State v. Bailey

No. 82-100

I N THE SUPREPIE COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
O T N

1982

STATE OF MONTANA,

P l a i n t i f f and Appellant,

GORDON A . BAILEY,

Defendant and Respondent.

AL3peal f r o m : District Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and. f o r t h e C o u n t y o f M i s s o u l a , The H o n o r a b l e
J a m e s B. W h e e l i s a n d The H o n o r a b l e J o h n S. IJenson,
Judges presiding.

Counsel o f Record:

For Appellant :

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
R o b e r t L. Deschamps, 111, C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a ,
Montana

F o r Resgondent:

F r e d R. Van V a l k e n b u r g ; S m i t h , Connor & Van V a l k e n b u r g ,
M i s s o u l a , I~Iontana

Submitted on B r i e f s : September 2 3 , 1982

Decided: December 1 6 , 1 9 8 2

Filed: DEC 1 6 ?SB2
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .

T h i s case comes b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t on a p p e a l from t h e D i s t r i c t

Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County. The
D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i s m i s s d t h e c h a r g e of a t t e m p t e d s a l e of d a n g e r o u s

d r u g s , a f e l o n y , on the grounds t h a t t h e defendant w a s denied h i s

r i g h t to speedy t r i a l .
The defendant, Bailey, was arrested and charged with the

f e l o n y o f f e n s e of a t t e m p t e d s a l e of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s on F e b r u a r y

1 8 , 1981. H e waived p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g . On March 3 1 a n i n f o r -
m a t i o n was f i l e d . The d e f e n d a n t a p p e a r e d i n D i s t r i c t Court on
April 22, 1981, and moved to dismiss the information on the

g r o u n d s t h a t it was f i l e d f i v e d a y s beyond t h e t h i r t y day t i m e
l i m i t s e t out i n s e c t i o n 46-11-203, MCA. T h a t i n f o r m a t i o n was

dismissed pursuant t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n o n May 2 6 . After

t h a t d i s m i s s a l and i n a p p a r e n t r e l i a n c e on t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
order, t h e d e f e n d a n t moved t o I n d i a n a and o b t a i n e d employment.
After the dismissal, the State submitted a motion to the

D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e q u e s t i n g t h a t it be a l l o w e d t o renew i t s o r i g i -

n a l motion f o r l e a v e to f i l e t h e information. T h i s m o t i o n was

denied o n J u l y 22 and on J u l y 23, 1981, the S t a t e moved the

D i s t r i c t C o u r t to r e c o n s i d e r t h e motion f o r r e n e w a l . That motion
was a l s o d e n i e d on A u g u s t 1 2 .
On t h e same d a y t h e motion to reconsider was denied, the

State filed a new information alleging attempted sale of
dangerous drugs, a felony. This was done pursuant to the
s u g g e s t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n its o r d e r denying t h e m o t i o n .
On that day the date of the initial appearance was set for
S e p t e m b e r 1 4 . T h i s was d o n e p u r s u a n t to a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e
S t a t e and the defendant, t o allow him to a v o i d e x t r a d i t i o n to
Montana.

The i n i t i a l a p p e a r a n c e and a r r a i g n m e n t w a s h e l d o n S e p t e m b e r
14. At t h a t t i m e t h e t r i a l d a t e was s e t f o r S e p t e m b e r 2 1 , b u t

was p o s t p o n e d on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t u n t i l F e b r u a r y
1982. On J a n u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 8 2 , t h e d e f e n d a n t moved to d i s m i s s t h e
charge on the ground that he was d e n i e d his right to speedy

trial. T h i s motion was g r a n t e d on February 2. In its o r d e r

dismissing the charge, the District Court noted that the time
between t h e d i s m i s s a l of t h e f i r s t i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e f i l i n g of

the second should be charged against the State, because in

reality this is b u t o n e c a u s e of a c t i o n c o n t i n u o u s l y p u r s u e d by

the State.

Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d in t h i s case:

1. Whether the District Court erred when it included the

time between the dismissal of the first information and the

f i l i n g o f t h e s e c o n d i n i t s c a l c u l a t i o n of t i m e t o s e e i f speedy
t r i a l had b e e n d e n i e d ?

2. W h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d when i t d e t e r m i n e d the

defendant was denied a speedy t r i a l ?

I n t h e case a t h a n d , t h e S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e t i m e between

dismissal of the f i r s t i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e f i l i n g of t h e second

should not be included i n t h e computation of t i m e f o r a speedy
trial, and t h a t t h e speedy t r i a l c l o c k b e g i n s to r u n anew upon

t h e f i l i n g of t h e second i n f o r m a t i o n . Based o n t h a t , they also

contend t h a t looking a t a l l the f a c t o r s enumerated under Barker

v. Wingo ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 407 U.S. 514, 3 3 L.Ed.2d 101, 92 S.Ct. 2182,

t h e r e is no d e n i a l o f a s p e e d y t r i a l h e r e .

I n s u p p o r t of its p o s i t i o n , t h e S t a t e p r i n c i p a l l y r e l i e s on

f o u r c a s e s , S t a t e v. S a n d e r s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. 209, 516 P.2d 3 7 2 ;

S t a t e v. Fife ( 1 9 8 1 ) r 6 3 2 P.2d 712, 38 S t . R e p . 1 3 3 4 ; A r n o l d v.

McCarthy (9th Cir. 1 9 7 8 ) , 566 F.2d 1377; and, United S t a t e s v.

McDonald (1982)f -- - U.S. -. - , 7 1 L.Ed.2d 696, 1 0 2 S.Ct. 1497.

As t o the first two d e c i s i o n s , -S a n d -. s
-- - - e r -
- F --
and --i f e , they held

that when a cause is reversed and re-anded for retrial, the

s p e e d y t r i a l c l o c k b e g i n s anew on t h e d a t e of t h e r e m i t t i t u r and

continues u n t i l t r i a l . W e do n o t believe t h a t the r u l e set out

i n S a n d e r s and F i f-- is a p p l i c a b l e to t h e p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n .
e Both

t h o s e cases d e a l w i t h p o s t - a p p e a l s i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e d e f e n -

d a n t h a s a l r e a d y b e e n t r i e d b u t r e v e r s a l is r e q u i r e d d u e t o some
impropriety i n the proceed ing .
B u t , t h i s is n o t t h e s i t u a t i o n i n M r . Bailey's case. It was

through an e r r o r in f i l i n g the initial information t h a t it was

dismissed. A l t h o u g h no f o r m a l c h a r g e s were p n d i n g during the

interim between the two informations, Bailey still seemed to
technically be an accused. During that interim, the deputy

c o u n t y a t t o r n e y a t t e m p t e d to c o n t i n u e h i s p r o s e c u t i o n . He t r i e d

twice t o h a v e t h e i n £ ormat i o n r e i n s t a t e d , t h r o u g h mot i o n s . These

a t t e m p t s were o p p o s e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t t h r o u g h h i s c o u n s e l . The

District Court, in its o r d e r denying t h e motion to reconsider,

had t o point out to the c o u n t y a t t o r n e y how t o p r o c e e d . Only

t h e n was t h e p r o p e r d o c u m e n t a t i o n to r e f i l e t h e c h a r g e s u b m i t t e d

to the court. Under such circumstances, Bailey is still an

a c c u s e d as h i s l i b e r t y is r e s t r a i n e d , b e c a u s e of the uncertainty

a s t o w h e t h e r h i s p r e s e n c e w i l l be r e q u i r e d , t h a t these e f f o r t s

to prosecute cause in his normal life, and he is subject to
p u b l i c a c c u s a t i o n as t h e s e a t t e m p t s were r e p e a t e d l y made i n o p e n

court. T h i s p l a c e s him i n a c o m p a r a b l e s i t u a t i o n of a d e f e n d a n t

who has been arrested thus putting him in the category of

accused. U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Marion ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 4 0 4 U.S. 307, 321, 30

L.Ed.2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455. Being an accused is a l l that is
required for the right to speedy trial to attach. S t a t e v.

L a r s o n ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 6 2 3 P.2d 9 5 4 , 957.

The Arnold case relied on by the State is factually

d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e case a t h a n d . D e s p i t e it d e a l i n g w i t h a

p e r i o d b e t w e e n t h e d i s m i s s a l o f a c h a r g e a f t e r a m i s t r i a l and t h e

subsequent r e f i l i n g of t h a t charge, the prosecutor i n t h a t case

d i d n o t make a t t e m p t s t o c o n t i n u e p r o s e c u t i o n i n t h e i n t e r i m be-

t w e e n t h e f i r s t and s e c o n d c h a r g i n g . T h i s c a n n o t be s a i d of the

county a t t o r n e y i n B a i l e y ' s case though. A s pointed o u t above,

he tried to c o n t i n u e t h e p r o s e c u t i o n , between the dismissal of

t h e f i r s t and t h e f i l i n g o f t h e second c h a r g e . Also, as p o i n t e d

o u t above, t h i s continued attempt t o prosecute placed B a i l e y i n a

p o s i t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f o n e who had b e e n a r r e s t e d t h u s making
him an a c c u s e d .

The S t a t e a l s o r e l i e s on t h e r e c e n t p l u r a l i t y o p i n i o n of the
U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n U n i t e d S t a t e s v. McDonald, s u p r a .

I n t h a t c a s e a c a p t a i n s t a t i o n e d a t F o r t Bragg, North C a r o l i n a ,

was f o r m a l l y c h a r g e d w i t h t h e m u r d e r of h i s w i f e and c h i l d r e n .

Those c h a r g e s were dismissed and he was honorably discharged.
But, at the request of the Justice Department, the Amy's
Criminal Investigation Division (CID) continued its investiga-

tion. A l l the i n f o r m a t i o n g a t h e r e d was f o r w a r d e d t o t h e J u s t i c e

Department. The i n £ o r m a t i o n w a s u l t i m a t e l y p r e s e n t e d to a g r a n d
j u r y which i n d i c t e d McDonald f o r t h e m u r d e r s .

However, t h e McDonald c a s e is a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e
one p r e s e n t l y b e f o r e us. D e s p i t e McDonald being a w a r e of the
ongoing investigation that took p l a c e during t h e s e v e r a l years

between the dismissal of the army charges and his subsequent
i n d i c t m e n t by t h e g r a n d j u r y , i t c a n n o t be s a i d t h a t he was t e c h -

nically an accused. But, this is n o t the case with Bailey.

D e s p i t e no f o r m a l c h a r g e s p e n d i n g , it is c l e a r from t h e r e c o r d he
is an a c c u s e d , because a s pointed o u t above, i n our discussions
o f t h e o t h e r c a s e s t h e S t a t e r e l i e s o n , he is i n a s i m i l a r p o s i -

t i o n t o a n a r r e s t e d p e r s o n due t o t h e S t a t e ' s c o n t i n u e d e f f o r t s

t o c h a r g e him d u r i n g the i n t e r i m between the f i r s t and second
information.

We t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t under these f a c t s t h a t B a i l e y meets
t h e t h r e s h o l d r e q u i r e m e n t of b e i n g a n a c c u s e d , t h u s , t h e r i g h t t o

a speedy t r i a l a t t a c h e s .
The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t i n a p p l y i n g t h e ad hoc t e s t , which is
m a n d a t e d by B a r k e r v. Wingo, s u p r a , to d e t e r m i n e i f a d e f e n d a n t ' s
r i g h t to speedy t r i a l h a s been denied t h a t t h e c l o c k should b e g i n
t o r u n anew on t h e f i l i n g o f t h e s e c o n d i n f o r m a t i o n . But, a s set
o u t above, t h i s i s n o t t h e c a s e , b e c a u s e B a i l e y was a n a c c u s e d
f r o m t h e t i m e of h i s i n i t i a l a r r e s t , d u e t o t h e p r o c e e d i n g s t h a t

took place in the i n t e r i m between the dismissal of the first

i n f o r m a t i o n and t h e f i l i n g of t h e s e c o n d and t h e e f f e c t of t h o s e
p r o c e e d i n g s on him.

T h e r e f o r e , a l l t h a t r e m a i n s to be d o n e is t o a p p l y t h e B a r k - r
- -e

a d h o c b a l a n c i n g t e s t t o B a i l e y ' s case. T h i s Court h a s s e t o u t

how t h i s t e s t is to be a p p l i e d i n S t a t e v. L a r s o n , s u p r a , where
it s t a t e d :

" F o u r f a c t o r s t o be c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r t h e ana-
l y s i s are: (1) l e n g t h of d e l a y ; ( 2 ) r e a s o n
f o r d e l a y ; ( 3 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of
t h e r i g h t ; and ( 4 ) p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t .
B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 5 3 0 , 9 2 S . C t . a t 2191.
- It
m u s t be remembered, h o w e v e r , none of t h e f o u r
f a c t o r s is r e c o g n i z e d as e i t h e r a n e c e s s a r y o r
sufficient condition t o a finding t h a t the
r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l h a s been deprived.
R a t h e r , t h e y are r e l a t e d f a c t o r s and m u s t be
considered t o g e t h e r with such o t h e r cir-
c u m s t a n c e s as may be r e l e v a n t . The C o u r t
m u s t s t i l l e n g a g e i n a d i f f i c u l t and s e n s i t i v e
balancing process. S e e B a r k e r , 4 0 7 U.S. a t
5 3 3 , 9 2 S . C t . a t 2193." 625-Fr2d a t 957.
L e n g t h o f d e l a y is t h e f i r s t f a c t o r to be l o o k e d a t u n d e r t h e

test. T h i s is t h e t r i g g e r i n g mechanism, S t a t e v . F i f e , 6 3 2 P.2d
a t 715, and u n l e s s t h e r e is a p e r i o d o f d e l a y l o n g e n o u g h t o be
presumptively prejudicial , no f u r t h e r i n q u i r y is r e q u i r e d ; S t a t e

v. Armstrong (1980), 616 P.2d 341, 351, 37 St.Rep. 1563.
B a i l e y claims a d e l a y of 216 d a y s i n t h i s c a s e . However, i n
o u r v i e w , o n l y 1 8 6 d a y s , t h e p e r i o d from h i s i n i t i a l a r r e s t u n t i l

t h e f i l i n g o f t h e s e c o n d i n f o r m a t i o n , s h o u l d be used t o d e t e r m i n e

i f t h e d e l a y is p r e s u m p t i v e l y p r e j u d i c i a l . The r e m a i n i n g t i m e is

d u e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s need f o r time to p u t h i s a f f a i r s i n I n d i a n a

i n o r d e r p r i o r to r e t u r n i n g to Montana to f a c e t h e d r u g c h a r g e s
and a r e q u e s t f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e g r a n t e d t o him.
The 186 days in this case is sufficient to trigger the
inquiry to see if the defendant's right to speedy trial was

denied. The l e n g t h of t h e d e l a y n e c e s s a r y to p r o v o k e s u c h a n
i n q u i r y is d e p e n d e n t on t h e p e c u l i a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e case
a n d a lesser d e l a y w i l l be t o l e r a t e d f o r s i m p l y s t r e e t crimes, as
w e h a v e h e r e , t h a n f o r complex o n e s ; B a r k e r v . Wingo, 407 U.S. at

NOW w e must l o o k a t t h e second f a c t o r under t h e t e s t s e t o u t
by B a r k e r , t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y . I t is c l e a r from t h e f a c t s
that the cause of this d e l a y was the deputy county a t t o r n e y ' s

error i n f i l i n g the information. Therefore, t h e e n t i r e 186 d a y s

from B a i l e y ' s arrest u n t i l the second information was filed is

a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e S t a t e .

The t h i r d f a c t o r t o be c o n s i d e r e d is t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s asser-
t i o n of h i s r i g h t . The S t a t e , when d i s c u s s i n g t h i s f a c t o r , u r g e s

t h i s C o u r t t o a d o p t t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t B a i l e y ' s a s s e r t i o n was s u f -

f i c i e n t t o r a i s e i n q u i r y as to w h e t h e r t h e r i g h t w a s d e n i e d , b u t

is i n s u f f i c i e n t to s u s t a i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s claim on i t s merits

because t h e r i g h t was n o t a s s e r t e d o f t e n e n o u g h . However, this

is n o t t h e case, b e c a u s e a s l o n g a s t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s a s s e r t e d

h i s r i g h t t o s p e e d y t r i a l p r i o r to t r i a l , he h a s m e t t h e third

f a c t o r i n t h i s t e s t ; S t a t e v. S t e w a r d ( 1 9 7 5 ) r 1 6 3 Mont. 3 8 5 , 5 4 3

P.2d 1 7 8 , 1 8 2 ; S t a t e v. L a r s o n , 6 2 3 P.2d a t 958.
The S t a t e , when d i s c u s s i n g t h e a s s e r t i o n of the right, also
claims t h a t B a i l e y d i d n o t w a n t a s p e e d y t r i a l b e c a u s e he e x e r -
c i s e d h i s r i g h t t o have t h e i n f o r m a t i o n d i s m i s s e d and resisted

i t s r e i n s t a t e m e n t a f t e r t h e S t a t e f a i l e d to comply w i t h s e c t i o n

46-11-203, MCA. T h i s p o s i t i o n is u n t e n a b l e . W e cannot penalize

the defendant for exercising his statutory rights or for the

prosecutor's mistake. To do s o would be to d e p r i v e him o f d u e
p r o c e s s o f l a w which is g u a r a n t e e d u n d e r A r t i c l e 1 1 , S e c t i o n 7 o f

t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . N e i t h e r c a n w e f o r c e him t o c h o s e o n e

right over another, this was made clear by the United States

Supreme C o u r t i n Simmons v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 390 U.S. 377,

1 9 L.Ed.2d 1 2 4 7 , 88 S . C t . 9 6 7 , w h e r e it a d d r e s s e d a s i m i l a r i s s u e

and stated: ". . . we find it intolerable t h a t one c o n s t i t u -

tional right should have t o be s u r r e n d e r e d to a s s e r t a n o t h e r . "
B e c a u s e t h i s a n a l y s i s seems t o a p p l y w i t h e q u a l s t r e n g t h n o t o n l y

t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s b u t t o a l l r i g h t s , B a i l e y s h o u l d n o t and

c a n n o t be f o r c e d t o c h o s e b e t w e e n h i s s t a t u t o r y r i g h t u n d e r sec-

tion 46-11-203, MCA, and his constitutional right to a s p e e d y
trial.

The f o u r t h f a c t o r t o be c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r t h e B a r k e r a n a l y s i s
is t h a t o f p r e j u d i c e :

" P r e j u d i c e i n a s p e e d y t r i a l c o n t e x t is to be
a s s e s s e d i n l i g h t o f t h e i n t e r e s t s of d e f e n -
dants which the speedy trial right was
designed to protect. In this regard,
d e f e n d a n t s ' i n t e r e s t s h a v e b e e n i d e n t i f i e d as :
'(i) to prevent oppressive p r e tr i a1
i n c a r c e r a t i o n ; ( i i ) to minimize a n x i e t y and,
c o n c e r n o f t h e a c c u s e d ; and ( i i i ) t o l i m i t t h e
possibility that the defense will be
impaired. ' B a r k e r v. Wingo, 407 U.S. a t 5 3 2 ,
9 2 S . C t . a t 2192." S t a t e v. L a r s o n , 6 2 3 P.2d
a t 658-659.

In addressing t h i s f a c t o r , t h e S t a t e a s s e r t s t h a t no p r e j u -

d i c e whatsoever e x i s t s . However, t h e d e f e n d a n t claims p r e j u d i c e

due to the fact that he was required to give up h i s job in

Indiana and r e t u r n t o Montana t o defend the charges. Economic

h a r d s h i p h a s been recognized as o n e form o f p r e j u d i c e t h a t c a n
f l o w from t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of a defendant's speedy t r i a l right;

S t a t e v. H a r v e y ( 1 9 7 9 ) r 6 0 3 P.2d 6 6 1 , 6 6 8 , 36 S t . R e p 2035; U n i t e d

S t a t e s v. Marion, 404 U.S. a t 320. Here, the county attorney

claims that any economic loss is n o t prejudice caused by the

State's conduct, as it was t h e r e s u l t of Bailey's i g n o r a n c e of

the l a w and n o t a s a r e s u l t o f the State's p r o s e c u t i o n of this

offense . We disagree. The economic h a r d s h i p t h e d e f e n d a n t s u f -

f e r e d is a d i r e c t r e s u l t of e r r o r i n t h e h a n d l i n g o f t h i s case by

the State. The d e f e n d a n t ' s l o s s would h a v e n e v e r o c c u r r e d i f t h e

f i l i n g o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n would h a v e b e e n h a n d l e d p r o p e r l y i n t h e

f i r s t place.

The l e n g t h o f delay i n t h i s case shifted t h e burden t o t h e

S t a t e to e x p l a i n t h e reasons f o r i t and to show t h e a b s e n c e of
p r e j u d i c e to t h e defendant; S t a t e v. F i f e , 6 3 2 P.2d a t 715. It

d i d neither adequately, as it is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s own

a c t i o n s c a u s e d t h e d e l a y and as shown a b o v e t h e r e w a s p r e j u d i c e .

These considered along w i t h t h e o t h e r r e l e v a n t circumstances such

a s t h e l e n g t h o f d e l a y and t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t u s as a n a c c u s e d ,

d u r i n g t h e e n t i r e p e r i o d o f d e l a y a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e S t a t e , sup-

port the District Court's finding t h a t the defendant w a s denied

h i s r i g h t to speedy t r i a l .

W t h e r e f ore a f f i r m .
e

Justice
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8'
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& d o 4
C h i e f Justice