No. 14295
IN THE SUPREME CCUKI' OF THE STATE OF FKNTANA
1978
STATE OF -
,
Plaintiff and Respodent,
ANDREW L. MrXLEZW,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal f c n District C u t of the Eleventh Judicial District,
ra: or
Honorable James M. Salansky, J a g presiding.
cde
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
-re, Lympus and Doran, Kalispell, mntana
Gary G Doran argued, Kalispell, mntana
.
For Respondent:
Mn. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, mntana
Leslie Taylor argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena,
mntana
Pat Springer, County Attorney, Kalispell, mntana
Stewart A Pearce I1 argued, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell,
.
P4xkdm
.- ;
Filed: ' '
Mr. ~ustice
Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
~efendant
Andrew L. McClean a p p e a l s from h i s judgment
of conviction following a jury t r i a l i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court
of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , F l a t h e a d County. McClean
was found g u i l t y o f c r i m i n a l s a l e of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s , i n
v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 5 4 - 1 3 2 ( 1 ) , R.C.M. 1947.
Defendant was c h a r g e d w i t h s e l l i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e
pound of m a r i j u a n a t o Denny Beach, who i n t u r n s o l d t h e
m a r i j u a n a t o an undercover o f f i c e r of t h e F l a t h e a d County
S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , Donald Bruce Bounds. Bounds t e s t i f i e d
t h a t on September 1 2 , 1977, he and Beach went t o a b a r where
t h e y met d e f e n d a n t s h o r t l y a f t e r 9:00 p.m. From t h e r e Beach
and d e f e n d a n t proceeded i n t o t h e r e a r p a r k i n g l o t of t h e
b a r , w h i l e Bounds remained i n t h e b a r and watched t h r o u g h a
back window. H e t e s t i f i e d he saw d e f e n d a n t McClean r e a c h i n
h i s p i c k u p , p u l l o u t a brown package and hand i t t o Beach.
Bounds t h e n went o u t s i d e , m e t Beach by h i s car and p a i d him
$110. Beach and Bounds r e t u r n e d t o t h e i n s i d e of t h e b a r
where t h e y m e t d e f e n d a n t o n c e a g a i n . Bounds o b s e r v e d Beach
g i v e d e f e n d a n t s e v e r a l b i l l s , p e r h a p s k e e p i n g a s m a l l commis-
s i o n f o r himself. Then Beach and Bounds l e f t t h e b a r i n
Bounds' car.
Defendant c h a l l e n g e s h i s c o n v i c t i o n on t h r e e grounds
a r i s i n g from t h e c o n d u c t of h i s t r i a l . H i s f i r s t issue
c e n t e r s on a s t a t e m e n t made by Bounds d u r i n g cross-examina-
t i o n t h a t Bounds had t a k e n a p o l y g r a p h t e s t . Defendant
c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by f a i l i n g t o g r a n t a
m i s t r i a l f o l l o w i n g t h e mention of p o l y g r a p h t e s t i n g . second,
defendant contends h i s c a s e w a s prejudiced because he w a s
n o t p e r m i t t e d t o p u t w i t n e s s e s on t h e s t a n d who would t e s t i -
f y t h a t Bounds on numerous o c c a s i o n s had engaged i n t h e s a l e
of a v a r i e t y of r e g u l a t e d d r u g s and had smoked m a r i j u a n a .
T h i r d , d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s h e d i d n o t have a f a i r t r i a l b e c a u s e
t h e S t a t e was p e r m i t t e d t o amend i t s i n f o r m a t i o n s h o r t l y
b e f o r e t r i a l by a d d i n g Denny Beach a s a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s .
I s s u e 1. Does t h e mention by a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s
t h a t he h a s t a k e n a p o l y g r a p h t e s t n e c e s s a r i l y p r e j u d i c e a
criminal defendant's case so a s t o require t h e t r i a l court
t o grant a mistrial?
Bounds mentioned a p o l y g r a p h t e s t d u r i n g cross-examina-
t i o n by d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t o r n e y :
"Q. M r . Bounds, you a r e p r o v i d i n g e v i d e n c e
a g a i n s t an i n d i v i d u a l on q u i t e a s e r i o u s
c r i m e . A. Y e s s i r .
"Q. Now, you a r e s t a t i n g t h a t you w e r e n o t
under t h e i n f l u e n c e of m a r i j u a n a t h a t
e v e n i n g . A. I know t h a t I w a s n ' t s i r .
"Q. How do you know t h a t ? A. Because I
h a d n ' t smoked any. I do n o t smoke mari-
juana, sir.
"Q. You do n o t smoke m a r i j u a n a ? A. No s i r .
A s a m a t t e r of f a c t , I t o o k a p o l y g r a p h . "
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r m i s t r i a l .
For a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s , t h e u s e of p o l y g r a p h d a t a and
t h e accompanying o p i n i o n of t h e p o l y g r a p h examiner a r e
generally inadmissible i n criminal t r i a l s . The p r i n c i p a l
r e a s o n p u t f o r w a r d by c o u r t s i n r e j e c t i n g t h e u s e of such
evidence i s i t s questionable r e l i a b i l i t y . United S t a t e s v .
Alexander ( 8 t h C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , 526 F.2d 1 6 1 , 167-68; U n i t e d
S t a t e s v . M a r s h a l l ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , 526 F.2d 1349, 1360;
United S t a t e s v . Tremont ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 6 5 ) , 351 F.2d 1 4 4 , 1 4 6 ,
cert.den. 383 U.S. 944, 86 S.Ct. 1198, 16 L Ed 2d 207 ( 1 9 6 6 ) .
Some e i g h t e e n y e a r s a g o Montana f o l l o w e d t h e r u l e t h a t "'.
.. [ u l n t i l it i s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t r e a s o n a b l e c e r t a i n t y
f o l l o w s from such t e s t s , it would b e e r r o r t o a d m i t i n
evidence t h e r e s u l t t h e r e o f ' . . ." S t a t e v . Hollywood
(1960), 138 Mont. 561, 575, 358 P.2d 437, 444 (quoting
people v, ~ecker (1942), 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W. 2d 503, 505).
Despite numerous improvements in design and technique
from the simple systolic blood pressure device at issue in
the first polygraph decision, Frye v. United States (1923),
54 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 293 Fed. 1013, courts continue to doubt
the "lie detector's" reliability. United States v. Alexander,
supra, 526 F.2d at 164. As the court in Alexander concluded,
"there are too many uncontrollable or unascertainable factors
which may affect the polygraphist's conclusion as to the
veracity or falsity of the examinee's responses." 526 F.2d
at 165. See also Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific
Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 Yale L.J. 694,
727 (1961).
In People v. Carter (1957), 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d
665, 674, the California Supreme Court held it was error to
permit a witness to testify that he had been willing to take
a lie detector test, thereby permitting the jury to infer
that the defendant was not willing. On the other hand, in
Johnson v. State (Fla. App. 1964), 166 So.2d 798, the jury
was made aware that a prosecution witness was a polygraph
examiner and that the examiner had concluded that the defen-
dant had at first lied to him concerning his whereabouts at
the time of the alleged crime. Yet because the examiner
revealed neither his actual test results nor his conclusions
therefrom, and because the defendant later admitted to the
examiner that he was in fact present at the scene of the
crime, the court held that the polygraphist's testimony was
not prejudicial. 166 So.2d at 805.
The Alaska Supreme Court, relying on the ~loridacourt's
Johnson decision, applied the rule of whether the mention of
p o l y g r a p h was p r e j u d i c i a l t o a c a s e v e r y s i m i l a r i n i t s
f a c t s t o t h i s appeal. G a f f o r d v . S t a t e ( ~ l a s k a 9 6 8 ) , 440
1
P.2d 405. I n G a f f o r d t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s , a n undercover
o f f i c e r , responded t o d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n by
v o l u n t e e r i n g t h a t he had d e s c r i b e d t h e i n c i d e n t a t i s s u e t o
a l i e detector. The Alaska c o u r t , q u o t i n g from Johnson
held:
". . . [TI h e m e r e f a c t t h a t t h e j u r y i s ap-
p r i s e d t h a t a l i e d e t e c t o r t e s t was t a k e n i s
n o t n e c e s s a r i l y p r e j u d i c i a l i f no i n f e r e n c e
a r e not prejudicial."
=
a s t o t h e r e s u l t i s r a i s e d o r i f any i n f e r -
e n c e s t h a t m i g h t b e r a i s e d as the result
4 4 0 P.2d a t 4 1 1 ,
q u o t i n g 166 So.2d a t 805. (Emphasis i n o r i -
ginal. )
See a l s o P e o p l e v. M a r t i n ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 62 I l l . A p p . 2 d 203, 210
N.E.2d 798, 802, a f f ' d , ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 35 I11.2d 289, 220 N.E.2d
170; S t a t e v . Cor ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 4 Mont. 323, 348, 350, 396 P.2d
86, 99-100-
Thus, d e s p i t e g e n e r a l p o l i c y a g a i n s t t h e u s e of poly-
g r a p h e v i d e n c e , t h e i s s u e must b e framed i n terms o f i t s
p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t on d e f e n d a n t . I n t h i s case the D i s t r i c t
C o u r t c o r r e c t l y d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a m i s t r i a l .
The r e f e r e n c e t o p o l y g r a p h was made under c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n
by t h e S t a t e ' s w i t n e s s . H e made no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r e s u l t s
of any such t e s t a l t h o u g h h i s answer c l e a r l y c a r r i e d t h e
i n f e r e n c e t h a t he had " p a s s e d " a t e s t . There i s no sug-
g e s t i o n t h a t t h e w i t n e s s was coached i n advance t o make t h e
reference. Cf. G a f f o r d v . S t a t e , 440 P.2d a t 4 1 1 . Finally,
any a c t u a l p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t a p p e a r s minimal. The
w i t n e s s ' r e s p o n s e was t o q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g h i s own h a b i t s
f o r m a r i j u a n a u s e and d e a l t o n l y i n d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e c h a r g e s
a g a i n s t defendant. While s u c h a r e f e r e n c e t o a l i e d e t e c t o r
may have b o l s t e r e d t h e w i t n e s s ' c r e d i b i l i t y , i t d o e s n o t
a p p e a r t o have done s o e x c e p t p e r h a p s t o r e h a b i l i t a t e him
from a p o t e n t i a l l y h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l a t t e m p t a t impeachment.
Issue 2. May a party impeach a witness by putting
witnesses on the stand to testify to specific instances of
the witness' conduct which might show a motive to testify
falsely?
Defendant's second issue concerns the order limiting
the introduction of impeachment evidence. In his brief
defendant argues he should have been permitted to put wit-
nesses on the stand to testify concerning Bounds' personal
habits for marijuana use and thereby demonstrate that Bounds
had a profit motive in obtaining a conviction. The witnesses
available to the defense were willing to testify that Bounds
had repeatedly sold and distributed dangerous drugs and had
repeatedly indulged in the use and possession of drugs. The
witnesses' testimony would have attempted to demonstrate
that Bounds used his employment as an undercover narcotics
officer to profit himself, to provide for his continuing use
of drugs and to successfully secure future employment that
he might continue his self-indulgences.
The District Court ruled it would permit witnesses to
testify only as to Bounds' "reputation for truth in the
community". It refused to allow such testimony "to just
vaguely uphold this profit motive, just by their testimony
that he at different times was in the possession of drugs
and offered them drugs." That testimony, the court con-
cluded, was not relevant to the charges against defendant.
Defendant argues that Rule 404(b), Mont.R.Evid., per-
mits the introduction of evidence of specific acts of the
witness, such as he offered, in order to show his motive to
testify falsely against defendant. He contends that because
Bounds used his employment with the sheriff's office as a
cover for obtaining and selling drugs, it would only be
l o g i c a l f o r him t o b e b i a s e d and m o t i v a t e d t o t e s t i f y
falsely .
Rule 4 0 4 ( b ) , Mont.R.Evid., i s i d e n t i c a l t o Rule 4 0 4 ( b )
of t h e F e d e r a l Rules o f Evidence. It states:
" ( b ) O t h e r c r i m e s , wrongs, a c t s . Evidence of
o t h e r crimes, wrongs, o r a c t s i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e
t o p r o v e t h e c h a r a c t e r of a p e r s o n i n o r d e r t o
show t h a t h e a c t e d i n c o n f o r m i t y t h e r e w i t h . I t
may, however, b e a d m i s s i b l e f o r o t h e r p u r p o s e s ,
such a s proof o f m o t i v e , o p p o r t u n i t y , i n t e n t ,
p r e p a r a t i o n , p l a n , knowledge, i d e n t i t y , o r ab-
s e n c e of m i s t a k e o r a c c i d e n t . "
Defendant r e l i e s on t h i s r u l e a s a means of p r o v i n g Bounds'
motive f o r t e s t i f y i n g f a l s e l y . However, i n t h i s c a s e sub-
s e c t i o n ( b ) must b e r e a d t o g e t h e r w i t h Rule 404 ( a ) ( 3 )
r e l a t i n g t o t h e c h a r a c t e r of a w i t n e s s , which p r o v i d e s :
"Character evidence n o t admissible - prove
to
conduct, exceptions; o t h e r crimes; c h a r a c t e r
- issue.
in
" ( a ) C h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e g e n e r a l l y . Evidence
of a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r o r a t r a i t of h i s
c h a r a c t e r i s n o t admissible f o r t h e purpose
of p r o v i n g t h a t h e a c t e d i n c o n f o r m i t y t h e r e -
w i t h on a p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n , e x c e p t :
" ( 3 ) C h a r a c t e r of w i t n e s s . Evidence of t h e
c h a r a c t e r o f a w i t n e s s , as p r o v i d e d i n A r t i c l e
VI."
Thus, w h i l e e v i d e n c e of a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r i s n o t
o r d i n a r i l y a d m i s s i b l e t o p r o v e t h e p e r s o n a c t e d i n con-
f o r m i t y w i t h t h a t c h a r a c t e r , t h e r e i s a n e x c e p t i o n which i s
t h e s u b j e c t of Rule 608, Mont.R.Evid.
Rule 608 d e a l i n g w i t h impeachment and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of
w i t n e s s e s c o n t a i n s two p a r t s . P a r t ( a ) l i m i t s a n a t t a c k on
a w i t n e s s ' c r e d i b i l i t y t o o p i n i o n o r r e p u t a t i o n e v i d e n c e on
t h e witness' character f o r truthfulness o r untruthfulness:
" ( a ) Opinion and r e p u t a t i o n e v i d e n c e of c h a r a c -
t e r . The c r e d i b i l i t y o f a w i t n e s s may b e a t -
t a c k e d o r s u p p o r t e d by e v i d e n c e i n t h e form of
opinion o r reputation, but subject t o these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
and (2) evidence of truthful character is admis-
sible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion
or reputation evidence or otherwise."
Witness A, therefore, may give his opinion as to Wit-
ness B's character, but he is limited to stating only his
opinion of Witness B's character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness.
Part (b) of Rule 608 deals with those instances in
which opinion or reputation evidence concerning a witness'
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is admissible
and proscribes, except in limited circumstances, the use of
extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of conduct.
These limited circumstances are described in the second
sentence of part (b), dealing with cross-examination of a
witness who has testified concerning his own or another
witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness:
Thus, on direct examination Witness A may not bolster
his opinion concerning the truthfulness or untruthfulness of
Witness B by making reference to specific instances of B's
conduct. On cross-examination, however, Witness A may be
questioned on his opinion by reference to such specific
instances. This cross-examination, however, is further
limited by the trial court's discretion in determining
whether it is in fact relevant to the issue of B's credi-
bility. The p o i n t of Rule 608 f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of t h i s
a p p e a l i s t h a t r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of a w i t n e s s '
c o n d u c t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of p r o v i n g h i s c h a r a c t e r f o r t r u t h -
f u l n e s s o r u n t r u t h f u l n e s s i s never p e r m i t t e d on d i r e c t
examination. I n t h i s r e s p e c t Rule 608, which i s n e a r l y
i d e n t i c a l t o i t s f e d e r a l counterpart, a c t s i n conformity
w i t h Rule 4 0 5 ( a ) , which i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e f e d e r a l r u l e .
Rule 4 0 5 ( a ) , g o v e r n i n g t h e methods of p r o v i n g c h a r a c t e r ,
makes i n q u i r y i n t o s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of c o n d u c t p e r m i s s i b l e
o n l y on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n :
" ( a ) R e p u t a t i o n o r o p i n i o n . I n a l l cases i n
which e v i d e n c e of c h a r a c t e r o r a t r a i t o f
c h a r a c t e r of a p e r s o n i s a d m i s s i b l e , proof
may b e made by t e s t i m o n y a s t o r e p u t a t i o n o r
by t e s t i m o n y i n t h e form of a n o p i n i o n . On
cross-examination, i n q u i r y i s allowable i n t o
r e l e v a n t s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s of c o n d u c t . "
See Advisory Committee's Notes t o Fed.R.Evid. 6 0 8 ( b ) , 56
F.R.D. 183, 268-69 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ; C l a r k e , Montana Rules of Evi-
dence: A G e n e r a l Survey, 39 Mont. L. Rev. 79, 120-21 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t he w a s i m p r o p e r l y d e n i e d
t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p u t v a r i o u s w i t n e s s e s on t h e s t a n d t o
t e s t i f y a s t o w i t n e s s Bounds' u s e of m a r i j u a n a o r s a l e of
d r u g s i s c o n t r a r y t o Rules 4 0 5 ( a ) and 608. This i s particu-
l a r l y t r u e i n l i g h t of Rule 6 0 8 ( b ) ' s r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d i s -
c r e t i o n of t h e c o u r t . T h i s r u l e , a l o n g w i t h Rule 403, g i v e s
t h e t r i a l c o u r t wide d i s c r e t i o n t o e x c l u d e e v i d e n c e which i n
i t s view would c r e a t e a d a n g e r of u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e o r confu-
s i o n of t h e i s s u e s :
"Although r e l e v a n t , e v i d e n c e may be e x c l u d e d
i f i t s probative value i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y out-
weighed by t h e d a n g e r o f u n f a i r p r e j u d i c e ,
c o n f u s i o n of t h e i s s u e s , o r m i s l e a d i n g t h e
j u r y , o r by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of undue d e l a y ,
w a s t e of t i m e , o r n e e d l e s s p r e s e n t a t i o n of
cumulative evidence." Rule 403, Mont.R.Evid.
Thus, t h e t r i a l c o u r t a c t e d w i t h i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n re-
f u s i n g t o permit defendant's witnesses t o t e s t i f y concerning
s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e s o f m a r i j u a n a u s e by Bounds.
I s s u e 3. Should t h e t r i a l c o u r t have g r a n t e d a d e f e n s e
motion f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e a f t e r p e r m i t t i n g t h e S t a t e t o amend
i t s w i t n e s s l i s t o n t h e morning of t r i a l ?
On F r i d a y , F e b r u a r y 3 , 1978, d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l r e -
c e i v e d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t Denny Beach had n e g o t i a t e d a
p l e a w i t h t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y , t h a t he would t e s t i f y f o r t h e
S t a t e a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t McClean, and f u r t h e r t h a t t h e S t a t e
would s u b s t i t u t e o n e d e t e c t i v e f o r a n o t h e r a s a w i t n e s s .
Due t o a p r i o r commitment d e f e n s e c o u n s e l l e f t t h a t weekend
f o r a b a r a s s o c i a t i o n c o n f e r e n c e i n a n o t h e r p a r t of t h e
state. On Monday morning, t h e 6 t h , t h e c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e
S t a t e ' s motion t o amend i t s i n f o r m a t i o n t o change t h e name
of t h e d e t e c t i v e w i t n e s s and t o add Denny Beach as a w i t n e s s
and g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t t h e noon hour t o i n t e r v i e w Beach,
r a t h e r than granting a continuance a s defendant requested.
Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e S t a t e l a c k e d good c a u s e t o amend
i t s l i s t of w i t n e s s e s a s r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 95-1803(a) ( I ) ,
R.C.M. 1947. "Good c a u s e " was d e f i n e d i n S t a t e v. K l e i n
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 350, 547 P.2d 75, a s a " s u b s t a n t i a l r e a -
son". The p o l i c y i s t o a v o i d s u r p r i s e t o a d e f e n d a n t which
would p r e j u d i c e h i s case:
"'Good c a u s e ' h a s been d e f i n e d a s ' s u b s t a n t i a l
r e a s o n ' , one t h a t a f f o r d s a l e g a l e x c u s e .
"The c o u r t s h o u l d f i r s t d e t e r m i n e whether t h e
need f o r t h e a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s and t h e r e a -
son f o r t h e i r n o t being d i s c l o s e d earlier i s
a 'substantial reason'. It should then deter-
mine whether t h e r e i s p r e j u d i c e based on s u r -
p r i s e and whether t h i s s u r p r i s e c a n be overcome
by t h e g r a n t i n g o f a c o n t i n u a n c e . I f t h e sur-
p r i s e e l e m e n t c a n be overcome by a c o n t i n u a n c e ,
t h e n t h e w i t n e s s e s s h o u l d b e e n d o r s e d and t h e
c o n t i n u a n c e g r a n t e d . The s p i r i t and i n t e n t of
t h e l a w i s t h a t names and a d d r e s s e s of poten-
t i a l w i t n e s s e s s h o u l d be d i s c l o s e d a s soon a s
t h e y a r e known." 169 Mont. a t 354, 547 P.2d
a t 77.
H e r e , t h e S t a t e informed d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l of t h e
change i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h i n h o u r s a f t e r B e a c h ' s nego-
t i a t e d plea. Defendant concedes t h e need f o r changing t h e
name of t h e d e t e c t i v e who would t e s t i f y a s t o c h a i n o f
evidence. Defense c o u n s e l c h o s e t o keep h i s commitment t o
t r a v e l t h e weekend b e f o r e t r i a l , and, a s t h e S t a t e p o i n t s
o u t , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d o e s n o t p r a c t i c e law a l o n e . One of
h i s p a r t n e r s c o u l d have i n t e r v i e w e d Beach. F u r t h e r , on t h e
day o f t r i a l , d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c h o s e t o keep a s p e a k i n g
engagement a t a b a r luncheon r a t h e r t h a n i n t e r v i e w Beach.
From a p r a c t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how
d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c o u l d have a d e q u a t e l y p r e p a r e d f o r t r i a l
w i t h o u t i n t e r v i e w i n g Beach i n any c a s e . Under t h e s e circum-
s t a n c e s i t i s h a r d l y a c a s e of s u r p r i s e t o d e f e n d a n t . He
knew of B e a c h ' s i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h e t r a n s a c t i o n f o r which
h e was t o be t r i e d . The t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t err by r e f u s i n g
t o g r a n t a continuance.
The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
W e Concur:
"/ J u s t i c e s
(2'