State v. Carden

No. 13478

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F

1977

THE STATE O MONTANA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

J O H N J . CARDEN, a/k/a
JAMES J . CARDEN and GLORIA
(EUSEK) CARDEN,

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: ~ i s t r i c t o u r t o f t h e F i r s t ~ u d i c i a lD i s t r i c t ,
C
H o n o r a b l e M. James S o r t e , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For Appellant:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana
R o b e r t S. K e l l e r , S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana

For Respondents:

S m i t h , Emmons, B a i l l i e and Walsh, G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
R o b e r t J . Emmons a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
K n i g h t , Dahood and Mackay, Anaconda, Montana
Wade J. Dahood a p p e a r e d , Anaconda, Montana

-- -- -

Submitted: F e b r u a r y 1 6 , 1977

MAY 2 5 19n
Decided :
- .?
.

Filed:
-w2 s 1977

Clerk
 Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the
Court.

Defendants James J. Carden and his wife Gloria Eusek Carden

were charged with several crimes arising out of a $5,000 settle-

ment of her Workmen's Compensation claim. The district court,
Lewis and Clark County, dismissed the case on the ground that
defendants had been denied their constitutional right to a speedy

trial. The state appeals. We reverse.
On December 20, 1974, the attorney general filed a direct

Information against the defendants in the district court of Lewis

and Clark County. Defendant James J. Carden is the former

administrator of the Workmen's Compensation Division, Department

of Labor and Industry, of the State of Montana. Defendant Gloria

Eusek Carden is the wife of defendant James J. Carden. The
Information contained 19 counts charging defendants with the following

crimes in connection with a $5,000 settlement of Gloria Eusek

Carden's claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act: Embezzlement

by a public officer; grand larceny; obtaining money or property
by false pretenses; presenting false proofs on a policy of insurance;

officer illegally interested in a contract; offering false or
forged document to be recorded; preparing false evidence; and
offering false evidence.

Defendants made their initial appearance on January 3, 1975,
before District Judge Gordon R. Bennett. Defendants were granted

additional time to brief the Information and were released on
their own recognizance. On January 9, 1975, District Judge Nat

Allen assumed,jurisdiction of the case upon request of Judge

Bennett.
 On January 1 7 , 1975, Judge A l l e n g r a n t e d defendants an _

e x t e n s i o n of time t o February 10 i n which t o f i l e t h e i r motions

and b r i e f s . On February 10 defendants f i l e d 56 motions a t t a c k i n g

t h e Information i n v a r i o u s p a r t i c u l a r s . Defendants r e c e i v e d a n

e x t e n s i o n of time t o February 26 t o f i l e t h e i r supporting b r i e f .

On March 18, Judge A l l e n r e v i s e d t h e b r i e f i n g schedule on

defendants' motions so t h a t defendants' b r i e f was due on A p r i l 21,

t h e s t a t e ' s answering b r i e f was due on May 21 and defendants'

r e p l y b r i e f was due on May 30. The s t a t e contends t h i s was done t o

synchronize t h e b r i e f i n g schedule i n t h i s c a s e w i t h t h e b r i e f i n g

schedule i n S t a t e v . James J. Carden, Cause /,3937 i n t h e d i s t r i c t

court. Defendants deny t h i s .

On May 20,the s t a t e received an e x t e n s i o n of time t o June 4

t o f i l e i t s answering b r i e f . T h e r e a f t e r defendants r e c e i v e d a n

e x t e n s i o n of time t o J u l y 3 i n which t o f i l e t h e i r r e p l y b r i e f .

On August 4 , t h e s t a t e moved t o d i s q u a l i f y Judge A l l e n

r e s u l t i n g i n an a p p e a l t o t h i s Court. W r u l e d t h a t Judge A l l e n
e

was d i s q u a l i f i e d . On September 30, D i s t r i c t Judge J a c k D. Shan-

strom assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n .

On October 21, Judge Shanstrom s e t a l l pending motions f o r

h e a r i n g on November 17. On November 3 , defendants d i s q u a l i f i e d

Judge Shanstrom.

On December 9 , D i s t r i c t Judge Paul G. H a t f i e l d assumed

jurisdiction. Judge H a t f i e l d s e t all motions by t h e defendants

f o r h e a r i n g on February 4 , 1976. A t t h e h e a r i n g , Judge H a t f i e l d

r e q u e s t e d counsel t o submit proposed o r d e r s and r e q u e s t e d t h e

s t a t e t o review i t s Information f o r c o n s o l i d a t i o n of counts.

According t o t h e s t a t e , i t subsequently wrote Judge H a t f i e l d

s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e Information could be reduced t o 6 counts and

t h e judge concurred.

-3-
 On April 14, 1976, Judge Hatfield entered an order ( )
1
dismissing 13 counts of the Information, (2) granting the state

leave to file an amended Information, (3) indicating that many

of the defendants' original motions were rendered moot by the

dismissal of the 13 counts, and ( ) setting a further hearing for
4
April 27. This was subsequently continued to May 4 due to incle-

ment weather.

In the meantime, on April 21, the state filed an amended

Information containing 6 counts. In the amended Information the
defendants were charged with 6 crimes generally corresponding

to the remaining counts in the original Information. The crimes

charged in the amended Information were: Embezzlement by a public
officer; grand larceny; offering a forged or false document to be
recorded; and preparing false evidence.

Following the hearing on May 4, Judge Hatfield set May 14

as the date for arraignment of defendants on the amended Informa-

tion; May 17 was set for hearing further motions to be filed by

defendants; and June 17 was set as the tentative trial date.

On May 11, defendants filed their motion to dismiss the case

for denial of a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Art. 11, Section 24, 1972

Montana Constitution.

On May 17, defendants presented the state with 25 motions
attacking the amended Information; a motion to dismiss all charges
because of prejudicial pretrial publicity; a motion for change
of place of trial; a demand for production of documents for trial;
a motion for production of documents; and a motion to compel the

state to furnish defendants with a copy of any oral or written

confessions or admissions with a list of witnesses.
 On May 27, defendant G l o r i a Eusek Carden moved f o r a

severance of h e r t r i a l from t h a t of James J. Carden.

On June 8, Judge H a t f i e l d , who was t h e n engaged i n a s t a t e -

wide campaign f o r e l e c t i o n a s Chief J u s t i c e of t h i s Court,

removed himself from j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e c a s e , following a motion

by defendants.

D i s t r i c t Judge James S o r t e t h e n assumed j u r i s d i c t i o n and

s e t a l l motions by defendants f o r h e a r i n g on June 17. Following

h e a r i n g a l l motions by defendants were denied, except t h o s e

r e l a t i n g t o discovery. T r i a l was s e t f o r August 16.

O J u l y 16, defendants requested a r e h e a r i n g on t h e i s s u e
n

of a speedy t r i a l . The r e h e a r i n g was h e l d on J u l y 28, i n

K a l i s p e l l during t h e annual convention of t h e S t a t e Bar of Montana.

Judge S o r t e r u l e d from t h e bench t h a t t h e c a s e be dismissed f o r

l a c k of a speedy t r i a l . The s t a t e f i l e d i t s n o t i c e of a p p e a l t h e

following day. On August 1, Judge S o r t e f i l e d a memorandum

opinion s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e reasons f o r h i s r u l i n g .

The appeal was o r i g i n a l l y argued on October 22, 1976 and

reargued on February 9 , 1977.

The s o l e i s s u e on appeal i s whether t h e defendants have been

denied t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . W note
e

defendants have p r e s e n t e d 16 a d d i t i o n a l i s s u e s f o r review r e -

l a t i n g t o o t h e r p r e t r i a l a s p e c t s of t h e c a s e , which we w i l l n o t

review a t t h i s time a s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l i s based

e x c l u s i v e l y on d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l .

Although t h e arguments of t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s on t h e

speedy t r i a l i s s u e c o n s i s t of hundreds of pages of b r i e f s f i l e d

i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t and i n t h i s Court on a p p e a l , we w i l l endeavor

- 5 -
summarize t h e p r i n c i p a l p o s i t i o n s of t h e r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s i n

b r i e f , understandable form. I n so doing, we w i l l confine our-

selves t o t h e b a s i c t h r u s t of t h e arguments a s we view them,

d i r e c t i n g our a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f o r e s t r a t h e r than t h e i n d i v i d u a l

trees.

The defendants p r i n c i p a l l y contend t h a t they have been denied

t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l under t h e p r i n c i p l e s

enunciated by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Barker v. Wingo,

407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101, and our d e c i s i o n s

i n S t a t e v. Steward, 168 Mont. 385, 543 P.2d 178, 32 St.Rep.

1185; S t a t e ex r e l . Sanford v. D i s t . C t . , Mont . 9

551 P.2d 1005, 33 St.Rep. 644; and state.:^. K e l l e r , - .
Mont

, 553 P.2d 1013, 33 St.Rep. 795. These cases g e n e r a l l y

involve a s e n s i t i v e balancing of four p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r s i n t h e

i n d i v i d u a l case t o determine whether a given defendant has been

denied a speedy t r i a l : (1) length of delay, (2) reasons f o r t h e

delay, (3) a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t by defendant, and (4) p r e j u d i c e

t o defendant.

Defendants contend t h a t when t h e s e four f a c t o r s a r e properly

evaluated and balanced under t h e circumstances of t h i s c a s e ,

defendants have c l e a r l y been denied t h e i r r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l ,

They emphasize t h e l e n g t h of t h e delay here i s excessive and un-

reasonable; t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l reason f o r t h e delay i s t h e manner

i n which t h e s t a t e chose t o prosecute t h e case by a 19 count

Information covering an e s s e n t i a l l y simple f a c t u a l t r a n s a c t i o n ;

t h a t t h e duty i s on t h e s t a t e ta a f f o r d defendants a speedy t r i a l ,

which defendants have n e i t h e r waived nor consented t o ; and t h a t

defendants have s u f f e r e d severe a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e by t h e f a i l u r e

of t h e s t a t e t o b r i n g them t o t r i a l w i t h i n a reasonable time.
L shuris, defendants clainl the state is responsible and charge-
n

able with unreasonably delaying the trial of defendants without

justification entitling defendants to dismissal of the charges

against them.

The basic position of the state, on the other hand, is that

while the four factor balancing test of Barker and its Montana

progeny Steward, Sanford and Keller is controlling, a proper

evaluation and balancing of these factors demonstrates that de-

fendants have not been denied a speedy trial within constitutional

requirements. The state argues it has pursued the prosecution

of this case with dispatch and cites several cases where delays

substantially in excess of those here were held not to constitute

violations of constitutional speedy trial guarantees: Barker, supra;

United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L ed 2d

627; United States v. Lane, 465 F.2d 408; United States v.

Jones, 475 F.2d 322; United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050;

United States v. Churchill, 483 F.2d 268; Ricon v. Garrison,

517 F.2d 628; United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185; United

States v. Stein, 456 F.2d 844; Constabile v. State, (0kla.Cr.)

513 P.2d 588.

The state emphatically denies that it is responsible or

chargeable with the principal delays involved in this case, viz.

the time necessarily consumed in researching, briefing, arguing,

and securing a decision on the voluminous motions filed by the

defendants and the time necessarily consumed incident to dis-

qualification of judges by both the defendants and the state.

The state further contends that the defendants have never sought

a speedy trial and are not now prepared to go to trial. Finally,
c h e s c a r e distinguishes Steward, Sanford and Keller but

requests us to review our prior holdings in Steward and Sanford

on assertion of the right to a speedy trial by defendants.

As a further preface to our decision herein, we note the

prior rulings of the district court on defendants' motion for

Jismissal of this case for denial of a speedy trial. The

district court initially denied defendants' motion. Subsequently

a rehearing was granted and the district court granted defendants'

motion. Briefly stated, the district court reasoned that the

long delay in bringing the defendants to trial in this case

established a prima facie case of denial of a speedy trial; that

both presumptive and actual prejudice to defendants resulted from

this delay; that three principal reasons accounted for the

delay in this case (1) the Montana disqualification law and the
procedural practicalities attendant on changing judges, (2) the

filing of multiple counts (19) by the prosecution in a relatively

simple factual situation, and (3) the state's disqualification

of Judge Allen after he had considered the case for over 7 months;

that none of these delays was chargeable to defendants; and

therefore the defendants were entitled to dismissal for lack of

a speedy trial. Implicit in the district court's reasoning

although not specifically stated therein is the proposition

that delays not chargeable to the defendants are the responsibility

of the state.

The starting point in our analysis of the speedy trial

issue is Barker v. Wingo,407 U.S. 514, 9 2 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed

2d 101, which both the state and the defendants concede is

controlling. Barker rejects the two arbitrary approaches to the

issue of speedy trial in favor of a balancing test in this

language :
 "We, therefore, reject both of the inflexible approaches--
the fixed-time period because it goes further than the
Constitution requires; the demand-waiver rule because it
is insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental.
The approach we accept is a balancing test, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed." 407 U.S. 529,d.530.

The substance of the balancing test in Barker is described

in these words:

"A balancing test necessarily compels courts to
approach speedy trial cases on an - - basis.
ad hoc
We can do little more than identify some of the
factors which courts should assess in determining
whether a particular defendant has been deprived of
his right. Though some might express them in
different ways, we identify four such factors:
Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the de-
fendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to
the defendant." 407 U.S. 530, 531.
Montana has adopted and applied the four factor balancing

test in Barker determining the speedy trial issue under Art.
11, section 24, 1972 Montana Constitution, as well as under

the United States Constitution in three principal cases: State

v. Steward, supra; State ex rel. Sanford v. Dist. Ct., supra;
State v. Keller, supra.

The length of the delay between the filing of the Information

and the date set for trial (544'days) triggers the inquiry here.

Barker v. Wingo, supra. It establishes a prima facie case of

denial of a speedy trial. State ex rel. Sanford v. Dist. Ct.,

supra. If this prima facie case remains unrebutted, the issue is
settled. In this case, the state's rebuttal must be weighed and
considered in the light of the four factor test of Barker.
The first factor to be considered is the length of the
delay. In this case the state concedes that the time lapse is
sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the other three elements
of the balancing test. We agree. We note that speed alone is

not the determining factor. Rather it is the manner in which
t h e s t a t e h a s p~lmraued t h e p z o s e c u t i o ~ i i n t h e l i g h t of t h e t o t a l i t y

of t h e circumstances i n t h e c a s e . The United S t a t e s Supreme

Court h a s p l a c e d t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n p e r s p e c t i v e i n t h e f o l l o w i n g

passage from United S t a t e s v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773,

11However, i n l a r g e measure because of t h e many

p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s provided an accused, t h e
o r d i n a r y procedures f o r c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n a r e
designed t o move a t a d e l i b e r a t e pace. A requirement
of unreasonable speed would have a d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t
b o t h upon t h e r i g h t s of t h e accused and upon t h e a b i l i t y
of s o c i e t y t o p r o t e c t i t s e l f . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s Court
has c o n s i s t e n t l y been of t h e view t h a t 'The r i g h t of a
speedy t r i a l i s n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t i v e . I t i s c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h d e l a y s and depends upon c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I t s e c u r e s
r i g h t s t o a defendant. It does n o t p r e c l u d e t h e r i g h t s of
p u b l i c j u s t i c e . ' ik* ff 'Whether d e l a y i n completing a
prosecution * * amounts t o an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e p r i v a -
r i o n of r i g h t s depends upon t h e circumstances C+ * *.
The d e l a y must n o t be p u r p o s e f u l o r o p p r e s s i v e . '
yc fi f f l [ T ] h e e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t i s o r d e r l y e x p e d i t i o n
and n o t mere speed. 1 1 1

I n our view t h e s t a t e h a s pursued t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w i t h

reasonable diligence. There i s l i t t l e "dead time'' i n which

n o t h i n g was done which d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h i s c a s e from Steward,

Sanford and K e l l e r . Although d e f e n d a n t s argue t h e s t a t e could

have proceeded more e x p e d i t i o u s l y had i t chosen t o charge t h e

d e f e n d a n t s w i t h a s i n g l e crime o r no more t h a n t h e 6 c h a r g e s

they e v e n t u a l l y ended up w i t h i n t h e amended I n f o r m a t i o n , t h i s i s

l a r g e l y s p e c u l a t i v e and unconvincing i n l i g h t of t h e 25 motions

f i l e d by d e f e n d a n t s a t t a c k i n g t h e amended I n f o r m a t i o n and t h e

a d d i t i o n a l d i s c o v e r y motions, venue motion, severance motion, and

motion r e l a t i n g t o p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y . I n any e v e n t , we cannot

s a y t h e law of Montana i s so c l e a r t h a t t h e manner of c h a r g i n g

d e f e n d a n t s i n t h i s c a s e rendered t h e i n i t i a l f i l i n g of a 19 count

I n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e unreasonable. I n our view t h e p r o s e c u t i o n

in t h i s c a s e h a s proceeded i n o r d e r l y and reasonable p r o g r e s s i o n
~cep-by-step towdrcl r r i a l ilrider the i r i r n i n a l p r o c e d u r a l s t a t u t e s

of t h i s s t a t e .

The second f a c t o r t o be weighed and c o n s i d e r e d under

Barker involves t h e reasons f o r t h e delay. T h i s h a s been p a r -

t i a l l y touched upon i n t h e preceding d i s c u s s i o n . To be more

p r e c i s e , t h e p r i n c i p a l d e l a y s i n t h i s c a s e were occasioned by

t h e time n e c e s s a r i l y consumed i n r e s e a r c h i n g , b r i e f i n g , and

a r g u i n g defendants' 56 o r i g i n a l motions, d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of

judges by b o t h t h e s t a t e and d e f e n d a n t s w i t h r e s u l t i n g p r o c e d u r a l

d e l a y s , r e q u e s t s f o r e x t e n s i o n s of time by b o t h t h e s t a t e and

d e f e n d a n t s , and t h e l a t e f i l i n g of b r i e f s . W do n o t s u g g e s t
e

f o r a moment t h a t d e f e n d a n t s were n o t e n t i t l e d t o f i l e t h e i r

56 motions, d i s q u a l i f y 2 j u d g e s , o r r e q u e s t e x t e n s i o n s of time.

What we do say i s t h a t t h e r e s u l t i n g d e l a y s a r e n o t t h e r e s p o n s i -

b i l i t y of n o r c h a r g e a b l e t o t h e s t a t e .

T h i s b r i n g s u s t o one of t h e p r i n c i p a l bones of c o n t e n t i o n

between t h e s t a t e and d e f e n d a n t s . The s t a t e contends i t i s

not chargeable with delays inherent i n t h e criminal j u s t i c e

system i n t h e absence of f a u l t on i t s p a r t . Defendants contend

t h a t such d e l a y s a r e c h a r g e a b l e t o t h e s t a t e because i t i s t h e

s t a t e ' s o b l i g a t i o n t o a f f o r d the defendants a speedy t r i a l and

t h e d e f e n d a n t s have no c o n t r o l over t h e s t a t e ' s c r i m i n a l

procedure s t a t u t e s o r i t s c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system.

W r e j e c t t h e b a s i c approach t o t h i s problem t a k e n by defend-
e

a n t s and i m p l i e d l y by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . T h i s approach i n d i -

c a t e s t h a t i f defendant i s c h a r g e a b l e w i t h a given number of

days d e l a y , t h e s t a t e i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y c h a r g e a b l e w i t h t h e r e -

mainder without r e g a r d t o o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Such an a r b i t r a r y

and mechanical approach i s unreasonable and goes f a r beyond t h e
speedy trial p r o v i s i o n s of t h e f e d e r a l and s t a t e c o n s t i t u -

rions. I t l e a v e s s o c i e t y naked of t h e means t o p r o t e c t i t s e l f

i n t h e f a c e of any p r o t r a c t e d and s p i r i t e d d e f e n s e . It i s

d i r e c t l y c o n t r a r y t o t h e f o u r f a c t o r b a l a n c i n g t e s t i n Barker

where t h e conduct of b o t h t h e p r o s e c u t i o n and t h e defendant

i s weighed under t h e circumstances of t h e p a r t i c u l a r c a s e under

W have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h e time r e a s o n a b l y consumed by
e

a d e f e n d a n t ' s good f a i t h motions r e q u i r i n g r e s e a r c h , h e a r i n g

and d e t e r m i n a t i o n a r e n o t c h a r g e a b l e t o defendant. S t a t e v.

K e l l e r , supra. Logic and reason compel a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e

same r u l e t o t h e s t a t e ' s good f a i t h e f f o r t s .

I n o u r view t h e circumstances of t h i s c a s e i n d i c a t e no

i n t e n t i o n a l o r d e l i b e r a t e d e l a y by t h e s t a t e , an i n s i g n i f i c a n t

amount of "dead time", no " i n s t i t u t i o n a l delays" i n t h e c r i m i n a l

j u s t i c e system beyond t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r a l r i g h t s of t h e

p a r t i e s , and no s u b s t a n t i a l d e l a y s f o r which t h e s t a t e i s

responsible o r chargeable.

The t h i r d f a c t o r i n t h e b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s , d e f e n d a n t s '

a s s e r t i o n of t h e i r r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , weighs most h e a v i l y

a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s under t h e circumstances of t h i s c a s e . Al-

though f a i l u r e t o a s s e r t t h i s r i g h t does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a waiver

of t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , i t i s a f a c t o r t o be c o n s i d e r e d

i n the balancing t e s t . I n Barker t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n was

expressed t h u s l y :

"7k ** The d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of h i s speedy t r i a l
r i g h t , t h e n , i s e n t i t l e d t o s t r o n g e v i d e n t i a r y weight
i n determining whether t h e defendant i s b e i n g d e p r i v e d
o f t h e right.. W emphasize t h a t f a i l u r e t o a s s e r t t h e
e
r i g h t w i l l make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r a defendant t o prove
t h a t he was denied a speedy t r i a l . " 407 U.S. 531.
 In our view the record in this case amply demonstrates

that the defendants did not really want a speedy trial. They

first asserted this right after protracted proceedings resulting

in dismissal of 13 of the 19 counts. For 507 days after they

were charged, defendants failed to even hint they desired a faster

pace in the proceedings. Defendants asked for and received

extensions of time. They failed to object to extensions of time

granted the state. They delayed for 40 days after the closing of

filings for Chief Justice of this Court before seeking Judge

Hatfield's removal because of his candidacy for a statewide

elective judicial office.
At the time defendants filed their motions for dismissal

for lack of a speedy trial, they had not pursued any pretrial

discovery and were in no sense ready for trial. Six days after

filing their motions for dismissal for lack of a speedy trial,
defendants filed, among other things, three pretrial discovery

motions and a motion to change the place of trial. Fifteen days

after filing their motion for dismissal for lack of a speedy

trial, defendant Gloria Eusek Carden sought severance of her

trial from that of her husband and codefendant. Under these

circumstances defendants' claim of deprivation of a speedy trial
loses its vitality. United States v. Churchill, 483 F.2d 268;

United States v. Dornau, 356 F.Supp. 1091. The further circum-
stance that defendants waited until the eve of trial to file
their motions illustrates the transparent nature of their claim
that they were deprived of their constitutional right to a speedy
trial. United States v. Churchill, supra; United States v.

Fasanaro, 471 F.2d 717; United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 322;

United States v. Toy, 482 F.2d 741; Day v. State, 61 Wis.2d 236,

212 N.W.2d 489; United States v. Saglimbene, 471 F.2d 16.
 'Che s t a t e r e q u e s t s us t o review o u r p r i o r h o l d i n g i n

Steward and Sanford on t h e t h i r d f a c t o r i n t h e Barker b a l a n c i n g

process. The s t a t e r e a d s t h e s e c a s e s a s h o l d i n g t h a t t h e f i l i n g of

a motion t o d i s m i s s f o r l a c k of a speedy t r i a l by defendant a t

? x i s arraignment i s a s u f f i c i e n t a s s e r t i o n of t h e r i g h t . Steward,

u n l i k e t h i s c a s e , involved e s s e n t i a l l y "dead time" between t h e

r i l i n g of charges and arraignment and motion on t h e eve of

t r i a l s o t o speak; Sanford involved t h e f a i l u r e of t h r e e d i f f e r e n t

judges t o s e t d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r h e a r i n g over a n e i g h t month

period d e s p i t e h i s repeated requests. Although i s o l a t e d s t a t e -

ments i n t h e o p i n i o n s may s u p p o r t t h e s t a t e ' s view of what t h i s

Court h e l d , t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s must be r e a d and i n t e r p r e t e d i n

t h e c o n t e x t of t h e f a c t s of t h e c a s e i n which they were made.

As t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court r e c e n t l y s t a t e d :

"While i t i s p o s s i b l e t o e x c i s e v a r i o u s p o r t i o n s of
t h e p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n t o s u p p o r t t h e r e s u l t reached
below, d i v o r c i n g t h e language from t h e f a c t s of t h e
c a s e s e r v e s o n l y t o d i s t o r t i t s h o l d i n g s . 11
I l l i n o i s v. S o m e r v i l l e , 410 U.S. 458, 469, 93 S.Ct.
1066, 35 L ed 2d 425, 434.

W view t h i s a s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n speedy t r i a l c a s e s where
e

each c a s e must be c o n s i d e r e d on an ad hoc b a s i s under i t s p a r t i -

c u l a r f a c t s i n a p p l y i n g t h e b a l a n c i n g t e s t of Barker. W in-
e

tended no e l i m i n a t i o n of t h e t h i r d f a c t o r i n t h e Barker

balancing t e s t , b u t simply h e l d t h a t under t h e f a c t s and c i r -

cumstances of t h o s e p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s , d e f e n d a n t s had p r o p e r l y

asserted their right.

The f i n a l f a c t o r i n t h e b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s i n v o l v e s t h e

q u e s t i o n of whether d e f e n d a n t s were p r e j u d i c e d by t h e d e l a y .

W need n o t b e l a b o r t h i s p o i n t .
e Both presumptive and a c t u a l

p r e j u d i c e a r e p r e s e n t t o some degree i n t h i s c a s e .
 Barker d e s c r i b e s t h e approach t o t h i s f a c t o r i n t h i s

'I* * P r e j u d i c e , of c o u r s e , should be a s s e s s e d i n t h e
l i $ h t of t h e i n t e r e s t s of d e f e n d a n t s which t h e speedy
t r i a l r i g h t was designed t o p r o t e c t . T h i s Court h a s
i d e n t i f i e d t h r e e such i n t e r e s t s : ( i ) t o p r e v e n t o p p r e s s i v e
p r e t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n ; ( i i ) t o minimize a n x i e t y and
concern of t h e accused; and ( i i i ) t o l i m i t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
r h a t t h e defense w i l l be impaired. Of t h e s e , t h e most
s e r i o u s i s t h e l a s t , because t h e i n a b i l i t y of a defendant
a d e q u a t e l y t o p r e p a r e h i s c a s e skews t h e f a i r n e s s of t h e
e n t i r e system. I f w i t n e s s e s d i e o r d i s a p p e a r d u r i n g a
d e l a y , t h e p r e j u d i c e i s obvious. There i s a l s o p r e j u d i c e
i f d e f e n s e w i t n e s s e s a r e unable t o r e c a l l a c c u r a t e l y
e v e n t s of t h e d i s t a n t p a s t . Loss of memory, however, i s
n o t always r e f l e c t e d i n t h e r e c o r d because what h a s been
f o r g o t t e n can r a r e l y be shown." 407 U.S. 532.

Here t h e r e i s n o t h i r g i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e

d e f e n s e h a s been impaired by t h e d e l a y . There a r e no l o s t o r

missing w i t n e s s e s . There i s no showing of l o s s of memory.

There h a s been no p r e t r i a l i n c a r c e r a t i o n , o p p r e s s i v e o r

otherwise.

There h a s been s u b s t a n t i a l a n x i e t y and concern on t h e p a r t

of d e f e n d a n t s . T h i s h a s manifested i t s e l f p h y s i c a l l y , m e n t a l l y

and e m o t i o n a l l y . I t i s perhaps more s e v e r e i n t h i s c a s e t h a n i n

the usual case. But t h i s i s an unusual c a s e . W do n o t s e e
e

how thLs a n x i e t y and concern can be e l i m i n a t e d o r minimized a s

f a r a s t h e s e d e f e n d a n t s a r e concerned u n t i l t h i s e n t i r e workmen's

cornpensation i n v e s t i g a t i o n and p r o s e c u t i o n i s completely f i n i s h e d .

I n summary t h e n , t h e circumstances of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e

i n v o l v e s u b s t a n t i a l d e l a y r e s u l t i n g p r i m a r i l y from t h e e x e r c i s e

of s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r a l r i g h t s i n h e r e n t i n ~ o n t a n a ' sc r i m i n a l

j u s t i c e system f o r which n e i t h e r t h e s t a t e nor t h e d e f e n d a n t s a r e

c h a r g e a b l e ; t h a t d e f e n d a n t s ' a s s e r t i o n of l a c k of a speedy t r i a l

has been b e l a t e d and t r a n s p a r e n t , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t s d i d

n o t r e a l l y want a speedy t r i a l and were n o t y e t ready f o r t r i a l
whea they f i l e d t h e i r motion; and t h a t p r e j u d i c e h a s r e s u l t e d

c o defendants from t h e d e l a y i n t h e form of a n x i e t y and concern.

O n t h e b a l a n c e , we h o l d d e f e n d a n t s have n o t been denied a speedy

t r i a l i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l sense.

The o r d e r and judgment of d i s m i s s a l i s r e v e r s e d . The c a s e

i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r t r i a l .

Justice

W Concur:
e
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g :

During o r a l argument t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h i s

a s "a p o l i t i c a l case". It was not made c l e a r what s i g n i f i c a n c e

was intended. The majority h e r e has scrupulously avoided any r e f e r -

ence t o t h e p o l i t i c a l background of t h i s o r r e l a t e d Workmen's Com-

pensation c a s e s but does s e t t h e case a p a r t a t p. 15 of t h e opinion

with "It i s perhaps more severe i n t h i s case than i n t h e u s u a l :

-
case. But t h i s i s an unusual case." (Emphasis supplied).

Appellate judges have s a i d i n t h e p a s t t h a t it i s n o t necessary

t h a t a c o u r t pretend t o be more ignorant than i t a c t u a l l y i s , nor

more ignorant than t h e public generally. I b e l i e v e t h i s t o be t r u e .

The p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y and excessive media treatment has n o t escaped

m notice.
y Be t h i s a s i t may, I cannot agree t h a t c a s e s should be

viewed o r t r e a t e d a s p o l i t i c a l o r unusual o r whatever. This c a s e

i s what i t i s , a s i n g l e o f f e n s e $5,000 fraud c a s e , a l l e g e d by t h e

s t a t e t o be a crime. The kind of case where t h e f a c t s , n o t names,

a r e important. The kind of case t h e average county a t t o r n e y s e e s

f r e q u e n t l y and disposes of w i t h i n s e v e r a l weeks o r a month with no

problems.

The m a j o r i t y opinion r e l i e s almost e x c l u s i v e l y on Barker v.

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101 (1972), and I

do not deny i t s a u t h o r i t y . However, i n explaining t h e a p p l i c a t i o n

of Barker t o t h e Montana c a s e s of Steward, Sanhord and K e l l e r , t h e

majority s t a t e s a t p. 6 "These cases g e n e r a l l y involve a s e n s i t i v e

balancing of four p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r s * * *." (Emphasis added.)

Again t h e majority s t a t e s a t p. 9, t h a t "Montana has adopted and

applied t h e four f a c t o r balancing t e s t i n Barker * * *." (Emphasis

added.) F u r t h e r , _ t h a t l'FIn.;this case, t h e s t a t e ' s r e b u t t a l must be
weighed and considered in the light of the four factor test of
Barker." (Emphasis added.) Thus it is obvious that the majority

over-simplifies the principles of Barker. The case is not so narrow
and restricted as the majority would lead us to believe. In it,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
"We regard none of the four factors identified above as
either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding
of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather,
they are related factors which must be considered together
with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum,
these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must
still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.
But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the
accused, this process must be carried out with full recogni-
tion that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is speci-
fically affirmed in the Constitution." (Emphasis added. )
407 U.S. 533.
Many cases following Barker have recognized that the principles
are not so constricted as the majority assumes. The foregoing
quotation was set out and approved in its entirety in Moore v.
Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S.Ct. 188, 38 L ed 2d 183, 185, 186. As

stated in United States v. Dreyer, 533 F.2d 112, 115:
"* * * The Court emphasized that it did not intend the
list to be exhaustive nor any one factor dispositive
and that other relevant circumstances should also be
considered." (Emphasis added.)
It is the "other relevant circumstances" set forth above in this

opinion, which cannot be ignored for a proper application of
Barker.
The majority opinion purports to give full support to the
rejection by Barker of the "demand-waiver doctrine". After
doing so, however, the majority goes all the way around the horns
of their dilemma and gives actual effect to the "demand-waiver" rule.
For this reason, we should look at the United States Supreme Court's
statement in connection with the rule in Barker:
"Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental
right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court's
 pronouncements on waiver of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s .
The Court has d e f i n e d waiver a s ' a n i n t e n t i o n a l r e l i n -
quishment o r abandonment of a known r i g h t o r p r i v i l e g e . I
* ** Courts should ' i n d u l g e every reasonable presumption
a g a i n s t waiver.' ***
and they should ' n o t presume
acquiescence i n t h e l o s s of fundamental r i g h t s . ' In ***
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, 82 S.Ct. 884
(1962), we h e l d :

I I I Presuming waiver from a s i l e n t r e c o r d i s imper-

missible *** t h e r e must be an a l l e g a t i o n and evidence
*
* *."I 407 U.S. 525,526.
By, i n e f f e c t , applying t h e "demand-waiver r u l e " , the majority

does f u r t h e r v i o l e n c e t o t h e law enunciated i n Barker:

"The n a t u r e of t h e speedy t r i a l r i g h t does make i t
impossible t o p i n p o i n t a p r e c i s e time i n t h e p r o c e s s
when t h e r i g h t must be a s s e r t e d o r waived, b u t t h a t
f a c t does n o t argue f o r p l a c i n g t h e burden of p r o t e c t i n g
t h e r i g h t s o l e l y on defendants. A defendant h a s no duty
t o b r i n g himself t o t r i a l ; t h e S t a t e h a s t h a t d u t y a s
w e l l as t h e duty of i n s u r i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l i s c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h due process. Moreover, f o r t h e reasons e a r l i e r ex-
p r e s s e d , s o c i e t y has a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i n b r i n g i n g
s w i f t p r o s e c u t i o n s , and s o c i e t y ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e t h e
ones who should p r o t e c t t h a t i n t e r e s t . I ' ( ~ m p h a s i sadded. )
407 U.S. 527.

The m a j o r i t y opinion a t page 7 a t t e m p t s t o support i t s u l t i m a t e

conclusion by c i t i n g t h e c a s e s r e l i e d on by t h e s t a t e , wherein

d e l a y s i n excess of t h a t Judge S o r t e was confronted w i t h were

involved. I t should be noted t h e only United S t a t e s Supreme Court

c a s e c i t e d i s United S t a t e s v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S e c t . 773,

i 5 L ed 2d 627, decided February 23, 1966, over 6 y e a r s p r i o r t o

Barker. Since Barker i s u n i v e r s a l l y accepted a s t h e B i b l e on speedy

t r i a l i s s u e s , and s i n c e i t h a s been a foundation f o r t h e new

f e d e r a l r u l e s and t h e d e c i s i o n s d r a s t i c a l l y reducing p e r m i s s i b l e

d e l a y s i n b r i n g i n g a c a s e t o t r i a l , any a u t h o r i t y of "Ewell"

is d i l u t e d , and t o some e x t e n t superseded by Barker. F u r t h e r , t h e

f a c t s i n Ewell a r e n o t a t a l l s i m i l a r t o t h o s e of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e ,

nor a r e t h e f a c t s i n t h e o t h e r c a s e s c i t e d by t h e s t a t e and t h e

majority.
 I t should b e noted a l s o t h a t t h e delay i n Ewell was not

" s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n excess" of t h a t i n t h i s c a s e , a s s t a t e d by t h e

majority. I n t h i s c a s e , t h e time between t h e f i l i n g of t h e Informa-

t i o n and t h e order of Judge Sorte was 585 days, a s compared t o 576

i n Ewell. A t any r a t e , t h e quotation of t h e majority from Ewell

a t page 10 of t h e majority opinion, i s not consonant with t h e n a t i o n a l

trend s i n c e 1966. The substance of t h e quotation i s t h a t u n l e s s

prosecution i s 11
,.purposeful o r oppressive" i n delaying a prosecution,

t h e r e i s no d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l . This i s not t h e law under t h e

1972 Barker d e c i s i o n and t h e cases and r u l e s a p p l i e d s i n c e then. This

has n o t been t h e law i n Montana, p r i o r t o t h e majority d e c i s i o n

i n t h i s case.

The majority opinion makes t h i s c h a r i t a b l e statement a t p. 13:

" I n our view t h e record i n t h i s case amply demonstrates
t h a t t h e defendants d i d n o t r e a l l y want a speedy t r i a l . "
(Emphasis added.)

This i s an exceedingly t r a n s p a r e n t e f f o r t t o b r i n g t h i s case

within t h e r e s u l t of Barker,but t h i s case i s i n no manner o r way

s i m i l a r under t h e f a c t s of Barker. There, Barker was anxiously

awaiting t h e outcome of t r i a l s and appeals i n t h e r e l a t e d case

of Manning, who was charged with t h e same crime. Barker was gambling

t h a t h i s case would be dismissed i f Manning were e v e n t u a l l y a c q u i t t e d .

The s t a t e obtained 16 continuances of t r i a l d a t e s , and Barker made

no o b j e c t i o n t o 13 of t h e s e continuances. He thoroughly approved

of t h e delays u n t i l he l o s t h i s b e t . There a r e a b s o l u t e l y no

s i m i l a r f a c t s i n t h i s case.

Moreover, a search of t h e record f a i l s t o d i s c l o s e any evidence

t o support t h i s g r a t u i t o u s statement of t h e majority. Likewise, i f

t h e r e was any i s s u e of f a c t before Judge S o r t e a s t o whether o r not

t h e Cardens wanted t o go t o t r i a l , i t i s not apparent from t h e record.
Under the established rules of appellate procedure neither an
issue of law nor an issue of fact can be raised for the first
time on appeal. The majority completely by-passes this principle.

The discretion vested in the trial court and the presumptions

in the trial court's favor recognized in Steward seem to have no
meaning in this case. This Court stated in Steward:
"This Court has held many times that all presumptions
are in favor of the trial court's decision. [Citing cases.]
The district court had ample opportunity to view the
record and determine the inferences to be drawn from the
actions of the parties. We find no substantial evidence on
the record rebutting the presumption the district court
acted properly in holding the actions of defendant and his
attorney did not waive the ripht to a speedy trial."
(Emphasis added.) 543 P.2d 183.
This Court further recognized the discretion vested in the
trial court in connection with the question of dismissal with
prejudice. In Steward, we said:
"* * * The State may exercise discretion as to
whether the accused will be reprosecuted. The trial
court should possess similar discretion to disallow
repmsecution if the prejudice caused the accused and
his defense by the denial of a speedy trial would be
compounded by a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense." 543 P.2d 184.
If we continue to recognize the presumption in favor of the
,-,.-
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. -
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ruling of the trial court there is no basis for reversal on this
record. If the majority bases its holding on manifest abuse or
lack of substantial evidence, it should so state.
The contention that the state has no responsibility for the
time consumed in connection with defendants' 56 motions attacking
the Information creates a bit of a "stench". There is no way or
no case to support any angle the state can use to avoid responsi-
bility for the time attendant to disposing 13 of the 19 counts.
The majority opinion denies that "the initial filing of a 19 count
Information in this case [was] unreasonable'! at page 10, but -
the
state admitted 13 counts were untenable. To say they were improvi-
dently filed would be undeservedly apologetic and charitable.
(See also in this connection: 53.9(c) (e) of Std. for Criminal

Justice of American Bar Association and Disciplinary Rules 7-103A
and 1 1 2 A ( ) 5 ;
-0()4() Montana Cannons of Professional Ethics 3.9

()c())
a()e. See also: United States v. Pauline Pipe, (Mont.)

Havre-Glasgow Div., Federal District Court CR-77-10-HG, April

1977, for a discussion concerning repeated indictment as denial
of due process which doctrine would not exclude application to

untenable Information counts.

The majority further condemns the defendants in relation to

the number of counts at p. 10 of its opinion, saying "this is

largely speculative and unconvincing in light of the 25 motions filed

by the defendants attacking the amended Information and the addi-

tional discovery motions, venue motion, severance motion, and

motion relating to pretrial publicity." This charitable statement

seems to assume that all motions should be filed at the outset

of the proceedings. After a declaration of "unusual case", I fail
to see any justification for the characterization "speculative and
unconvincing" to describe motions relating to venue and pretrial
publicity prior to the time the grounds had fully accrued, or not

filing discovery motions prior to the time when it was determined
whether or not the Information would be dismissed.

The majority on p 9, recognizes that 544 days between
.
filing Information and trial date was sufficient to trigger an
inquiry as to speedy trial in the following language:
"It establishes a prima facie case of denial of a speedy
trial. State ex rel. Sanford v. Dist.Ct., supra. If
this prima facie case remains unrebutted, the issue is
settled." (Emphasis added.)

Having purported to recognize the rule, the majority emasculates

it by ignoring that the burden is upon the state to rebut the
the presumption of a denial of a speedy trial and it is the duty
of the state to bring the case to trial.

On p. 10 of its opinion, the majority blandly states:
"In our view the state has pursued the prosecution with
reasonable diligence.I1
This statement cannot be justified by the record and particularly
the state's belated disqualification of Judge Allen after presiding
for 264 days, but, more that that, it sidesteps the issues. The
question is not limited to whether the prosecution proceeded with
!'reasonable diligence" but whether or not the defendants were
deprived of a constitutional right. If they were so deprived at
the hands of the state, it matters not whether it was the executive,
legislative or judicial branch at fault. (In this regard, see
admissions by state in Petition for Supervisory Control v. Arnold
Olsen (Goldman dismissal), April 26, 1977.)
The majority states at p. 13:
"* * * The further circumstance that defendants waited until
the eve of trial to file their motions illustrates the
transparent nature of their claim that they were deprived of
their constitutional right to a speedy trial." (Emphasis added.)
Let us take a good look at the above statement and then
compare it with the unanimous expression of the Court in Steward.
It was there said:
"The 'appropriate motion' is a motion to dismiss for
denial of a speedy trial. The proper time to assert the
right to a speedy trial is prior to the actual commencement
of-the trial, usually at the time the trial date is set,
or the time the case is called to trial. Morse v. Munici-
pal Court, et al., 13 Cal.3d 149, 118 Cal.Rptr. 14, 529
~.2d 46. -~efendant, the instant case, made his motion
in
to dismiss at the proper time." (Emphasis added.) 543 P.2d
182.
We also stated in Steward:
"The district court here was correct in holding:
"' * * * the Defendant's attorney would not be
 representing the Defendant if he would raise the question
of the fair speedy trial. This was incumbent upon the
County Attorney to do so under the circumstances. 1 1 1
(Emphasis added.) 543 P.2d 182.

Here, the "tentative trial date" was June 17, 1976 and on May 11,
1976 defendants filed their motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy
trial. How does this differ from the law announced in Steward?
The majority attempts to circumvent Barker by constant
reference to lack of "dead time", pp. 10, 12 and 14 of its opinion,
apparently on the theory that if there is no extended interlude
without some activity there can be no deprivation of a speedy trial.
There is a very conspicuous lack of authority cited for this theory,
and the only mention in Barker of "dead time" is in a totally
different context. There Justice Powell observed:
"* * * Most jails offer little or no recreational or
rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is
simply dead time." (Emphasis added.) 407 U.S. 532,533.
Any application of this statement to the instant case is difficult
to see or understand.
In passing I must comment that at p. 12 of its opinion the
majority takes the position that the state or "society" is left
"naked of the means to protect itself in the face of any protracted
or spirited defense." In light of the facts of this case, the
statement can only be viewed as an apology for incompetence. If
nothing else it is a new concept that the state needs protection
from individual defendants. Society does have an interest in speedy
trials, but it is not adversary. It is in upholding and protecting
the integrity of the judicial system against the deficiencies and
abuses of its agencies which are in total control of the state
government. The defendants and society, rather than arch adversaries,
are in a position of parallel interests. It is ludicrous to make
the assertion, particularly in what the state has termed an "unusual
case" backed by state appropriation of approximately $1,933,737.00,
against a handful of defendants. This imbalance is not a naked society
but approaches tyranny.
The thread of misunderstanding runs all through the majority
opinon and finally in the summary, p. 15, asserts:
'I** * the circumstances of this particular case
involve substantial delay resulting primarily from
the exercise of statutory procedural rights inherent
in Montana's criminal justice system for which neither
the state nor the defendants are chargeable * * *.I1
($ai
%hss added)
This statement like the rest of the opinion misses the principal
point, that this is not a 2 or single element matter, such as
how the prosecution proceeded, that controls. Rather it is the
total effect of the system. If the "Montana criminal justice system1'
is so structured that a relatively simple, single transaction,
alleged to be criminal, results in a 544 day delay of trial, then
there has been a denial of a speedy trial, and it matters not
whether it resulted in action or inaction by the courts, prosecution
or legislature, or all in concert, the state is the system and
totally responsible for "statutory procedures inherent in Montana's
criminal justice system".
Again, the majority persists in ignoring the basic rule of
Barker:
"* * * But the rule we announce today, which comports with
constitutional principles places the primary burden on
the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are
brought to trial. * * *I1 407 U.S. 529.

Again, on the matter of prejudice, I point out to-the
majority that:
( ) District Judge Sorte in the memorandum supporting his
1
"order and judgment dismissing with prejudice" stated:
 " I n t h i s S t a t e t h e law i s t h a t long delay e s t a b l i s h e s
a prima-facie c a s e of d e n i a l of a speedy t r i a l . T h i s c a s e ,
a s of J u l y 28, 1976, was 586 days from t h e d a t e of t h e
f i l i n g of t h e Information and i s p r e s e n t l y s e t f o r t r i a l
August 1 6 t h , 1976, which i s 605 days. Sanford ( J u l y 8 t h ,
1976) h e l d d e l a y of t e n months (299':days) between a r r a i g n -
ment and t r i a l e s t a b l i s h e s a prima-facie c a s e of d e n i a l
of t h e r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . That s i t u a t i o n , ,‘ vr: { A

i s p r e s e n t h e r e a s i s t h e presumption of p r e j u d i c e (Sanford
v. D i s t r i c t Court, 33 S t a t e Reporter 644, S t a t e v. Steward,
32 S t . Reporter 1185 and c a s e s c i t e d . Uncontradicted t e s t i -
mony given by defendants a t a h e a r i n g h e l d May 1 7 , 1976, i n
Great F a l l s , Montana, c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e s p r e j u d i c e beyond
t h e presumption. (See E x h i b i t s admitted June 1 7 , 1976.)"

(2) The s t a t e h a s o f f e r e d no evidence t o c o n t r a d i c t t h i s

testimony.

(3) The s t a t e h a s t h e burden t o n o t only produce proof of

no p r e j u d i c e b u t overcome t h e presumption of c o r r e c t n e s s of Judge

S o r t e ' s judgment.

(4) I n S t a t e .v. K e l l e r , Mont . 9 553 P.2d 1013, 1017,

33 St-Rep. 795,798, t h i s Court a g a i n s t a t e d one of t h e major purposes

of a speedy t r i a l i s t o p r o t e c t t h e accused i n t h e following language:

" I n h i s concurring opinion i n Barker, a t page 121, J u s t i c e
White emphasizes one of t h e major purposes i n p r o t e c t i n g
t h e accused. Wholly a s i d e from p o s s i b l e p r e j u d i c e t o a
defense on t h e m e r i t s , t h e accused w i l l be s u b j e c t t o sub-
s t a n t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on h i s l i b e r t y pending t r i a l , e i t h e r
i n j a i l o r w h i l e f r e e on bond, ' I 1 * ** t h a t may d i s r u p t h i s
employment, d r a i n h i s f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s , c u r t a i l h i s
a s s o c i a t i o n s , s u b j e c t him t o p u b l i c obloquy, and c r e a t e
a n x i e t y i n him, h i s family and h i s f r i e n d s . " ' U.S. v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L ed 2d 468, (1971)."

I n United S t a t e s v. Dreyer, 3 C.C.A. March 1976, 533 F.2d 112,

115, i t was s t a t e d :

"This reading of Barker, which conf i n e s ' p r e j u d i c e '
t o impairment t o t h e defense, was e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t e d
by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n ~ o o r e - v .Arizona,
414 U.S. 25, 26-27, 94 S.Ct. 188, 189-190, 38 L.Ed.2d
183, 185-186 (1973) ( p e r curiam). There t h e Court quoted
approvingly from J u s t i c e White's concurring o p i n i o n i n
Barker v. Wingo, s u p r a , 407 U.S. a t 537, 92 S.Ct. a t 2195,
33 L.Ed.2d a t 121:

" ' I n o r d i n a t e d e l a y "wholly a s i d e from p o s s i b l e pre-
j u d i c e t o a defense on t h e m e r i t s , may I s e r i o u s l y i n t e r f e r e
 with t h e defendant's l i b e r t y , whether he i s f r e e on
b a i l o r n o t , and *** may d i s r u p t h i s employment,
d r a i n h i s f i n a n c i a l resources, c u r t a i l h i s a s s o c i a t i o n s ,
s u b j e c t him t o p u b l i c obloquy, and c r e a t e anxiety i n him,
h i s family and h i s f r i e n d s . ' I ' United S t a t e s v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). These
f a c t o r s a r e more s e r i o u s f o r some than f o r o t h e r s , but they a r e
i n e v i t a b l y p r e s e n t i n every case t o some e x t e n t , f o r every .
defendant w i l l e i t h e r be i n c a r c e r a t e d pending t r i a l o r on
b a i l s u b j e c t t o s u b s t a n t i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on h i s l i b e r t y . '

"The majority i n Barker a l s o recognized t h a t an accused
i s 'disadvantaged by r e s t r a i n t s on h i s l i b e r t y and by l i v i n g
under a cloud of a n x i e t y , suspicion, and o f t e n h o s t i l i t y . '
Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. a t 533, 92 S . C t . a t 2193,
33 L.Ed.2d a t 118. A proper reading of Barker, t h e r e f o r e ,
must include w i t h i n t h e meaning of ' p r e j u d i c e ' any t h r e a t
t o what t h e Second C i r c u i t r e c e n t l y has termed ' a n accused's
s i g n i f i c a n t stakes--psychological, p h y s i c a l and f i n a n c i a l - - -
i n t h e prompt termination of a proceeding which may u l t i -
mately deprive him of l i f e , l i b e r t y o r property.' United
S t a t e s v. Roberts, 515 F.2d 642, 645 (2d C i r . 1975).lt
(Emphasis added.)

(5) Our f i l e s do n o t r e v e a l t h e defendants a r e proceeding

forma pauperis, b u t a r e using t h e i r own a s s e t s .

(6) Hence, t h e p r e j u d i c e found and w i t h i n t h e contemplation

of Barker, Marion and Dreyer and adopted by Montana i n K e l l e r ,

has n o t been recognized by t h e majority beyond " t h i s i s an unusual

case".

(7) There has been no burden e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e m a j o r i t y

and no burden met by t h e s t a t e .

(8) The s t a t e has disposed of t h e e n t i r e i s s u e of p r e j u d i c e

summarily and t o t a l l y ignored t h e uncontroverted p r i n c i p l e t h a t

t h e burden i s upon t h e s t a t e t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t t h e r e has been no

prejudice. The majority i n s t a t i n g " t h e r e i s nothing i n t h e record
(Emphasis added.)
t o suggestt'/any of t h e s e types of p r e j u d i c e has unwittingly conceded

t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c e element must be resolved 100% i n favor of de-

fendants. Even i f t h e burden was on t h e defendants t h e conclusion

of t h e majority would be untenable under t h e a u t h o r i t y of Dreyer

and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n , and K e l l e r .
 I would a s k t h e m a j o r i t y i n t h i s o p i n i o n , what i s t h e s r a t e

o f t h e Law a s i t h a s been announced i n t h e many d e c i s i o n s s e t t i n g

r o r t h t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s

presumed t o be c o r r e c t and a l l doubt r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r of t h e

p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y on a p p e a l . How a r e we t o view t h e d o c t r i n e e s t a b -

l i s h e d by Steward, Sanford and K e l l e r ? Are t h e y s t i l l t h e law,

except i n "unusual" o r " p o l i t i c a l cases" ?

I , f o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d , f e e l Judge S o r t e ' s judgment should

be a f f i r m e d .

Justice.

Hon. L.C. Gulbrandson, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e
Paul G o H a t f i e l d , a g r e e s w i t h t h e d i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e Daly, t o
t h e e x t e n t s a i d d i s s e n t imposes r e s p o n s i b i l i t y upon t h e S t a t e of
Montana f o r " i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e l a y s " i n t h e criminiil j u s t i c e system.