g on
May 1 7 , 1976. The j u r y was interviewed p r i o r t o v o i r d i r e by
Hon. Robert C . Sykes, because of a controversy t h a t e x i s t e d a t
t h a t e x i s t e d a t t h a t time between t h e Lincoln County s h e r i f f
and t h e county a t t o r n e y , William Douglas. Evidence began on
May 18, 1976.
O May 21, 1976, t h e defense made two motions f o r a m i s t r i a l .
n
The f i r s t motion was made because defendant had been brought t o
c o u r t on t h e morning of May 21 i n handcuffs, and t h o e h a n d c u f f s
were unlocked i n f r o n t of t h e j u r y before t h e t r i a l commenced.
The reason f o r t h e handcuffs, according t o t h e deputy s h e r i f f ,
was t h e defendant's bickering.
The o t h e r motion was because a j u r o r , Sandy Kolar, had
evidence of t h e matter acquired o u t s i d e of t h e t r i a l . In fact,
Kolar was p r e s e n t with Douglas when videotape of t h e exhumation
of t h e body of D a v i d p c c a had been shown. Douglas was f u l l y
aware Kolar was p r e s e n t a t t h i s videotape showing.
Both motions f o r m i s t r i a l were denied; Kolar was excused
and an a l t e r n a t e j u r o r was seated. A f u r t h e r motion f o r m i s -
t r i a l was made and a motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t .
Defendant was found g u i l t y and sentenced t o 75 years i n
t h e Montana s t a t e prison. Defendant appeals from t h e judgment,
and p r e s e n t s four i s s u e s on appeal:
1. Whether a defendant charged with d e l i b e r a t e homicide
has a r i g h t t o a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n on mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homi-
cide?
2. Whether t h e a r r e s t of p o t e n t i a l defense witnesses
deprives a defendant of due process and a f a i r t r i a l ?
3. Whether it i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r an accused t o
appear i n handcuffs before a j u r y ?
4. Whether t h e replacing of a j u r o r who i s a personal
f r i e n d of t h e prosecutor and has personal knowledge of evidence
of the. c a s e i s e r r o r , i f replaced by an a l t e r n a t e j u r o r p r i o r
t o t h e time t h e jury goes i n t o d e l i b e r a t i o n s ?
I s s u e 1. I s a defendant charged with d e l i b e r a t e homicide
e n t i t l e d t o a jury i n s t r u c t i o n on mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide
even though no evidence i s presented on t h a t i s s u e . Under s e c t l o n
94-5-103, R.C.M. 1947, d e l i b e r a t e homicide i s mitigated i f committed
"under t h e influence of extreme mental o r emotional s t r e s s f o r
which t h e r e i s reasonable explanation o r excuse." A s ascertained
from t h e record, defendant's theory i s t h a t he did n o t k i l l
the deceased and had no knowledge of who d i d . A t t r i a l , defendant's
a t t o r n e y , i n h i s opening statement s t a t e d :
"* * * 'Now,-,Randy w i l l take t h e stand and I w i l l t e l l
you e s s e n t i a l l y what he w i l l say. He has no knowledge
o r information a s t o how ~ a v i d G c c a met h i s death, he
could speculate and t h a t i s a l l i t would be i s pure
s p e c u l a t i o n , he doesn' t know, ** *"
This Court reaffirmed t h e Montana r u l e on t h e requirement
f b r an i n s t r u c t i o n on mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide i n S t a t e v .
Buckley , Mont , , 557 P.2d 283, 33 St.Rep. 1204, 1207
(1976) and s e t out t h i s t e s t :
"* ** t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s must cover
every i s s u e o r theory having support i n t h e evidence,
and t h e inquiry of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t must only be
whether o r not any evidence e x i s t s i n t h e record t o
warrant an i n s t r u c t i o n on mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide .''
557 P.2d 285.
The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Keeble v. United S t a t e s ,
412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L ed 2d 844 (1973), s t a t e d t h a t
t h e defendant i s ' e n t i t l e d t o i n s t r u c t i o n on a l e s s e r included
o f f e n s e , i f evidence would permit t h e j u r y r a t i o n a l l y t o f i n d
him g u i l t y of t h e l e s s e r offense and a c q u i t him of t h e g r e a t e r .
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e t h e r e was no evidence i n t h e record t o
show m i t i g a t i o n a s required by s e c t i o n 94-5-103. In fact,
defendant's theory throughout t h e t r i a l was t h a t he d i d n o t
murder t h e victim. I n S t a t e v. McDonald, 5 1 Mont. 1, 16, 149
P. 279 (1915), i t was s a i d :
"* * * I n many i n s t a n c e s , however, t h e evidence i s such
a s t o show t h a t t h e defendant i s e i t h e r g u i l t y of t h e
o f f e n s e charged o r i s e n t i t l e d t o an a c q u i t t a l . I n
such cases t h e c o u r t may not be put i n e r r o r f o r r e f u s i n g
o r f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t a s t o t h e lower degree o r t h e
included offense ."
This r a t i o n a l e a p p l i e s t o t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , and t h e t r i a l c o u r t
a c t e d properly i n not g i v i n g t h e a l t e r n a t e i n s t r u c t i o n on m i t i -
gated homicide.
I s s u e 2, concerns t h e county a t t o r n e y ' s a r r e s t i n g and
holding *itnesses Jacobsen and S t u a r t and a f t e r questioning
r e l e a s i n g them. Defendant a l l e g e s t h i s p r e j u d i c i a l l y impaired
t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of defense c o u n s e l f s e f f o r t s t o interview
t h e s e same witnesses. This Court i n S t a t e v. Gangner, 73 Mont.
187, 194, 235 P. 703 (1925) s t a t e d :
"Whatever t h e popular notion may be, i t i s
n e i t h e r t h e duty nor t h e r i g h t of t h e s t a t e , a c t i n g
through i t s p u b l i c o f f i c e r s , t o secure t h e convic-
t i o n of one of i t s c i t i z e n s by any a v a i l a b l e means,
f a i r o r f o u l . The C o n s t i t u t i o n guarantees t o everyone
accused of crime a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l ***
and t h e s t a t e had no more r i g h t t o deny defendant's
counsel access t o a witness m a t e r i a l t o t h e defense
then i t would have had t o s e c r e t e t h e witness t o prevent
t h e defendant using him ** *.I'
I n t h e i n s t a n t case while defense counsel was a b l e t o
t a l k t o t h e s e witnesses, defendant contends t h e prosecution
so intimidated them t h a t t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e interviews
was s u b s t a n t i a l l y diminished. Yet, t h e r e i s no showing how
t h e prosecution intimidated these witnesses o r t h a t i t i n -
s t r u c t e d them n o t t o cooperate with t h e defense a t t o r n e y , o r
t h a t i t otherwise attempted t o d i r e c t l y impede t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s
of defense counsel. The record shows t h a t a t t h e time t h e s e
witnesses were interviewed and a r r e s t e d , they were p o t e n t i a l
defendants i n t h i s case. There i s extensive d i s c u s s i o n in1 t h e
record concerning t h e s e witnesses. I t i s c l e a r from t h a t
d i s c u s s i o n t h e c o u r t took every a c t i o n p o s s i b l e t o provide
t h e defense access t o them.
While defense counsel may have had d i f f i c u l t y i n l o c a t i n g
and interviewing witnesses Jacobsen and S t u a r t , t h e r e i s nothing
i n t h e record t o show l a c k of due process, which could be a t t r i -
buted t o the s t a t e ' s i n v e s t i g a t o r y procedure.
Issue 3. O t h e morning of May 21, 1975, defendant was
n
escorted i n t o t h e courtroom i n handcuffs by a deputy s h e r i f f .
Apparently t h e handcuffs were removed once defendant was i n t h e
courtroom. Counsel f o r defendant contends defendant having been
seen by t h e jury i n handcuffs i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . When t h e
handcuff i n c i d e n t occurred, defense counsel moved i n chambers
f o r a m i s t r i a l and was denied. Ruling, however, on t h e m i s t r i a l
was reserved i n order t o give t h e c o u r t opportunity t o question
t h e j u r o r s a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t was i n t o determine whether t h e
j u r o r s were influenced by t h e handcuff i n c i d e n t . This was done
a f t e r t h e j u r y reached i t s v e r d i c t , b u t before i t was announced.
This exchange took place between t h e c o u r t and j u r o r s :
"THE COURT: N w before presenting t h i s v e r d i c t t o
o
.me, I would l i k e t o ask t h e j u r o r s some questions.
Did any of t h e j u r y observe t h e defendant during
t h e course of t h e t r i a l being brought i n t o t h e
courtroom i n handcuffs?
"THE JURY: Yes s i r .
"THE COURT: Now, d i d t h a t i n any way a f f e c t any of
you i n your d e l i b e r a t i o n s a s t o h i s g u i l t o r innocence?
''THE JURY: No.
"THE COURT: It did n o t , any of you?
The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of the c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system i s
t h a t an accused, whatever h i s p a s t record, i s presumed innocent
u n t i l proven g u i l t y beyond a reasonable doubt. Coffin v.
United S t a t e s , 156 U.S. 432, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L ed 481 (1895).
I t follows t h a t t h e accused i s a l s o e n t i t l e d t o t h e i n d i c i a
of innocence. I n t h e presence of t h e j u r y , he is o r d i n a r i l y
e n t i t l e d t o be r e l i e v e d of handcuffs, o r o t h e r r e s t r a i n t s , s o
he w i l l not be m d e d a s an obviously bad person o r t o suggest
t h a t t h e f a c t of h i s g u i l t i s a foregone conclusion. United
S t a t e s v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 614 (4th C i r . 1970).
The Montana case c l o s e s t i n point i s S t a t e v. Bentley, 155
Mont. 383, 472 P.2d 864 (1970). There t h i s Court h e l d t h e
defendant was n o t prejudiced by having t o wear j a i l c l o t h i n g
during t h e t r i a l . However, t h e Ninth C i r c u i t Court i n Bentley
v. C r i s t , 469 F.2d 854 (1972), reversed t h e Montana holding
and held t h a t compelling t h e accused t o wear prison c l o t h i n g
mag deny him t h e presumption of innocence.
I n S t a t e v. Sawyer, 60 Wash.2d 83, 371 P.2d 932 (1962), -
t h e defendant was handcuffed i n t h e courtroom upon adjournment,
much l i k e t h e i n s t a n t case wherein t h e defendant was brought
i n t o c o u r t handcuffed and then unlocked. The c o u r t found no
prejudicial error. Sawyer r e l i e d upon Way v. United S t a t e s ,
285 F.2d 253, 254, (10th C i r . 1960) where, a s h e r e , t h e
defendant was brought i n t o t r i a l handcuffed, without o r d e r
of t h e c o u r t , and t h e handcuffs were then removed. I n Way
t h e c o u r t held t h a t " i n t h e absence of an i n d i c a t i o n of pre-
j u d i c i a l consequences, such an occurrence does Inot warrant
t h e g r a n t i n g of a new t r i a l . " It i s incumbent upon defendant
t o demonstrate a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e , which he has n o t done here.
The Ninth C i r c u i t i n United S t a t e s v. Kress, 451 F.2d 576 (1971),
held t h a t an appearance before t h e jury during t r i a l by a
defendant i n shackles i s n o t i n h e r e n t l y p r e j u d i c i a l .
The majority r u l e i s t h a t , absent unusual circumstances,
a p r i s o n e r brought i n t o c o u r t f o r t r i a l i s e n t i t l e d t o appear
f r e e from a l l bonds o r shackles, t h i s r i g h t being an important
component of a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l . However, i n S t a t e
v. Jones, 130 N.J.Super. 596, 328 A.2d 41 (1974), t h e c o u r t
h e l d defendant's r i g h t t o be f r e e of shackles during t r i a l need
n o t be extended t o t h e r i g h t t o be f r e e of shackles while being
taken back and - f o r t h between t h e courthouse and t h e j a i l . Most
c o u r t s now agree with Sawyer t h a t a defendant i s n o t denied a
f a i r t r i a l and i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o a m i s t r i a l s o l e l y because he
was momentarily and i n a d v e r t e n t l y seen.:in handcuffs by j u r y
members.
I n t h e i n s t a n t case counsel f o r defendant admits t h e j u r y
was w e l l aware of t h e f a c t defendant was i n custody and n o t
f r e e on b a i l . There i s no i n d i c a t i o n t h i s occurrence was pre-
judicial. I n t h e absence of an i n d i c a t i o n of p r e j u d i c i a l conse-
quences, such an occurrence does n o t warrant t h e g r a n t i n g of a
new t r i a l .
- 8 -
Issue 4 . On May 21, 1976, f i v e days a f t e r t h e t r i a l
commenced i t came t o t h e c o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n t h a t j u r o r Kolar,
along with t h e county a t t o r n e y and h i s wife had, s e v e r a l months
p r i o r t o t r i a l , viewed a videotape of t h e exhumation o f t h e
deceased. This f a c t was unknown t o t h e c o u r t and counsel f o r
t h e defendant p r i o r t o t h a t time. Z t was immediately apparent
t o the court that:
"* * * under t h e s e circumstances, M i s s Kolar
was n o t q u a l i f i e d nor should have been made p a r t
of t h i s jury unless t h i s was known t o defendant's
a t t o r n e y p r i o r t o t h i s time. 11
P r i o r t o determining a course of a c t i o n , t h e c o u r t c a l l e d j u r o r
Kolar i n t o chambers and i n t h e presence of counsel and defendant,
the following t r a n s p i r e d :
"THE COURT: So would you have t h e b a i l i f f,:aBki h e r
t o come i n here. The l a s t time I asked, I t h i n k
I asked Mrs. Hunt t o come i n here and I scared t h e t a r
o u t of h e r . Well,- I don' t want t o s c a r e the t a r o u t
of you. I t has j u s t come t o m a t t e n t i o n and con-
y
firmed by M r . Douglas t h a t p r i o r t o t h e time of t h i s
t r i a l , i n h i s .presence, you d i d observe and s e e t h e
videotaping t h a t had been conducted of t h e exhumation
of t h e body.
"MISS KOLAR: Yes.
"THE COURT: Well, now i t i s m opinion t h a t t h a t
y
should have i n i t s e l f d i s q u a l i f i e d you from p a r t i c i -
p a t i n g i n t h i s t r i a l , because you have observed p a r t
of t h e process of the i n t e r r o g a t i o n and i n v e s t i g a t i o n
of t h i s case and t h a t could a f f e c t your d e l i b e r a t i o n s
fiossibly and t h i s information, n o t being known t o M r .
Shaffer prevented him from possibly e x e r c i s i n g t h e
r i g h t of a peremptory challenge t h a t he might have
exercised o r might n o t have. Now, what I am concerned
with i s whether o r n o t during t h e course of t h i s t r i a l
have you a t any time discussed t h i s f a c t with any
o t h e r member of t h e j u r y ?
"MISS
KOLAR: No, I have n o t .
"THE COURT: And t h e r e h a s n ' t been any j u r o r t h a t
knows f r o m you t h a t you saw any of t h i s videotaping
o r anything?
"MISS KOLAR: No ."
I t was f u r t h e r developed upon questioning by defense counsel
t h a t j u r o r Kolar was a f r i e n d of t h e county a t t o r n e y , and "more
so" of h i s wife and t h e videotape was viewed p r i o r t o going
t o s e e a movie. The c o u r t then f u r t h e r questioned j u r o r Kolar:
"THE COURT: Well, j u s t one thing. A s i t p e r t a i n e d
t o your p a r t i c i p a t i n g on t h e jury and i n t h e v o i r
d i r e , you f e l t t h a t viewing t h a t had n o t i n any way
a f f e c t e d your opinion a s t o t h e g u i l t o r innocence
of M r . Baugh?
"MISS KOLAR: No. s i r .
"THE COURT: And you f e l t t h a t s i n c e t h i s was j u s t a
viewing of t h e exhumation t h a t t h a t i n no way would
a f f e c t your d e l i b e r a t i o n s ?
"MISS KOLAR: No, it would n o t .
"THE COURT: Now, d i d you f e e l t h a t your f r i e n d s h i p
with Mrs. Douglas and your knowledge of M r . Douglas would
.
,.. ! . i n - any way a f f e c t your d e l i b e r a t i o n s ?
MISS KOLAR: No, sir."
The c o u r t then excused j u r o r Kolar from f u r t h e r s e r v i c e
and even though t h i s v i n f o r m a t i o n "should have been d i s c l o s e d
by M r . Douglas during t h e v o i r dire" t h e c o u r t f e l t t h e t r i a l
could proceed by s e a t i n g one of t h e a l t e r n a t e j u r o r s . The
c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t no prejudice had r e s u l t e d i s c l e a r from
t h e d e n i a l of defendant's motion f o r a m i s t r i a l .
I I n open c o u r t , t h e j u r y , with t h e a l t e r n a t e s i t t i n g f o r
Kolar, was admonished:
':'THE COURT: JC ** M r . Smith, a t t h i s time, you should
take t h e jury box and i n so doing, although t h e Court
knows o r makes t h i s assumption, t h e reasons f o r Miss
Kolar's n o t p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n any f u r t h e r proceedings
should n o t and w i l l h o t a f f e c t t h e r e s t of you j u r o r s
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h i s case and t h a t we a r e proceeding
with t h e t r i a l . That was one of t h e reasons we have
a l t e r n a t e j u r o r s i f c e r t a i n circumstances do a r i s e .
Now, a t t h i s time, having reconvened, M r . Douglas, c a l l
your next witness ."
A t t h e conclusion o f t h e t r i a l , a f t e r t h e j u r y had reached
i t s v e r d i c t , b u t before t h a t , v e r d i c t was announced, t h e c o u r t
questioned t h e jury:
"THE COURT: During t h e time t h a t Miss Kolar was
a member of t h e j u r y , d i d she d i s c u s s with any of
you any of t h e evidence on t h e t r i a l ?
"THE JURY :' No.
"THE COURT: Let t h e record show t h a t a l l of t h e
j u r y answer no t o t h a t question. That t h e previous
q u e s t i o n , they s t a t e d t h a t t h e b r i n g i n g of t h e
defendant i n handcuffs i n t o t h e courtroom i n t h e i r
presence d i d n o t a f f e c t t h e i r d e l i b e r a t i o n s and t h e
presumption of t h e defendant's innocence u n t i l proven
g u i l t y . Now, t h e f a c t t h a t Miss Kolar was removed
from t h e jury and M r . Smith replaced h e r , d i d t h a t
i n any way a f f e c t your d e l i b e r a t i o n s on t h i s c a s e ?
"THE JURY: N .I1
o
Defendant was n o t prejudiced by t h e occurrence involving
j u r o r Kolar. While s e r i o u s prejudice may have a r i s e n i f j u r o r
Kolar had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e v e r d i c t , those problems were
thus a r r e s t e d by replacing h e r with an a l t e r n a t e j u r o r and t h e
f u r t h e r safeguards taken by t h e t r i a l judge.
The v e r d i c t and judgment of t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s affirmed.
Concur
.---We 1 :