No. 13900
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
TIMOTHY T. CALAWAY,
Plaintiff,
-vs-
SID JONES,
Defendant.
........................................
SID JONES,
Third Party Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
PARKER IRRIGATION & SUPPLY et al.,
Third Party Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
Honorable doel G, R&h, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great Falls, Montana
George N. McCabe argued, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondents:
Marra, Wenz, Iwen and Johnson, Great Falls, Montana
Alexander, Kuenning & Miller, Great Falls, Montana
Edward C. Alexander argued, Great Falls, Montana
Dzivi, Conklin, Johnson & Nybo, Great Falls, Montana
William Conklin argued, Great Falls, Montana
Cure and Borer, Great Falls, Montana
Edward W. Borer argued, Great Falls, Montana
Smith, Emmons, Baillie and Walsh, Great Falls, Montana
Dennis P. Clarke argued, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted: May 1, 1978
Decided: JUN 2 ? 197.Q
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B . Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court:
This i s an appeal from an order of d i s m i s s a l e n t e r e d i n
t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Cascade County.
This a c t i o n was commenced by a complaint f i l e d on December
5 , 1972, by p l a i n t i f f Timothy T . Calaway, a g a i n s t defendant Sid
Jones. The complaint a l l e g e d Calaway leased land from Jones
i n 1971, t o be seeded i n potatoes. Jones agreed t o provide
i r r i g a t i o n f o r the land. The p a r t i e s a d d i t i o n a l l y agreed on a
d i v i s i o n of crop shares. Calaway a l l e g e d Jones f a i l e d t o provide
t h e i r r i g a t i o n system required and, a s a r e s u l t , t h e e n t i r e crop
was l o s t .
On January 3, 1973, Jones f i l e d an answer, counterclaim and
t h i r d p a r t y complaint, denying r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e crop l o s s ,
a l l e g i n g sums due and owing him from Calaway and a s s e r t i n g claims
seeking both a f f i r m a t i v e r e l i e f and idemnification a g a i n s t Parker
I r r i g a t i o n & Supply, a d i v i s i o n of B i t t e r r o o t Cannery & Wholesale
Supply Company, a Montana corporation; Simpson Timber Company,
a corporation; Gheen I r r i g a t i o n Works, a corporation; and B. F.
Goodrich Company, a c o r p o r a t i o n , t h i r d p a r t y defendants and
respondents. I n sum, t h e t h i r d party complaint a l l e g e d t h e
i r r i g a t i o n system i n s t a l l e d and furnished by respondent Parker
I r r i g a t i o n & Supply, and m a t e r i a l s manufactured by t h e o t h e r
respondents, were d e f e c t i v e and, t h e r e f o r e , responsible f o r t h e
crop f a i l u r e .
Respondents f i l e d answers, t h e l a s t was f i l e d by Parker
I r r i g a t i o n on November 27, 1973. By reason of crossclaims between
t h e respondents f o r indemnity, t h e pleadings between respondents
were n o t completed u n t i l A p r i l 1975.
I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s were s e n t by Jones t o a l l respondents
following t h e i n i t i a t i o n of t h e t h i r d p a r t y a c t i o n . The i n t e r r o -
g a t o r i e s were completed upon the June 26, 1974, r e c e i p t of t h e
answers of Parker I r r i g a t i o n .
B. F. Goodrich Company submitted i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s t o Jones
on September 10, 1973. Upon h i s f a i l u r e t o answer, Goodrich, on
June 27, 1974, moved t o compel answers t o i t s i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s .
Jones answered t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s on J u l y 2, 1974.
Jones was t o be deposed by Goodrich on March 3 , 1975.
However, Jones f a i l e d t o appear, and was n o t deposed u n t i l March
24, 1975, upon t h e order t o appear entered by t h e D i s t r i c t Court.
Jones has taken no f u r t h e r a c t i o n i n prosecution of h i s t h i r d
party claims.
F i n a l l y , on May 12, 1977, Simpson Timber Company moved t o
dismiss t h e t h i r d p a r t y complaint f o r want of prosecution. The
o t h e r respondents joined i n t h e motion. A hearing on t h e motions
was held on June 1, 1977. On June 7 , 1977, t h e D i s t r i c t Court
granted t h e motions t o dismiss, finding:
It* ** t h a t t h e t h i r d p a r t y p l a i n t i f f has not been
d i l i g e n t i n t h e prosecution of t h e t h i r d p a r t y com-
p l a i n t , o r i n procuring determination of t h e p r i n c i p a l
a c t i o n and t h a t t h e r e i s no adequate excuse f o r t h e
delay ** *.It
Jones appeals t h e June 7 , 1977, o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t Court
dismissing h i s t h i r d p a r t y complaint.
The s o l e i s s u e presented f o r review i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t
Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n dismissing t h e t h i r d p a r t y com-
p l a i n t f o r want of prosecution.
The r u l e of c i v i l procedure which governs t h e d i s m i s s a l
of an a c t i o n f o r f a i l u r e t o prosecute i s Rule 41(b), M.R.Civ.P.
I t provides i n p a r t :
"INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL -- EFFECT THEREOF. For f a i l u r e
of t h e p l a i n t i f f t o prosecute o r t o comply with t h e s e
r u l e s o r any order of c o u r t , a defendant may move f o r
d i s m i s s a l of an a c t i o n o r of any claim a g a i n s t him. ** *It
It i s g e n e r a l l y h e l d , i n t h e absence of a s t a t u t e pre-
s c r i b i n g time l i m i t a t i o n s f o r bringing an a c t i o n t o t r i a l , t h a t t h e
matter of d i s m i s s a l f o r want of prosecution i s a matter addressed
t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t . This Court s t a t e d
i n Cremer v. Braaten, (1968), 151 Mont. 18, 19, 20, 438 P.2d 553:
"It i s w i t h i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l c o u r t
t o dismiss an a c t i o n i f i t has n o t been prosecuted with
reasonable d i l i g e n c e . It i s presumed t h e t r i a l c o u r t
a c t e d c o r r e c t l y and i t s decision w i l l n o t be overturned
without a showing of an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . M.R.Civ.P.,
Rule 41(b); S t a t e Savings Bank v. Albertson, 39 Mont.
414, 415, 102 P. 692; S i l v e r v. Eakins, 55 Mont. 210, 175
P. 876."
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , Jones argues t h e District Court abused
i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n dismissing t h e cross-complaint a s respondents
have shown no a c t u a l prejudice occasioned by t h e d e l a y , a s a l l
witnesses a r e p r e s e n t l y a v a i l a b l e f o r t r i a l . Likewise, Jones con-
tends t h e delay a t t r i b u t a b l e t o him was n o t exceedingly lengthy,
thus f a i l i n g t o give r i s e t o a presumption of prejudice. We
cannot agree with t h i s contention i n view of t h e conduct of Jones
during t h e discovery phase of the t h e proceedings.
It i s well e s t a b l i s h e d i n Montana law t h a t an a c t i o n may
be dismissed f o r f a i l u r e of t h e p l a i n t i f f t o prosecute i t with
due d i l i g e n c e , absent a s u f f i c i e n t showing of excuse. S t a t e ex r e l .
Johnstone v. D i s t r i c t Court, (1957), 132 Mont. 377, 319 P.2d 957;
Cremer v. Braaten, supra. The unanimous weight of a u t h o r i t y
demonstrates t h a t t h e r u l e i s equally a p p l i c a b l e t o a defendant's
f a i l u r e t o d i l i g e n t l y prosecute a cross-claim o r counterclaim.
Seaman v. Superior Court of Marin County, (1920), 183 Ca1.47, 190
P. 441; H a r r i s v. H a r r i s , (1948), 65 Nev. 342, 196 P.2d 402; P e t t i n e
v. Rogers, (1958), 63 N.M. 457, 321 P.2d 638; Hanson v. Lee, (1970),
3 Wash.App. 461, 476 P.2d 550; 27 CJS.Dismissa1 & Nonsuit 565.
I t was i n i t i a l l y held i n Montana t h a t mere l a p s e of time
i s insufficient i n i t s e l f t o j u s t i f y a dismissal. S t a t e Savings
Bank v. Albertson, (1909), 39 Mont. 414, 102 P. 692. However,
i n commenting upon t h e r u l e i n Cremer v. Braaten, supra, t h i s
Court s t a t e d :
" P l a i n t i f f argues t h a t t h e a c t i o n could n o t be
dismissed a s defendant has shown no i n j u r y by t h e delay.
When a p l a i n t i f f has s l e p t on h i s cause f o r over
twelve years t h e law presumes i n j u r y and places t h e
burden on t h e p l a i n t i f f t o show good cause f o r t h e delay.
S t a t e ex r e l . Johnstone v. D i s t r i c t Court, 132 Mont.
377, 319 P.2d 957." 151 Mont. 20.
A unreasonable delay t h e r e f o r e operates t o place upon t h e p a r t y
n
seeking r e l i e f t h e burden of demonstrating a reasonable excuse
f o r h i s inaction.
Here, however, we f i n d t h e delay occasioned by Jones' i n -
a c t i o n t o be unreasonable. Jones f a i l e d t o take any s i g n i f i c a n t
a c t i o n towards a f i n a l determination of t h e case f o r a t l e a s t t h r e e
years p r i o r t o t h e d i s m i s s a l , and has o f f e r e d no excuse f o r t h e
delay. Jones' f a i l u r e t o timely respond t o c e r t a i n i n t e r r o g a -
t o r i e s , and f a i l u r e t o appear a t a scheduled deposition c h a r a c t e r i z e
h i s i n a c t i o n regarding furtherance of an u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t i o n of
h i s claim.
A s no abuse of d i s c r e t i o n i n dismissing t h e cross-claim
has been demonstrated, t h e order dismissing such claim i n favor
of respondents and each of them i s a f
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