Lindquist v. Moran

NO. 82-179
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIE STATE OF MONTANA
1983

WALLACE J. LINDQUIST and DAWN
LIMDQUIST, individually, and
WALLACE J. LINDQUIST, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of
DANIEL R. LINDQUIST
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

KEITH MORAN, JOHN McFADDEN and
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON,
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from: District Court of the Fifth Jud.icia1P)istrict,
In and for the County of Jefferson,
The Honorable Frank E. Blair, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Worden, Thane & Haines; Robert J. Phillips,
Missoula, Montana
James E. Purcell, Butte, Montana
For Respondents:
John F. Iwen, Great Falls, Montana

-
Submitted : January 12, 1983
Decided: March 31, 1983

Filed: MAR 3 1 4983
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
t h e Court.
A J e f f e r s o n County j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f

defendants McFadden and Jefferson County in a personal
i n j u r y c a s e a r i s i n g o u t of a t r a f f i c a c c i d e n t . The D i s t r i c t

Court granted p l a i n t i f f I s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l . McFadden
a n d J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y now a p p e a l .

I n t h e e a r l y morning h o u r s of J u n e 25, 1976, J e f f e r s o n
County deputy sheriff McFadden stopped a vehicle being
d r i v e n t o w a r d W h i t e h a l l f r o m t h e B o u l d e r a r e a by a W e n d e l l
Gary S c h l o s s a f t e r o b s e r v i n g e r r a t i c d r i v i n g p a t t e r n s .

McFadden administered a coordination test which Schloss
failed. S c h l o s s was then arrested f o r d r i v i n g under the
i n f l u e n c e of an i n t o x i c a t i n g beverage. Schloss's passengers
were p l a i n t i f f s 1 decedent (Daniel Lindquist), K e i t h Moran,
and Mark Yochim. McFadden had a l e g a l i n t e r n , Mark Murphy,
r i d i n g w i t h him.

S i n c e McFadden d i d n o t h a v e a b r e a t h a l y z e r t e s t a v a i l -
a b l e , he c a l l e d W h i t e h a l l C h i e f of P o l i c e McGuire and a s k e d
McGuire to deliver one to the scene of arrest. Af t e r

administering the breathalyzer, McFadden a s k e d S c h l o s s how
h e wanted the vehicle transported, s i n c e it could not be
l e f t on t h e s l ~ o u l d e r l e s s f r o n t a g e r o a d . H e o f f e r e d t o have

Murphy d r i v e i t t o B o u l d e r o r t o have it towed to either
W h i t e h a l l or Boulder. Schloss requested that his friend,
Moran, be a l l o w e d to drive the car t o Boulder. McFadden
a s k e d McGuire t o c h e c k Moran o u t t o s e e i f h e was a l l r i g h t
t o drive. McGuire and Murphy e a c h t a l k e d t o Moran f o r t h r e e
t o f i v e m i n u t e s , d e t e r m i n e d t h a t h e was " o k a y t o d r i v e , " a n d
McGuire r e p o r t e d t h a t f a c t t o McFadden.

The Schloss v e h i c l e preceded t h e county u n i t toward
Boulder with Moran driving and Yochim and Lindquist as

passengers. About twenty t o t h i r t y minutes a f t e r leaving
t h e s c e n e of Schloss's arrest, approximately twenty miles
from Whitehall, the county unit stopped to let Schloss
r e l i e v e himself. Upon p r o c e e d i n g , i t came upon Schloss's

vehicle, which had been driven off the road. Lindquist

r e c e i v e d s e v e r e h e a d i n j u r i e s i n t h e a c c i d e n t and d i e d n i n e
days l a t e r .

P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d s u i t a g a i n s t IYloran and t h e n e n t e r e d

into s e t t l e m e n t agreements with h i s i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r and
Schloss's carrier. The a g r e e m e n t s p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e s e t t l e -
m e n t s were l o a n s and t h a t t h e c a r r i e r s would r e c o v e r u p t o
25 p e r c e n t o f a n y n e t award r e c o v e r e d by p l a i n t i f f s from
J e f f e r s o n County a n d / o r McFadden. McFadden and J e f f e r s o n
County were t h e n added t o t h e a c t i o n . The a g r e e m e n t s were

s e c r e t and w e r e d i s c o v e r e d o n l y a f t e r McFadden and J e f f e r s o n
C o u n t y s e r v e d i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s upon p l a i n t i f f s a s k i n g a b o u t
any r e l e a s e s or payments. The i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s w e r e o b j e c t e d
t o by p l a i n t i f f s and Moran, and a p p e l l a n t s w e r e r e q u i r e d t o

f i l e m o t i o n s t o compel a n s w e r s t o t h e i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s and t o
compel p r o d u c t i o n o f d o c u m e n t s . A m o t i o n i n l i m i n e was made

by p l a i n t i f f s t o k e e p a n y m e n t i o n o f t h e s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e -
ments from t h e j u r y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d t h a t m o t i o n .

The m a t t e r was t r i e d b e f o r e a J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y j u r y .
A verdict was returned on December 14, 1981, i n f a v o r of
McPadden and Jefferson County. It assessed 75 percent
n e g l i g e n c e t o Moran and 25 p e r c e n t t o p l a i n t i f f s t d e c e d e n t
and awarded total damages of $25,692.60 for medical
e x p e n s e s , f u n e r a l e x p e n s e s , and l o s s o f c o m f o r t , p r o t e c t i o n ,

affection, and s o c i e t y . No damages were awarded f o r p a i n
and s u f f e r i n g , for l o s s of e s t a b l i s h e d c o u r s e of life, or

for l o s s of future earnings. P l a i n t i f f s moved f o r a new
t r i a l , w h i c h was g r a n t e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t .
A p p e l l a n t s and r e s p o n d e n t s p r e s e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g f o u r
i s s u e s on a p p e a l :

1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n granting t h e
m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l ;
2. Whether the District Court erred in giving

I n s t r u c t i o n No. 32, which i n c l u d e d d i s c o u n t t a b l e s , b u t n o
d i r e c t i o n s on t h e i r u s e ;
3. Whether t h e j u r y v e r d i c t was i n c o n s i s t e n t ; a n d ,

4. Whether the secret indemnification agreements
b e t w e e n p l a i n t i f f s and t h e i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r s ("Mary C a r t e r "

a g r e e m e n t s ) a r e p r o p e r s u b j e c t s f o r i n q u i r y upon a n y r e t r i a l
i n v o l v i n g McFadden and J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y .
W w i l l address only the f i r s t issue,
e which is d i s -

p o s i t i v e of t h i s c a s e .
P l a i n t i f f s , on J a n u a r y 28, 1 9 8 2 , moved f o r a new t r i a l
for the following reasons, which they alleged materially
a£f e c t e d t h e i r s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s :

1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury, o r a d v e r s e p a r t i e s o r any o r d e r of t h e c o u r t o r abuse

of d i s c r e t i o n b y which t h e p l a i n t i f f s were p r e v e n t e d from
having a f a i r t r i a l .
2. I n s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e t o j u s t i f y t h e ver-
d i c t o r o t h e r d e c i s i o n and t h a t i t is a g a i n s t law.
3. E r r o r i n l a w o c c u r r i n g a t t h e t r i a l and e x c e p t e d
t o by t h e p l a i n t i f f s .
P u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 25-11-104, MCA, plaintiffs' coun-

s e l f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t i n s u p p o r t o f t h e m o t i o n . I t a l l e g e d :
M c F a d d e n ' s n e g l i g e n c e as a m a t t e r o f l a w f o r a l l o w i n g Moran

to drive and for not checking the registration of the
Schloss v e h i c l e t o e s t a b l i s h its ownership; an i n c o n s i s t e n t
verdict that improperly found plaintiffs' decedent 25
p e r c e n t n e g l i g e n t when h e h a d no c o n t r o l o v e r t h e o p e r a t i o n
of the vehicle; t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court improperly allowed
t h e j u r y t o use d i s c o u n t t a b l e s p r o v i d e d by d e f e n d a n t s which

had no i n s t r u c t i o n s a t t a c h e d ; and t h a t t h e low damages a w a r d
r e f l e c t e d b i a s a n d p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t o f t h e j u r y a n d i t s
r e f u s a l t o " f o l l o w t h e evidence'' p r e s e n t e d .

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r a
new t r i a l "upon good c a u s e shown." I n its opinion i n support
of the order, the District Court held that McFadden, an

a g e n t o f J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , was n e g l i g e n t a s a m a t t e r o f l a w
for a l l o w i n g Moran to drive S c h l o s s l s automobile into
B o u l d e r w h i l e d r u n k , and t h a t t h e c o u r t s h o u l d h a v e d i r e c t e d
a v e r d i c t i n f a v o r o f p l a i n t i f f s and a g a i n s t McFadden a n d

J e f f e r s o n County. It also ruled t h a t p l a i n t i f f s 1 decedent
h a d no c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c a r i n w h i c h h e was r i d i n g a n d c o u l d

n o t , t h e r e f o r e , be c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t . It f i n a l l y held

t h a t t h e amount o f t h e v e r d i c t was " i n a d e q u a t e , s h o c k i n g a n d
could o n l y have been a r r i v e d a t through b i a s , p r e j u d i c e and
passion against the plaintiffs." W e d i s a g r e e and v a c a t e t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l .
Plaintiffs' m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l was b a s e d o n t h e
above t h r e e grounds a s provided i n s e c t i o n 25-11-102(1), (6)
and ( 7 ) , MCA. I n g r a n t i n g a m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l , t h e D i s -
t r i c t C o u r t must s e t f o r t h t h e grounds w i t h p a r t i c u l a r i t y .
H a l s e y v. Uithof ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. 319, 326, 532 P.2d 686,
689-690. The f i r s t g r o u n d was i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e p r o c e e d -
i n g s of the court, jury or adverse party, o r any o r d e r of

the court or a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n by which the p l a i n t i f f s
were p r e v e n t e d from having a f a i r t r i a l . No f a c t s w e r e s e t
forth supporting t h i s allegation i n p l a i n t i f f s ' affidavit.
T h i s g r o u n d was n o t m e n t i o n e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r

and o p i n i o n . P l a i n t i f f s ' motion with r e g a r d t o t h i s ground
was i n a d e q u a t e . Montana W i l l i a m s Double Diamond Corp. v.
H i l l ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 248, 256, 573 P.2d 6 4 9 , 654.
Nor was r e f e r e n c e made i n the order and o p i n i o n to
plaintiffs' third ground: error i n law o c c u r r i n g a t the

t r i a l and e x c e p t e d t o by t h e p l a i n t i f f s . I t appears from
plaintiffs' affidavit that this basis was founded upon

plaintiffs' objection to the discount tables. Again, no
mention of this appears in the District Court order and
opinion.
The order for new trial thus appears to be based

s o l e l y upon a n " i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e t o j u s t i f y t h e
v e r d i c t o r o t h e r d e c i s i o n , a n d t h a t i s a g a i n s t law."

McFadden a n d J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y c a n be h e l d n e g l i g e n t a s
a m a t t e r of law o n l y i f t h e f a c t s u n e q u i v o c a l l y d e m o n s t r a t e
t h a t McFadden b r e a c h e d a d u t y of c a r e t o p l a i n t i f f s ' dece-
d e n t by a l l o w i n g a n a p p a r e n t l y i n t o x i c a t e d p e r s o n t o p i l o t

t h e v e h i c l e i n t o Boulder. The f a c t s d o n o t s o d e m o n s t r a t e

such a breach.
I n c o n s i d e r i n g a m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l , t h e t r i a l c o u r t

is n o t t o weigh t h e e v i d e n c e w h e r e c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e i s
presented. Y e r k i c h v. O p s t a ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 Mont. 272, 274, 577
P.2d 857, 859. Rather, the trial court's discretion to
grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence is

e x h a u s t e d when i t f i n d s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e
verdict. S t e n b e r g v . Nee1 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 6 1 3 P.2d

1 0 0 7 , 1 0 1 1 , 37 S t . R e p . 1 1 7 0 , 1 1 7 5 ; K i n c h e l o e v. Rygg ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,

1 5 2 Mont. 187, 1 9 1 , 448 P.2d 140, 142. Where c o n f l i c t i n g

evidence is p r e s e n t , it is a n a b u s e o f the trial court's

discretion to grant a new trial. Ferguson v. Town Pump,

Inc. (1978), 177 Mont. 122, 128, 580 P.2d 915, 919,

o v e r r u l e d on o t h e r g r o u n d s , 1 8 0 Mont. 2 3 3 , 590 P.2d 117. We

w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e o u r v i e w of t h e e v i d e n c e f o r t h a t o f t h e

jury where that evidence furnishes reasonable grounds for

d i f f e r e n t conclusions. Rock S p r i n g s C o r p . v . P i e r r e ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,

Mont. , 615 P.2d 206, 211, 37 S t . R e p . 1378, 1384.

Finally, t h i s C o u r t must view t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most

f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y below. Anaconda Co. v.

Whittaker (1980), Mont. , 610 P.2d 1 1 7 7 , 1 1 7 9 , 37

St.Rep. 9 0 2 , 905.

Here, substantial evidence supports the jury verdict

i n f a v o r o f McFadden a n d J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y . McFadden a s k e d

o f f i c e r McGuire t o " c h e c k t h e k i d o u t . " H e saw McGuire g o

up t o t h e S c h l o s s v e h i c l e a n d p r e s u m e d McGuire was d o i n g s o .

McGuire r e p o r t e d t h a t Moran was a l l r i g h t a n d t h a t h e d i d

not smell alcohol on Moran's breath. note that the

b r e a t h a l y z e r t e s t g i v e n t o S c h l o s s c o u l d n o t be r e a d a t t h e

scene.

McGuire, Whitehall chief of police for six years,

t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t a l k e d t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e v e h i c l e .

He looked inside the car and saw no open containers of

a l c o h o l o r any o t h e r a c t i v i t y t h a t i n d i c a t e d a l a w w a s b e i n g

violated. Murphy s t o o d b e s i d e McGuire a s h e t a l k e d t o Moran

next to the car. PlcGuire asked to see M o r a n ' s driver's

license, c h e c k e d t o see i f he c o u l d smell h i s b r e a t h , had
him walk a r o u n d , and had him g e t h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e o u t o f

h i s wallet. McGuire c o n c l u d e d h e was n o t i n t o x i c a t e d .

Murphy s t o o d w i t h i n t w e l v e t o e i g h t e e n i n c h e s o f Moran

and d i d n o t s m e l l a l c o h o l . Nor d i d h e s e e a n y b e e r c a n s o r

other alcohol containers in the car. H e watched Ploran a s

Moran walked around, spoke, and t o o k h i s d r i v e r ' s license

o u t of h i s w a l l e t . M o r a n ' s s p e e c h was n o t s l u r r e d , h e had

no d i f f i c u l t y removing t h e d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e , h i s e y e s were
not bloodshot, and h e d i d n o t s t u m b l e a s h e w a l k e d . Murphy

heard McGuire inform McFadden that Moran was "okay to

drive." He a l s o heard Schloss say that he did n o t want

Murphy t o d r i v e h i s c a r b u t wanted Moran t o d r i v e i t .
N e i t h e r McFadden n o r Murphy n o t i c e d a n y e r r a t i c d r i v -

i n g a s t h e y f o l l o w e d b e h i n d Moran f o r some t w e n t y t o t h i r t y

minutes a s he drove toward Boulder. The highway patrol

o f f i c e r t h a t i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e s c e n e o f t h e a c c i d e n t was t h e

only witness t h a t noticed a " s l i g h t smell" of alcohol on

Moran's breath. He stated, however, t h a t he d i d n o t have

r e a s o n a b l e g r o u n d s a t t h a t p o i n t t o b e l i e v e t h a t Moran was

d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e of alcohol. Moran was n o t s o

cited. In the highway patrolman' s opinion, the accident

o c c u r r e d when Moran l o o k e d i n t h e r e a r view m i r r o r a s t h e

c a r rounded a c u r v e .

The c e r t i f i e d emergency m e d i c a l technician ( E M T ) who

responded t o t h e s c e n e of t h e a c c i d e n t performed an i n i t i a l
patient assessment of Moran that involved listening very
c a r e f u l l y a b o u t M o r a n ' s mouth f o r a n y b r e a t h i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s
o r o t h e r evidence of r e s p i r a t o r y problems. He s m e l l e d no

alcohol and d e t e r m i n e d t h a t Moran was a l e r t and o r i e n t e d .

Based upon t r a i n i n g t o d e t e r m i n e if s i g n s of intoxication
a r e p r e s e n t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of p r o v i d i n g m e d i c a l t r e a t m e n t
and upon h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s of Moran, t h e EMT s t a t e d t h a t h e
d i d n o t b e l i e v e Moran was i n t o x i c a t e d .

Finally, defendants McFadden and McGuire introduced
u n r e b u t t e d e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y f r o m a h i g h w a y p a t r o l m a n which
supports t h e i r position t h a t McFadden's a c t i o n s i n t u r n i n g
t h e v e h i c l e over t o one of S c h l o s s l s p a s s e n g e r s were r e a -
sonable.
Substantial evidence supports t h e jury verdict. The

District Court abused its discretion in granting a new
trial. I n l i g h t of t h e s e t t l e m e n t agreements t h a t f i x l i a -
b i l i t y among Moran, t h e i n s u r a n c e c a r r i e r s , and p l a i n t i f f s ,
t h e q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d on damages a r e moot.
The o r d e r of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l
i s v a c a t e d and t h e judgment on t h e j u r y v e r d i c t r e i n s t a t e d .

3 4$$$$+*
Chief J u s t i c e

W e concur:

i
/

/ Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:

I dissent. The majority has searched the record to find
"conflicting evidence," but all of it is irrelevant. The
plain truth is that the deputy sheriff of Jefferson County
turned a vehicle over to a drunk to drive, and as a result
Daniel Lindquist was needlessly killed.
The duty of the deputy sheriff when he arrested Schloss
for drunk driving, was to search his automobile for evidence
of alcoholic containers. Section 16-6-105, MCA. The deputy
did not search the vehicle. The duty of the deputy sheriff
was to impound the vehicle in which the al-coholic beverage is
found. Section 16-6-105, MCA. He did not impound the
vehicle. Instead he I.et the drunk driver dictate who should
drive the automobile to Boulder.
Self-servingly now, all the officers testify that they
saw no reason for Moran not to d.rive. But this testimony
flies in the face of what the accident revealed 40 minutes
later. Moran smelled of alcohol; there was spilled beer all
over the back seat; there was a quantity of beer cans strewn
around. How can the majority call the evidence conflicting,
in the face of the physical evidence that the authorities did
not perform their duty, the performance of which might have
saved a life? Undoubtedly, between the time the vehicles
left the arrest scene until the Vega ran off the road, some
occupants of the car were not only then intoxicated, but were
continuing to consume beer under the very nose of the deputy
sheriff in the following vehicle.
The highway patrol officer actually testified that the
fact that Moran had been drinking was "not really" a
contributing factor to the accident in the face cf the
physical evidence here.
Small wonder that the District Court ordered a new
trial, and indicated he should have directed a verd-ict
against the deputy and the county.
The record is bare of any evidence that the decedent was
negligent before or at the accident. Yet the jury found him
25 percent negligent. This was a factor on which the
District Court relied to grant a new trial. The jury granted
the decedent nothing for his pain, suffering, or loss of
earnings. This was another factor relied on by the District
Court. The District Court was correct in granting a new
trial.
The result is that the parents of the decedent get
nothing for this misjudgment of public duty. I cannot agree.

f --.\

!\ .. -, $ *

We join in the foregoing dissent.
o1 Justice 0